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THE NATURAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM.

BY M. D. O'BRIEN.

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There is but one birthright, Freedom.—Immanuel Kant.

The idea of a polity in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech; the idea of a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed.—M. Aurelius Antoninus, *Book* 1, *Chapter* 14.

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NOTE TO PAGE 33.

Direct personal experience of the loss naturally following upon want of personal discrimination, is necessary to all real improvement, as well as to all sound, practical wisdom. Moreover, it is also necessary to good officialism. For how can an artificially-coddled nation of grown-up babies breed a wise crew of officials? It is not in the nature of things, and, as we know from the downfall of bureaucratic Peru, which collapsed at the touch of a few plucky adventurers, does not as a matter of fact happen. To interfere with the spontaneous growth of the root weakens the quality of the fruit. For man to play the little god-almighty to man, is for man to loose the discipline and guidance of nature.

NOTE TO PAGE 34.

Says a recent issue of the *Daily Chronicle*:—"Last year 462 mistakes were made in London by doctors in notifying cases of infectious disease for removal to public hospitals, with the result that 102 of the mistaken cases ended fatally." There is a sample of State Paternalism for adults. Here is a sample of the same thing for children.—"Out of 365 schools built by the London School Board 230 already examined have, it is stated, been declared faulty and unhealthy; and it has been found necessary to appoint a Sanitary committee, which held its first sitting on Wednesday, to deal with the reports which continue to come in. In nearly all cases the Board paid for work which was not carried out; and consequently, in order to make bad drainage good, the ratepayers of London are called upon to pay a further sum of £250,000.—*Lloyds News*, 19 Feb., 1893. Physical and mental degeneration carried out by state compulsion costs a lot now, but it will cost more when feeding and clothing comes on. The total cost to the municipality of Paris for maintaining a school with two meals a day provided gratuitously, and clothing for those who *cannot* afford it, is "£73 9s. per pupil per annum, or, with the daily wine which is to be added (15 centimes a day—£2 1s. 5d. per annum), the expenses will be £75 10s. 5d. each." [Report of the late Royal Commission on Elementary Education Vol. iii., appendix B, page 727]. This system simply means that somebody must get the children and everbody must keep them.

NOTE TO PAGE 68.

"The Community" is but a phrase used to denote an indefinite crowd of persons; some living in harmony and some not living in harmony with each other; an indefinite number of separate individuals regarded *en masse*, and abstracted in thought from the rest of nature, to which they belong, and without which they can neither be nor be conceived to be. In the same way "Orchard" is but a word to denote an indefinite number of trees, which appear as a distinct group when taken together and abstracted from and compared with the rest of nature, or when taken together and abstracted from and compared with other trees. Two or three trees don't constitute an Orchard, and yet, however large the latter may be, it is never anything more than the sum of the particular trees, each with its own particular nature and shape, that go to make it up. So with a "Community," a Jack and a Jill are not conventionally supposed to constitute this, but an indefinite number of Jacks and Jills are conventionally supposed to do so. The whole thing is purely conventional. What alone constitutes real sociability, whether of two or many, is voluntary, mutual consent respecting exchange of private service or private property.

[Continued at back of inside title.]

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NOTE TO PAGE 120—122.

A critic writes:—" As readily as the understanding translates for us sensations from the external world; so readily does our reason give us an intuition that certain actions are in themselves good or evil. For example we have learned through sense experience, the existence of fraud; and then our reason, without rambling argument as to when, where, or how, it could be excused passes an *a priori* judgement upon fraud as evil in itself, and consequently, under all circumstances, immoral. Every text book on " Equity " applies this principle by declaring that "fraud vitiates everything;" and that any contract tainted with it is voidable. Whoever looks into the huge indexes to English law reports, under the head of fraud, will find that this *a priori* principle, for hundreds of years, and in thousands of cases, has been applied by the Courts to put down fraud as evil in itself: and no Court has ever been so absurd as to say, "you may use fraud occasionally for a good purpose." The entire administration of justice rests on an *a priori* principle traceable to Cicero ; " give each one his own :" and our Judges, when they were law students, had to learn, and when on the Bench had to apply hundreds of *a priori* principles, like, " he who seeks equity must do equity :" and they carry out *a priori* judgements condemning numerous crimes as evil in themselves; and no one ever dreams of excusing murder, larceny, or burglary in a particular case ; because reason pronounces them *a priori* to be of necessity and universally unrighteous. The uncertainty in litigation arises from conflicting evidence ; from the tangle of Acts of Parliament ; and from some principles which are generalizations of the understanding merely; and which, not being known like reason's *a priori* judgement against fraud, are not unconditioned so as to be universally true; and those secondary principles, as Thomas Aquinas called them in morals, are innumerable. Take the constitutional enactments of the Bill of Rights ; and the illegality of the King dispensing with laws, erecting Courts, or keeping up a standing army without consent of Parliament, are mere generalizations, founded on antient usage in England, and having their fitness in the experiments of English experience ; but they are not known *a priori*, so as to be of necessity true and unconditioned all over the world : and the only *a priori* principle in the Bill of Rights is one forbidding fines and forfeitures to be exacted from people, before being tried and convicted of the offences for which they were fined ; for this would be a violation of a first principle of justice in any age and in any country." About liberty the same critic writes :—" The highest ideal of political liberty is government by laws, mainly limited to giving each one his own, by hindering unjust aggressions of the citizens upon one another, so that they may have opportunities and motives for competing among themselves in mental and physical strength, with the final purpose of each individual working out his greatest possible self-development, in accord with right reason."

NOTE TO PAGES 170 AND 171.

(" Education " and Improvement). " With the single exception of offences against property without violence [there has been] a decided increase in indictable offences of every other description, an increase which has in almost every instance more than kept pace with the growth of population." Police Force has grown at double the rate of ordinary population. Commitments have also increased in proportion

[Continued on inside of cover at back.]

THE NATURAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM.

THAT which thou would'st not suffer thyself seek not to lay upon others. Thou would'st not be a slave—look to it that others be not slaves to thee. For if thou endure to have slaves, it seems that thou thyself art first of all a slave, for virtue hath no communion with vice, nor freedom with slavery.

As one who is in health would not choose to be served by the sick, nor that those dwelling with him should be sick, so neither would one that is free bear to be served by slaves, or that those living with him should be slaves.—EPICTETUS.

Schopenhauer, in correction of a far greater thinker, observes that when Spinoza denies the existence of right apart from the State, he confounds the means for asserting right with right itself. This is unquestionably true. But the belief that human law can be the ultimate ground and the only measure of right appears upon the face of it so untenable that one is lost in wonder how it could possibly have obtained such credit. All right the creation of positive law! The right to existence, for example? or the right of self-defence? or the right to use to the best advantage one's moral and spiritual faculties? Imagine a number of settlers in a new country before they have had time to frame a polity. Are they then devoid of these rights? Surely it is sufficient to ask such a question. But we are told that these rights arise from a contract, express or implied. As a matter of fact society is not founded upon convention, although I allow a virtual compact whence is derived the binding obligation of laws regarding things in themselves indifferent. But if the rights which I have instanced exist at all—and in practice everyone admits their existence—they possess universal validity. A contract may or may not be. It is contingent. But these rights must be. They are absolute. Right is founded on necessity. What is necessary and immutable cannot proceed from the accidental and changeable. To me it is evident, upon the testimony of reason itself, that there are certain rights of man which exist anterior to and independently of positive law, which do not arise *ex contractu* or *quasi ex contractu*, and which may properly be called natural, because they originate in the nature of things.—W. S. LILLY.

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The adjective *right* has a much wider signification than the substantive *right*. Everything is *right* which is conformable to the supreme rule of human action: but that only is *a right* which, being conformable to the supreme rule, is realized in society and vested in a particular person. Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say that a poor man has no *right* to relief, but it is *right* he should have it. A rich man has a *right* to destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be *right*.

To a *right* on one side, corresponds an *obligation* on the other. If a man has a *right* to my horse, I have an *obligation* to let him have it. If a man has a *right* to the fruit of a certain tree, all other persons are under an *obligation* to abstain from appropriating it. Men are *obliged* to respect each other's *rights*.

My *obligation* is to give another man his *right*; my *duty* is to do what is *right*. Hence duty is a wider term than obligation; just as *right*, the adjective, is wider than *right*, the substantive.

Duty has no correlative, as obligation has the correlative *right*. What it is our duty to do, we must do, because it is *right*, not because any one can demand it of us. We may, however, speak of those who are particularly benefitted by the discharge of our duties, as having a *moral claim* upon us. A distressed man has a moral claim to be relieved, in cases in which it is our duty to relieve him.

The distinctions just explained are sometimes expressed by using the terms *perfect obligation* and *imperfect obligation* for *obligation* and *duty* respectively; and the terms *perfect right* and *imperfect rigt* for *right* and *moral claim* respectively. But these phrases have the inconvenience of making it seem as if our duties arose from the rights ofothers; and as if duties were only legal obligations, with an inferior degree of binding force.—WHEWELL, *Elements of Morality*, book i., § 84-89.—*V.* Jurisprudence, Rectitude.

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

As Emerson points out in his essay on politics, there is a striking contrast between our behaviour towards each other as man dealing personally with man, and our treatment of each other as units of a social aggregate. When a party of tourists agree to travel together for a few months, in some new and interesting country, each one is allowed by the rest—or such is the tacit understanding—to do exactly as he likes so long as he permits others to do the same. All meet on equal terms, make free agreements, and invariably respect what each one would call his rights and liberties. Not that cases never arise when it would be to the temporary advantage of some to coerce others—as for example when cold weather might suggest an equal distribution of coats, rugs, &c. Yet nothing of the kind ever occurs, and if the idea were suggested, it would be treated as a joke, with perhaps a hearty laugh all round at the tactics of modern legislators. Why is this? Why should we be ashamed to treat those we know as we are always trying to treat those we do not know? I should not think of attempting personally to force my neighbour to send his child to school, or to work only a certain number of hours a day, or to abstain from drinking alcohol, or smoking tobacco. I mean I should not do these things in person. I am too big a coward for that. In fact, I should use honeyed words to him, and say: "My dear Sir, I respect your opinions; I think we are all entitled to hold and act upon our convictions." And then I should go, like a shuffling cur, behind that ingenious contrivance for hiding sneaks—the ballot box—and vote away his liberty. I should not do this openly. I should not do it to those I know, even were I stronger than they. Why should I do it in a roundabout way to those I do not know.

To ask this question is to ask why Individualism exists at all. It is the expression of a conviction which lies very deep down in human nature—the conviction of equality. Not the Socialist's equality of share and share alike all round; good, bad, and indifferent. It is the expression of the conviction that we are all logically entitled to the same freedom for expressing our motives in action, that is, for doing as we like. Take an illustration of what is meant by this. Suppose that a member of the before-mentioned tourist party, seeing that one of his fellow-tourists possessed a goodly number of warm coats, suggested that they should forcibly be taken away from their owner and given to those who had none. What would be the feeling of all the rest? Probably they would be some time before they could take him seriously, and when they did, their disgust would close their mouths. But why should this be? We should all be actuated by similar feelings if some one attempted to coerce any of our friends in such a manner. It is quite a common thing to find people refusing to vote for a particular Socialistic measure, solely on the ground that it would bear unjustly on a friend's business or profession; although, were this not the case, they would vote for it willingly; that is to say, they would do exactly the same injustice to other people, simply because they did not happen to know them.

Is not the answer to our question extremely simple? As long as I know my brother, I am logical. I say: "Here am I living, and showing in my life that I consider myself fully entitled to act upon my own motives: here is my brother, who is a human being like myself, and is therefore logically entitled to act as I do, since things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another." In short his nature and mine are so much alike that I cannot logically claim a liberty for myself, without at the same time implicitly claiming the same liberty for him. But I do claim such liberty for myself. Every man does so. No bigot or tyrant who tries to coerce his fellow-man, can so coerce without acting on his own motives; or, in other words, proclaiming to the world his intense belief in the personal liberty of some men at least—the violators of their fellow citizen's liberty—and, therefore, logically of all men.

And this is all that is meant by natural right. It is what people always claim for themselves, and what therefore they cannot help tacitly claiming for all who are like themselves. The fact is, we are all Individualists up to a certain point. We are logical enough, and could argue out our own case well enough; but we cannot bring ourselves to apply our own arguments all round. "I am stronger than you, and therefore, I will force you into what I hope to be the good of the community. I will force you to do, not what you want, but what I or other people want." That is the paltry plea we are continually bringing up: as if violating each other's liberties, whenever we get the chance, could be for the good of any community. Who are the community? You and I, and everybody else! Will it, then, do us or the community any real good, to be continally at war with each other? each of us continually claiming more liberty for ourselves than we are willing to grant to others? The whole business is a piece of illogicality and unfairness from beginning to end.

But, so it is said, there is no natural right. "Right is transfigured might." As well argue that the book of Euclid is transfigured might. What we individualists say is, that natural right is a logical extension of a certain postulate which every person makes, and cannot help making, so long as he continues to act upon his own opinions, and even in voluntarily giving up a certain amount of our liberty, we do *give* it up, and are thus acting upon our own motives, and therefore tacitly assuming a right so to do. No talk about animals continually warring upon each other ; no argument about what majorities can actually do when so disposed, affect the question at all. If I am stronger than you I can knock you off the pavement ; but if I do so, I am claiming more liberty for myself than I am allowing to you : or, in other words, I am claiming for myself, and by " the substitution of similars " for every other man, the fullest possible liberty of action, and am thus laying down a principle which reaches to all mankind, and ultimately condemns myself. Natural right is the inevitable logic of men as rational beings ; and they can no more avoid affirming it by implication than they can help acting and thinking.

But, it is objected, all this is mere abstract reasoning. So is all reasoning. An abstract proposition is only a general proposition—a predication of similarity or disimilarity between two or more facts. No reasoning is possible without a certain degree of abstraction. I never saw an argument yet that did not involve a general or abstract statement of some kind. The only difference between abstract propositions and ordinary propositions is, that the former cover a greater number of facts than the latter. They are of wider generality. But this is only a difference of degree : not of kind. The rejectors of natural right always set up some other abstraction in its place, such as happiness, welfare, progress, efficiency ; or some other object, not less abstract, although much more vague, narrow, and unsatisfactory than natural right.

CHAPTER II.

THE controversy between the believers in natural right, and their opponents, is largely due to a mutual misunderstanding. "Men have a natural and equal right to liberty," say the first. "When and where has such a right ever been recognized?" ask the second. Now, Right is no more an historical than it is a biological fact. In the actual world there is often as little recognition of it as among lions and tigers. And, as might be expected, those who claim to rest politics on some other basis than that of Right, fancy they effectually dispose of the latter by pointing to the actual facts of life and history. They might as well deny the existence of truth speaking and the duty of truth speaking, on the ground that the world is full of liars. Right, we contend, is an unavoidable postulate of the reason, like the existence of our neighbours' thoughts and feelings, for instance. We cannot demonstrate it from more ultimate data, but all reasoning about human relations necessarily take it for granted; and the fact that people frequently follow passion before reason, no more gets rid of reason, its postulates, and its obligations, than the ravings of a maniac disprove the postulates and deductions of mathematics. Force, and the passion of which it is the fitting expression, lie outside the sphere of argument. You don't reason with a confirmed bully; you knock him down, and then employ your reasoning faculties to devise the best means for keeping him down. This protection of personal right and liberty is the only art of governing that is based upon any science of human life; it is the only application of rules that are of universal validity for rational beings.

Right is a deduction of the understanding, drawn from the implicit claim for free action made by force-worshipper and liberty-advocate alike; a deduction which becomes only more and more unavoidable as men rise in the scale of reason. An idiot cannot understand the axioms and deductions of EUCLID, but none the less are they binding upon human reason. The fact is, the laws of the understanding are as real and unavoidable, as those of the material world to which they correspond. The rational faculty is as rigidly bound by the limitations and conditions of its own nature, as the running stream or the falling rain; and the more rational a man is, the more difficult it is for him to avoid the conclusion that his fellow-being is logically entitled to the same freedom for expressing internal motives in external acts, as he himself is; and, indeed, no one makes a greater claim for this liberty than those who abuse it. As we have seen, when only two or three are gathered together, this law of rational and logical consistency is recognised as the most sacred and important thing for men to consider in determining their respective activities. We say to the individual bully who attempts to squeeze his fellow-man into some arbitrary pattern, "Let him alone, though a fool, he is a man like yourself and entitled to the same freedom for enacting his folly, and of profiting by the experience it brings, that you are for showing your wisdom (?). If he is wrong he must be left to find out the fact for himself; you have no warrant from Heaven for being your fellow-citizen's moral guardian, for forcibly imposing your wisdom upon his acceptance; therefore, mind your own business, and let other people's lives and actions alone." This is how practical common sense deals with the ordinary government of life; but, unfortunately, when that enlarged pattern of ordinary government, which we call the State, is concerned, common sense takes to itself wings, and leaves the mind a prey to the grossest political superstitions. The consequence is that we allow the crowd of bullies to do things that every individual amongst them would be ashamed to do alone. Thus the State comes at last to be looked upon as infallible: a law unto itself; above all respect for Right, and bound by no obligations to respect moral considerations; divinely anointed with the oil of authority, and accurately described by the maxim once applied to kings—"The State can do no wrong."

In this way it comes about that government is excused for doing a thousand things which are morally abominable. Equality of rights is destroyed in order to build up arbitrary power. We should all question the right of A to regulate the diet of B; we should see that in such a case *might* and *right* are totally distinct. But when a majority of A's, calling themselves a State, decide that a minority of B's shall drink no more claret to dinner, the might of the former is supposed to endow them with a moral right to coerce the latter. Nothing is more demoralizing than government; nothing tends more to destroy character than the regulation of minorities by majorities; hence nothing needs more keeping within the narrowest possible limits than that corporate action of individual despots called the State. In our collective treatment of each other the temptations of power usurp the place of conscience, and men who would scorn to disregard the opinions and tastes of their nearest neighbours, come, when acting in the capacity of voters, to treat large masses of their fellow-citizens—whose freedom they are in a moral sense under an equal obligation to respect—not as men and women with thoughts, passions, and feelings, but as things, or rather as animals, to be "like dumb cattle driven."

Now-a-days even the fanatic has grown too cowardly to act by himself; he only bullies when backed up by a crowd of others. The living presence of his opponent makes the civilized savage hide his scalping knife. When he stands face to face with his fellow, be that fellow the meanest villain that crawls; the presence of the latter fills him with the sense of the true equality, to which, as isolated rational products of the same eternal fact, we are all logically entitled; viz., equal scope for playing out the deep eternal drama that is always going on in the greatest and the least of the souls of men. When brought face to face with the fellow being he is longing to coerce, even the fanatic has a dim sense that the stage of life, and the settings of the pieces that are to be enacted thereon, belong neither to him nor to his political clique or majority; but that even the humblest player has an equal right to choose his own part; and that all should be free to act a self-chosen, and not a prescribed *role*; until the last scene is reached, and the Power which built the stage and formed the players, shall ring down the curtain. The most crafty politicians pay involuntary homage to this feeling. How many, for example, of the pharisaical maniacs who suffer from chronic water on the brain, have the courage to go in person and dash the wine cup from the lips of their non-teetotal friends? The natural greatness of human individuality awes the modern tyrant into a certain measure of mock homage to liberty; so that he generally seeks to do his dirty work by means of the ballot box, the magistrate, and the policeman. Like most cowardly animals the modern tyrants hunt in packs; and when brought face to face with their victims, take refuge behind a barrier of sham politeness and sickening cant. Needless to add that the one thing these very righteous hypocrites abhor, is plain speaking.

The despotism of the single individual is pretty well played out, but that of the clique, of the party for the moment, or of the numerical majority at the ballot, is only in its infancy as yet. After centuries of painful experience, we have come to see that one individual's opinions, even if they be those of the infallible Pope himself, can only rightly form the guides for that individual; and that, however wise and great a man may be, he has no right to force his opinions upon other men. The tyranny of the individual is no longer admitted. It is the tyranny of the individuals that we have yet got to learn to regard as equally illogical, equally inconsistent with the rational part of our nature. No man, we say, should force another man's thoughts, or rather force him to profess opinions he does not hold. No single man should force another man's actions. But when a number of these same men are gathered together in the form of what is termed a State, it is perfectly legitimate for them to force anything and everything they like down the throats of the numerically weaker party! Numbers carry the reason captive. You can see the absurdity of me regulating your life and your affairs; you can understand that it is much better for each of us to look after our own concerns, than to be perpetually prying into and busybodying over each other's actions; you can see that we have each as much as we can really and effectually do to rightly regulate ourselves; and that whenever we attempt to regulate others, none of our duties will be adequately performed. But when one of us is multiplied a few thousand times, your intellect gets befogged; you become the plaything of phrase-mongers and politicians, who talk in pompous language about the big State, spelt always with a capital S, and about your very important duties towards it. As if your duties to a crowd of your *fellows* could be any more or less than your duties to your *fellow*. We owe no more service to the organised crowd than we do to the first stranger we meet. He who helps his neighbour as he would help himself, has fulfilled all the duties of citizenship ; and the poorest beggar that crawls is entitled to exactly the same service as the biggest crowd that ever abused its power. Numbers make no difference to duty ; for the fulfilment of duty is obedience to the supreme voice of individual reason, and not a servile following of the slavish prescriptions of "society." The individual to himself is greater than the crowd. The law of conscience, to which he is alone answerable, is higher than legislation, and it knows no difference between few and many, between States and subjects, and between the highest and the lowest of rational creatures.

WHAT is the State? As used by Politicians and Socialists, a mere abstraction : a bogie set up to frighten fools. Strictly speaking there is no such thing as a State. The term expresses a pure mental fiction, like aquosity, luminosity, and similar abstract figments. All that really exists is the individual surrounded by a number of beings similar to himself. And the separate groups of these individuals are classified as States, municipalities, counties, &c. The individual is the basis of society ; for the social aggregate is simply the unit multiplied. There is no commune existing as a sort of divine providence over the heads of the individuals that make up the commune, and capable, as some seem to fancy, of showering down unlimited happiness upon its subjects. The English State, using the term in its widest sense, is simply the sum total of the activities of individual Englishmen. If we once firmly grasp this fact, we are able to see that the greatness of a State depends upon the greatness of its individual components ; just as the strength of a chain depends upon the character of the individual links of which it is composed : so that all Socialistic measures which sap the individual character and personal responsibility of citizens, destroy the integrity of the whole State. The strength of England, for example, like that of Greece and Rome in their best days, has hitherto consisted in the strength of each individual unit of the nation : and it is only the sturdy individuality of the units of the past that has made this country what it is. When the individual strength, private originality, and personal reponsibility, go with the old freedom we have hitherto held so dear, the greatness of England will disappear like that of all the nations dead. Fortunately for the future of the human race, nature, as exemplified in the rise and fall of empires, has decreed that strength shall only be with the free, and in this fact has sealed the doom of social democracy for ever. Socialism may be the death of States and Nations, but the human race outlives its failures, and it will never rest until it realizes its highest ideal of perfect liberty, enjoyed through that harmony of reason, that rational obedience of natural law, which, properly understood, is perfect love. For in the last resort reason and love are one. Reason is the light of law, and by this light the soul recognizes its kinship with all things ; the recognition of this kinship is love, is oneness with the infinite, is the perfect peace which not even death can destroy. Towards this "the whole creation moves."

In opposition to the foregoing argument, it is often urged, both by the Socialist and others, that the State is an organism, an organised aggregate of human beings forming an independent community. But this, I venture to think, hardly meets my contention. Independent of what ? Of the individuals that make up the "State"? Surely the organicist hardly means this. Yet, unless he does mean this, I fail to see how his definition disposes of my argument—that the State is the sum total of the activities of the individuals included in it. Where and what is the State apart from its component units? We can easily conceive of individuals existing independently of the State, but we cannot imagine the State existing independently of individuals. If the individual is not the basis of society, what is? The *onus probandi* lies, not upon those who deny, but upon those who assert the existence of these metaphysical entities.

So long, however, as these general terms "State," "Society," "Social organism," are acknowledged to be what they really are; viz., convenient metaphorical expressions for classifying groups of similar objects under single and commanding statements, there is not much to say against them; but when they are used to prop up theories which assign greater rights—mights we cannot dispute—to groups and majorities, than to single individuals, it is high time they were stript of their imaginary meaning, and shown to be the empty abstractions they are. Nothing is easier than to conjure with abstractions. We speak of "man" as if the term denoted something more than the individual human beings who dwell upon this earth—as if there would still be a something answering to the term if all individual human beings disappeared. We speak of the "crush" at the doors of a theatre as if it described something more than the summation of individual pushes. And in the same way we speak of "society" as if it were something more than "you and I and everybody else." In this manner we make our minds the slaves of their own bogies, and fall down in abject fear before creatures of our own comparing and classifying faculties.

The organicist is fond of comparing the various voluntary and compulsory associations included in the "State," to the different parts of a highly complex army. But he may make his sections and sub-sections, his companies, battalions, and divisions, as complex as he likes. He may segregate and re-segregate them as much as he wants; and he will be no nearer than ever to showing that they are anything more than the various summations of the individuals that go to make them up; or that their respective activities are anything more than the sum of the activities of those same individuals. The organicist lays stress on the well known action and reaction of human beings, and groups of human beings, upon each other. But instead of simply showing that individuals act and re-act upon each other, that they form into small aggregates, and these last again into larger aggregates, and that the separate aggregates also act and re-act on one another, he should show that these groups are something more than the units that make them up; and the best way to do so, is to show us such groups existing apart from their component units. As one proof of the truth of his theory, the organicist urges that the stability and well-being of the aggregate depends on the degree of efficiency with which the various sections fit in and work with one another towards "the common good." Does it not rather depend upon something antecedent to this, viz., upon the degree of efficiency with which the various *individual* components of the sections fit in and work with one another towards the common good; that is to say, towards the freest possible individual development; which *is* the only good *common* to all? Even if society were an organism, individual liberty would still be the first requisite to social health. You may fit your sections as you like; but if they are composed of individual conscripts, neither sections, nor companies, nor battalions will work together as harmoniously as they must do when each individual, not having his consent over-ridden by others, is freely combining with his fellows in an association that does not sacrifice liberty to combination. Your society must be a free aggregation of free units, or it is merely a name for a degrading form of social slavery. The organicist often argues as if Individualism were opposed to co-operation. All it opposes is *compulsory* co-operation. Of voluntary co-operation every individualist club is an instance. Even compulsory co-operation the individualist would not do away with *suddenly*, but slowly and surely, beginning, say, with the board schools, the Post Office, the State dependence of the Church, and such tyrannies as compulsory vaccination, registration, &c.

Let us now ask a few questions about this mysterious thing called a "social organism." Where is it? Does it include all the human inhabitants of the earth? If not, are there more than one of these creatures? Would you call the British Empire a social organism? Or would you perfer to limit the application of the terms to the British Isles? Would you call a voluntary association like the Salvation Army an "organism?" Do not such obvious questions at once expose the fanciful character of the theory? Would it not be better to admit that it is much less misleading to say that we each of us exist in a world full of thousands of similar units, that these units are able to combine and re-combine, to act and re-act on each other in diverse ways, but that none of their conceivable combinations are such as to justify the application of the term "organism" in anything more than a purely metaphorical sense? Social organism! As well talk of an ant-organism, of a beaver-organism, or of a wolf-organism. As well argue about a bird-organism held together by the common medium of the air. If we were all stuck together like the Siamese Twins, then the term "organism" might do; but until this event happens, such a word, taken in anything like a literal sense, is a gross and unmeaning exaggeration.

Everybody who knows anything of biology is aware that the word "organism" is only used to describe something whose parts are physically continuous. Yet this is precisely what the individual parts of society are not. You might as well call a forest an organism, simply because the trees afford each other mutual warmth and protection, and are joined together by substantial air. One could understand that if a militant *regime* were established with its battalions, companies, &c., commanded from one centre, as described by the organicist, society might then bear some remote resemblance to an organism. Under a system of absolute command and slavish obedience, the units move together more like one body; as witness the German Army under Von Molke. But this is precisely what we outgrow as we become civilized. Under the industrial *regime*, where conscription and compulsory service have given place to free contract and free exchange, the units are much less closely held together; individual independence is at its maximum and central control at its minimum. As true civilization progresses, society gets less like one militarily organised whole; and more like a collection of freely moving, freely co-operating units: the chains of compulsion which bind the parts together are broken; the individual tends to become everything, the State nothing; liberty takes the place of slavery, exchange of service the place of Government regulation, and, at last, the social machine having done its work, the individual stands out clear and free of all external trammels. It is only after experiencing all forms of tyranny that the mind comes to really value liberty above all other things. The outer compulsion is the sign of inner weakness, and dies in proportion as the knowledge of law grows. When his knowledge of the laws of human character and of external things is complete, man will become a law unto himself; conscience, the embedded knowledge of all time, will become the only recognised authority; and all minds, having been brought into more complete harmony through the clearer and fuller knowledge of the natural results of conduct, will dwell, as it were, in the common enjoyment of one great light—the only thing that all varieties of taste and temperament can peaceably possess in common—the light of physical and moral laws.

This is the true communism; the seeing together of the same facts and uniformities of facts: the joint service of law and truth. The other communism—that of property—is but a common grovelling in dirt. It is the worship of the material for its own sake, and the consequent blindness to the great light of law, which shines through all things.

Society will outgrow the State, will leave it behind. For the State is political law, is force, is the negation of reason and of love; is the clumsy scaffolding within which the spirit of man is slowly and painfully building up a nobler temple. At best, political law is only passion's check upon the external expression of passion; the outward form of man's inward slavery, the measure of his backwardness in the direction of self reform. For the inner life ever determines the character of the outer life, and as the former improves the latter will change. Complete Liberty is only for the pure in heart. When men are free from their own personal infirmities, they will be free from the tyranny of one another. Then shall there be for them a new heaven and a new earth. Then shall they enter upon another life, which shall be glad and complete and free; in that its spring and principle will be a common love of that which is more than life: the eternal law, ever exemplified by the universe, and by all that it contains: this will be mirrored in each soul; each soul will find its true freedom in the loving service of it. To understand, and to love that which is understood; the marriage of the heart with the intellect; the love of the fire for the light, and the oneness of all souls in this common love: this is freedom, this life, this the goal that shall be. Not the love of men; men by themselves are nothing: but the joint love of the universal harmony, in which men will be but as notes; this shall bring the world together: not on the footing of dust, not as mere eaters and drinkers, not as political sharers out and mutual thieves of each other's fodder, not as greedy Socialists and sticky material communists; but as rational portions of a perfect order, as beings whose only happiness consists in intelligent performance of human functions, and consequent harmonious co-operation with an orderly working whole. For man does not live for himself, or for his fellows; but for that which, call it by what name you will, is greater and stronger than man. To walk by the sight of law, and find peace in its light: to live according to nature; to eat, drink, and clothe only for the sake of health, and use the sex relations solely for that parental continuance of the race which is their only intelligible and unharmful function; to meet all rational wants while avoiding every form of excess; to keep the mind pure and free from unhealthy fancies and degrading superstitions, ever fixed upon the hard and naked truth; to enjoy life without pining over death; to love and welcome whatever forms a necessary part of nature's order; to reverence nothing but truth, and obey nothing but the plain dictates of individual reason: to be one with all intelligent beings in this sense, and in this sense alone: this is the true life, this the individualism of the future. The perfectly balanced nature, rich and complete in mental insight, tolerant with width and depth of thought, strong with the strength of transfigured passion, and calm through the peace that reason gives: with the advent of this will come the final release of man from the tyranny of men. At present man is so far below the height of his true, his rational nature, that he cannot trust himself. He is not free because he is not worthy to be free. He is steeped to the eyes in a coarse materialism. But when the rational use of necessaries has replaced the irrational lust after unnecessaries, when truth and reality are preferred before glitter and display, then will he become fit for the freedom that shall yet be his.

CHAPTER III.

IN its narrower acceptation the State is simply a group of persons, whether elected or not is no matter, who, by means of tax collectors, police, &c., exercise control over the rest of the nation. Taken in either sense, the State is nothing more than a collection of units, and although the fact of being backed up by superior numbers, may give it greater *powers*, it cannot in the very nature of the case confer greater *rights* than what are already possessed by the poorest individual that the State contains. All that numbers can confer on a Government is might: right is a deduction of reason; not a present made to CÆSAR by the legions—either of soldiers or of voters. A cynic may reply, that if might is not right, it is invariably the winning side. So said the selfish monster who died at St. Helena, but events turned out otherwise. So, no doubt, thought CHARLES IX. and his friends on the eve of St. Bartholomew. So thought the Holy Catholic Church in the days of JOHN HUSS and JEROME of Prague. And so thought the howling Jewish Democracy, who. mad with passion, cried out "Crucify Him." But, curiously enough, the moral teaching of the solitary Individual who sought neither power nor fame, and whose staunchest disciples forsook Him in the hour of danger, triumphed over persecution and torture, outlived the wreck of empires, survived the craft of priest, and cardinal, and Pope, and finally established itself in the hearts and minds of men for ever. Never was the lie more clearly given to that cry of a baffled ambition—"the big battalions win."

If, then, Government, being but a group of individuals, can have no more right than the units of which it is composed, it follows that a Government is under exactly the same obligations to respect human liberty as any single member of the State is. And by obligation is here meant a law of understanding—of rational consistency—which is binding on man only in so far as he is a rational being. Either it is right or it is wrong for me to dictate to you what you shall eat or drink, what you shall wear, where you shall live, how you shall work, and for how long—either this kind of regulation is legitimate or illegitimate. If right, then it is as legitimate for one man to so regulate the life of another, as for ten thousand men to regulate the lives of nine thousand. If wrong, then it is as unwarrantable for ten thousand to regulate nine thousand as for one to regulate another. A bad action does not become good because many people conspire together to perform it, and a good action does not become bad because few, or possibly only one, can be got to enact it. If one man is under an obligation to respect the liberty of of his fellows, all men are; all Governments are; all majorities are. Numbers cannot add one fraction to the justice of a just action, neither can they take away one fraction from the injustice of an unjust action.

We argue, therefore, that men are under a moral obligation to respect each other's liberty; that as Governments cannot make morality, so, neither, can they by any amount of Acts of Parliament, unmake it. Laws do not create morality: on the contrary it is morality that justifies or condemns laws. The supreme judge of right and wrong is not the will of the Government, or of its supporters, but the individual conscience, enlightened by the reason. This is the only light men have, and when they give it up to follow a mere crowd e of ¶ 1 & leading to ¶ 2

of beings equally as imperfect and devoid of the inner light as they are themselves, they commit an act of self-abasement that cuts them off from the line of human progress, and reduces them to the level of mere puppets, pulled by strings from without.

But what do we mean by moral obligation? I "ought" to respect your liberty; "ought" to leave you to develope along the lines your conscience and reason seem to dictate. Why? Because as long as I remain a rational being, judging and choosing for myself, I implicitly lay it down as a postulate that liberty is desirable, is right, for myself. There is a logic of action and of conduct, as well as a logic of words. Man, in every action he freely performs, in every thought he freely utters, posits himself and his claim for free scope of thought and action. Thus, in my very argument with you, and in my printing and circulation of that argument, I am claiming a freedom of thought and action which I cannot, without committing logical suicide, limit to myself. My actions assume that liberty is right for myself. But you and all others are only so many other selves; consequently I am bound to admit that liberty is right for all men. So that, having made this admission, I am acting inconsistently and irrationally, if I singly, or jointly with others, proceed to place restrictions upon your freedom, or upon that of others. This is the only intelligible meaning of moral obligation. "Ought" is the expression of a law of the understanding. It is a short way of saying that when we have laid down such and such an assumption, we are bound, in logical consistency, to follow out the consequences that reason shows to flow therefrom. Thus, for example, A makes up his mind that such and such shop hours are desirable. He opens and closes his shop accordingly. Having, therefore, by his own action, laid down the postulate that he should be free to form his opinion on this question and to act upon it, he has tacitly claimed the same freedom for his neighbour; so that when, by a process of nose counting, he manages to force his neighbour to swallow and act upon his (A's) personal theories, he is behaving inconsistently—claiming freedom for himself but denying it to others. All forms of tyranny have this illogical and inconsistent character about them. They at once both assert and deny the obligation of obedience to individual conscience: assert it for the tyrant and deny it to the slave. They are so many attempts to realise that worst of all kinds of inequality: the inequality that must exist where some are attempting to set their consciences as custodians over others. /The only equality that is worth having, is equal freedom for all men to obey the promptings of individual reason and conscience. This equality of freedom is the one indispensable condition without which men are neither rational nor moral beings./ The other kind of equality, which consists in equal amounts of creature comforts for everybody, is simply the equality of well fed pigs./ Fortunately man does not live by bread alone. He has a moral nature, which requires a sphere of individual liberty for its development, and which can only exist along with personal responsibility, personal risks, and personal possessions. These individual requisites enable each one to make what the Stoics called a "right use of appearances," and it is only in the right use of appearances that the most perfect human life consists.

The obligation we are under to respect one another's freedom may be illustrated by the similar obligation which morally binds us to respect the truth. Each man, we say, "ought" to tell the truth to his fellow. Why? Because he is always asking and expecting it to be told to him. Now, each one of us is only a unit in an aggregate of similar beings. So that when we lay down the postulate that men should speak the truth to us, we are bound, in logical self-consistency, to speak it to them. Every individual man is thus bound by a law of reason, and therefore all possible groups of such individuals are so bound. A lying Government, unlike one that tramples on the freedom of the individual, is seldom excused on the ground that public lying redounds to "the welfare of society." The individual and the collective welfare are here seen to be inseparable; and the inconsistency of applying a principle to men in general, and then proceeding to deny its validity for particular units or groups, is clearly perceived. And the fact that it is frequently difficult to find where the truth lies, or to express it when found without some mixture of error, is not allowed to weigh a feather weight in excusing either the individual or the group from uttering and furthering the truth to the full extent of their power. Life is full of obstacles, and there are difficulties in the way of expressing truth, just as there are in the path of protecting liberty; many a time the easiest, and the momentarily better course, seems to consist in the circulation of a little falsehood, and not seldom the temporary welfare of others appears to rest on lies. But the steadfast respect for truth justifies itself in the end; and the case is exactly the same with liberty. The evils incidental to liberty are temporary, and are always more than counter-balanced by its advantages: but the evils of coercion are lasting and deep, and they have no advantages to be set against them.

Thus the same reasoning which applies to truth applies with equal force to liberty. Although, in our complex relations with each other, it may be no more possible to always secure equal and absolute liberty for all, than it is to always utter absolute truth; yet the same force of moral obligation which binds us to respect the latter holds equally good with regard to the former; and just as there is an ideal of perfect truth towards which it should be our aim always to move, so there is an ideal of equal liberty which claims our respect and ought* to be the goal of all our efforts. The obligation we are always under to respect each other's liberty, may be well expressed in a form similar to PORTIA's appeal to the Jew for mercy—

> "In our every word and action, we do ask for freedom,
> And that same claim doth teach us all to respect
> The liberty of others."

The foregoing sufficiently establishes what is known as the doctrine of natural right; the right, namely, of all rational creatures to equal liberty of action, and the moral obligation all men are under of respecting that right. It has been shown that no possible arrangement of social units, whether in the form of minorities or of majorities, of Governments or of the governed, can justify men, either severally or jointly, in violating in others the liberty-claims they implicitly and unavoidably set up for themselves. It has been shown that all forms of coercion are in their very nature self-contradictory and irrational, and that although, historically, tyranny precedes liberty, yet logically and ethically, liberty precedes tyranny. Of course to the politican this conclusion will carry little weight. Politics,

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*Controversialists have kicked up a great dust over the word "ought." It is said that no natural explanation can be given of it. Yet when we remember that the word is only used when some previous assumption has been made there should be no difficulty. Suppose I assume, for example, that I am going to London by the shortest and quickest route. Then if A is that route, I "ought" to go by it; that is to say, in order to be consistent it is necessary for me to go by that route: I *must* go by it or be illogical. This "must" is merely the logic of my previous assumption. It is the same as the word "ought." This is how the character of necessity arises. It is really a logical necessity. Thus, suppose I say "All men 'ought' to be virtuous." The word "ought" here takes for granted two things. First that virtue is a good; and, second, that men have agreed to seek whatever is good; so that when I say they "ought" to be virtuous, I am merely saying that they are acting inconsistently in not being so. If someone comes forward and says that he desires nothing but evil, then unless I am permitted to make an assumption for him, I cannot say he is acting inconsistently in not seeking the good. If I still say he ought to pursue the good I am assuming something for him.

or the art of group-regulation, it will be said, are in no way related to ethics, or the science of individual conduct; for while the primary rule of the latter is the recognition of personal liberty, that of the former is "the happiness of the greatest number," "the public good," or "the commonweal." While the first law of the latter is "be just before you are generous," that of the former is "be generous before you are just."

It may be admitted that, as a fact, ethics and politics have very little in common—about as much as lies and truth—but this is all to the advantage of the former and of the theories that are reared thereon. Ethics are a body of statements expressing the fundamental conditions of permanent individual and social welfare. They represent the relatively lasting and indestructible laws of human nature. And human nature, it must be remembered, alters very slowly from century to century, and from civilisation to civilisation. The heart of man is pretty much the same in all ages and climes: the same passions agitate it, the same hopes and fears raise and depress it; it finds the same satisfaction in freedom, and pays the same respect to justice, and it rebels with equal readiness against force, whether that force rests upon a counting of noses or upon a military organisation. The moral world is a cosmos whose more important laws are as well known as those of the physical world. The maxim that "the wages of sin is death" is as true as the generalisation "unsupported bodies fall to the ground." The connection between lies and confusion is as unbreakable as that between the moon and the tides. Interference with liberty and property breeds hatred, and hatred rebellion, as surely as lighted gunpowder explodes. The generalisations of ethics are formulations of laws, which are as old as humanity, and which cannot be destroyed without unmaking and rebuilding human nature afresh.

And these generalisations rest, not upon the whims and fancies of a clique, a majority, a crowd, or an age, but upon the experiences of all men who live and have lived since long before the dawn of history. The instincts which, in the course of countless generations, these experiences have generated, and which respond to them as note vibrates to note, afford the strongest evidence of the reality and permanence of moral laws, and are, in literal truth, the stored up testimonies of all the dead generations to the transcendant importance of ethical considerations. How real must be those laws, to whose awful majesty the voices of the living dead, bear witness in the silent speech of conscience.

The generalisations of ethics, then, rest upon permanent laws of human nature, and therefore partake of the permanance of these laws just so far as they accurately express them. Ethics approximate to the nature of an exact science as our knowledge of moral laws becomes more complete, and, as already pointed out, the basic generalisations of such a science are already laid in a foundation as real and lasting as the law of gravitation. Now generalisations of observed laws when applied to practice become principles. Take an example. Experience discovers that drinking cold water, when heated to perspiration by violent exertion, invariably leads to disastrous results. The fact is generalised and applied as a principle for the guidance of conduct. Similarly with regard to ethical generalisations, only with greater certainty. The generalisation of the moral sequence or law that lies always produce confusion, either directly or through the formation of habits that ultimately end in confusion—this generalization when applied to conduct becomes a principle, and those who so apply to tell truth, as the phrase goes, "on principle." This principle, or rather the generalisation of which it is the application, like the theory of gravitation, has been verified so often that it has at last become recognized as a law of life, and those whose minds are properly balanced, as soon think of ignoring it as of disregarding the fact that fire burns, or that heavy falling bodies crush. It is, indeed, well to be open to re-verify everything, even the most sacred and widely-established conceptions, when good reason is shewn for doing so; but a man who went on the principle of trying every case of truth-speaking "upon his merits" would be as wise as one who always made a rule of sticking his hand into every new fire, in order to see if, like all the old ones, it would burn. And the same reasoning applies with equal force to all the promptings of passion, as distinguished from the promptings of reason, i.e., to all immoral conduct. What is in itself disorder and confusion, produces disorder and confusion, either within or without the individual consciousness, as surely as intense cold freezes water. The moral world has its heaven of satisfied conscience and its hell of unsatisfiable passion "where the worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched."

If it be replied that this is the degradation of morality to a science of natural laws, it is fair to ask wherein lies the degradation? What is there more solid than law to build upon? What more awe-inspiring, what more productive of reverence than the consciousness of law? Only in so far as they recognise law do all minds become as one. In proportion as we know the laws of things all hopes and fears alike vanish: we are able to look the eternal in the face, without complaint and without request, and something of the peace of eternal things descends to calm the passions of the soul.*

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*This truth is so important as a guide in life that the following account of it may not be out of place:—"The mind has greater power over the emotions *(in so far as they are passions)*, and is less subject thereto in so far as it understands all things as necessary. . .

The denial of Right, based as it is on the ground that the obligation we are under to respect each other's liberty, is an ethical and not a political obligation, has no more weight than the argument of a blind man—that light does not exist because he cannot see it. That anyone accustomed to look at things through the politician's spectacles, should at last reach such a depth of demoralization that he cannot see any wrong in an otherwise unjust action, provided a majority of the electors approve of it, is not all surprising. The theory that the obligations of the individual do not exist for the individuals, and that laws which the unit cannot ignore without suffering disastrous consequences, may be treated with impunity by the large or small group, forms the one weak point in all governments. The theory of the politician is, that so long as a government has force behind it—whether that force rests upon soldiers or citizens—things are going all right; and no doubt so they are for the politician, since his very existence is a sign of social rottenness, and, up to certain limits, the more corrupt the State becomes the stronger he gets. *Up to certain limits.* The more diseased becomes the body, the more thrive the disease germs—until the patient dies. The quack flourishes as the fools become more numerous, but he comes to grief at last along with objects he feeds upon. So it is with a powerful government. Up to a certain point, its power increases with the spread of

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The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see that pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated as soon as the man who has lost it perceives that it could not by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an infant because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or, lastly, because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas if most people were full-grown and only one here and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants, because infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in nature."—SPINOZA, *Ethics, Part V., Prop. VI.*

oppression, but that point once reached, it is either destroyed by some mighty social convulsion, or gradually dies with the nation it has lived upon. The power of the individual, or collective tyrant, is made up entirely of the passions of his supporters. Taken together these form a very SAMSON of strength to begin with. But, unfortunately, the giant is blind; he can neither see nor avoid the indispensable conditions of social welfare; consequently, either he destroys the State or the State has the wisdom to destroy him. It is often said that there are no limits to the action of a popularly elected government. There are limits to all human action, whether individual or collective. As well urge that there is nothing to limit the action of a drunkard. The conditions of social welfare can, it is true, always be ignored; but not with impunity, either by units or groups. These conditions limit all human conduct, and to ignore the ethical rules which express them, for the mere sake of following party expedients, is like attempting to steer a ship according to the momentary and ever-changing shape of the waves, and not by the rules of navigation. The laws of men are always weighed in a balance of natural laws, and when the latter are systematically ignored nothing can save society from destruction. When ethics express the permanent conditions of social welfare they are sound. When politics are built upon the recognition of these conditions, as formulated in ethical canons, they too are sound. But when men, by reason of acting in groups, allow their passions to obscure what their individual judgment has already amply proved, and proceed to set up and act upon those rules of short-sighted expediency, by which no individual or group can survive, the social aggregate inevitably decays with the units that compose it.

If it be urged that this is pinning down politics to hard and fast *a priori* rules, then it may be replied, that so far as they are sound, they must be regulated by hard and fast rules. This is not saying that there should be no flexibility in applying those rules. Life is an art resting upon a science of moral generalisations which get stronger and clearer as the centuries pass. Every generation re-verifies and strengthens the fundamental canons of ethics. "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt do no murder," "Thou shall not covet," do not grow weaker as man grows wiser. Their value, their indispensibility as conditions of life, rests upon an ever wider and wider field of experience. All the invariableness and stability of real laws of nature become theirs; and while it is true that the mind should always be open to alter them, and even to ignore them, whenever a sufficient amount of experience has been accumulated to justify such treatment; yet until this is done, they must be allowed, under penalty of loss, to possess the same *a priori* relation to each individual act, as, for example, the law of gravitation does. Each day we set out with the *a priori* maxim "unsupported bodies fall to the ground," and we shall continue to apply this method until experience builds us up a better. Similarly with morality. A generalisation, although resting upon antecedent induction, is always *a priori* in its application to practice. In the very nature of the case this must be so; for we cannot be making our knife and cutting our stick with it at one and the same moment. Now the laws of nature, and of that part of it which consists of human character, are rigid. Their seeming uncertainty is solely due to our ignorance. The more we know about them, the more rigid they appear. And, consequently, the more rigid become the ethical generalisations framed upon them. The more true a system of ethics is, the more closely does it correspond to the real facts of life, and the more rigid become its rules. A perfect ethic would be as inflexible as nature herself. What follows from this? Why; that so far as politics rest upon ethics, they must be governed by hard and fast rules. In so far as they are ruled by mere five-minutes-expedients, passion, haphazard, and guess-work, they are not based upon ethics. But what are ethics? As we have seen, the science of human life, the only guide to a successful art of living. If, then, politics are not bases upon ethics, on what are they based? If individuals, when acting jointly, may ignore the plain distinctions between right and wrong, why may they not also ignore them when acting singly? And if it is admitted that ignoring them as individuals, must bring us to grief; does it not follow that the same conduct pursued by groups of individuals, must also end in the same disaster? Social utility and personal morality here coincide; for what is utility but the application of generalisations which have been inductively established, deductively applied, and again inductively verified?

It is said that the first consideration for that corporate action of men called government, is not so much natural law and the ethical generalisations based thereon, as the collective happiness, or, failing that, "the happiness of the greatest number." "Not only material security, but the perfection of human and social life," says Sir Frederick Pollock (The history of the Science of Politics, *Fortnightly Review*, Jan., 1883, p. 99), "is what we aim at in that organised co-operation of many men's lives and works which is called State," and he adds "I fail to see good warrant of either reason or experience for limiting the co-operate activity of a nation by hard and fast rules." Here we have the very essence of the Socialistic argument. The State, like the individual, is to aim at human happiness; but the State, unlike the individual, is not to limit its action by those hard and fast ethical rules which are considered binding upon the individual. It would be wrong for you and I to interfere with the work of our neighbours; to forcibly take away all or portions of the result of his labour; to prescribe his food, clothing, health, education, opinions, religion, &c., &c.,—in a word, to turn his life into a puppet's dance done to the tune of our own fads. This kind of thing as carried on between individuals is not only wrong, it is "inexpedient." In fact, it is a perfect nuisance, productive of infinitely more loss than gain to all parties concerned. Busybodyism on a small scale does not pay anyone; it only leads to distrust, envy, malice, and ill-feeling all round. But tried on a large scale, it is sure to be a great success; to perfect social life, and render everybody—or at least the majority—perfectly happy! When there are only one or two persons co-operating, they cannot afford to ignore the hard and fast rules of ethics. If they neglect the canons of fundamental morals their co-operation soon lands them in chaos. But when a larger number—whether a majority or minority is immaterial—sailing under the title of "State," choose to try and promote human happiness by violating the indispensable conditions of social welfare, they are sure to succeed; for what power is there to make against the effective majority? Society is an "organism" specially exempted by some fairy grandmother from having to obey any laws of health. When acting *en masse* the collective creature can just do what it likes with perfect impunity. Men in their joint action constitute a little omnipotence all to themselves. The social "organism" forms no part of a larger organism: of nature herself, the remorseless destroyer alike of the few or the many who ignore her laws. It stands apart by itself. All this talk about law is merely the expression of the fancies of impractical theorists. Man is God, there is no greater power in the universe, and the practical politician is his duly qualified representative! There are rules of health, rules of morals, rules of trade, hard and fast rules, conditioning the successful application of all art, but no rules of politics! The politician is the only genuine miracle worker: the infallible Cagliostro of the nineteenth century, and he has managed to learn his art without having to burden his mind with such unscientific formulas as "hard and fast rules."

Sir F. Pollock, to whom we have just alluded, continues reasoning thus:—"We must fix the limit by self-protection, says Mill; by negative as opposed to positive regulation, says Mr. Spencer. But where does protection leave off and interference begin? If it is negative and proper regulation to say a man shall be punished for building his house in a city so that it falls into the street, is it positive and improper regulation to say that he shall so build it, if he builds at all, as to appear to competent persons not likely to fall into the street? It is purely negative regulation, and may therefore be proper, to punish a man for communicating an infectious disease by neglect of common precautions. Why is it improper to compel those precautions, where the danger is known to exist, without waiting for somebody to be actually infected?"

The reply to this is obvious. What is the end of law? Is it not the nearest possible approximation to justice that can be made by finite power? The completest possible correspondence between offences and penalties that human art can achieve? Where then is the justice of putting *all* the building trade in an official strait waistcoat, just for the sake of catching a few bad builders, and, possibly, protecting a few thoughless persons? It is not to a builder's interest to build places that won't stand. But should such a case ever occur, justice is fully met by the punishment of the individual offender. It is a waste of energy to punish all builders beforehand, *in order to prevent the real culprits from being found out:* for this is exactly what these cut and dried beforehand preventions mean. They may save our skins for a time; but they prevent us from discovering where the weak places are; and so create a blindness that eventually leads to a still greater general loss. They prevent the incidental fall, but precipitate the general crash. In confounding good, bad, and indifferent together in one lump, in punishing all alike, they deprive the public of the requisite data for forming sound individual judgments, and by this means protecting themselves. It is to the advantage of everybody that evil doers should be known, so that the energies of the law may be directed where they are really needed, not wasted over good, bad, and indifferent alike. But in proportion as you prevent beforehand, you curtail experiment, and thus shut out the possibility of discovery. Also you prevent improvement. It is a well known fact that in this matter of building alone, the arbitrary and absurd rules of municipal inspectors, much more frequently prevent improved houses from being built, than they save inferior houses from falling. The expensive law suits, the loss of capital, the loss of time, and the general industrial discouragement that these rules cause to the general body of builders, only result in giving the average tenant an inferior house to live in. Protection indeed! As if people could be protected against their own innate lack of common sense! Let them suffer from bad houses; for in no other way can they acquire the requisite experience by which to estimate better ones. There is no official royal road to comfort, or even to security; for it is probable that, taken on the whole, state officialism causes more accidents than it prevents.

And as for the communication of disease; this depends far more upon those private personal habits that no law can alter, than upon any amount of mere official drill. The vaccination laws are a fair sample of the value of state drill. The community were to be "protected" by the forcing of diseased matter out of one person into another. In order to prolong our precious lives we poisoned our neighbour. Why not? Some of our neighbours *might* unconsciously cause our death before it is fairly due! How terrible to think of! Therefore don't wait to discover the guilty party, but punish everybody beforehand, in order to make sure of safety. Don't make yourself disease-proof by purity of life and intelligent obedience of the laws of health; this is altogether too obvious and simple a method: but "protect" your rotten system by a forcible regulation of everybody. For who knows from whom you may not catch your death? How sad if you died a few years too soon. What a loss to society! And lock everybody up, in order to prevent yourself from being robbed. For who can tell who is a not a possible thief? Make yourself safe! Hang everybody, so that you may not be murdered. For who is there that may not possibly commit this offence? In short, why run any risk whatever when regulation can prevent it? Comfort, not justice, is the end of law.

The absurdity of the Socialist's theory lies in his assumption that people can be effectually coerced into happiness or into virtue. The priest once imagined they could be successfully coerced into "true" religion—he may think so now for anything we know. The sanitarian thinks they may be coerced into cleanliness. The teetotaller would compel them to temperance. The State educationalist imagines they can be crammed to hold any quantity and quality of knowledge, like a gun plumbed up to the muzzle with wads. This theory is very old—as old as impatience, intolerance and bigotry, and although in its older forms—in religious matters, for instance—we have, or are supposed to have, amply demonstrated its falsity, yet we still go on applying it to education, health, amusement, trade, and all the other crazes of modern fanatics. After centuries of persecution, wars, and massacres, we have at last discovered that force

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cannot make people religious; that the substitution of an external authority in the place of the internal conscience only produces formalists and hypocrites; and that genuine piety springs from the internal impluses of free beings. Eventually we shall come to see that force is equally impotent to make men either cleanly, healthy, wise, or virtuous. These four things make up the very strength and greatness of the individual, and of all his possible multiplications and arrangements. And, curiously enough, like genuine religion, they are the result, not of external or governmental compulsion, but of the spontaneous activity of free citizens. Of course it is perfectly true that we can pay a lot of inferior men to look after our health, our knowledge and our virtue. But at what a fearful price. The money payment is nothing: it is the loss of individuality, self-control, manhood, and variety, that is the great thing. All these patent arrangements for getting rid of personal responsibility, tend to reduce men and women to the level of a flock of sheep, swayed this way or that way by the biggest crowd or the cunningest official. There are, or used to be, some very noble people who kept valets to wash, dress, and perfume them; their conduct has been often justified on the ground of expediency and utility, but nobody has yet had the hardihood to maintain that either masters or servants were morally or physically any better for such unmanly and degrading practices. And neither are men and women who delegate to officials the personal duties of cleanliness, health, education, and virtue. Socialism is only the old Tory privilege system applied to DEMOS. The highest and strongest societies are composed of individuuls who are capable of looking after themselves, who are virtuous from choice, and who need neither the quacks of the soul to tell them how to think, nor the quacks of the body to tell them how to act. Individual variety and character form the greatest of all social utilities, and no kind of compulsory organization can supply their loss. The aim of all successful and lasting government is, not to degrade free citizens to the level of well-fed pigs, whose styes are mechanically cleaned out at stated periods, but to leave the course clear for the evolution from within of the ideal man, so well described by Sir F. POLLOCK as at last coming "forth into the light, with the moral law written in his soul, and justice for an immortal heritage."

Looked at in the light of the lowest utility, the recognition of equal right to liberty of thought, of speech, and of action, comes before everything else. The coercionists who attempt to distinguish between happiness and freedom, and pretend to see how the former can be promoted at the expense of the latter, never justify their position. If the end they propose is in itself desirable, no enquiry is made as to whether the means indicated do or do not promote that end. Education, for example, is assumed to be a condition of happiness. This being granted, it is never asked whether the dragooning of parents and children either tends to promote happiness, or to create a natural desire for knowledge, or a pleasure in freely pursuing it. Although it is admitted that cramming a food down a person's throat is about the most effectual method that can be used for producing an ineradicable dislike for such food; although nobody has ever yet been known to excel in any pursuit that was not followed freely and for the sake of the profit or pleasure derived therefrom; although it is well known that the vast majority of successful men and women in all the different walks of life have risen to eminence through possessing the freedom to follow the natural bent of their own tastes and inclinations, and that in proportion as they have been coerced by others, in that proportion have their various abilities been hindered of their possible achievements; although all these advantages of liberty are well known to the utilitarian and five-minutes-expediency-quacks, yet, when the advocacy of some drastic and cast-iron coercion system is likely to get them a fleeting popularity and a majority at the next election, such world-wide and every-day experience is thrown aside as the mere *a priori* speculations of let-be reactionaries. It is never noticed that the worst kind of "let-be" is that which ignores fact and experience in order to rush blindly in the dark. Thus, the real utility—the adoption of appropriate means to secure clear and desirable ends—is sacrificed to a sham utility, which, like a lie, helps for the instant or the minute, to damn for the hour and the day. There lives no more short-sighted dealer in *a priori* nonsense than the fanatical compulsionist who expects to produce inward joy, or virtue, or knowledge by outward compulsion. The athlete who should attempt to promote vigour by manacling arms and legs, would be a philosopher in comparison. Perhaps after the quacks have worn out their present popularity, we may come to see that while there are many different ways of helping each other, there is one sure and certain way of hindering the effects of even the best efforts,—destroying the indispensable condition of all success, viz., liberty.

As judged by a standard of social expediency or utility, liberty comes off with flying colours. Take any department of life you please, and you will find that in proportion as individual or collective coercion steps in, in that proportion does life, character, and happiness deteriorate. For after all what is life but movement, and what can be the result of restricting movement but a diminution of life? The murderer restricts the movements of his victim, and in order that there may be as little as possible of this kind of restriction we are obliged to restrict him. The same applies to the thief, and, to a lesser extent, to the breaker of contracts as well. The assumption underlying and justifying all these social restrictions is the maximising of movement—the production of the greatest possible amount and variety of life. Social life may be defined as the sum total of human activities existing at any given moment, and the only condition of the greatest volume of these activities consists is the greatest possible scope for their free play. Any *a priori* scheme which seeks to drive them into some stiff political pattern, not only restricts all activities that won't square with its own cramping form, but, worse still, curtails the opportunities of natural selection to such an extent as practically to bar out that slow evolutionary process, which saves society from the explosion of its pent up forces in what is known as "revolution." Hence, equal liberty is a safeguard, the loss of which nothing can compensate. It is to the forms of life what a free press is to the forms of thought—a practice ground for unlimited experiment, for natural selection, and for the survival of the newer and better over the older and worse. In a word, it is at once the condition of all healthy life, and of progress towards heathier life. Equal freedom of thought, we say, is the only condition of healthy and vigorous thought, of new ideas, of the survival of new forms of thought over old forms; in short of intellectual progress. Is it not exactly the same with forms of social life? How shall there be progress in social life if there is not the fullest possible opportunity for every human form to grow, to appear, and to develop along with others; so that free experiment may find out the types that are best fitted to advance? Put us all under one system, and progress comes by shocks and jumps, instead of slowly, surely, naturally and peacefully. Every now and then the hard shell has got to be broken in order to allow the crab to grow. Heretics and reformers are crushed by the system, until at last some mighty LUTHER and his followers suddenly appear on the scene, with courage and strength enough to hurl the gigantic tyranny to the ground. All these force systems are reared upon a sea of social unrest, and when excess of power has so far corrupted them that the forces of archery out-balance the forces of tyranny, the shaky social fabric suddenly falls into an easier position, like an iceberg whose sudden collapse has been led up to by the slow and silent destruction of its base. These unexpected and violent re-adjustments of social arrangements are called revolutions. There is only one way of preventing them; and this is by allowing the fullest possible liberty for each unit, compatible with the equal liberty of all units.

In point of fact the coercionist, or the majority or minority of coercionists, are simply doing on a large scale what the murderer and the thief are doing on a small scale. The latter only cut down the activities of others until those activities square with their own notions of fitness. Like the fanatical quacks, instead of adapting themselves to human nature, they attempt to adapt human nature to themselves; the only difference is that they do their work without either passing Acts of Parliament, shirking the personal dangers and risks, or indulging in cheap cant about the "welfare of society," the "commonweal," or the "happiness of the greatest number." The social outcasts whose actions we are obliged to restrict are barefaced and unpretending coercionists; the cunning busybodies who run round fawning upon working men for votes are anything but this; and, although they are infinitely the more dangerous of the two, they have not yet become social outcasts; but unless human affairs are all going to the dogs, these very good and disinterested gentlemen will become social outcasts presently.

It is sometimes urged that even under Individualism, social activity is essentially a species of coercive regulation, like the drill of the conscript for example. This is utterly untrue, All social relations, all dealings with our fellows, are only social so far as they are free. Introduce the element of force, and they become anti-social to the extent of the compulsion applied. That is only a social act in which a man realizes his own and not some other person's motive. If you say "Good morning" to your neighbour because it is the fashion to do so, or because some authority has attached a penalty to omission, and not because you have any genuine personal feeling in the matter, then the act is not vital, human, social, but indifferent, mechanical, anti-social. In itself it has no more social character about it than the act of a well-drilled soldier who shoots mechanically at his target. All that force produces is a sham. So far from promoting reason, charity, and toleration,—the only factors that make acts truly social,—it hinders them; and the more this force system increases, the more unsocial men become. The real happiness of men does not consist in elaborate and complicated drill systems, in the uniformity and monotony to which they lead, or even in the gigantic monuments they sometimes produce—else the social state of the slaves who built the pyramids should form the true ideal of human progress—but in the variety of character, the sincerity of motives, the charity, toleration, and reason that come in with liberty, and go out with it. The dependence of all human happiness and of all rational social relations upon individual liberty, has been well expressed by FICHTE in his work on the *Science of Rights.* "If," says he, "reason is to be realized in the world of sense, it must be possible for many rational beings to live together as such; and this is *permanently* possible only if *each free being makes it its law to limit its own freedom by the conception of the freedom of all others.* For each free being having the power to check or destroy the freedom of other free beings, and being dependent in its free actions only upon its will, it is only when all free beings have voluntarily made it their law (rule of action) never so to check the freedom of all others, that a community of free beings becomes possible, wherein such a check never occurs."

CHAPTER IV.

LET us now look at an argument that has recently been advanced against the fundamental principle of Individualism.

In the course of his papers on Socialism, which appeared in last year's issue of *Good Words*, Professor Flint attempts to upset the Individualist position. Not that he approves of Socialism. He appears to have as great a dislike for the latter as most of us have. The socialism of democracy is often as distateful to the cultured recipients of State favours, who flourish on a one-sided educational socialism, as it is to the pampered products of our Socialistic National Church. That those who believe the socialism of wealth and patronage to be right, but the socialism of poverty and starvation to be wrong, should have no definite theory of government at all, is not in the least surprising. Definite principles and rules are always awkward things for those who live in glass houses. A lax, blow-hot-and-cold, commit-yourself-to-nothing sort of creed, which enables you to adopt just as much Socialism or Individualism as you like, is the thing. "I believe in Socialism to a certain limited extent, don't you know?; and in Individualism to a certain limited extent, don't you know?" say some of Mr. Donisthorpe's political friends; and, if we are to judge by his articles, Professor Flint might well sit for their portraits; so forcibly does the description apply to him.

Listen to what he says about the Individualist's doctrine of equal liberty:—"The party of Individual liberty believe that they find at least the firm foundation stone of such a system (he is referring to a free system) in the formula 'the Liberty of each, limited only by the like liberty of all.' But is it so? To me these words seem to be vague and ambiguous. They tell neither what is the liberty of 'each' nor of all, and, therefore, nothing as to how, or how far, the liberty of each is to be limited by that of all. 'Like liberty'! Like to what? Like to a liberty which has no other limit than the liberty of others? Then the formula means that each individual may do to any other what he pleases, provided all other individuals may do to him what they please."

This argument effectually disposes of Individualism, thinks the Professor. The faith he has in its impregnable nature makes one smile. He forgets that if *all others* are to be free to do to the coercing individual or individuals what they please, coercion is impossible, and that to the extent to which coercion prevails *all* others are more or less *hindered* from doing what they please. For it is perfectly certain that *all* must include the individual who is coerced, and who is prevented to the extent of the coercion that he is subjected to, from doing what he pleases. When, for example, nine men fall upon one man, can it fairly be urged that all the ten men are doing what they please: certainly nine are, but how about the tenth? If *all* others are to be equally free, the doing must be of such a nature as not to hinder the action of others—must be non-coercive. Suppose, for example, Professor Flint, through the tax-gatherer, compels me to subscribe 5s. to a State grant for the University of Edinburgh;* am I not then hindered to the extent of 5s. from doing to him (Professor Flint) what I please? I might please to make him a present of the amount for the purpose of helping him to found a non-Socialistic University. Professor Flint cannot see that coercion, in so far as it is coercion, necessarily stops one or more of the "*all*" from doing as they please; and is, therefore, as inconsistent with the unfettered pleasing of all as, for example, a Socialistic University is. Suppose I forcibly tie my neighbour's hands; would it be fair to say that *all* (including my neighbour) may then do to me as they please? Coercion at least stops the "pleasing" of some, and the more people there are coerced, the less number there are among the "*all*" who are able to please.

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* The consideration in Committee of the Education and Local Taxation Relief (Scotland) Bill was resumed. Of the total equivalent grant of £265,000 to Scotland, £60,000 was set apart by the second clause in aid of the cost of secondary education, and two sums of £25,000

Professor Flint then goes on to inform us that allowing each one to do as he pleases so long as he does not hinder others from doing what they please "is simply saying that there should be no society, no government, no law whatever." Here he again ignores the law implied in his own definition of Individualism, viz., the law or rule that *none* shall be

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and £50,000 were to be distributed among the Parochial Boards, the former sum being for the maintenance of pauper lunatics, and the latter for the relief of the local rates in such manner as the Boards might determine. The first Amendment to this Clause was moved by Mr. Esslemont, with the view of increasing the secondary education grant from £50,000 to £100,000. Mr. Balfour said the Government felt obliged to adhere to the general distribution of the funds as sketched in the Bill, and he must, therefore, oppose the Amendment, which ultimately was rejected by 180 to 123.—Mr. D. Crawford moved an Amendment providing that the £60,000 should be devoted to "intermediate" education, instead of "secondary," the object being to obtain the inclusion of technical education within the scope of the Bill. The Amendment was rejected by 197 to 136.—The third substantial Amendment was moved by Mr. J. Wilson, his object being to strike out the Sub-section of the second Clause which allocated, out of the grant, £30,000 to the Scottish Universities. He contended that any such grant should be provided out of the Imperial funds, and not out of Scotch money of which the £30,000 entirely consisted. The Amendment was rejected by 236 to 104.—*The Evening Standard*, Wednesday, May 4, 1892.

hindered from doing as they please. He once more forgets that directly interference takes place some people are hindered. The Professor, like most semi-Socialists, identifies peace and security with Governments, forgetting that the two are by no means identical. In Russia there is plenty of government, but very little security. Among the Wood-Veddas there is no social organization at all, but nevertheless it is thought "perfectly inconceivable that any person should take that which does not belong to him, or strike his fellow, or say anything that is untrue."* Not only is the rule or law that I should not interfere with the pleasing of my neighbour perfectly intelligible, but it is practised among some uncivilized savages. Needless to say, the latter don't possess Socialistic Universities.

But if the liberty of each is not to be limited by the equal liberty of all, what is it to be limited by? Shall we say, "by the unequal liberty of all?" The Professor dislikes the word liberty. He asks what the liberty of each is? This is exactly what Socialistic law pretends to tell. We content ourselves with saying what it is not: we say it is not interfering with your neighbour. To tell what it is would require an enumeration of all men's infinitely varied non-aggressive activities. The Professor says that liberty must be limited by a social law. The abuse of it, which makes liberty unequal, must; and if the law gives more liberty to all, than it takes away, we don't object. All law is an evil, but sometimes it is a lesser evil than anarchy. But in order to give more freedom than it takes away, law must be framed upon a recognition of the liberty of each limited by the like liberty of all. In a word, the law in question must be an attempt to restore the broken equality: *i.e.*, the equal freedom that has been destroyed by the violence or fraud it is seeking in its blundering way to remedy. Professor Flint says liberty should be "limited by just law." Exactly; but is interfering with our neighbours just at all? If not, then, how can any law be just which carries out such interference? We are ultimately brought back to the questions: what are the justifications of law; on what principles should law be framed? If we say that it is unjust to interfere with our neighbour, and that it is just to respect his freedom, then law, in so far as it is just, must be of a purely protective and non-interfering character. In this sense just law is "constituted by liberty, or mere equality of liberty," the very thing Professor Flint denies. To talk about "social law" as if it were something to be determined apart from all considerations of equal liberty, and yet never to tell us on what other considerations it should be determined, is simply darkening counsel with words. It throws no light whatever upon the problem of the limits of Government, while it furnishes a specious excuse for every new Socialistic interference.

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* Quoted by H. Spencer in "Man *versus* the State."

Professor Flint sums up his argument thus:—"In fact, the phrase 'the liberty of each, limited alone by the like liberty of all' is destitute of meaning apart from knowledge of a law which limits liberty—apart from knowledge of the very law which it is supposed to reveal." Now, if Professor Flint had stated the Individualist maxim more clearly he would have seen that it *does* express a rule or law by which to limit liberty. For this very purpose it was framed. "The fullest possible liberty for each, consistent with the *equal* liberty of all," either means that liberty should be limited by the rule of equality, or it means nothing. But if it means the former it does convey the "knowledge of a law which limits liberty," viz., the law of equality.

Now let us examine a reply that has been made to the contention that socialistic regulation is incompatable with justice.

On page 35 of his book on *Darwinism and Politics*, Mr. D. G. Ritchie urges that the arguments advanced against State Socialism on the score of injustice, only hold good as against a partial collective compulsion; complete and thoroughgoing State-action does not lie open to them. For example, "giving free education to some children may be objected to as pauperising: free education as the right of all would make none paupers."

How thoughtless these force-fanatics are! Free education for all, would still leave the possessors of children in pauper-dependence upon the non-possessors—the married dependent upon the earnings of maids and bachelors. Like all Socialism, it would frequently mean the compulsory endowment of the more sensual and less thrifty at the expense of the less sensual and more thrifty. In other words, it would largely amount to the expropriation of the worthy in order to fill the world with the unworthy. State-Socialism is laziness, carelessness, and sensuality combined into a sort of old man of the sea, seated firmly with his legs twined around the neck of personal worth, bullying the latter until it is ridden to death. If, as Socialists affirm, the *voluntary* survival of the fit is cruel, what shall we say of the *compulsory* survival of the unfit? If it is unjust to prevent people from forcing the results of their own shortcomings upon others, what shall we say of the justice of a system which does not only fail to prevent, but actually forces, the consequences of unthrift or of sensuality on those who are not responsible for them? "Bear ye one another's burdens" is well when the burden is voluntarily undertaken, for then, and then only, the good feeling goes with the act; but where it is not voluntarily undertaken, where virtue has the consequences of vice forcibly thrust upon it, and this without any choice or moral acquiesence on its own part, a system prevails which tends to drag all individual worth down to one low level of degradation. And certainly if there is little justice in this kind of compulsion when it is partial, there can be still less when it is complete. This is only going from bad to worse. What we want from Mr. Ritchie and his fellow force-worshippers, is a justification for A legally forcing the consequences of his vice or folly upon B; until we get this, we are without any justification for similar conduct on the part of a crowd of A's towards a crowd of B's.

The shortsighted character of Mr. Ritchie's analysis, shows itself plainly enough when he is found arguing about "Free" Education as if everybody were willing to have exactly the same article, provided it is called by the same name. As a matter of fact, views on education are fortunately as varied as views on religion. This is a sign of health and promotes toleration. Now, State education is at best but the particular kind of cramming system approved of by the majority (or their official wire-pullers) for the moment; so that to force this one system upon all varieties of ideas and tastes, is as unjust as to force a particular kind of State religion upon everybody. Surely the centuries of religious persecution have sufficiently shown the folly of forcing our fads, religious or non-religious, upon each other. The great danger of modern times is, that the variety and many-sideness of human nature, will be destroyed in the cast-iron force-machines of social fanatics. It should be remembered that social tyranny is worse than religious tyranny. The latter touched but a portion of life: trade, commerce, amusement, health, &c., it generally left entirely free. But the tyranny of the social bigot has no limit. It coerces all parts of life alike. There is no portion of personal freedom that is not in some way threatened by it. The State machine would be everywhere: everything would go through it, and would be crushed and maimed by it. Popery in its worst days was a flea-bite to what this would be. The greatest curse of modern times is the social fanatic, who seeks to use the strong arm of the State in order to drag all humanity down to the level of his own narrow and degraded views.

Now let us see what Mr. Ritchie has got to say about industrial competition. There are two kinds of competition: that of brains and that of muscles. According to Mr. Herbert Spencer these are respectively exemplified in industrial and militant types of society. Under the industrial *regime* the individual reason of each citizen is allowed the fullest possible expression, consistent with equal freedom for the expression of the reason of all other citizens. You are free to produce what you can with such faculties, great or small, that you happen to possess, and to exchange the product for whatever others will freely give out of the results of their faculties, but you are not free to forcibly appropriate either the faculties or products of others. In order that liberty shall be maximized, it is necessary for compulsion to be minimized. We coerce the thief because, not content with equal liberty for himself, he coerces others; he breaks the equality of freedom, and so puts himself outside the rightful enjoyment of it. In order to make liberty as equal as possible we are obliged to restrict him—for a time at least. If as much as possible of individual liberty for everybody, were not the object aimed at, we should have no more warrant for coercing the thief, than for treating the taxation compulsionists in the same manner. The thief makes a forced levy in order to carry out something which he thinks desirable; the taxation-compulsionist does exactly the same thing; only the thief, unfortunately for himself, is in such a small minority that he is soon put *hors-de-combat.* There is an external social force to stop the small confiscator; there is none to hinder the larger confiscator. The unit collars with fear and trembling; the majority with impunity. It is disgraceful to steal on a small scale; but robbery on a large scale is respectable.

It is quite obvious from this that our present *regime* is a mixture of militancy and industrialism. In some cases we unite to defend the freedom of the personal character, and to allow it scope for expression. In other cases we unite to crush the individual; and attempt to compel him to square his non-aggressive actions with our despotic social framework. The thief shall not coerce him for his (the thief's ends) but we (the majority) shall coerce him for ours. Of course the thief's ends are wrong and ours are right. We say so, and we are the majority, and the majority's ends are always right. The voice of the majority is the voice of God, because the majority is God. We cannot possibly do wrong: we never crucified the world's Saviours, or compelled them to drink hemlock: we never tolerated the inquisition, or at any time took advantage of our numerically weaker brethren.

Putting these considerations aside for the moment, it is evident that the compulson of the many by the few, or of the few by the many, is of the older militant and warlike type of competition—the competition which destroys the struggle for survival amongst ideas, and sacrifices brains to muscles. This is equally so when the contending parties fight with votes instead of with bayonets. If we "count heads to save the trouble of breaking them" this is because we intend to break them if the counting is not admitted as a substitute. Both weapons are those of force, as distinguished from those of reason. In the matter of your free Church, the competition involved is a struggle of brains, of reason, of argument; compulsion is not now allowed: but in the matter of your "free" museum or park, the lower form of purely militant warfare is revived ; the oldest form of the struggle for existence again comes to the front, and rational beings are not ashamed to imitate the antics of savages.

Yet Mr. Ritchie has the audacity to tell us that this majority struggle is the new and civilized method ; while the industrial form of competition, which prevents the compulsion of muscles in order to allow free play for the action of reason, is the old form revived ; and he urges that the latter "belongs to a lower type than the struggles between organized communities, where a strict organization mitigates the internal strife." In other words, Mr. Ritchie is of opinion that the continual struggle of parties to cram each other's nostrums down one another's throats, is a higher form of competition than what occurs under Free Trade, where each one is at liberty to make the best of his faculties, so long as he does not coerce or compel his fellow. Mr. Ritchie is reversing the order of thing with a vengeance. Free Trade may not be perfect—what is in this world?—but it is at any rate a more elevated and less degrading form of competition than the unprincipled warfare of party politicians.

CHAPTER V.

IN another book written on a similar subject *(The Principles of State Interference)* Mr. Ritchie lays great stress on the fact that liberty is purely negative. He appears to think this objection a very strong one. Of course liberty is negative, but it is none the less valuable on that account. Nay, its negative character *is* its value; for it is this feature alone that enables it to be the condition of all that is valuable in life. In one part of his book Mr. Ritchie himself appears to recognise this truth; for he admits that freedom of choice, a purely negative condition, is the necessary ground of all human morality; and he even goes so far as to approve of the late Professor Green's statement that "the direct legal enforcement of morality cannot be considered expedient or inexpedient: it is *impossible.* The morality of an act depends on the state of the will of the agent, and therefore the act done under compulsion ceases to have the character of a moral act. It wants the negative condition of morality." And in a note Mr. Ritchie himself adds, "The same holds true, of course, with regard to religion, if religion is anything more than ritual observance. There is a story told that some Tory Churchman (who must have been born two centuries too late) said to the late Professor Thorold Rogers: "Religion must be compulsory, or else there will be no religion at all."

As might be expected from a State Socialist, Mr. Ritchie cannot see any analogy between compulsory religion and compulsory education. He thinks that while State compulsion cannot produce genuine piety, it may very easily produce genuine knowledge. We are beginning to find out otherwise. We are discovering that while, on the one hand, the compulsion of the Board Schools has given young people such a distaste for healthy reading, that they use what little educational residue it leaves behind, in helping them to devour their favourite penny dreadfuls and shilling shockers, in flooding the *Free Libraries* with demands for for sensational literature, or in wallowing in all the filth of the criminal and divorce courts; on the other hand everything in the shape of literature that partakes of an intellectual or a moral character, is becoming more and more shunned by these satiated recipients of compulsory State cram, these soiled minds that speedily vomit up the good food they have been so carefully stuffed with, and then take to feeding on garbage. In France, where the State has had education in its hands for a longer period, the literary degradation is even more marked. The coarse animalism of ZOLA dominates alike both story and play, and even the refined literary genius of a DAUDET cannot keep clear of the sewer.

The reason advanced by Mr. Ritchie for making a distinction between religion and education is paltry in the extreme. He says "There is no *a priori* presumption in favour of a general policy of *laissez faire*, because in the vast number of cases the individual does not find himself in a position in which he can act "freely" (*i.e.*, direct his action to objects which reason assigns as desirable) without the intervention of the State to put him in such a position—*e.g.*, by insuring that he shall at least have some education." One cannot avoid smiling at this antiquated excuse. Was there ever an unjust institution in this world that did not exist for the good of the individual; either for his spiritual or temporal good? These coercionists are all sacrificing themselves for your good, my dear reader! Surely, under these circumstances, you cannot do anything less than love and obey them.

Precisely the same argument has all along been used by religious fanatics to justify the compulsory attendance of religious observances. You must be coerced for your good, not merely your temporal good, but your eternal good: a much more important thing. If from your earliest years, any amount of religion is not crammed down your throat, you may grow up in Egyptian darkness worse than death. Think of that! You may go to hell; and its our special duty not to let you. You shall not even damn yourself. We will *force* salvation upon you, and pitch you into heaven whether you want to go there or not. Ah, my friend! it's not the money, or the position, or the power that we want. All these things are nothing. It's you, or rather your precious soul, that we are grieving about. We love you, my dear friend, and we mean to save you from hell. Be assured you shall not go there if force can keep you away.

It is never noticed that if people are left perfectly free, those who want religion will take it: those who don't, will let it alone. The want will prove that it is adapted to their nature: the dislike will prove that it is unadapted. What profit can there be in compelling men to wear what does not fit them? The disadvantages outweigh the advantages. In the matter of religion we have already discovered this truth, and the time will come when we shall acknowledge that education comes equally under the same law. Those who like and desire education, always pick it up; just as they take to music, painting, drawing, or any other hobby. Then it fits them: it becomes a part of themselves. They understand it, and use and wield it as easily as an expert fencer wields his sword. All excellence is built up in this free and spontaneous manner. Nature is at the bottom of everything that is of the least value, and all the artificial cramming in the world will ultimately break down before her. The interest and the love that always go hand in hand with freedom, will do infinitely more to help on the cause of real knowledge, than the most perfect universal coercion system that official cunning can contrive; for the latter at best but turns knowledge into a task, and thus leaves it as devoid of soul and reality as the mechanical ritual of a State—compelled hypocrisy. The only ends of compulsion in matters educational will be pedantry, monotony, uniformity, hatred of natural spontaniety, and contempt of all real self-acquired knowledge. "That the whole or any part of the education of the people," says JOHN STUART MILL, "should be in the hands of the State, I go as far as anyone in deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or a majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body."

The reply made to all this, is, that the child is too young to judge for itself?* Even the most elementary instruction is useless to many, and the vast majority of occupations in no way require it. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, the State cramming system only unfits the children of the working class, for those more laborious occupations to which they are both by nature and heredity specially fitted. If it provided them with something better, there might be some excuse for its existence. But this is beyond its power; for it cannot alter the laws of supply and demand. All it can do is to stock the labour market with physically and mentally broken down wasters, who are fit neither for thought or action. The practical politician is a very practical person. He does all the harm he possibly can, and then cries out for power to do more harm. What he has done for education the public will some day have their eyes opened to see.

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* Useful and instructive though good reading may be, it is yet only one mode of cultivating the mind: and is much less influential than practical experience and good example in the formation of character. There were wise, valiant, and true-hearted men bred in England long before the existence of a reading public. Magna Charta was secured by men who signed the deed with their marks. Though altogether unskilled in deciphering the literary signs by which principles were denominated upon paper, they yet understood and appreciated, and boldly contended for the things themselves. Thus the foundations of English liberty were laid by men who though illiterate, were nevertheless of the very highest stamp of character. . . . . Many of our

But who are best able to judge what kind of training a child most needs? or whether it is or is not naturally fitted for book learning?—An official bureau acting from a remote centre, or those persons directly interested and related, who can act on the spot, are able to "temper the wind to the shorn lamb," and who are specially fitted both by experience, relationship, and heredity to ascertain what each particular child is specially adapted to do?*

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most energetic and useful workers have been but sparing readers. BRINDLEY and STEPHENSON did not learn to read and write until they reached manhood, and yet they did great works and lived manly lives; JOHN HUNTER could barely read or write when he was 20 years old, though he could make tables and chairs with any carpenter in the trade. "I never read," said the great physiologist, when lecturing before his class; "this" (pointing to some part of the subject before him) "this is the work that you must study if you wish to become eminent in your profession." When told that one of his contemporaries had charged him with being ignorant of the dead languages, he said, "I would undertake to teach him that on the dead body which he never knew in any language, dead or living."—*Self Help*, by S. SMILES, page 273.

* In the same way that legal enactments and customs have authority in States, so also the words of a father and customs have authority in private families; and still greater authority on account of the relationship, and the benefits conferred: for children have a natural

The whole system of State parenthood is suicidal. For logically carried out it means that children shall be regulated by a nation, or rather by a majority of people who individually have had no experience of parenthood, and who consequently are totally incapacitated for their duties. Everybody doing the duties of each in this matter of training children, means that each shall shirk his own duties; and therefore that each separate unit of the State shall be without any personal experience of what these duties are. Everybody under this system is trying to shove his duties on to everybody else, and the result will be—well those who come later will see what it will be.

The position of individualism on this point is perfectly clear. Let education alone. It is better that a continually diminishing number of children should go uneducated, than that the State should usurp the natural and morally-disciplining functions of parents, that it should first begin to teach, then to feed and clothe, and then to lodge the children of the middle and working classes. Ignorance is a trifle by the side of State communism. But under greater freedom the advantages of education would become manifest (just as the advantages of religion do), and when needed would be practically adopted. The principal of the survival of the fittest might be safely left to take care of this. We must remember that in the last resort, it is not we who decide what is fittest, and what shall survive; but nature herself: and she can weigh up communes and States as easily as atoms and stars. We are strong only in obedience

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affection for their parents, and are naturally disposed to obey. Moreover private education differs from public; as in the case of medicine; for universally abstinence and rest are good for a man in a fever; but to a particular individual perhaps they are not; and the pugilist perhaps does not use the same style of fighting with all. It would seem then that the case of the individual might be studied with greater accuracy if the education was private, for then each is more likely to meet with what suits him.—ARISTOTLE, ETH. 10, ix.

to her laws. Our legislative defiance of these laws will only lead us to national death. The final judge of efficiency and inefficiency is not a loutish duty-shirking democracy: it is an unvarying cosmic process, which takes no cognizance of the shouts and screams of passion-driven multitudes, and which will eventually sweep all the circumventions of these cunning political knaves into the well merited limbs of oblivion. Natural law is just the one fact that the politician never reckons with; and it is this fact that will throw him at last.

One point on which Mr. Ritchie very strongly insists is the impossibility of drawing a hard and fast line between social and self-regarding conduct. He is perfectly right. There are few, if any, actions that affect only the agent. No doubt to disparage his book very seriously affects Mr. Ritchie; and the fact that he wrote the book must very seriously affect those who are foolish enough to imagine that the cause of liberty can be in the least degree damaged by it. The religious people were once very seriously affected by arguments they could only refute with chains and faggots. And why not? Whatever you do that displeases me, that I disbelieve in and think wrong (and of course if I think a thing wrong it *is* wrong) very seriously affects me: and whatever I do on the same terms very seriously affects you. The religious people had a rather neat way of putting this undeniable truth. They used to say that if a man only damned himself, it would not much matter, but unfortunately, he had such a sociable knack of damning others, or at least of persuading others to damn themselves. Such damnable conduct could not be tolerated, any more than the social conduct of which Mr. Ritchie disapproves can be allowed; and the religious people did their level best to stop it, just as Mr. Ritchie and his friends will do what they can to stop what they don't agree with: they (the religious people) failed; religious heresy proved too strong for them; and Mr. Ritchie and his friends will also fail: social heresy will prove too strong for them. For

> "Freedom's battle once begun
> Though baffled oft is ever won."

Dear me! the social effect of conduct: where does it stop? Take one extremely simple but important instance. If you wear no collar you outrage society. If you wear three collars you outrage society. What is there you can do or abstain from doing that does not hurt somebody? True, you may only hurt their feelings; but then feelings are the only, and the tenderest, and therefore the most important things, most people have got. You won't hurt men of sense? Granted. But then men of sense are in too small a minority to constitute a State; and when they are numerous enough to do this, you will have been long ago dead and buried. For you must remember that society in relation to you simply means "everybody else," and if you don't live to please this motley collective creature, naturally it will attempt to make you do so. Mr. Ritchie comes forward to back it up in the good work: or at least he would do so if it did what he wants it to do: but if it did otherwise—well, he would begin to entertain some doubts about its infallibility. Power is only legitimate when it coerces in *our* way, and rams *our* excellent ideas down the throats of the people. When it takes to thrusting the wrong ideas of others down our throats, it is illegitimate, unjust, tyrannical, inexpedient, and therefore cannot be abolished to soon.

There is no end to the regulation that might be started in the name of other people's (societies) interest. Think of the number of laws that could be passed on the plea of protecting posterity. In the first place there would be the need of protection from the disastrous and far-reaching effects of bad logic.

This would mean the suppression of all socialistic literature, for a start. Volumes might be written to show how necessary this measure is; how bad logic injures, not merely the externals of life, but the very centre, the very heart and core, the supreme directing agency on whose purity and strength the whole business of life rests. Then there is the injury done to future generations by the drinking of fermented liquors. For even if you drink little, you lay the seed of a habit which may sprout in the drunkenness of the next generation. "If I get drunk," says Mr. Leslie Stephen, "my son has the gout." "Then stop the tap," chorus Sir Wilfred Lawson and the whole of his fanatical crew. This is your social despotism all over. Has my neighbour a habit that won't square with my notions of fitness? Then fine him! imprison him! bully him into some semblance of right behaviour! Don't trust to the spontaneous growth of individual reason, or to nature's steady illimination of the unfit. These methods are too slow. Humanity must be made perfect immediately. Force is the true remedy, and my party the only one that knows how to wield it.

This is the method of sentimentalism, of the mental blindness which cannot see that moral evils tend to cure themselves. This is the pity which is ten thousand times more cruel than the reason that it affects to despise. In a village not far from here dwells a man who only lives to starve himself to death. He wants to pass through what Epictetus poetically calls "the open door" before nature gives him the signal. His friends object and provide a keeper to retain him. This keeper will frequently spend hours in patiently bullying him to eat. The man is a misery to himself and to all around him. But it would be cruel to allow him to follow what appears to him to be to his own interest! He must be forcibly retained in a world that he is not adapted to live in. This is a fair sample of the wisdom of sentimentalism, of that busybodying spirit which presumes to take the universe under its charge. How much truer and more just is the healthy common-sense so well expressed by KENT in the last scene of *King Lear*.

> O let him pass! he hates him,
> That would upon the rack of this tough world
> Stretch him out longer.

Apply the foregoing to the case of a great drunkard. Sentimentalism is now agitating for public asylums, supported out of the rates, for the cure of "poor inebriates." Here is a young man who is rapidly drinking himself to death. "What a pity," says sentimentalism, "cannot something be done for him?" As a matter of fact something is being done for him, and the best that can be done under the circumstances. He is rushing (or lushing) himself out of a world in which he is not adapted to live. Nothing could be better.* Moreover, he is a self-made *helot*, a standing example against the evil to which he is succumbing. "This won't do," says sentimentalism, "he must be stopped at this game; science must take care of him; sober people must be taxed to prop up this morally rotten pillar, this encumbrance which, if left to itself, will speedily carry itself off." So he is forcibly thrust into an asylum, where he is gently treated; that is to say, where he is messed and fiddled about for a time, and then returned "cured." Yes, cured indeed; but his spirit is gone. Before, he was a dying man; now, he is a living baby; watched continually, and always suspected of being liable at any moment to again fall into the same habit. And, if ever he marries, he transmits this slavish, broken spirit to posterity. Is it worth while taxing the sober and self-reliant in order to keep this weak and morally bankrupt type artificially on the go?

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* This excludes no sort of voluntary help, or, what is better still, voluntary example. But it allows sufficient play for the illumination of the unfit: a most necessary process, *and one that has to be artificially supplied when the State undertakes to look after everything.* For example, in socialistic Sparta it was found necessary to inspect everybody, and to snuff out those that were thought to be unfit.

To logically carry out Mr. Ritchie's doctrine of social influence, we must stop people from doing anything. For whatever they do will be done imperfectly, and will more or less injure present or future generations. Even Mr. Ritchie would hardly go to this length. He would say that to some extent we must permit human folly and take the risks. But by what rule are we to measure this extent? Is it to be legal to chew twist, and illegal to drink beer? Is political gambling to be permitted, and usury suppressed by Act of Parliament? Is Protestantism to be "the thing," and Catholicism "not wanted?" Mr. Ritchie supplies no rule whatever. He never attempts to supply any. Yet the more this sort of regulation is indulged in, the more needful does some rule become. He prefers the happy-go-lucky method of tinkering here and patching there, getting everything into a hopeless tangle, and then crying out for more grandmotherly legislation to set matters straight. He fails to see that this is a game at which two can play; that if the teetotalers coerce the drinkers to-day, the drinkers may turn the tables on the teetotalers to-morrow; and that where there is no respect for the principle of liberty, one set of fools have as much right as another, to act the part of petty despot, and ride the high horse over everybody.

The doctrine of liberty has its difficulties, but it is, at any rate, more definite and precise than Socialism. It says: "Stop, where possible, overt interferences, and deal with frauds and contract-breakings in proportion as they approximate towards the character of overt interferences. This rule is not infallible, and, like everything human, its carrying out is beset with difficulties. But, if roughly observed, it will at least keep a country clear of that miserable condition of things where each fool, as his turn comes round, attempts to force all his special fads and crotchets upon everybody; where you, together with all other citizens, are my collective master, while I, together with all other citizens, conspire to make a slave of you: in a word, where each individual man is a perfect slave, minus the millionth part of mastership he is able to exercise through the ballot. The experience of all ages teaches us to leave men's vices and follies to punish themselves. Springing as they do from moral causes which force cannot touch, it follows that all our legislative attempts to destroy them are only so much time and trouble to the bad; time and trouble that might be better used in furthering the really needful and defensive work of government. Nature, as exemplified in that law of mental consistency, which, for want of a clearer term, we call the moral law, gets at these vices and follies much better than we can. She alone reaches down to the conscience, the centre from which all the government of life proceeds, and strengthens it with a real knowledge of the tremendous issues of conduct. She works both within and without, and moulds the soul as easily as the body. But our legislative machinery only touches the mere externals of life: the soul, the moral part, that which alone gives value and direction to all the rest, this machinery leaves unaffected, except for the worse; inasmuch as the force it involves augments the hatred which the coerced man naturally feels towards those who attempt to coerce him.

It is of course quite true that freedom by itself, and apart from moral effort, cannot make humanity perfect. Nobody ever urged that it could. What the believers in individualism do urge, is, that all the good there is in men has grown out of the right use of freedom. Liberty is not exactly well-being, but it is an indispensible condition of well-being. And the evils attendant upon freedom are, on the whole, far less than those accompanying tyranny. It is better for me to run the risk of my neighbour's want of cleanliness than attempt to wash and comb him down regularly every morning. It is better to put up with his ignorance than destroy his love of knowledge by cramming books down his throat. I would rather read Mr. Ritchie's bad arguments than compel him to learn logic. In short, in a free country, if a man has not sufficient sense to be anything else, he has a perfect right to be a fool. It is not worth while trying to regulate everybody because so many exercise this right. The game isn't worth the candle; we lose more than we gain by attempting to restrict such a right; and assuredly our Socialist reformers ought to be the last people in the world to menace it.

Mr. Ritchie tries to get MILL into a corner by bringing forward a very frivolous argument. MILL urged that "liberty consists in doing what one desires." This, rejoins Mr. Ritchie, is only a negative definition. "If you see a man stepping on a bridge which you know to be unsafe, you feel justified in seizing and holding him back. . . ." "But," says MILL, "Liberty consisted in doing what one desires; and the man does not desire to fall into the river." Possibly not. But it by no means follows that he does not prefer to take the risks, in preference to being "seized and held" by Mr. Ritchie. At any rate, there *are* men who prefer this. Those who believe in liberty *must* take these risks; unless they prefer a State appointed Ritchie following them about everywhere, in order to safeguard them against the possible risks of freedom. Not a bad illustration, this, of what Socialism is; of what it will be when every man is every other man's *jailor*. The argument applies all round. When, for example, Mr. Ritchie was just about to publish his book on State interference, some official personage might have come along saying, "My dear sir, this book won't sell: it's not what the public want: they prefer Ally Sloper and the penny novelette. I cannot therefore allow you to fall into the river of economic ruin. My conscience and the State's love for you won't let me quietly stand by and see you run such terrible risks. This MSS must be 'seized and held' until the refined tastes of the majority learn to appreciate it."

All that Mr. Ritchie and his friends are warranted in doing, consists in warning a man of the danger he runs, and if he still persists in risking that danger, the strongest possible evidence is afforded that running risks *is* doing "as he desires." There is no accounting for tastes. The game of seizing and keeping a would-be suicide is more expensive than it is worth. The world is best rid of such people. Though, in point of fact, a man may run risks without being a suicide. Just fancy Mr. Ritchie "seizing" and "holding" Blondin from his walk over Niagara, saying in the sweetest possible accents, "My most worthy sir, liberty consists in in doing what you desire. Like myself you desire to run no risks." We can imagine how Blondin might turn round and say "You wretched busybody, I am willing to run any amount of risks rather than be placed at the tender mercies of you and your despotic crew. I did not come into this world to dance at the end of your official string. Because you live in a state of chronic funk, is life for me to be without danger and excitement? Out of my daylight, and go bury yourself in your socialistic feather bed! Go; be looked after; or look after somebody else! This world was made for the fearless and the free, and to them it will belong when poltroons are no more."

CHAPTER VI.

Mr. Ritchie is not content with bad reasoning: he indulges in still worse superstition. The latter shall now be examined.

Nearly all men worship a fetish of one kind or another, a special, local, limited pet mumbo jumbo, that never was and never will be outside the imaginations of its purblind votaries. There is the Paleyian teleologist with his convenient *deus ex machina*, that fits and squares with anything, and "alters as it alteration finds." There is the more advanced theist with his infinite personality, his metaphysical round square and square circle; for such in truth is all that it amounts to. There is the devout Catholic with his infallible Pope. There is the Positivist with his abstract Humanity, the "Virgin Mother" as Mr. Congreave prefers to call it. There is the Spiritualist with his unlimited supply of highly probable ghosts. There is the Theosophist with his constantly re-incarnated Mahatmas. And, finally, there is the State Socialist with his worship of the abstract State, the the gracious dispenser of favours, the supreme and infallible source of all power and all wisdom; in a word, the only God there is or ever will be. It is true that socialists like Mr. B. Shaw have discovered that there is no God,* but their investigations have never been carried so far as to undermine the divinity and prestige of the organized crowd, the State par excellence. The abstract man is ungodable: this multiplied duplicate of your noble self, was before the worlds were, and as a God he will remain when they have ceased to be. In his corporate capacity, he is the source of all natural law, the maker and unmaker of every natural power: he is limited and conditioned by nothing stronger than himself: at his nod all the possesses of nature stop; the course of evolution turns back; and when he wills it, a new universe suddenly comes into being. In short, in his collective aspect he is the embodiment of infinite wisdom and infinite strength. And when we look around on our noble fellow mortals, when we carefully mark all their inex-

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* I deny that God exists, that Reason is a motor, and that Duty, Self-Sacrifice and Discipline are abstractly any better than Self-Assertion and Insubordination.—*Free Life*, October 31st, 1890, page 65.

Self-Assertion and Insubordination are vague: so is Self-Sacrifice. As for Reason, it is rather a guide than a motor, a balancing of life's forces in such a manner that they harmonize with the rationally interpreted process of things, on the basis of seeking one's own true self-interest. This alone is virtue. Take an instance. You would avoid drinking adulterated spirit, if your reason told you that you would be injured by so doing. In other words, your desire for the stuff would be outbalanced by the still greater desire for calm harmonious working with the process of things. And so with all other vices. This is all that is meant by virtue or obedience to the dictates of right reason. Who disobeys is a fool; for he does worse than deny the highest (call it what you please): he soils and degrades himself, and fouls the purity of his own most high and intellectual nature. Says EPICTETUS, "But thou art a supreme object, thou art a piece of God, thou hast in thee something that is a portion of Him. Why, then, art thou ignorant of thy high ancestry? Why knowest thou not whence thou camest? Wilt thou not remember, in thine eating, who it is that eats, and whom thou dost nourish? in cohabiting, who it is that cohabits? in converse, in exercise, in argument, knowest thou not that thou art nourishing a God, exercising a God? Unhappy man! thou bearest about with thee a God, and knowest it not! Thinkest thou I speak of some God of gold and silver, and external to thee? Nay, but in thyself thou dost bear him, and seest not that thou defilest him with thine impure thoughts and filthy deeds. In the presence even of an image of God thou hadst not dared to do one of those things which thou dost. But in the presence of God himself within thee, who seeth and heareth all things, thou art not ashamed of the things thou dost both desire and do, O thou unwitting of thine own nature, and subject to the wrath of God!"

pressible perfections, we are forced in common honesty to admit this truth. There is no doubt about it, Humanity is the supreme being: and in virtue of its honour, truthfulness, toleration, charity, disinterestedness, and noble love of justice.

One of the sincerest converts to this great religion is Mr. Ritchie. According to him the *individual* is nothing: the *individuals*, everything. He builds up his huge collective God by adding together a sufficient number of nothings, and then (as is most fit) begins to speak of the product with bated breath. His arguments shall now be examined. On page 11 of *The Principles of State Interference* he says: "The individual is thought of, at least spoken of, as if he had a meaning and significance apart from his surroundings, and apart from the community of which he is a member. [His relation to his surroundings is not and cannot be denied. But the "community" is a mere drop in the ocean of these surroundings. The individual lives and works with the strength of the sun and stars, aye, and of what is infinitely more than these. A member! What is the "community' itself but a little screaming, fretting member of the infinite?] *It may be quite true that the significance of the individual is not exhausted by his relations to any given set of surroundings;* but apart from all of these [here "all" and the little herd called the "community" are cleverly lumped together, as will be seen from the following words] he is a mere abstraction—a logical ghost, a metaphysical spectre, which haunts the habitations of those who have derided metaphysics. *The individual, apart from all relations to a community, is a negation.* You can say nothing about him, or rather it, except that it is not any other individual."

Well, if we happened to be this "individual," we think we could say a good deal; or if we did not say it we could think it. When we hear these superstitious people trying to explain away "the individual," we simply laugh; for we know that such self-effacing philosophers cannot, and never will, explain this fact away. The reader may perhaps say we ought not to call them hard names. Perhaps not, but at present we are unable to think of any more exact descriptions, and, after all, truth is largely an affair of naming. If we can say what is correct we are content, and as for politeness—well, we leave that for polite people. It is one of those sweet sociable habits we could never learn.

Now, on comparing the two sentences that are printed in italics, it will be at once seen that the first sentence admits the possible inaccuracy of the second. It is true that this admission is veiled as much as possible. And no wonder too! For the man who tells his reader that he (the reader) has no meaning apart from the community, asserts what each individual knows to be false on the strength of his own personal experience. If every man, woman, and child in the world died to-morrow and left you to live alone, you would still have a meaning and a relation to your natural environment, and so, under the same circumstances, would your neighbour, and so would Mr. Ritchie, and so would any man. The man who tells me that I am a metaphysical ghost, apart from him and the rest of the crowd, either says what he knows to be a deliberate lie, or fails to grasp the simplest elements of reasoning. If he says that he himself is a ghost, or that the crowd is a collection of ghosts, I shall not presume to contradict him. They may all be ghosts for anything I know, or care, or can demonstrate to the contrary; and if, like ghosts, they all vanished this moment, they could not take the world away with them: the sun will still rise and set, the grass and flowers would grow, the everlasting stars would still look down; still would remain the air and the light; and the unit could live out his natural term in harmony with that infinite existence, that universal order, whose laws he is here to obey; and which was before the jarring discord of human voices broke its silence, and will remain when human voices are as silent as itself. If "Society" is great, Nature is greater; and he who knows himself to belong to her, who lives to see and obey her laws, could be strong, self-reliant, and happy, though all the cunning knaves and babbling fools of this world should one fine morning sink into eternal dust, and leave him to inhabit time and liberty alone. This is as certain as that twice 2 are 4. It utterly disposes of all the shallow lies about the *necessary* dependence of the unit upon the crowd. The laugh is always against the Socialist, for no man with an ounce of spirit in his nature cares a toss either for him or his crowd. The best reply to this fussy person's nonsense about "Society" is to point him to the universe, and tell him and his crowd to go to the deuce: that they are quite as much in your road as you are in theirs, and that you can do just as well without them as they can do without you. The real strength of the individual is the truth he sees, not the vain chattering of the foolish crowd; and this truth remains so long as he remains; totally unaffected by the coming and going of the outside units that make up what is called "Society": fixed and sure to the last second of this mortal life. The unit will make a sorry exchange, when he gives away this real and unshakable piety, for the State Socialist's puerile unhealthy social-god worship. His only good is within himself, and, if he finds it not there, nothing outside can give it to him.

What poor transparent twaddle it is, this stuff about the "community." The very existence of the thief and the murderer in our midst, proves how much social membership is necessarily involved in individual existence. Facts speak louder than theories. What sort of a "member" is that unsentimental gentleman who contrives machines for blowing up holy Czars and uncorrupt Houses of Parliament? That is a strange hand which knocks off its own head. The truth is, no man need belong to any human association unless he sees it is to his interest to do so. And the more you restrict his freedom, the less will he be likely to find his interest inside your association. Whatever healthy human association there is, is not a physical fact, or a social fact, but a moral fact; and it rests entirely upon that respect for individual freedom which permits men to freely associate together and work in rational harmony with one another. If you tell a man that he *must* do some particular thing because he is a "member" of your social body, he will quickly tell you that there are two things necessary to this kind of "membership," namely, your consent *and his consent*, and that the membership cannot truthfully exist until you have obtained the latter. You may say it exists, but he will know you to be either a fool or a liar, and in the long run you will be made to know that socialistic humbug does not pay even in politics.

"Membership" indeed! The nearest approach made to this in human affairs is the relation of an unborn child to its mother, and even this is not a membership of "society,' but only of a single and perfectly distinct individual, who may (or may not) live at the time in what is called "society": that is, in the same "State" or in the same town as other single and distinct individuals. And even this narrow and non-social membership is broken at birth. The very act of birth is a clear and distinct liberation from all real membership, except the unbreakable and universal membership of nature, and is a launching forth of each human creature into the realm of choice, where each one can either work with others, go into the wilds, or into the silence; or make it as hot as hell for those who attempt to *compel* "membership" of a "community" by violating the consent and trampling upon the rights of individuals.

Let us take a concrete case, and assume for argument's sake that A was a member of a community before he was actually separated at birth from B, who was a member of a community before she was separated from C, who was a member of a community before she was separated from D, and so on to infinity. Now when do we arrive at real, and not hocus pocus membership. For if B was separate when A was born, and if C was separate when B was born (and so on to infinity) how can there ever have been any actual membership at all? We may rest assured there never was, and, what is more, there never will be. The unit is a distinct and independent creature, so far, at least, as other people are concerned. His only object of membership is the infinite impersonal reality in which he lives and moves and has his being. He is one with no outside herd, but only with the indwelling light, whose strength no man and no crowd shall ever break. Even if you put him in a cage, he is still distinct from others, both in his thoughts and actions. All this nonsense about "membership" of a community is simply a lot of bamboozling metaphor and shallow lying. Of course, as the socialist bully is never tired of throwing in the face of his opponent, each individual has the whole social world against him. He knows this if he knows anything. He knows also that the world can and does do its level best to snuff him out. Well, his business is to defend himself. He may as well be killed for a sheep as a lamb. He has only a short time to stand fire. Let him cast all sentiment in the teeth of the hypocrisy that seeks to play upon it. Let him make a virtue of necessity, take the odds, and go out with his face towards the foe. The world can always get rid of the unit: what a poor insignificant mite the single individual is! but there is one thing the world can never do: it can never get rid of the courage which defies the world, and works on through all things for the perfect liberty that yet shall be. There is at work in this infinite universe, a force, a power, a spirit, call it what you will, that cannot allow the monstrous tyranny of socialism to flourish. Under many forms and names has that tyranny sought to get itself fairly established. But, in the long run, it has always been broken, and it will be broken to the end of time. It is a mean cowardly lie, an attempt to cheat each man out of his birthright, and the universe is so constructed that no lie can permanently succeed.

As an instance of the separateness of the individual and the State, take this anecdote:—Helvidius Priscus, a Roman senator and a Stoic philosopher, was commanded by the Emperor Vespasian not to go into the Senate. He replied "It is in your power not to allow me to be a member of the Senate, but so long as I am, I must go in." Said the Emperor, "Go in, but say nothing." Said Helvidius, "Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent." Said Vespasian, "But I must ask your opinion." Said Helvidius, "And I must say what I think right." "But if you do, I shall put you to death." "When did I tell you that I am immortal. You will do your part, and I will do mine: it is your part to kill; it is mine to die, but not in fear. Yours to banish me; mine to depart without sorrow."

In what relation, then, does an ordinary individual stand towards those other individuals who, taken together, are called the general community? In the relation of an exchanger. Exchange makes the only difference between the citizen and the thief, between the man who respects individual consent and the man who violates individual consent; in a word, between the State Socialist and the defender of liberty and property. The Socialist does not believe in *quid pro quo.* It is too sociable to agree with him. For, curiously enough, the man who talks most about social "membership," is precisely the man who is least worthy to be a "member." Of all unsocial people, he is most unsocial who violates the consent of his fellow-man. The Socialist, like the thief and the taxgather, is simply a person who tries to "socialise" what he wants, without stopping to obtain the consent of those to whom it belongs, and who have worked to acquire it. The ordinary citizen does stop to obtain this consent. The latter produces something that he does not want (or gives the time and labour that he would sooner part with than starve) in exchange for something that he does want. This is the only normal human relationship for adult human beings, for those who prefer manhood to babyhood. Civilised man is an exchanging animal, a respecter of that personal consent on which all exchange depends. The savage, like the Socialist and the tax-gatherer, is not an exchanging animal: he is a sort of land pirate who goes out and collars what he wants: thinking, no doubt, that he is justly entitled to all he can get, either by hook or by crook. The difference, then, between savagery and civilization, and between socialism and liberty, is simply this fact of exchange, this respect for personal consent and private property. Consent is the very essence of civilization. Hence it is the business of government, acting on behalf of all, to see that the consent of each individual citizen as regards the disposal of his actions and of his property, shall be carefully respected by all other citizens, in order that each may exchange what he does not want for what he does want. This healthy and unsentimental process of industrial exchange is the only real and lasting social life. Puling Socialists come and disappear, but this shall go on for ever. Nothing can be conceived to be higher. Business, as such, is the noblest and purest form of social intercourse. Compared with this bracing discipline, all other social relations are little better than namby-pamhy tea meetings, where old women whine and groan over everything. You, for example, exchange so much money that you don't need for more important purposes (such as betting and ballet girls for example) in order to obtain this book: I exchange so many words that I don't need, for this money. Is it not awfully mean? Yet it is true. And what is equally true, is, that this kind of exchange is a type of all real sociability. Of course, the world affects to despise it; but then what is there that the world does not affect? The vices of the world are sometimes the virtues of sensible men. Nature has endowed each man with certain needs, and, in a civilized community, exchange is the only fair way of meeting these needs. Business does you good, my canting denouncer of commercialism; it stops your childish whine, makes you keep your eyes open, lest you should be cheated; and effectually knocks all the silly sentimentalism out of your maudlin soul. There is nothing, my dear communist, like business, and minding your own business. Exchange is the noblest thing in life, nobler even than socialization. This capitalist, for instance, exchanges so much capital for so much work: this labourer so much work for so much capital. The former would rather have the work than the capital: the latter would rather have the capital than the luxury of walking about with his hands in his pockets. Of course, both seek to reap some direct or indirect advantage from the exchange. Is it not mean of them? But what that advantage is, is their business and not ours. Ours is to mind our own business. This consent-respecting and exchanging process is the basis of civilization; and the only normal duty of government is to see that neither the Socialistic thief nor the thieving Socialist shall in any degree impare or destroy it. Business, my poor puling sentimentalist: that alone is sociability and true sociableness: all the rest is a nauseous mass of cant, and lies, and flattery, and mutual admiration. Go and read this to your "comrades": they will enjoy it: they love plain truth, and plain unsentimental speaking.

But to continue our argument about the unit and the community. Into what a bog does the contention of the State socialist lands him. For if each individual is a negation when considered apart from his fellows, it is strange that one individual negation should write a book for other individual negations to read; in order to convince them that both writers and readers, considered apart from the community, *and in their relation to nature as a whole*, are mere spectres and phantoms, metaphysical ghosts, nonentities, dreams, nothings. What a plight this leaves the poor State in; for what solidity can that structure contain which is built up of mere ghosts and nonentities? No doubt, as the socialist says, a house is something more than a haphazard collection of stones: it is a particular arrangement of that collection. But if the stones in question were individually only so many abstractions, if they had no reality in relation to nature as a whole, the structure they were formed into would be somewhat unreal. And the same reasoning applies with equal force to the State. If we as separate units had no reality in relation to the universal order, if we did not ultimately draw all our strength and reality from thence, if we could not continue to draw that strength and that reality though all men save ourselves vanished into thin air, the State in which we may (or may not) form a part would be a very unsubstantial affair. It would be a State woven out of moonbeams, misty and unreal as the ghosts that composed it. No, no, my socialist fetish-worshipper, the State is not a deity, and no amount of bad reasoning can ever transform it into one. It draws its strength and reality from that universal order from which you and I draw our strength and reality. If it were abolished to-morrow, this eternal fountain of all life would not be abolished with it; and you and I could still live, though the State perished. Can the State pull down the sky? Can it alter a single law of nature? It cannot. It is but an atom in the infinite, a momentary whisper in the everlasting silence. The socialist is not logical. The outcome of his premise about the unreality of the unit, is not the exaltation of the State into a deity, but rather the deep philosophy of PROSPERO.

> Our revels now are ended. These our actors,
> As I foretold you, were all spirits, and
> Are melted into air, into thin air:
> And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
> The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
> The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
> Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve;
> And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
> Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
> As dreams are made of, and our little life
> Is rounded with a sleep.

That the reality of the State depends upon the reality of its units may be shown by another example. A country dance is something more than a haphazard collection of dancers: it is a conscious joint action of what may be here turned *dance-units*. But the reality of the dance depends entirely on the reality of the units in whose conscious action and interaction it consists. If these units were only so many logical ghosts, the dance would be rather a ghostly affair. So with the State. Group-action at least implies groups of realities, not of phantoms. Even a logical ghost implies a logician somewhere. Perhaps Mr. Ritchie will say that the State is the only logician. When we read his arguments we almost feel disposed to believe him.

Mr. Ritchie has no time to enquire how this most positive and real entity called the State ever managed to get itself into existence. Did it start with a few individual ghosts, and then gradually grow from a few nothings into a crowd of somethings? No doubt an entire community was let down from the clouds by what Mr. Ritchie calls the "Spirit of the Nation"—let down as a beginning, as a fair and definite start; and in order to save the socialist from having to admit that the parts were anticedent to the whole, the individuals prior to the crowd. In most cosmologies one or two individuals come first. But evidently the cosmologies are too individualistic. One or two individual negations could never go on growing until they developed into a positive State. Therefore they did not do so. The many are anticedent to to the few, and the "social body" existed before its elements.

The truth is that Mr. Ritchie gets into his fog by consciously or unconsciously ignoring the distinction between the social environment and the natural environment. In point of fact, the former is but a small fragment of the latter. It is perfectly true, not indeed that we are, but that we have been related to others; or rather to a few of them. To two individuals we owe our very existence, just as they in their turn owe their existence to two other individuals, these last to two others, and so on, until the little child called "society" is lost and merged in that universal mother which is greater than we, which makes and unmakes States, and ultimately brings destruction upon all the high-blown schemes of lying knaves and time-serving political quacks. But if we are related to the human ant-hill, how much more are we related to the manifold and infinite reality, whose air provides us with the breath of life, whose sun warms and supplies us with food, the pulse of whose being beats within our breasts, and whose silent and inexorable laws associate us "with a presence that gives fulness and tone to life, but which we can neither analyse nor comprehend"? These facts cannot be got rid of, whatever theological or anti-theological explanation may be sought to be put upon them. Destroy all individuals save one, and that one is no more reduced to the level of a mere negation than was Alexander Selkirk on his island (when the latter again found himself surrounded with the falseness of "society," he regretted that he had not remained with the reality of his island). The real truth is, the relations of the individual are not by any means exhausted by his voluntary connection with his fellows, important as that connection is supposed by shallow and superstitious minds to be. It has been well said that each man is a universe in himself, and that he has another universe to attend him. This is the true philosophy, and when once a man sees through all the hollow cant about other people, he makes it his own, and lives in it, and dies in it; for truth alone is "the great companion": that only lasts and is with the soul always, even unto the end. This is the indwelling light that lighteth all men. And the love of this is the love which a man giveth unto what alone is divine within him: free, spontaneous, without money and without price; unassailable and unshakable by the envy, malice, and falsehood of others; a *summum bonum*, which society can neither give nor take away. Fill your heart with it, and nothing that others can either do or leave undone, shall ever hurt or harm you more. For to love truth is to be reconciled with all things. This is the peace which conquers death, being, in fact, but a foretaste of the peace to which death leads. And if you have this peace, you will never need to depend on the excitements of others: you will be able to bestow rather than receive; for you will possess that which, the more you give away, the more remains to yourself. How shall this peace be obtained? By despising cant, and going in for justice and fair play all round, by repudiating with all the strength of your soul the wretched lie of mobocracy, and by always walking in spirit with the eternal reality, ever above that herd of low slimy things which little cringing knaves flatter and fear only to their own ultimate undoing.

The individual is indeed but a part of a larger whole; but that whole is infinitely greater than society; in fact, when compared with that whole, society is but a drop in the ocean. This is an old doctrine, taught by the most individualistic philosophy the world has yet heard: the philosophy of Stoicism: the philosophy to which the average human mind has not yet reached, but to which it will reach when the religious and social superstitions of to-day are long buried and forgotten. And the individual is, through his understanding, related to a yet deeper fact. For even the largest assemblage of actual or possible mental phenomena are not all. Before the faintest gleam of consciousness dawned upon the infinite silence, there was, as there is and ever will be, that unknown and unknowable substance, which forms the ultimate ground of all thought and all motion; and when human thought and feeling have gone to their eternal rest, that reality will remain, real and permanent as ever; an indestructable prerequisite to all things. This ultimate fact is inexpressible in terms of thought, not necessarily because it is less than thought, but possibly because it is more. The apprehension of this reality has been well put by TENNYSON—

"Thy voice is on the rolling air;
I hear thee where the waters run;
Thou standest in the rising sun,
And in the setting thou art fair."

"What art thou, then? I cannot guess;
But tho' I seem in star and flower
To feel thee some diffusive power,
I do not, therefore, love thee less."

* * *

"Far off thou art, but ever nigh;
I have thee still, and I rejoice
I prosper, circled with thy voice
I shall not lose thee, tho' I die."

This is the strength of the eternal, and against it the yelping curs of democracy will ever break themselves in vain.

Seeing that Mr. Ritchie argues that individuals, considered in themselves and apart from the State, are but so many mere negations, it might be fairly expected that he would be found contending that all possible collections and arrangements of them are mere negations of negations; and that consequently the so-called State is the veriest abstraction of abstractions, the ghost of ghosts. Nothing of the sort. This kind of logic does not agree with Mr. Ritchie. Listen to what he says:—"The body corporate is mysterious, if anyone likes to call it so, mysterious like the personality of the individual." *Comment*—Yet he has previously said that, apart from their relations to a small fragment of nature called the "social environment," the individuals are only so many mere negations. Now, he adds all these nothings together, and then calls their sum total mysterious. The process by which he manages to create this mystery is certainly mysterious. "Emperors, kings, councils, and parliaments, or any combinations of them are only the temporary representatives of something that is greater than they. '*Principis mortalis republicia æterna.*' This sovereignty of the people, this general will, is only an idea, it will be said." *Comment*—It should hardly reach to the level of a voice, still less of an idea, or of a *will*, if every individual component of it is only a mere negation. "But," continues Mr. Ritchie, "it is an idea; but not therefore unreal. It is real as the human spirit is real, because it is this very spirit striving for objective manifestation. It lives and grows and becomes conscious of itself. It realizes itself in different forms, in the family, the clan, the city, the nation, perhaps some day in the federation of the world."—*Principles of State Interference*, page 69.

If ever there was a social ghost, here is one with a vengeance. It closely resembles the famous grin without the cat, so humourously described in *Alice in Wonderland.*

It is a re-dished up form of the abstract Man, spelt with a capital M, and who, according to the late Professor Clifford, was before Jehovah was, &c., &c. Here in full bloom and as large as life, is all the hocus pocus of the Positivist school. Is it for this that all theological contradictions have been discarded? is it in order that we may the more readily fall down in abject grovelling worship before a noisy collection of mere duplicates of ourselves, some of them little better, and many of them infinitely worse, than ourselves? Every lover of clear thought must refuse to believe it. As long as he can see the light of the sun, the spirit of individual man, animated with the strength of that which is one with every star and world throughout the universe, will rise in eternal revolt against such degrading mental prostitution. That spirit of nonconformity, which is the eternal strength working in the individual soul: that spirit which arms the soul to dare all things for the truth it sees; will for ever lift individual life above this debasing social slavery, this superstition worse than death and blacker than hell. And that spirit is destined to trample all these shallow sophistries (the cunning excuses for seeking to establish slavish contrivances) under its feet continually. It will constantly break down every barrier and every wall that knaves throw across the path that leads to freedom. For the highest aspiration of the human soul is not the State; with its dishonest politics, its bribery, its lies, its crowd of greedy lusters after power and place, its gingerbread external pomp and unspeakable inner corruption; its tyranny, its respect for nothing but brute force; its mean underhand tricks; its secret crushing of the weak, the helpless, the friendless, or the unknown,—the highest aspiration of the soul is not for this gigantic whited sepulchre, full of ravening wolves that devour widows' houses, and, for a pretence, make fulsome speeches to the mob,—the ideal towards which life moves is not this wretched den of political thieves, but is a world where no man dictates to another man, where no majority of men dictate to a minority of men, and where all, individually obeying the natural laws of the universal order, having discarded show and seeking only to supply rational needs, are one with nature in all things, "and work and worship in the infinite."

The illusive character of Mr. Ritchie's theory is clearly shown by his comparison of the family with the State, as if the latter were simply an outgrowth of the former. In point of fact, what answers to the State, namely, the commune, is frequently antecedent to the family; the power of the latter growing up at the expense of the former. Modern Socialists recognize this, and aim to reverse the process, so as to drag humanity back to that piggish condition in which the commune is everything, and the separate family nothing. But there is indeed no sort of analogy between the family and that political sham called the State. The former arises out of no mysterious metaphysical hobgoblin, as Mr. Ritchie pretends to think, but arises simply and solely out of the desire on the part of individuals to obey one of the fundamental and universal laws of nature; a law that runs throughout all animate existence, and which is no more mysterious than the law of gravitation. The family is but a means, and the best means, for obeying this law. In this sense, the family is necessary, quite apart from all defects of human nature; but who will venture to say that the State is necessary, apart from such defects? The State is but a mere keeper, sometime needed for a violent patient, and destined to go on the recovery of health; but the family is as much needed in health as in sickness, if not rather more. No, no! the two are not varieties of the same force. They are wide as the poles asunder. They are diverse as light and darkness. The family is natural and real: the State artificial and unreal. The family is a perpetual truth : the State a transitory sham.

This ideal of the universal omnipotent State is not new : it is old. In obedience to this ideal the Romans tried to establish a military despotism over the necks of men. The individualism of barbarism broke that despotism to prices. Out of its ruins emerged an ecclesiastical ghost, a lie infinitely more subtle and diabolical than Cæsar himself. The individualism of the Reformation broke down that despotism. And now the same "spirit"* is trying to establish a political despotism. The individualism of the present and of future will break this also to pieces. Howsoever often the attempt is made to enslave individual life, the result will always be the same. For liberty works with the strength of an eternal truth : tyranny with the weakness of an eternal lie.

When a writer roundly affirms that each individual spirit, as such, is a mere nonentity, and then goes on to talk of a sort of general spirit which resides in no particular human body, but which takes councils and parliament as its representatives, he is simply trying to get a song without voices and music without notes. He is letting all the gas out of his balloon and then expecting it to rise. In short, he is attempting to make something out of nothing, and seeking to create a compound without elements. Even State socialism cannot manage this feat. Nature is a cruel jade to these circle-squarers. Why cannot she allow her laws to be made and unmade at their pleasure ?

And the most sublime joke about the whole thing, is, that even if this general, national, social, or whatever it may be called : even if this spirit did exist, there is no reason for supposing that any particular king, or council, or parliament, or what not, is its fair and legitimate representative. Why pin it down to this or that narrow form? What is here meant shall be illustrated by the case of a papal council. Nine disinterested and pure souled priests are called together for the purpose of ascertaining the preference of God. Five vote for Pope A, and four for Pope B. This means that God or the "spirit" of the church prefers Pope A: he is its legitimate representative. Why, nobody can tell. Why should the spirit in question have a greater weakness for number five than for number four? Nobody knows and nobody cares so long as the favourite man gets elected. If you happen to be among the majority, you will say that the wisdom goes along with the greatest number of heads: if you have the misfortune to be in the minority, you will think that fools are many and wise men few. But what a spirit can have in common with political numbers and mere party triumphs, no man in this world knows or ever will know. Why not look at the matter in a plain common sense light? The whole business has got no more to do with a mysterious spirit, than counting a brood of chickens has got to do with such a nonsensical bogie. It is purely a matter of physical force, or (as in the case of religion) of mental fear; and the power that is secured by it may be exercised with bad motives or with good motives, but its better or worse use has nothing whatever to do with numbers.

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* This word is used, not in a mysterious, but in a purely metaphorical sense.

But this national spirit, it may be said, only incarnates itself in a democratic majority. This majority, and this alone, is the genuine one; all else are mere pinchbeck imitations. Of course. But which democratic majority? That of to-day, of yesterday, or of to-morrow? Why, this mysterious hobgoblin is as changeable as Dame Fortune herself. It never knows its own mind two elections together. It is as fickle as the luck of a gambling table. To-day it moves in the decrees of the National Assembly: to-morrow in the knife of Charlotte Corday. Who shall say he has not got it? Who shall say he has got it? It is everywhere and nowhere. Each party swears by it; and each party denies the right of the other's claim to it. It is only used to make fools believe in a universal national agreement, which the very use of it proves not to exist. In fact, it is only another form of the theist's "universal consent," advanced to convince those who don't consent. What have you got to put in its place? Nothing. We don't need anything in exchange for superstition. We sweep it out, and then dwell in a clean house.

This "spirit of the nation" plays some strange freaks at times. On one memorable occasion, expressing itself in the will of an Athenian democratic majority, it disfranchised a democratic minority. Nay, it went further. It took everything the minority possessed, and then sold them into slavery. Possibly the State socialist will say that under such circumstances it was a privilege for the minority to be allowed to bow to the infallible decision of this great national spirit; or rather, to that of its "temporary representative." Very likely. But if that minority had properly known their business, they would speedily have changed the "temporary" complexion of that spirit's outward manifestation, or, at least, have perished in the attempt. For the national spirit is very tractable when properly taken in hand; it only bullies those who fear it; and it may be persuaded to alter its mind by means far more conclusive and straightforward than ballot voting. There is a form of force which needs no superstition to prop it up, and which soons knocks all cant on the head. When the talkers and spouters see this force, they know their little day is ended. Let them go on, and they will see it, and feel it too.

Mr. Ritchie sees plainly enough that, in proportion as the

Socialistic State interferes more and more with individual freedom, the source of legislative power will be questioned. To meet this contingency he drags in his metaphysical ghost. He says that "the acts of the government in every country which is not on the verge of revolution are not the acts of a majority of individuals, but the acts of the uncrowned and invisible sovereign, the spirit of the nation itself." How extremely conclusive and satisfactory! Let it be applied to a concrete case. When (a revolution not just about to begin) 800 tax 700 for a public museum, this tax is not the act of a majority, but of some great social or municipal ghost, some collected essence of everybody in general and nobody in particular. If, for example, Sir W. Lawson and his fellow fanatics shut up all the public-houses, the tyrannical act in question is not merely expressive of the fads of a political faction, but of a non-natural, magnified, and unseen something called the SPIRIT OF THE NATION. How like the old-fashioned "spirit of the glen," which robbed belated travellers whenever it could do so. But in what way such a mysterious thing can be affected by a revolution, nobody can tell: revolutions only affect flesh and blood, but this queer creature is impalpable, unseen, &c. And the curious part of the statement—argument it cannot be called—is, that when the tyrannical laws of this bogie are swept away, the change in question is not due to the fact that the game of social despotism is played out (this would be far too natural and obvious an account) but because the "uncrowned and invisible sovereign" has altered its infallible mind. Well, the sooner it is made to alter its mind the better. At least, one thing is evident. This nonsense, when thoroughly sifted to the bottom, makes no more for Socialism than for Individualism. The uncrowned king, like our shadows, will move as we move, and change as we change: therefore it is collectively everything, and we are individually nothing. Q.E.D. Such is the argumentative pap with which we may expect to be fed when the liberty-hating officials of the Socialist State, work all the printing presses in the country, and when, therefore, whatever questions the infallibility of the despotic State, will be rigidly excluded "for the general good."

This grand national ghost is very similar to the familar little hobgoblin known as the "spirit of a meeting." The latter "lives and grows, becomes conscious of itself, realizes itself," does it not my eloquent political favour-currier? Only there is one curious little feature about it. When sensible people are present, it behaves itself: when fools are present—well, it doesn't; it breaks down platforms and throws chairs about. So with that larger and more permanent meeting called a nation. When those present know how to behave, the spirit also knows: when they don't, neither does it. A most real and independent entity, my dear reader; as real as your own image in the glass, or as the shadow which imitates all that you do! A strange, very strange, and mysterious thing, this national hobgoblin!

Like other State socialists, Mr. Ritchie does his best to exaggerate the indebtedness of the individual to what is termed "society." This imaginary obligation of the one to the many, is always made the grand excuse for every social tyranny. With this inexhaustable cant about other people, and the noble sacrifices they have made for the individual, every political knave fills his pockets. The sugary stuff is species of political spice, which the seeker after political power and pelf lavishly scatters wherever he goes. It costs nothing and buys everything. Grown children run after and greedily devour it. It serves the double purpose of conciliation and flattery; and thus both bamboozles the unit and leads the crowd.

What a mountain of lies is sought to be piled upon each in the name of all! How much when every pro and con is duly balanced, does an individual owe to his fellows? Do the benefits outweigh the injuries, or is it the other way. Let us see. Let us enumerate a few of the great and manifold blessings that our blessed parent "society" in its infinite love has graciously deigned to bestow upon us.

In the first place each individual man is indebted to his noble fellow creatures for a body, which, owing to their persistent non-observance of the simplest laws of nature, is not even as healthy as that of a wild hedgehog. With admirable self-sacrifice, his dear fellow men have forced upon his acceptance an encumbered estate, which they have been kindly abusing for 10,000 generations. Ah! how his heart must yearn towards them for all their goodness. They have done everything well through their deep love of him, and if he is not grateful he looks so. He really seems to love his brother like one brother should love another.

In the next place, truth compels us to acknowledge that the individual man is beholden to his dear fellow creatures for a mind enriched with all the results of their many and great virtues. Heaven only knows how they have striven to make it pure and peaceful, happy and free from stain! How earnestly they have worked at this self-denying task, this labour of love for him; never once indulging themselves either in envy, hatred, malice, or uncharitableness; doing all and expecting no return: helping to build up brotherhood and all that, my socialist friend. Don't you feel grateful?

Let us glance at some of the methods by which they have sought to benefit him. If these don't make him eager to surrender his liberty and individuality, and rush gladly into social slavery, it is to be feared that gratitude is not one of his virtues.

Vanities innumerable have they followed, bequeathing the resulting tendencies to him. And because of this, each individual is filled from his earliest youth with a multitude of false inclinations, which only his own imperfect and self-gathered knowledge of nature's laws can to some extent guard him against. For ages his kindly disposed fellow mortals have been doing their level best, by over-eating, over-drinking, flattering, lying, envying, &c., &c., &c., &c., to bury nature's diamond of life under a burning mountain of their own vices. By means of a thousand and one acts of wilful disobedience to natural law, they have managed to poison the racial inheritance with which nature endows each one of her children: and now (if the Socialist is their spokesman) they turn round upon the few who do strive after natural and healthy life, saying, "There! look what WE have done for you." The Socialist represents them as a noble and modest crew, does he not? If they are what he says they are, their impertinence is only equalled by their disgusting hypocrisy. Their parasite and flatterer has a poor client: a huge, half-drunk, over-gorged, collective lout. Low guzzling herd of mutually-admiring and mutually-deceiving sensualists: in reply to this preposterous claim, set up on your behalf by a set of rascally political pirates and social blood-suckers, hear a bit of truth about yourselves. You call yourselves, or are called by your flatterers, THE DEMOCRACY, THE PEOPLE, THE COMMUNITY. Do you think any kind of fancy names can in the least degree alter what you are?—a reeking, stinking mass of gluttony, drunkenness, lust, envy, vanity, greed, malice, lies, and uncharitableness. Among you all there is not one natural person in a thousand. We are personally indebted to you, and we must bow and cringe to you? And for what, pray? For your many and great virtues! For the excellent example you set us! Shut up your foul mouth, and cease this silly boasting. It becomes the many no better than the few. Power! have you? What power? Only power to destroy the flesh? Every brutish thing has that. But not power to destroy the truth. In the fullness of time this last shall undo you, break your rotten back, and drive you out utterly. Noisy crowd of low base natures! brave mass of trembling units! go down the broad road to your congenial hell of national torpidity and ultimate racial extinction. Miserable shams! conventional puppets! moral and intellectual pigmies! The brand of inferiority is on you for ever. You hate and fear principles. Liberty is too bracing for your namby-pamby maudlin unmanliness. You prefer the lusts of your bellies to the dictates of supreme reason. Therefore, as sure as the sun shines in the heavens, you will disappear before the race of real men that is to be. For only they who prefer principle to comfort and luxury, are worthy to be free.

Undoubtedly, the world at large has done a great deal for the individual. Noble, virtuous, truthful, self-sacrificing crowd! It has ringed each separate unit round with an iron network of irrational and useless customs, false beliefs, hollow sentiments, and low ideals: lies which take years to explode, and in the vast majority of cases are never exploded at all: for how many die without once seeing through the baseness and littleness of this world? passing through life with the social slave's harness ever upon their souls, and going into darkness without even having had one glimpse of the light.

This "society," humanity, community, or whatever you may please to call so general a mass of folly and corruption, has helped each individual towards strength and clearness of mental vision by constantly wallowing in superstitions most gross and unnatural, building out of its own fears a world of gibbering phantoms, and then endeavouring to frighten each new comer with them. This social entity (or non-entity) has flattered itself with the childish conceit that it is something distinct from Nature's general order, unbound (in some mysterious manner) by her inexorable laws of life and death; and from this central and primary illusion it has branched out into evils almost infinite; from every one of which each individual inherits a special personal advantage. How deep and unpayable is our debt to Society! This low herd of base characters, has ever lived to serve its belly before its intellect, to obey lust before law, to love passion and fear reason. Its highest glory has always been its deepest shame. Instead of recognizing itself as one with Nature, finding its highest wisdom in learning her laws, and its only happiness in obeying them, it has disdainfully spurned this harmony, hence dwelling in discord continually. There is no falsehood that it has not loved: there is no truth that it has not hated. Its worst specimens, its Calugilas and Neros, have been godded and enthroned by it: its best, its Christs and Socrates, it has basely murdered. Whenever it has felt itself rebuked by the presence of personal nobility or personal purity, its black passions have prompted it either to yell "Kill, kill, kill, kill, kill him," or else "Away with him: crucify him." Not a vice is there that it has not nursed and petted: not a virtue it has not scoffed at and outraged. What little understanding it possesses is due to no merit of its own; for the germs of this understanding were left it by the animals from which it has fallen; and the subsequent development of this understanding has been caused by a necessity which would not permit practical life to be carried on otherwise. And, even at its best, this corrupt social "entity" has only obeyed the dictates of reason through fear, and as a task for which it expects to be rewarded with all sorts of earthly and heavenly luxuries: and, wherever possible, it has deserted these dictates to go and luxuriate in unmitigated follies. What it calls its "virtues" are either soulless and mechanical acts, which it does to admire, and grin at, and mouth about; glassing itself therein, puffing itself out almost till it bursts, endeavouring to exalt itself above the very heavens; or else they are merely so many traps and gins which it cunningly sets to catch the divine favour, thinking, poor self-deluded conceit, to place the immutable and eternal under a special obligation to it. Some say that even in spite of all these "virtues" it is still going fast to hell. But this is by no means certain. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful whether the gentlemen below stairs would lower themselves to associate with so incorrigible a mass of depravity. Even "Auld Nickey Ben" must draw the line somewhere. This social quintessence of dust, by the strangeness of its antics, has managed to make itself the standing laughing stock of the universe, the bedaubed, veneered, and decorated curiosity of existence, the only unnatural thing in nature; unmeet for heaven, and so preposterously absurd that even hell would fling it forth in derision: if, that is, it should ever be so impertinent as to attempt to enter there. Ever has it neglected realities to follow shams; and it has worn its grinning conventional mask for so long, that the pasteboard and stucco have at last grown to the skin, and, if suddenly pulled off, would bleed the poor artificial thing to death. Even its labour, the only reality about it, is nearly all wasted; for, while toiling and sweating for the useless toys and paltry gewgaws which merely feed its depraved tastes, it has left real needs in many cases almost entirely unprovided for. In a word, it has wholely misused the gift of life, and done its best, by stooping to fear its dreams, to make death as horrible as possible. The result is that it has never yet learnt how to reconcile itself either with time or with eternity, either with itself or with that universal order which is wider and vaster than it.

It is so base that its good will—the only thing it can give in exchange for the services conferred upon it—is never to be obtained except either with flattery or ostentation ; and when got, the much-prized boon is not worth having ; for it can never rise above a gape at a public meeting, or a vulgar parade through the public prints. Poor low mass of semi-idiocy, even the flies that play at hide and seek through its unclosed lips, are more naturally perfect after their kind than it is after its kind. O most worthy and noble god to worship! "He that will give good words to thee will flatter beneath abhorring."

From all this social virtue the individual derives a full and complete benefit. Therefore he ought to feel gratefully obedient, and quietly allow collective wisdom to do just what it likes with him. Such, when stript of all vagueness, is the State Socialist's argument. It is simply a plea for social tyranny in the name of social virtues and social benefits. A more transparent, and at the same time a more disgusting piece of cant, was never sought to be palmed off on human credulity. Individually, we are not under the slightest obligation to obey the crowd, and as long as we possess individual understandings, we never shall be. Good heavens! what is our understanding good for, but to lift us above all this social prostitution? Our only centre of allegiance is our own individual reason : what that thinks to be right we are logically bound, under penalty of self-hurting inconsistency, to follow : what that thinks to be wrong we are bound, in precisely the same way, to avoid. This truth would hold good if there were only one man in existence : it holds equally good when there are 10 million. Did we come into this world to cringe and bow to one another? Was the lamp of reason purposely given us so that we might not use it? and are we now to fling it away at the socialist bidding? Are we to see through our own eyes, or through those of some other person or persons? Are we to walk by our own light, or are we to blindly put our hands into those of other helpless and un-selfdirecting children, and so all go headlong into the ditch together? Who is to lead if everybody is to follow? And if some may presume to lead others, why may not others presume to lead themselves? This socialistic superstition is rotten right through. There is no bottom in it; and, logically carried out, it simply means universal chaos. For if it is right for one man to be a despot, a leader, a chief, or what not, it is equally right for all men to be so. If it is right that one man should be a follower, a fag, or a slave, it is equally right that all men should be such. The only logical conclusion is, that each man should lead himself, and keep his hands off the lives of other men. Either one man should domineer over another, or one set of men over another set of men, or all men should be equally free. There is no middle position, and the choice between these two positions is the choice between Individualism and Socialism: between individual liberty and collective slavery.

CHAPTER VII.

THIS shallow and enslaving claim, so peremptorily made upon the unit by the crowd-worshipper, a claim which society as a whole (as *everybody*) does not, and, indeed, cannot possibly set up, but which is set up in its name by a few place and power-seeking politicians, can impose on no man whose individuality is worth keeping, and who knows how to laugh at the transparent humbug that "other people" are always trying to foist upon him. The phrase "other people" is here important. For, strictly speaking, the crowd which you see outside yourself is not society; it is only a portion of society; and the least important portion to you. If "Society" means anything at all, it means everybody, and, therefore, when *you* are left out, society is not present; only a portion of it is present; and when you don't agree with it, society does not agree with itself: only a portion of it does so. In order to be condemned by society a man must be condemned by himself: in order to be ruled by society a man must be ruled by himself, his judgment must coincide with that of other people, his want agree with their want; and when this is the case there can be no tyranny; all is harmonious and reasonable: there exists a co-operation that is natural, perfect, glad, unirksome, and complete.

But even admitting it to be possible for the crowd to put forth such a claim as that which the State Socialist sets up in its name, even admitting that such universal unanimity ever did or ever could exist in any crowd, the reply which any clear-thinking individual might fairly make to it, would utterly shatter all its logical and morally bending force. Let the case of Socrates and his murderers be taken as an instance of this. First, let us hear what those murderers might have said to Socrates, and then what Socrates might have said, but did not say, to them. No excuse is required for putting the following address into the mouth of Socrates, seeing that what he really did say may easily be ascertained by those who care to read the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon. It always appeared to us that, in theory at least, Socrates paid much greater respect to the State than right reason warrants.

IMAGINARY ADDRESS OF ATHENIAN CITIZENS TO SOCRATES.—You, O Socrates, have now for many years, and in spite of repeated warnings from us, proved yourself to be a very troublesome old fellow, a corrupter of the youth of this city, a disturber of religious belief, and a wilful disobeyer of the civil laws. This is the return you make for all we have done for you. We gave you life, we educated, fed, and clothed you, we surrounded you with useful institutions, and protected you with just laws. In every way that we possibly could, we have striven to help and benefit you. Yet, in return for all this, you ungratefully persist, despite our repeated warnings against it, in strolling about the streets and market places of the city, constantly talking and arguing with the young men of Athens, saying to them what you know we do not like, and what we firmly believe to be against the true interests both of our holy religion and of the social commonweal. Seeing, therefore, that you entirely belong to us, both body and soul, seeing that you are a member of our "social organism," seeing that we made you what you are, and seeing further, that what you are does not suit us, and that you stubbornly refuse to become anything different, we are fully warranted in doing just what we like with you, and thus effectually getting rid of so objectionable a person. We are infallible, and we constitute the State. All who say or write anything contrary to what we approve, are dangerously and incurably mad. So must they be treated. It is for the general good that such should be gently, but forcibly got out of the way. For, as you well know, in this commonwealth the interest of the individual is nothing: that of the individuals, everything.

IMAGINARY ADDRESS OF SOCRATES TO ATHENIAN CITIZENS.—It seems to me, O Athenians, that what you have just said, simply amounts to this: because without my consent, and, indeed, under circumstances where I was obliged to accept whatever other people thrust upon me, you have done something which *you* believe to be for my good, therefore, I am morally bound to spring like a slave at your beck and call, and dance like an ape to the discord of your unworthy prejudices and gross superstitions. In brief, I am either to shut my mouth or only to say just what suits you. Such, when put plainly, is the claim that you make upon me, and as such I now propose to examine it. In the first place, then, I contend that it is out of all proportion to the supposed benefit. I say "supposed benefit," because, as I shall presently show, what you throw in my face, is, properly speaking, no benefit at all. But even admitting it to be ten times greater than you imagine it to be, it carries with it no justification for what you propose to do. No gift, however large, can excuse the taking away of life or liberty. Gifts cannot bind any man into slavery. For a man is only morally bound by his own reason, by what *he* believes to be right, by what he freely assents to and freely agrees to carry out. But in regard to your so-called benefit, no option was given me; it was thrust down my throat willy nilly; and, moreover, I made no agreement whatever respecting it: If I did make such an agreement, show me the bond, and I will abide by its conditions, be those conditions harsh or mild.

If one man gives another man a present, that other man is bound no further than the agreement that he makes binds him, and if he makes no agreement he is not bound at all. And the same rule applies to any number of men; for numbers cannot add to or take away a fraction of the strength of moral obligation, where such obligation exists; neither can they create an obligation where it does not exist. Now, I have made no agreement with you, therefore I cannot in any reasonable sense be bound in slavery to your narrow-minded intolerance. Neither can you, on any rational ground, attempt to coerce me into such slavery. Of course, I readily admit that you may use all those blessings of civilization, which you have so liberally and unsolicitedly showered down upon me, as so many excuses for doing what you like with me. Every slave driver says to his slave "See what I have done for you! I have fed, clothed, educated, and brought you up! I have been a perfect providence to you! You are mine and I shall do as I like with my own." Thus, O Athenians, you may sacrifice my good to what you are pleased to call the good of all; though I deny that what you propose to do is for the good of all. Of course, I admit that it is for the real or supposed good of yourselves. I deny, however, that it is for my good; and inasmuch as you are the best judges of what is for your good; seeing that you alone know what you like best; so, in like manner, and on precisely the same grounds, I am also the best judge of what is for my good: for none can tell so well as myself what is best suited to my own particular wants and tastes. You say that what you propose to do is for the good of all. Is it for my good? I don't think so, and I am the best judge of this matter. What is not for the good of one, cannot possibly be for the good of *all*, however convenient and expedient it may appear to be for *some*. The only thing that is for the good of all, is, for each man to leave his fellow-man free; is a mutual respect for personal difference and personal consent. Liberty alone is the common good: it is perfectly true that it gives nothing specially to any, but then it allows everything that is consistent with the equal freedom of all. You say that what I speak in this city is unpleasant to you? Then don't listen. Those who disagree with what I teach may pass on: they are perfectly free to do what they please. Let them allow the same freedom to me I don't interfere with them, therefore let them abstain from interfering with me. What I teach is either true or it is not true. If it is not true, it won't last; the real truth will eventually prevail against it: for truth moves spontaneously, and of itself, and needs no state law either to get it established or to keep it established. But if what I teach is true, then you go against your own interest, and the interest of this city, in preventing it from being heard. As for me, you may rest assured that I shall not close my mouth at any man's bidding. I am here to use the various parts of my nature in performing those functions to which they are naturally adapted. My understanding is fitted to see truth; my lips to speak it when seen. In saying what I believe to be true, I am only doing what all of you here present also pretend to do; so that in condemning me for this, you are logically condemning yourselves. You stand convicted by your own verdict, weighed and found wanting in your own balance. What are you afraid of? Do you fear that my single tongue can out-talk or out-argue all yours put together? Does all Athens need proctecting against the free speech of one man? You profess to be acting politically, and yet you are not politic. You are not even following the lowest expediency. Wise men will recognise it to be to their own interest to allow the fullest possible discussion of everything. For just the view that is ignored or stifled, may be the only true view, and every truth is a gain. If, as I have just pointed out, what I teach is true, your own interest lies in knowing it: if it is not true the real truth will eventually supplant it; for in a free commonwealth error can never prevail against truth.

However, O Athenians, since you do not recognize liberty as the common good, and since I have no organized force with which to defend my rights, I must make the best of a bad job and follow necessity with a good grace. To your ruling I must submit as to the earthquake or the thunder bolt. It is the sign by which nature intimates that she wants back what she has only lent for a time; and true wisdom consists in making that agreeable which fate has made unavoidable. To a man who lives to know the truth about things, and to obey the laws of nature so far as he sees them, a few day or years more or less can make little difference. His knowledge of law lifts him above all slavery to time; so that the destruction of time is no real loss to him.

But what I deny, O Athenians, is, that there is any logical or moral force in your arguments. You say you gave me life. This is not true. Two particular individuals gave me life, just as two particular individuals gave life to each of you. On this ground, then, I am no more beholden to you than you are beholden to me. We are more like separate branches of one tree than mutually dependent beings. We meet on equal terms, with the strength and independence of the dead within us, and those who might lay claim to us are not allowed by nature to do so. Moreover, the life that we possess ultimately originated without any volition of ours, in a natural and universal order which is greater than all of us put together. Not to our laws, but to the on-going of this order is all life due; and as for us, we are but the doors through which it enters into possession of its own. You speak as if I belonged to you. Such is not and cannot possibly be the case. I belong to the same great order of natural facts to which you also belong: I am a citizen of a vaster city, not built with hands, a city wherein this little Athenian State lies as a grain of sand beside an infinite sea. Then you say that you educated, fed, and clothed me; and you seek to make all this an excuse of depriving me of my freedom, and for compelling me to shut my mouth. Such a pointed reminder, when made by one man to another, even though it should chance to be true, would rightly be deemed to be unworthy of a noble and generous soul, and I fail to see how it can be otherwise when made by many men to one. But in my case it is not true. As regards the feeding and clothing, the statement won't bear looking at. Assuredly *all* of you, O Athenians, did not feed and clothe me: on the contrary two particular individuals did this, and these two individuals gave you an equivalent for whatever they received by way of exchange from you. Though, even if you had bestowed these gifts upon me, they could give you no sort of rational warrant for destroying my freedom, so long, that is, as I abstain from destroying yours. For, as I have already pointed out to you, a gift carries nothing with it except the agreements that have been freely made by those who have received it. What agreements have I made? As to education; for that I owe you no compensation, if anything the boot is on the other leg, and you ought rather to compensate me, seeing that, against my wishes, you have tried to thrust down my throat a jargon of useless pedantry, which you foolishly miscall "a liberal education." In addition to this you have dinned into my ears a string of soulless, conventional, and cast iron rules which you mis-call morality. How many years, do you think, has it taken me to see through the folly of all this artificial nonsense? A great portion of my life has been spent in unlearning the huge mass of indigestible, cumbersome, and unnatural rubbish that you in your overweaning self-conceit, have so heedlessly thrust upon me; and all the knowledge I possess that has ever been of the slightest use to me, is not what you have crammed down my throat, but what I have freely and spontaneously learnt for myself. And as for these showery but decaying institutions with which you have surrounded me, what use are they to me? I don't need them, and what is more, I don't want them. My requirements are few and easily satisfied. These ambitious institutions are only for those who lust after more than nature requires, who love pomps, and meaningless forms, and power tyrannously exercised over the weak; who admire one another, and flatter one another, and lie to one another continually. But a simple life, lived according to the laws of nature, needs not all this noisy flourish of trumpets. These pretentious institutions are for other people: they were never made for me or for the likes of me. Therefore, as regards these I am in no way whatever beholden to you: you made them to please yourselves, not to help me, and it is sheer hypocrisy for you to talk as if you did. As for what you say about protection and law, it is not worth replying to. The best system of law is that which protects liberty; but this, O Athenians, is precisely what yours does not do, or I should not now be standing here before you. There is one more plea that you may set up. You may ask "How would you have lived, Socrates, if we had not supported you with our custom? if we, the democracy of this august state, had not kindly condescended to purchase your statuaries? Well maybe I should have done what you are now compelling me to do. At least I should have been saved the trouble of all this foolish trial, and to a philosopher time is but a small object; though truth will oblige you to confess that, in spite of your boasted political power, you are all of you the veriest bond slaves to it. But I suppose that even if you, or rather some of you, had not condescended, out of the deep love you bear towards me, to purchase my produce, I could still have gone forth into the world and subsisted on the fish, animals, or wild fruits that nature provides; and if you had not defaced the fair face of nature with this corrupt city I might not have had to travel far. When you brag so loudly about what you have given, you forget what you have taken away. Yet the force of your argument may be broken by a single question. Why did you purchase my goods at all? You wanted them, did you not? You don't buy what you don't want? I shall not believe you if you say you do. But if you wanted them, the service I rendered to you in supplying them was as great as the service you rendered to me in purchasing them. Consequently we are quits: I cannot fairly boast to you, and you cannot fairly boast to me.

I am forgetting another plea that you may urge. You may say: "By living amongst us, O Socrates, you tacitly agreed to obey our laws." I did nothing of the sort. I tacitly agreed to respect your freedom, and I have respected it. I tacitly agreed to treat you as I would like you to treat me, and this I have all along faithfully observed. I am bound by the moral law, but not by any absurd rule that you may please to lay down. According to your argument, I should be morally bound to walk about on my hands and knees, if you, in your superior wisdom, passed a law commanding me to do so. Such absurd reasoning is not worth refuting. What would you think if I said to you: "By living in the same city as myself, you tacitly agreed, O Athenians, to obey my commands. I command you to let me alone; therefore you are morally bound to obey." You would very quickly rejoin "We are not going to be slaves to you, O Socrates, you are not numerous as we are, you are not in a majority." But what has a majority got to do with the morality of a command? A majority is might, not right. The truth is, you have no better ethical warrant for coercing me than I have for coercing you. If I were strong enough I could bully you; you are strong enough to bully me, therefore you do it. In point of fact, we both have the same right and no more, the right to defend ourselves against aggression; but neither of us have any right to become aggressors.

And now, O Athenians, I have examined all the pleas that you can possibly urge. I have endeavoured to show that, neither singly nor jointly, do they afford the slightest warrant for the destruction of that personal freedom which you strike at through me. You have not even the plea that the city, or, if you prefer it, the State, condemns me: at best but a portion of the State does this; and, until I condemn myself, your condemnation, even on your own democratic principles, is as imperfect and incomplete as a bridge without its keystone. And the same glaring illogicality runs through all your democratic laws. You boast that they are passed by the State, that is, by everybody, by the whole people; whereas, in point of fact, if everybody agreed to what they prescribe, there would be no need to pass them: what they are passed to secure would be naturally and spontaneously obtained without them. The only excuse you can now put forward is the excuse of might, and every tiger, every beast of prey, every irrational thing has this ignoble plea. You seem to think that power justifies anything. But there is something even better than power: the just and rational use of power. And this just and rational use consists in allowing the same liberty to others that you claim for yourselves. The freedom that is good for one man, is good for all men; and what is good for all men, is equally good for one.

Democracy should be the very last form of government to make distinctions in a matter of this kind. Do you serve passion or reason? Are you men or something lower? It is a small thing to fear the wagging of an old man's tongue; it is a small thing to hurry him out of the way a few years before nature would take him; it is a great thing, and an evil thing, and a disastrous thing to strike at a principle on which all human welfare depends; a principle which every man desires to see respected when his own interest is at stake, however much he may on special occasions let his passions blind him to the equal claims of others: a principle that is wider than democracy, and the recognition of which will grow clearer in other times and other climes, when the misused power of this shallow and corrupt State has faded like a momentary dream of night.

As for me, O Athenians, my duty is clear. To that which is highest; to that which I know best; to that near friend from which all my strength has come: to my own reason, and to nothing else, is my sole allegiance due. You may easily suppose that this supreme centre is much more to me than the narrow bigotry of a noisy political crowd. I have not followed truth all these years in order at last to meekly close my lips through fear of the threats of an unprincipled and decaying State. What seems to me to be true, my reason bids me speak, and I shall not be silent at the bidding of any man, or any set of men however powerful. And now I have done. Your condemnation hurts me far less than it injures the security of your own State. To me it means but the loss of a few years at most: to you it weakens the respect for a principle on which all your national health and prosperity depend. Life for a philosopher is not measured by length of days, but by clearness of mental vision and rational obedience of the laws of things. It is sufficient if a man live long enough to reconcile himself with the order of nature; for such reconciliation is peace, and to those who know this peace, nothing that others can do will ever come amiss. This body, these sensations and ideas, these elements so curiously compounded together, are not absolutely and unconditionally mine: they belong to universal nature: with them I have been permitted to fulfil a needful part in the on-going of the cosmic process: now it is time to give them back to that which gave them. It is impiety to desire to hold them longer than the interest of the whole requires. They are now wanted elsewhere; and true piety consists in asking nothing from the gods, but in cheerfully obeying everything. Here, in this narrow pass between the two silences, I have lived without hope and without fear; having found the peace that transcends hope and casts out fear: the peace not given by men, but which a man gains for himself through reason. In this supreme possession consists the greatest good that time can know. Do you imagine I would lose it by failing, at your bidding, to follow the dictates of that to which it is due and on which it depends? What is life without the peace of obedience to supreme reason? A short time, even if it be but a few days, or hours, or moments, that is free from fear and remorse, is better than endless years of cowardice and duty shirked. In accepting life on your terms I should destroy what alone makes life valuable. Death is far preferable to this. Do you think I did not count all the risks beforehand? You measure life by the number of meals you can swallow: I, by unyielding allegiance to what seems to me to be true. I have taken my reward here already, beforehand, and in spite of you, and I don't in the least mind paying what I always knew I ran a risk of being called upon to pay. I have lived my own life as a free being: I have fully and perfectly expressed myself Thus have I made sure of an achieved good; for nothing can make that which has been not have been. But as for such creatures as you: you are always expecting but never getting. Life to you is one long turmoil of vanity and mutual admiration; of restless fear qualified by equally restless hope. Therefore to you I say; forget not this: that living rationally and in obedience to the laws of the Gods, is infinitely higher than either hoping or fearing: it is possessing: it is dwelling in the cloudless sunshine of an ever present now."*

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* From Socrates branched cut the two great ethical schools of antiquity, namely, the Stoics and Epicureans. We have given only the Stoical side of the philosopher, as being best suited to the particular circumstances of the case. It was his Stoicism, and not his Epicureanism, that made the greatness of Socrates. The latter is dead and forgotten: the former can never die.

CHAPTER VIII.

IT may be said "Why run down society?" That question may be answered by another. "Why crack society up?" Why seek to make a fetish of it, and attempt to use it to bamboozle the individual soul out of its true self-allegiance? The individual can very well afford to let society alone, if society will let him alone. When it won't, he generally finds means in the long run to make it. Hitherto he has proved more than a match for mere numbers, and he will not go back on his record. Let him look on himself as a single ship, surrounded on all hands by hostile fleets, which ever seek either by stratagem or force to undo him: let him pour in broadsides without ceasing, and when all the powder is done, let him go down into that silence "where the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest." His only friends are the laws of things: let him learn these, and trust them, and obey them: then he need not care a straw for his fellow-man's love or hate; for then he will rest on something more secure than humanity: on the truth that cannot change.

If the unit were indeed under all the enormous obligation to society that the Socialist wants to make him believe he is, there would be no need for all this unworthy parade, and silly boasting about "our very noble selves." The very existence of all these excuses for forcing what ought to come spontaneously—and would so come if it were deserved—is proof positive that society is rotten and corrupt at heart, totally undeserving of the self-stulification that is so noisily demanded in its name. When society is really worthy, it will not demand or force: it will neither boast itself about obligations or listen to those who do.

But why an infallible social collectivity of this kind should require so much forcible legislative regulation to keep it straight, is not easy to see on the superstitionist's principles. That which presumes to regulate everybody ought to be above the law. There are plenty of gods which require a fresh coat of paint occasionally; but a god that needs the constant presence of an army of social police, to keep him either from going to pieces or very seriously hurting himself; a god that even its own worshippers dare not trust alone; is certainly the most wonderful deity this world has ever seen.

The great point is to knock all this cant about "other people" solidly on the head. No man can be either free or happy until he has done this; and this once achieved, nothing can enslave him more. The keenest dart of malice glances unharmfully off him who knows the littleness of humanity. But there is no need to run society down until some knave begins to run it up. Its follies and vices need not be mentioned by anybody until the collective embodiment of these vices and follies is set up as an object of worship and allegiance. Then it is time to speak. The mask should then be torn off this filthy idol, so that it may be seen to be what it really is: a noisy chattering mass of vanity and corruption. The individual is just about as much indebted to this thing, as it is indebted to him; nay, not as much if he happens to be a tolerant broad-minded man, going about his business and leaving others to go about theirs. The best people have always treated the crowd better than it has treated them. The narrow-mindedness and bigotry, the petifogging spying and prying, the uncharitableness, and all the unspeakable meanness of the crowd towards the unit, is well known. Mrs. Grundy is not a deity either to love or to admire. A man is no more morally bound to her than he is bound to a crew of wild baboons. She is neither the source nor the centre of moral duty. At best she is but a portion of the subject matter on which the moral consciousness of each may work. Like the rest of nature she is so much material for each man to rationally regulate his life towards, not from fear but from reason. A wise man will treat her according to her nature, just as he will treat other facts according to their natures; varying his treatment as the subject matter varies, and never stooping either to flattery or fear. And on this view, most men have always endeavoured to act, however much they may cant about "humanity," "fraternity," and all that nonsense. This creed of reason is the common creed of all men, the only creed that ever has worked or ever will work. Fanaticisms and namby pamby sentimentalisms come and go, but this creed remains. Each man finds the moral law within himself, in the inexorable logic of his own consciousness. He knows that when he treats other *rational* beings differently from what he, in their circumstances, would wish to be treated, he stultifies his own soul, and commits an injury against that which is highest and noblest in himself—the consciousness of consistency, which is at once both perfect happiness and perfect virtue; is the greatest thing in life. He knows, moreover, that this law is only binding so long as people behave like *rational* beings, and that when they begin acting towards him like wolves or tigers he is justified in treating them as such. This is the only basis of morality, laid within the centre of each individual soul; independent alike both of the external few and the external many; fixed and unshakable while time and understanding last. Duty is the consistency of the reason with itself, the obligation it is logically under of treating things which are equal to the same thing as if they were equal to one another. Out of this logical obligation, this law of self-consistency, proceeds what is termed our duty to society. A rational being will treat other people well, not because they deserve it (can he read their hearts so as to know this?) still less because they have any right to command it, but because he desires other people to treat him well, and because he will not stoop to stain his soul with the petty passions which prompt worse treatment to others than he wishes for himself. In all things the rational being acts for the sake of that inner peace which self-consistency brings. He follows right for his own sake, and not for the sake of others: he speaks truth for its own sake, and not for the sake of others: for he knows that these are peace, and that their peace is better than the approval of the whole world. Only that is worthy which a man gives unto himself. Those who have this peace (not established by society; for how should that noisy vanity give it?) need neither fear or hope anything from others. "From the contagion of the world's slow strain they are secure." Nothing can touch or harm them more. They are one with the universal harmony for ever.

As an example of the doctrine here enunciated take the case of truth speaking. That falsehood is contrary to the interest of the real and essential self, may be easily proved. For when a man says or acts what he does not think, one portion of his consciousness conflicts with another portion. His body pulls one way and his mind another. Movement stands up in open rebuke and accusation against thought. The liar's consciousness of what really exists within is contradicted by what his body represents to exist there. Thus is he at strife with himself, and judged and condemned of himself. It is as if his two eyes, which ought naturally to move together as a single unity, moved in diverse directions, the axis of one pointing up to the sky, that of the other down to the ground. The liar is a walking mental squint, a monster whose unnaturalness inevitably punishes itself. Along with every falsehood there goes a lack of harmony, of natural fitness, of correspondence between the outside and inside. The entire mental and bodily consensus does not move and function as one complete and unified whole: there is a continual jar and friction between the parts, as if the Government did not proceed from a single centre. And neither can it proceed from such a centre when a man follows some external social standard of morality, and simply lives to please and flatter others. The liar strives to live as two beings, which differ from and misrepresent one another. Hence the stream of his life gets into the habit of sometimes flowing one way, sometimes another. The result is that he has to be constantly struggling to keep the two spheres of his activity perfectly distinct, lest he should slip and forget himself, and be imposed upon by his own falsehoods; as indeed he frequently is, and the more so in proportion to the amount of falsehood that he indulges in. His social self tends to run off with his individual self. The part he acts humbugs and teases the part he thinks. What he is in his closet is laughed at and rebuked by what he is amongst the crowd. All his imitations, and pretences, and smirks, and smiles, and flatteries, come home to him when he is with that from which nature will not let him get away, socialize and communalize as he may. Then, when the noise and confusion can be no longer kept up, the great silence steals in and speaks to him. "What have you been doing with that which I gave you? Is it worth while to gain the grins and flatteries of the whole world and stain your own soul? Is it not better to live to the laws of nature, and of your own nature, even if only for a moment, than to bask in the smiles of all men for ever? Is not truth enough, and the knowledge of it perfect peace?"

This is the only reason why a lie is wrong. It is unnatural, against the real nature of a rational being, against the inner unity of reason, against the only strength a man possesses—that of intellect, of clear and distinct understanding, and of consequent power of self-direction. Why do sinners lean on priests? Why do cowards lean on one another? Because the poison of social falsehood has taken away this self-direction. The mind has become impure, and, therefore, naturally gravitates to what is akin to itself. Only the sick need a physician. And men make themselves sick with lies. For the lie is the only producer of that internal disorder and confusion which break up the harmony of the understanding, and so prevents the understanding from seeing itself perfectly reflected in that which clothes itself—the speech and action of its mortal coil. When the mind sees this reflection, it is self-satisfied, at peace, one with universal nature. This peace, this oneness, is virtue; for virtue is truth. And truth is a good in itself. If only one being existed in the universe, it would be equally good for that one being. For such a being might just as easily mis-express himself in acts, as social creatures do now mis-express their real thoughts in words. The lie is a personal mis-expression, and goes deeper than society or the good of society. Although, as a matter of fact, it is only the fear of others that frightens us into untruth. Society is the devil which a wise man will always shame, let it shout and rave and cant as it likes. Truth is its own reward. It is the health of the soul, and health is good, whether other people know of its existence or not. The whole theory of social obligations is radically false. A lie is not wrong because it misleads others: a quicksand, a bog, a mirage, or a mist does this; yet they are not wrong: on the contrary they are perfectly adapted to do what they do, are natural and complete after their kind, are unblemished portions of the universal order. No, the falsehood is wrong because it injures the man who tells it. The only wrong there is about it is inside, not outside. It makes a man imperfect after his kind; that is, after the manner of a rational being; after the distinctive and only essential nature of man: viz., that reason which, being taken away, leaves only dust behind. Fancy a parent telling his child that a lie is only wrong because it misleads him (the parent), or because it misleads other parents, or because it misleads "society." What a false, conventional, and absurd basis of morals! It directs attention to the mere superficial shows of life, and away from that inner law of mental consistency, which, "if men would obey with all their hearts, their lives would be well." There is a more fixed and solid basis of truth than "society." A lie is wrong because it injures the health of that inner sovereign, which ought to be kept pure in order that it may form an appropriate portion of a perfect cosmos, and so that it may clearly see the laws of that cosmos, freely obeying them, therein making itself one with eternal beauty. The deception of others is a mere external and incidental matter, a something not our own; but the lie damages our own property, our soul, the only thing that fortune cannot hurt. Deception of others! Leave them to look to that. What harm can your lie do to their understandings, to the only worthy portions of them? Either they will discover the lie, or they won't discover it. If they do, they will quickly cast it away; if they don't, it will never trouble them. "What the eye does not see, the heart does not grieve for." It is nothing to be deceived, nothing to be flattered: on these things the world feeds and lives, always trying to make itself believe that it enjoys the filthy garbage. Those who allow these things to disturb them will never know peace. But it is everything to deceive. When a man himself stoops to lying, he stains his own soul with that which, when done by another, carries no stain. And to those who have learnt to regard themselves as a portion of nature, it is easier to speak the truth than to tell a lie. For in speaking truth a man moves his body into conformity with his understanding, and so progresses in the natural direction; that is, in the direction in which the general process of evolution is moving and ever has moved. In the utterance of truth body and soul are absolutely parallel. The whole thought and the whole expression fit in perfectly with one another. There is no inner jar, no discord whatever. In a word, there is that harmonious working of the individual system which is eternally right and good in and for itself, whether other people like it or not. This is the real basis of morality. It is independent of society, and yet if the conclusions that flow from it are obeyed, nothing but profit can come to society. Nature has not left every man as a mere beggar for Mrs. Grundy to patronize, a mere thing that cannot live apart from the grins and lies of "other people." She has so constituted each man that his only duty is towards that most high reason which she has placed within him. If he is faithful to this, he need concern himself about nothing further. For then he lives in perpetual harmony with the cosmic process, and moves with this process towards that intellectual perception of law which is its highest and most perfect consummation.

But in the socialist ideal all are to love all: everybody is to be a friend to each, and each is to spread out his regard over everybody. There will be no narrow exclusiveness, no selfish preferences for private monopolies of the love that equally belongs to all. How well this silly sentimentalism works in practice has been humourously illustrated by the poet Gay:—

THE HARE AND MANY FRIENDS.

Friendship, like love is but a name,
Unless to one you stint the flame.
The child, who many fathers share,
Hath seldom known a father's care.

'Tis thus in friendship ; who depend
On many, rarely find a friend.
  A Hare, who in a civil way
Comply'd with ev'ry thing, like GAY,
Was known by all the bestial train
Who haunt the wood, or graze the plain.
Her care was, never to offend,
And ev'ry creature was her friend.
  As forth she went, at early dawn,
To taste the dew-besprinkled lawn,
Behind she hears the hunter's cries,
And from the deep-mouth'd thunder flies :
She starts, she stops, she pants for breath ;
She hears the near advance of death ;
She doubles to mislead the hound,
And measures back her mazy round ;
'Till, fainting in the public way,
Half-dead with fear, she gasping lay.
  What transport in her bosom grew,
When first the horse appear'd in view !
  Let me, says she, your back ascend,
And owe my safety to a friend.
You know my feet betray my flight ;
To friendship ev'ry burthen's light.
  The horse reply'd, Poor honest Puss,
In grives my heart to see thee thuss :
Be comforted, relief is near ;
For all your friends are in the rear.
  She next the stately Bull implor'd,
And thas reply'd the mighty lord :
Since ev'ry beast alive can tell
That I sincerely wish you well,
I may, without offence, pretend
To take the freedom of a friend.
Love calls me hence ; a fav'rite cow
Expects me near yon barley-mow ;
And when a lady's in the case,
You know all other things give place.
To leave you thus might seem unkind ;
But see, the Goat is just behind.
  The Goat remark'd her pulse was high,
Her languid head, her heavy eye ;
My back, says he, may do you harm ;
The sheep's at hand, and wool is warm.
  The Sheep was feeble, and complain'd
His sides a load of wool sustain'd :

Said he was slow, confess'd his fears ;
For hounds eat Sheep as well as Hares.
  She now the trotting Calf address'd,
To save from death a friend distress'd.
  Shall I, says he, of tender age,
In this important care engage?
Older and abler pass'd you by ;
How strong are those ! how weak am I !
Should I presume to bear you hence,
Those friends of mine may take offence.
Excuse me, then. You know my heart,
But dearest friends, alas ! must part.
How shall we all lament ! Adieu ;
For, see, the hounds are just in view.—*Fable* L.

The ideal of the more extreme Socialist is communism. All things are to be in common. As Mr. Morris once said "Things are not to be yours or mine, but 'ours.'" It is not possible: nature won't permit it. Fancy a man's hands, and feet, and eyes being "ours"! Perhaps the nearest approach to consistent communism was made by Sir Isaac Newton, when, in a fit of abstraction, he used his housekeeper's finger for a tobacco stopper. It would be rather awkward, when you wanted to use your hand, to find that your loving friends were passing it about amongst them. But communism never has washed among rational beings, and it never will. It may do for a couple of moon-struck fools, but even these soon get sick of it. The feelings and tastes of other people are doubtless very interesting to other people, but they are not and never can be everything to the unit. Society is not my god, and neither, if you speak the truth, is it yours.

How refreshing it is, after reading all the modern cant about taking the perverted feelings and tastes of society as centres of moral allegiance, to turn to the pure ideal of one of the few souls that have seen and rejected poor vanities and gross superstitions of this world: "To receive the impressions of forms by means of appearances, belongs even to animals ; to be pulled by the strings of desire, belongs both to wild beasts and to men who have made themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero: and to have the intelligence that guides to the things which appear suitable, belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods, and who betray their country, and do their impure deeds when they have shut the doors. If, then, everything else is common to all that I have mentioned, there remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and content with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for him; and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it tranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither saying anything contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, modest, and contented life, he is neither angry with any of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads to the end of life, to which a man ought to come pure, tranquil, ready to depart, and, without any compulsion, perfectly reconciled to his lot."—M. ANTONINUS iii., 16.

Yes, the moral law is planted within, where neither States, nor mobs, nor democracies, nor princes can reach. No man can give this law to another man. No set of men can give this law to another set of men. This law is more fundamental than the State. It rests on that individual consciousness which was before the State, and which will be when a nobler and purer humanity has dissolved the State for ever.

CHAPTER IX.

ON pages 387-9 of his work on *Individualism*, Mr. Wordsworth Donisthorpe has searchingly criticised the theoretical basis of Individualism. Let us therefore briefly examine his arguments, and, if possible, counter-criticise the chief objections that are raised by him.

As illustrations of the difficulty of solving practical questions by means of theoretical conceptions, he gives the following instances :—

"A.—I meet Smith in the desert ; he is in possession of a splendid ruby worth £10,000. I knock him down, tie his hands, rifle his pockets, and carry off the ruby.

B.—Conditions the same. I hold a pistol to his head, and demand the ruby : he hands it to me of his own free will and accord, and I carry it off.

C.—Conditions the same. Smith is dying of thirst ; I have a skin of water ; I threaten to leave him to perish unless he gives me the ruby ; he hands it to me, and I ride off with the ruby and the water also, and leave him to his fate.

D.—Conditions the same. The same bargain as in C. I carry off the ruby, but give him the water as agreed on.

E.—Conditions the same. I give myself out as an expert lapidary ; I satisfy Smith that his ruby is only a fine but common form of amethyst, worth about £10 ; I buy it for that price, and sell it for £10,000.

F.—I meet Smith in London ; he cannot find a purchaser for his ruby at a high price ; meanwhile, I have learnt that

Jones is willing to give £10,000 for such a ruby; I keep the secret, and offer Smith £1,000, which he accepts, whereupon I sell the ruby to Jones for the full price.

G.—I meet Smith in London; I do not know of any likely purchaser, but I believe the ruby to be worth £10,000; I offer him £5,000, which he accepts, and I carry off the ruby, and eventually sell it for £10,000.

Query—At what point does direct coercion end and indirect begin? At what point does my conduct cease to be immoral? At what point is it and ought it to be regarded as illegal.

I know that A is a case of direct coercion; I know that it is immoral, and I know that it is and ought to be illegal. I know that G is not a case of direct coercion; I think it is not immoral, and I know that under the English Law it is not illegal, though the Roman Law provided a remedy, and I *think* the Roman Law was wrong, and the transaction ought legally to stand. With respect to B, I know it is immoral and illegal, but I am not quite sure about direct coercion. With respect to C, D, E, and F, I cannot regard them as cases of direct coercion. I consider C immoral and illegal; I consider D immoral, but doubt whether it should be illegal; I consider E immoral, and I think it should probably be illegal; I think F should not be illegal, and I am doubtful of its immorality. And between any two of these roughly-graduated instances scores of delicate shades of unfairness could be drawn, concerning which it would be impossible for the subtlest casuist to generalise. If this is the case in so simple a matter as acquiring a ruby from its possessor, how can we expect to be able to deduce any general rules as to private morals or State functions from a single principle *a priori?* I regard the attempt as futile; and I hold that only by the experience of generations can any rough, practical working rules be arrived at—that is to say, by a process of careful induction and verification."

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"According to him (Mr. Hubert Spencer) it is the duty and eventual tendency of society to allow the widest liberty to each of its component individual members compatible with the equal liberty of all. Now there is here no form of liberty excluded, not even the exercise of brute force; unless the exclusion of the exercise of brute force is involved in the term liberty. But is it? And if so, are any other forms of force excluded—*i.e.*, cunning, fraud, undue influence, etc.? Again, if so, can all these excluded forms be generalised under some such class name as direct coercion?

If not, the liberty of each, limited alone by the like liberty of all, is a precise description of absolute anarchy. Says the anarchist, 'You are free to do whatever you can do; you are free to kill me; I am free to kill you. Your liberty to take my goods is limited only by my liberty to keep them. All is freedom—equal freedom.'"

Now when applied to theoretical Individualism, the foregoing argument, if it means anything at all, means that because human conduct gradually shades downward from force proper to the faintest degree of fraud, therefore the *a priori* maxim: *The widest liberty of each, compatible with the equal liberty of all*, is of no practical value as a guide towards law making. Theoretical Individualism is futile, deduction useless, and verified induction the only safe guide. So much does the argument amount to, and as such let us now examine it.

In the first place, then, it is well to point out that, if the foregoing reasoning were sound, it would utterly destroy the value, not only of the liberty maxim, but also the worth of all general rules and principles whatsoever. For there never yet was a general rule framed whose subject matter—the cases to which it is intended to be applied—does not shade off in the manner described by Mr. Donisthorpe. Take, for example, the maxim "Thou shalt not steal." Now the facts to which it refers may be shaded outwards from the taking of £10,000 to the plucking of a leaf in your neighbour's garden. If anyone cared to be at the trouble, he could draw up just as strong a case to prove that no practical guidance can be derived from this "Single principle *a priori*," as Mr. Donisthorpe has drawn up for the purpose of showing the practical uselessness of the liberty formulæ. Take the following instances:—

My neighbour keeps a valuable fox terrier.

1st.—Without receiving the slightest encouragement on my part, the animal attempts to follow me to the nearest town: but, knowing that it may easily get lost, I drive it back to its home.

2nd.—Facts the same; but I quietly allow it to do what it likes: it follows and is lost.

3rd.—Facts the same: but I give it some very slight encouragement; it goes and is lost.

4th.—Facts the same: but I pat and caress it, and do all that I can to entice it to go along with me; it goes and is lost.

5th.—Facts the same: but after enticing it to follow for many miles, I take no further notice of it, and allow it to get lost on the road.

6th.—Facts the same: but after enticing it to follow to the nearest town, I purposely lose it in the midst of a crowd.

7th.—Facts the same: but when a stranger admires it, and asks its price, I tell him that he can do as he likes with it; and I let him put a string round its neck and lead it away.

8th.—Facts the same: but I do all that I can to help the stranger in catching the dog.

9th.—Facts the same: but I take up the animal and offer it to the stranger.

10th.—Facts the same: but I tell the stranger he may have the dog for £3 : he pays the money, and carries off the animal.

Query—Where does indifference end and theft begin? Where comes in the practical value of the *a priori* maxim: "Thou shall not steal?": for certainly, in relation to any particular concrete case or set of cases, this maxim also, just like the liberty maxim already noticed, must be inevitably and completely *a priori* in character; since it inheres in the very nature of a general rule, whatever its origin, to be always *a priori* in relation to every separate fact to which it may be sought to be applied. (For a fuller account of this see pages 24-29 of the present book).

We may even go further, and show that what is called induction, is really at bottom nothing but an aggregate of separate deductions carefully summed up in a scientific formulæ. As a matter of fact, the human mind is only capable of going through one kind of logical process, and thus all the apparently different forms of reasoning are but so many variations of the same tune, so many performances of one and the same mental operation. In fact, any argument that cannot be expressed in the form of a syllogism (with its inevitable *a priori* major premise) is not truth but worthless obscurantism. An example furnished by Geology will throw into clearer light what is here contended for. Let us then suppose that, by means of a boring instrument, I pull up from beneath the surface of Hampstead Heath, a lump of yellow earth, which, for convenience, I will call Hampstead Clay. Here is my testing sample, serviceable until experience gives a better. This I carry to different parts of Middlesex; at each place comparing it with other lumps of clay obtained by means of the boring instrument already mentioned. When I put a new lump by the side of this first lump, I see that in all essential points the two agree; and I find, moreover, that the same agreement is repeated every time a fresh boring enables the comparison to be made. Now let it be assumed that I wish to generalize this constantly repeated agreement of the new with the old; that I want to express it in some wide and all-embracing form: in short, that I desire to raise it to the level of a sweeping scientific induction. How am I to achieve such a result? By the sole aid of "rigid induction?" Not likely. In order to build up my desired induction, I must employ the deductive method, and without this method I cannot advance a single step. How then am I to proceed? There is an *a priori* axiom in Euclid which says that—"Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another." With the aid of this I can work. I apply it to my lumps of clay, and by means of it I am enabled to construct my experiences of those lumps into a useful scientific generalization. For the second lump is like the first; so is the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and thus on to the last. But, as we have just seen, things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Therefore, to cut a long story short, Middlesex possesses a large seam of Hampstead Heath clay, or, if you prefer the term, "London clay,"—as the geologists call it. Such is the inductive generalization deductively arrived at. It is nothing more than a summation of a number of separate deductive arguments, and that which is true of it is equally true of every inductive generalization whatsoever. "Rigid Induction" never was and it never will be.

There is no need to apply this short and easy method with the disbelievers in general principles, to each and every phase of our complex human life. One or two examples will be enough to show that Mr. Donisthorpe's reasoning destroys all science and all morality at one fell swoop.

To begin with, take Mr. Donisthorpe's illogical statement that case A "is immoral." How, on his own principles, can he know this? To say that a particular act is immoral, implies a previous knowledge, as well as a previous classification, of what are and what are not immoral acts. Suppose, for instance, we said to Mr. Donisthorpe "How do you know that it is immoral to knock a man down under the particular circumstances you have mentioned?" He would be obliged to reply somewhat as follows—"Unprovoked and non-defensive interference with a man's person is immoral. This is both unprovoked and non-defensive. Therefore it is immoral." The wording of his argument might be different; but the *form* would be the same, and would, consequently, be equally *a priori* in relation to the particular case in question. That is to say, the philosopher who despises all *a priori* principles as being futile, would find himself obliged to resort to them in order to prove the truth of his own propositions. Let any person who thinks otherwise just try to draw conclusions about particular events, without the aid of *a priori* principles of one kind or another. He will find that he cannot do so. He will find that at every step of his reasoning he will be obliged to take for granted some general, sweeping, and *a priori* maxim. The rigid inductionist is not upsetting theoretical individualism: he is vainly kicking against the nature of things, as expressed in the unalterable laws of human thought. For what, after all, is an *a priori* principle? It is simply a formula, a general statement of truths that have been previously recognized and verified. The application of such a formula to a particular case is what is called *a priori* reasoning. For example, I find by experience that unsupported stones fall to the ground. The consequence is, that when I come across a particular stone, I apply to it this general experience of previous stones, *i.e.*, of things which in certain points resemble the present stone, and, from the resemblance, conclude beforehand that the latter, when unsupported, will also fall to the ground;

since, as EUCLID says, "Things which mutually agree with one another, are equal to one another." I am not, however, absolutely sure that in this case they do altogether agree. If I were sure of this, I should not need to go through any time-taking process of reasoning at all; since the only function of the latter is to act as a guide where absolute and instantaneous certainty is unattainable. So in this instance. Falling to the ground may be just the one point in which the untried stone differs from all the stones that have previously been tried. The untried stone may impress me with most of the sensations imparted by the tried stones, and yet I cannot be absolutely certain beforehand that if I throw it up, it will also impress me with that particular change in the order of my sensations which I call falling to the ground. This last is just the one conclusion that I am obliged to beg, and I beg it solely on the strength or my *a priorily* applied maxim. I *think* that I do not need in this case to make any special experiment; though, if I can do so, I shall either re-verify or correct my past experience of stones, and thus increase for future *a priori* application, the value of the maxim which expresses it. But if I were compelled to re-experiment in every new case, my *a priori* reasoning would be altogether useless to me: it would perform no serviceable function in the economy of life; for its only value lies in the fact that it will tell me what, on the assumption of a general uniformity in the happening of events, is likely to happen in those new and untried cases where practical experience cannot reach. In other words, its only value consists in the very feature that Mr. Donisthorpe denies it to possess; namely, in its power of beforehand guiding the conduct of practical life where "careful induction and verification" cannot at the moment reach. *A priori* reasoning is the long arm of the intellect by which man is enabled to reach beyond present experience, and determine questions which cannot at the time be absolutely verified by rigid induction—at once a necessary function and a natural limitation of a finite intellect. With an infinite intellect reason would be unnecessary, and for such a reality it could not exist. Man, a finite creature, lives by consecutive thought, and thinks by means of the steps in the time process of reason. But the infinite intellect of an infinite reality could think instantaneously and intuitively, without being hampered in the slightest degree with this ratiocinative time-limitation; that is, without being compelled to pass through the different mental stages of a finite creature. For the last must, at least so far as it is a practical being, think under the form of time; the first can only think under the form of eternity; that is, in itself, and so far as it is an infinite intellect. As a finite being, the last must begin to think and cease to think. But the thought of the first could never begin and can never end; like that of PLATO's "eternal geometrician," it must always exist as the infinitely perfect fulness of one everlasting now. And man, in so far as his reason enables him to grasp abstract truth, enters, so to speak, within the very portals of this vast intellect's infinite light; stands, as it were, on the steps of truth's great white throne, and loses his personal limitations in a form of thought that transcends personality; and was, and is, and is to be: the permanent, changeless attribute of a reality in which all actualities and all possibilities are always fully and completely realized.

Let us apply our *a priori* maxim to a practical concrete case. I am travelling, we will say for the first time, through a narrow mountain pass. Loose rocks and stones hang above me on either hand. Naturally I conclude, but solely on the strength of my *a priori* maxim, that I am in some danger of being crushed; though it is true I have never been in this particular district before: therefore, of course, I have not yet had any opportunity of rigidly examining and carefully testing each rock and stone separately, or even of ascertaining how they gradually shade off from the most dangerous looseness into absolute security. If any man were to ask me at what point the danger began, and at what point it ended, I could not for the life of me tell him. In spite of all this, however, I go armed with a general *a priori* principle; resting, it is true, upon previous experience, but still general and *a priori* in relation to the present facts. The practical rule that I am led to draw by seeking to apply this principle, is—*keep well in the open, and as far from overhanging rocks as possible;* and never walk under the latter unless you are absolutely forced. I admit that, owing to the unevenness of the road, I cannot apply this rule as well as I would: I therefore do the next best thing, and apply it as well as I can. No doubt Mr. Donisthorpe does precisely the same with whatever *a priori* maxims and rules that he may find himself obliged to adopt: and we have seen how, in the case of morality, he does, at least implicity if not explicitly, adopt such maxims and rules. Why cannot he do the same with those of liberty?

There is no need to urge that the rule about liberty is perfect, or that it can be applied without a varying degree of qualification to all the difficult problems of life and government. This is not the point. The point is this—*Is the rule in question rendered practically worthless because of its a priori character?* The rule may be good or it may be bad when looked at from some other point of view; but is it bad because of its *a priori* nature? Mr. Donisthorpe urges that it is; and yet he bases his own arguments against it, on conclusions that are equally general and *a priori.* Now either *a priori* rules afford guidance or they don't afford guidance. If they don't, then Mr. Donisthorpe has no business to make use of such rules. If they do, he has no warrant for objecting to the liberty maxim on the ground of its *a priori* character.

Perhaps Mr. Donisthorpe will deny that he does make use of *a priori* rules. Well, considering that he has written a book on the *a priori* assumption that people will read it, there is every appearance that he does. Possibly he will reply that his assumption is not *a priori*: that it rests upon his previous experience of the fact that people do read books. Very likely; but the *a prioriness* lies in the application of this experience to the as yet new and untried case. As Professor Stanley Jevons says: "knowledge may originally be of an *a* posteriori origin; and yet having been long in possession, and having acquired the greatest certainty, it may be the ground of deductions, and may then be said to give *a priori* knowledge."

The mere fact that a rule is based on old induction, does not make its application to future events any less *a priori* in character. *A priori* means before experience, and certainly Mr. Donisthorpe's speculations concerning the possible readers of this book, were before experience. Not only so, but they took for granted what no amount of induction can demonstrate, because, as MILL himself was obliged to admit, this something that is taken for granted is the ultimate major premise of every inductive inference. I mean the uniformity of nature. Mr. Donisthorpe's *a priori* reasoning about his book may be stated thus—"Incidental variations apart, the same general order that has prevailed in the past will continue in the future. In the past people have read books. Therefore people will continue to read books. Consequently there is at least a *possibility* of my book getting read by some persons, although by how many is of course quite another matter."

Now, it is difficult to avoid the obvious conclusion that Mr. Donisthorpe did derive a very large amount of practical guidance from the deductive application of his belief in the uniformity of Nature as above set forth. Of course, as just pointed out, he may reply that the belief expressed in such maxims as these—*Nature repeats itself. The future will resemble the past. The universe exemplifies law*—is not of an *a priori* character, inasmuch as it rests upon past observation and experiment. But we have seen that the *a prioriness* of a maxim lies, not in its origin, but in its application. In this application there is always a step taken beyond experience, whether past or present.

How, for example, do I know that the sun will rise to-morrow. The fact that it has risen only proves that it *has* risen : it does not prove that it *will* rise. As the late Professor Clifford pointed out in one of his essays, there may, for anything we know to the contrary, be an upset in the solar system at any moment. We have not yet exhausted all the factors at work in that illimitable process called the universe, and probably we never shall do so. Yet we shall always continue to take the *a priori* rule about nature's uniformity, as the basis of all our induction ; itself undemonstrable by induction, because forming the indispensible pre-requisite to every inductive process. Why we should be placed under this necessity is impossible to tell. Why an act of faith, a trust, a leap of the mind into the as yet non-existent future, should be at the very foundation of all human reasoning, is more easily asked than answered. Possibly the expectation of future uniformity on lines similar to past uniformity, has been gradually built into the very structure of the human mind by the long psychic process of which that mind is the highest known phase. But be this as it may, the necessity that all men are continually placed under of being guided by this *a priori* maxim, effectually and for ever disposes of the argument than an *a priori* principle, by reason of its deductive character, can afford no guidance to practical conduct. For if its *a prioriness* renders a deductive maxim worthless, then all reasoning whatsoever is worthless; since all reasoning takes for granted, and rests upon, the deductively applied maxim that nature is uniform.

It is a very common custom with those who oppose the application of general abstract principles to political problems, to cry down every theory that is not exclusively based upon what Mr. Donisthorpe calls "rigid induction." Now I have not a word to say against induction. But I contend that by itself, and apart from deduction, it is utterly useless, both for theory and practice. Deduction is just as necessary as induction, and in all sound reasoning the two go together. Of course it is perfectly true that a great deal of what is called deduction, is merely the application of previous induction to new cases; or at least it is the application of what is generally termed "induction," to new cases: though if the *a priori* maxim expressive of our belief in nature's uniformity is necessarily implied and taken for granted in each and every inductive process, such a form of reasoning as pure and simple induction, that is, induction involving no *a priori* element, is an absolute mental impossibility; as impossible to the mind as walking on air is to the body. This however by the way. When, by means of so-called "rigid" induction, we have brought a mass of similar acts under one general and commanding proposition, we may next begin to apply this proposition in detail to particular instances, continually verifying it, and correcting and modifying it from time to time as new experience warrants. By the help, let us say, of the so-called inductive method, Mr. Donisthorpe has discovered that knocking a man down and robbing him is immoral. The consequence is, that directly he sees Smith treated in this summary manner, he applies his inductive generalization *deductively*, and immediately infers that something wrong is going on; although, as a matter of fact, he is totally unable to trace out all the particular evils, moral, mental, and physical, that may arise from this particular interference with personal freedom. That is to say, he applies the *a priori* method in classifying his own special instances, and then objects to the theory of liberty on the ground that it involves an *a priori* principle!

And why? Because, as we all know, it is so very difficult to draw arbitrary lines and distinctions: in this strange world things blend so confoundedly into one another. "Between right and wrong not the thickness of a sixpence." Thus argues the rejector of abstract principles. As if the very use of distinctions did not consist in guarding us against the evils to which this unfortunate blending would otherwise lead us. Abstract rules are the lines of latitude and longtitude which we draw across a perfectly lineless sphere. The whole business of life consists in making useful distinctions, and in being guided by them. And the happiest man is he who can make the clearest distinctions. True, it is difficult to make distinctions, but it is necessary. Take the art of navigation, for example; an art based entirely on distinctions which in past times have been made with the greatest risk and difficulty. Is the captain of a vessel to throw this art aside on the ground that it is made up of a mass of (to him at least) *a priori* maxims, which he can only in part, and never at the moment of use, verify and modify? Why, this elaborate argument about one thing shading into another would be seen through and laughed at by any ordinary schoolboy. Everything shades into everything else. Day blends into night: we cannot absolutely point out the precise instant or stage where the one begins and the other ends; and yet we can tell pretty well when it is light; and to some extent we can even trace the various degrees of dawn. Mr. Donisthorpe, by implication, says that he cannot say exactly where immoral actions end and where moral actions begin; and yet, as we have seen, he does not scruple to classify certain acts as immoral. Evidently, then, he must have got over the difficulty somehow. He must have drawn the line somewhere. It never seems to strike him that if certain glaring and typical acts are morally wrong, other acts may be treated as wrong in proportion as they approximate towards these typical cases. For example, if it is assumed to be wrong to prevent a man from sowing his own corn, it would seem to be equally wrong to steal the crop after it had grown up. The theft is so nearly identical with the interference that they may very fairly be treated in a somewhat similar manner. And thus we may proceed from the most glaring to the least glaring cases, modifying our treatment as our cases recede further and further away from cases of direct and unmistakeable aggression. Take an illustration. A captain of a brig orders the man at the wheel to keep the ship's head NNW. With a smooth sea and a fair wind this is an easy matter. But there are times when the very opposite state of things prevails; there are occasions when the weather is so bad that the ship cannot be kept on a straight course, let those who steer display what care they will: the rule, therefore, cannot be perfectly carried out. What should be the practical inference from this? That the rule is useless? That "rigid induction" should be substituted for the general maxims of navigation? That it matters not which way the ship is steered? Surely not! If the man cannot steer as straight as he would, let him steer as straight as he can. Similarly with liberty. If law cannot unravel all the intricacies of human conduct, let it in the first instance protect against aggression, where aggression is clear and real, lessening its action in proportion as injuries are removed further and further away from the character of real aggressions; and carefully guarding itself against all those seductive forms of over-legislation which sacrifice the greater protection to the lesser, and defeat the ends of government by carrying legal regulation into regions where things are well fitted to regulate themselves. By this means we should get a scale of protections roughly corresponding to the varying degrees of injury which men inflict on each other; with death and imprisonment for murder and violence at the bottom, and fines for milder offences at the top. The primary end of law should be the security of person and property. This is the normal and only just function of of government. For security is not merely the condition of happiness: it is necessary to the very existence of men. To no other rational purpose than the promotion of this can force be used. For force is war, and the end even of war is peace. That the natural fruction of each man's actions, carried on without aggression upon others, should be secured to him; that the farmer should reap what he has sown; that the labourer should receive the wage he has contracted for; that the capitalist should get the interest which those who have been advantaged by the use of his capital have agreed to pay him: that there should be this general security for all, whatever be their rank or station, is the very first of social needs, and one which, being realized, all the rest will come spontaneously of themselves wherever they are really useful. In proportion as this primary need is unsupplied, social life stops, and man sinks back into the savage State. For the essence of social life is free exchange, and the essential condition of this is perfect freedom for the exchangers, together with perfect security for what they exchange.

Instead, therefore, of the State adopting the part of an aggressor, using its powers of taxation and regulation in trying to protect people against themselves, by allowing the inefficient, the idle, and the vicious to shoulder their defects upon the backs of the efficent, the intelligent, and the virtuous; let it be swift to give redress where real injury has been done: but let it not waste and weaken its energies in dissipating them over too wide a field, and in attempting to suppress incidental evils by putting everybody into a socialistic strait waistcoat. The power of government is limited. It is a special form of activity adapted to do a special thing. Being itself a form of brute force, it is fitted for little else than to deal with brute force. In proportion, therefore, as it goes in for these universal regulation and taxation schemes, it neglects what it is fitted to do in order to bungle what it is not fitted to do. In short, it becomes a jack of all trades, and master of none.

In place of the liberty maxim Mr. Donisthorpe prefers "the experience of generations." Good. But how are you going to apply your experience, unless you generalize it? That is, unless you gather it up under some convenient and commanding statement? Yet if you do this, all the objections that you level against the liberty maxim apply with equal force to your own generalization. You are condemning the *a priori* road while travelling upon it yourself. Moreover, what right, on exclusively inductive principles, have you to assume that "the experience of generations" is of the slightest practical value? If it served yesterday it may not serve to-day or to-morrow, and to affirm that it will, is to affirm the widest possible *a priori* maxim, namely, the maxim which expresses our fixed belief in the permanent uniformity of Nature. The fact is, these people who are so fond of "rigid induction" are *a priorists* in spite of themselves. Drag their propositions into the light, take these propositions to pieces, and the rigid inductionists stand convicted of the very same sins that they so thoughtlessly condemn in others. Well might BISTAIT speak thus scornfully of these extremely unphilosophic philosophers.

"*There is no fixed principle in political economy.*

That is to say, in plain language,—

'I do not know what is true or what is false; I am ignorant of what constitutes the general weal or woe; I will not give myself the trouble to find it out. The immediate effect of each measure upon my personal welfare is the only law which I consent to recognise.'

There are no such things as principles! That is as if you were to say that there are no such things as facts; for principles are only the *formulæ* which result from an order of well-attested facts."

The truth is that the principle of liberty, although used *a priorily*, although, like all general principles, obliged to be so used when practically applied to conduct, is merely a general statement of generations of inductive experiment and observation. Except as being such, the principle in question, as JOHN STUART MILL* so ably showed, would have no value whatever. And precisely the same objections that are urged against this principle may be urged against any and every inductive generalization. Take again the old case of gravitation. All unsupported bodies behave in a special and uniform manner. I mentally separate this feature from its concomitants, and then embrace it under some general commanding statement. Here is induction in full swing. But presently I begin to apply this statement to particular cases: on the strength of it I proceed to affirm that a particular body, say a cannon ball, will, under given conditions, behave exactly as other and similar bodies have behaved. I do not—perhaps I cannot—apply the inductive method: it might be useful to do so; and whenever convenient this method should be applied; for only by its constant use can our general maxims be verified: but the only value of induction lies in the fact that it enables us to build up trustworthy generalizations which will serve to guide us where the inductive method* cannot be used. The end of induction is, in a certain limited sense, to enable us to do without induction.

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* See his *Essay on Liberty*, the arguments of which have never been disposed of.

But to continue with the illustration of the cannon ball. In affirming the deductive *a priori* maxim that, under given conditions, it, the ball, *will* fall to the ground, I go beyond both past and present experience. Yet will it be said that this *a priori* maxim affords no "rough practical working rules?" One rule it certainly affords, namely, "Keep out of the ball's path." Well, now I come to deal with the liberty maxim in a similar manner. The widest possible observation, both present and past, has revealed the fact that each human being, nay, each living thing, strives to the utmost of its power to live its own life in its own way. True, there are plenty of creatures, both human and non-human, who, either singly or jointly, do their level best to prevent other creatures living their lives in their own way; but never yet was any living thing known, which did not ceaselessly endeavour, to the full extent of its powers, to carry out its own motives, that is, live its own life in its own way. This innate self-love is the very basis of all life, as well as of all virtue; capable of improvement it is true: but planted by nature far too deeply ever to be rooted up by the lies and hypocrisy of communism. The socialist busybody, even more than the individualist, unconsciously exemplifies this fundamental and indestructible fact; for the efforts of the former to regulate others, are only the expression of his intense dislike to being regulated himself. He objects to the purely negative regulations which are necessary for defending the freedom of his victims, and thus keeping his own self-assertive and tyrannical proclivities within some sort of reasonable bounds. For no more self-assertive thing lives than the canting seeker after political power. He needs no bad arguments to sophisticate his soul, and thus encourage him to hide his hypocrisy even from himself.

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* Not a method free from deduction, as already shown.

Of course it is perfectly true that this freedom, this scope for the expression of motives, is frequently possessed in only a very small degree by many unfortunate people; but when this is so, it will usually be found that the misfortune is caused by other people enjoying an amount of freedom to which they can give no title other than that of force or fraud committed against their numerically or physically weaker brethren. If this is not an argument in favour of the liberty maxim, at least it is not an argument against it. Might is no proof of right, though the former may legitimately be used to defend the latter.

Considered in its inductive aspect there are few scientific generalizations that are wider or sounder than the liberty maxim. The great claim is everywhere set up; by tyrant as much as by slave; by rich as much as by poor; by the civilized as much as by savages,—"Let us all have as wide and ample scope for the free play of our respective activities as we can get." Co-operation is no exception to this rule; for, so long as it remains free, it is only one of the many forms in which the individual motives that make for joint action, express themselves. And when it is not free it necessarily expresses the personal motives of those who compell it, be they in a majority or be they in a minority; for no numerical distribution of tyranny can alter the real truth of things. A great deal of our liberty consists in free co-operation with our fellows for the joint supply of natural individual needs; and, in proportion as we become more rational, this kind of co-operation will increase. For it is based upon, and springs from, no unworthy terror inspired by legal force; but it rests upon a trust in the fixity of human reason; on the mind's regard for principle; on its respect for the same freedom in others that it desires for itself: in short, upon its innate and indestructible self-consistency. This is the only true and lasting basis of real human co-operation. There is no tyranny in it: there are no rotten politics in it. It is a co-operation and yet a competition: a co-operation to effect exchange; a competition to produce more and ever more, better and ever better articles of exchange. It is the service of the highest, that is, of the reason whose obedience is Duty. It is the following of the divinely implanted self-interest lying at the root of every living thing, and moving all things nobly and well; the great indwelling impersonal god of each, voiceless, lipless, tongueless, but never wearying in its efforts to keep each living creature in the straight path of duty; and thus giving to each the peace which can come in no other way. It is the comradeship of the great companion, the never deceiving friend, which is each man's very self, and which, if a man is wise, he will trust alone, and love above all this lying and canting world of men. In a word, it is that healthy "selfishness" called business: the highest and most god-like, because the most unhypocritical and unsentimental of all forms of human activity: the free and fearless competition of men as distinguished from the wretched socialism of cowards: the voluntary co-operation of exchange, as distinguished from the involuntary compulsion of collective theft: the vigorous rivalry of those who are not afraid of facing that truth about themselves and their own faculties which only a mutual measuring of blades can reveal; who would rather know and suffer from their own weaknesses than be artificially shielded from the dangers of battle; rather lose than be prevented from taking their chance of winning; rather be run through with an enemy's lance than never enter the competitive lists of nature's great tournament: who live only to do their duty in the station where Nature has placed them, ready, like true soldiers, to stand or fall in the service of the highest, and take their rest when Nature gives the signal; having done the work she gave them to do, and received its wages in the peace that comes by doing it.

For duty—even the simplest and most trivial—is a far grander and nobler thing than any amount of greasy "brotherhood," or "fraternity," or vapid sentimentalism of that childish description: it is manhood; it is courage; it is reason: it is the free spirit quietly going on its way, doing the work that the eternal has given it to do, and telling all fussy interferers and canting humbugs to clear out and go to the deuce. Rivalry has no terrors to those who live for duty. They are indeed mean and ignoble souls that object to competition. For competition is duty: is doing the best with the faculties that are given, and laying about with right good will in nature's great battle field of life. Those sickly sentimentalists who object to competition are like soldiers who long to desert their posts, and run from the field through fear of being beaten by better men. Wretched, poor-plucked, low-bred creatures; they may escape for a time, but in the long run they will be found out and swept out. For competition will not be abolished to please them, though it will improve as the competitors themselves improve. As humanity gets nobler and braver, freer from all this unworthy sentimentalism and unmanly cowardice, competition will lose its more brutal aspects, and will become a rivalry in taking pains to produce useful articles of exchange; a rivalry in patience, carefulness, and forethought; in sagacity, insight, ingenuity, and invention; in wisdom and genius; in strength of body and strength of mind: a competition in the following of truth; a competition in research, discovery, and generalization; in clear thinking and plain speaking; in courage and highmindedness; in real manhood, and in every human virtue.

And now, leaving this digression, to proceed with the reply to Mr. Donisthorpe. Curiously enough the very contention that men have no right to this universally asserted scope for the expression of motives, this liberty to live according to the dictates of personal judgment : the very denial of this right is itself an unconscious affirmation of it. For the compulsionist's own arguments ; his putting of these arguments before the reading public ; his efforts to get a hearing for what he has to say, and, indeed, all his voluntary actions, prove him to be implicitly claiming a freedom for himself which he is explicitly denying for others. What he denies in general he claims in particular, thus logically hanging himself with his own rope.

Freedom, then, and the fullest possible freedom for each, is a desirable fact ; since it is what each living creature equally desires and always does its utmost to get But, it may be urged, some people, being more intelligent than others, and knowing better than others how to use freedom, are entitled to possess more of it. This was the plea of the old slave owners. It sounds weak to-day. It will be laughed at to-morrow. Intelligence indeed ! Why, the use of freedom, with its losses, gains, duties, and responsibilities, is the only means by which the foolish can ever be trained and disciplined by Nature into greater intelligence ; and the only means through which such intelligence as now exists has been slowly evolved. Slavery, of whatever kind, means torpidity, stagnation, death. Liberty is the great teacher, the only real school of character ; and, when it goes, the very source and fountain of all human intelligence will be finally dried up. Not even the ability required for governmental work will remain. If, as MACAULAY well said, people are to wait for freedom until they know how to use it, they will be enslaved for ever ; since only through exercise, with its schooling blunders and failures, can men ever learn the intelligent use of anything. As well expect that people can learn the proper use of heat without a few scalds and burns, as imagine that the uses of freedom can be mastered without that excellent process of trial and error which Nature has laid down as the indispensable condition of all improvement.

It is evident, then, that scope for the expression of motives is a freedom which all alike, either consciously or unconsciously, claim for themselves, but which no one can consistently claim more of for himself than he is willing to allow to others. Is the whole matter to end here? Is this a question on which the human mind can rise to no general and conduct-guiding truths? Is it to be concluded that, whereas in other departments of knowledge it is possible to express universal characteristics in the form of sweeping and commanding generalizations, yet here it is impossible to do so? Is it to be said that on a thousand and one different questions of science, of philosophy, and of morals, it is possible to frame rules for human guidance, but that on the question of liberty it is impossible to reach this consummation? Surely in this last matter we are not left in so hopeless a condition! Seeing that each individual person implicitly claims the fullest possible freedom for himself, is he not logically bound, so far as he is a rational being, to allow the fullest possible freedom to all who are intellectually one with himself; that is to say, to all men; inasmuch as all men are one in this their intellectual and essential features? And if one man is so bound, are not all men so bound? are not all governments so bound? For, as we have seen in the earlier pages of this book, governments are only groups of men. And if one man is bound to recognise the fullest possible liberty for all, are not all men equally bound to recognise the fullest possible liberty for one? But if this be so, what can express so universal an obligation as well as the maxim—*The fullest possible liberty of each, limited only by the like liberty of all?*

Mr. Donisthorpe's contention that the carrying out of this maxim will not exclude "even the exercise of brute force" is very much like saying that the continuance of peace will not exclude war. When war begins peace ends: and when equal liberty ceases; when, that is, some people begin to enlarge their own freedom by curtailing the freedom of other people, the liberty maxim is no longer being universally carried out. There is no longer equal freedom for all, but freedom for some at the expense of others.

The language put by Mr. Donisthorpe into the mouth of his imaginary anarchist reads very much like what a man might say to his caged linnet. "You, my dear bird, are free to do whatever you can do: you are free to kill me; I am free to kill you. Your liberty to put me in the cage is only limited by my liberty to keep you in it. All is freedom, equal freedom."

Equal freedom as between whom? Equal scope for each to carry out his own motives, when one, for instance, has got ten massive chains wrapped round the arms and legs of the other? When one is in jail and the other at large? When one can say what he thinks and the other is gagged? When one can fight and the other is prevented from doing so? Is this anarchy? Well, it is certainly not individualism: neither is it a consistent carrying out of the liberty maxim.

Why! dear me, such a state of things is not even a free fight. Taking this sort of reasoning along with other remarks of Mr. Donisthorpe's, it is evident that he thinks competition necessarily excludes freedom. But does it? When two people fight a duel, are not both equally free to run each other through the body? Are not both equally free to make the best of whatever fighting qualities they may chance to

possess? So it appears to me. But when one stealthily falls upon the other, ties the arms of the latter, and then, after taking away all his powers of defence, runs this helpless one through the body, the case is altogether different. Whatever else it may be, it is not a case of equal freedom. As a specimen of Mr. Donisthorpe's inability to distinguish between a "free fight" and a fight that is not free, take the following: "Even now a strong man is permitted to take advantage of a weak man by reason of his superior muscular force—*e.g.*, a porter will snatch a situation at a railway station from one of weaker build. [A porter can snatch nothing of the kind; for the situation does not exist, let alone belong to the weaker porter, until the person who employs the stronger porter thinks well to employ him. The "situation" is merely the satisfaction of that person's wants, and that person is free, if he thinks fit, to employ the weak porter, who, on Mr. Donisthorpe's reasoning, would then have snatched the situation from the strong porter. The whole transaction is purely a matter of free consent and not of snatching at all.] So a powerful navvy at piecework will earn a higher wage than one that is weaker, and what is more, will force the weaker man by competition in the labour market to accept a lower wage than he could otherwise have commanded."
—*Basis of Individualism*, page 19.

The same argument applies to the navvy. To take from a man what does not belong to him is no more possible under competition than under any other system. All that fairly belongs to a man is freedom to exchange *with those who are willing to exchange with him.* And he has this same freedom whether he is employed or not. No man has a right to a monopoly in any process of exchange. For example, I want a bag carrying from Charing Cross to Waterloo for 1/-. Am I not to be free to exchange that shilling for that bag-carrying just with whom I please? or is some particular porter, or majority or minority of porters, to be allowed to force me to employ them, whether I want or not? Mr. Donisthorpe is a strange advocate of liberty. If these are the kind of arguments that result from the present legal "protection" of barristers, the sooner there is Free Trade in this line of business, the better.

Mr. Donisthorpe fails to realize that if equal freedom means anything at all it means equality of exemption from interference. But can it be seriously maintained that when one man is regulating another, or when one set of men are regulating another set of men, *all* men are equally exempt from interference? Yet, if they are not, how can they all be equally free?

But what has now become of the "rigid induction" which scorns every form of false *a priorism*? According to Mr. Donisthorpe the fundamental proposition of Individualism is equivalent to the Anarchist doctrine of a free fight. He objects to a single and *a priori* principle on the ground that it is too wide for practical guidance, and yet from the equally sweeping maxim of the Anarchist he manages to draw a rule which applies to every individual man, woman, and child in the world; a rule that all may take as a guide, whether it guides them well or ill. In the Individualist maxim—"All men should be equally exempt both from individual and collective interference"—he fails to find any guidance whatever: but from the Anarchist or free-fight maxim, from "the good old rule, the simple plan, that he should take who has the power, and he should keep who can," he draws such practical rules as these:—"You are free to kill me; I am free to kill you. Your liberty to take my goods is limited only by my liberty to keep them."

It is not in the least degree surprising that those who repudiate general and *a priori* maxims should yet be obliged to use them. All rational human conduct is regulated by *a priori* maxims of one kind or another, and all of them more or less sweeping in their nature. Experience is a mere chaos until it is gathered up and expressed under some wide and all-embracing statement; some statement which expresses what is uniform in the facts to which it refers, and which, for this reason, may be relied upon as a safe and trustworthy guide in new cases. Even the simplest domestic management cannot be carried on without constant reference to a handy stock of general principles. Indeed, the deductive application of these principles is the chief business of life. True, it is important that they should be frequently verified; but it is still more important that they should not be ignored. "This egg will set hard if boiled for 10 minutes" is as much an *a priori* statement as the maxim—"The State will decay in proportion as the liberty and property of one class is destroyed in order to increase the liberty and property of another class." The only difference between these two maxims, is; that whereas the first is an *a priorily* applied generalization of purely physical facts, the second is an *a priorily* applied generalization of well known laws of human life and character. Are we to live in a universe of law and yet never generalize and apply our knowledge of such law? And when we do generalize and apply this knowledge; when, moreover, our generalizations correspond to and accurately express the most universal and fundamental facts of human nature, are we to be told that they are of too *a priori* a character to be of any practical value as guides of legislation? If, as has been already shown, self-assertion, self-love, self-expression of motives, or whatever it may be called, is the fundamental and indestructible root of all life, not only human but non-human, then it follows that the generalization which expresses this fact is the most fundamental and important of all human generalizations; and, this being so, its importance should be as fully recognised in the sphere of legislation as the fact to which it corresponds is recognized in all the affairs of practical life. That is to say, there ought to be the same reluctance on the part of government to regulate large masses of men, as there is on the part of one individual to regulate another. For this fact, this self-expression, lies deeper than political power, and, in the long run, that kind political power which seeks to ride rough-shod over it, will pay dearly for its folly. There is a mightier force in this world than even a political majority.

In point of fact, all intelligent human conduct, of which government forms a conspicuous portion, is but the adaption of means to ends, and is only possible in virtue of those summarizations of past experience which are called *a priori* maxims. Deductive reasoning is simply the practical utilization of the capitalized observation and experiment of all the past; and when it is accompanied, tested, and strengthened by present inductions, it gains in security and value the more it is employed. To listen to some of the denouncers of general principles, one would imagine that the human mind is never safe, except when, to use a somewhat vulgar analogy, it hops about on the single leg of induction. The most curious thing about all this pooh-poohing of abstract reasoning, is, that the very people who indulge in it are themselves tarred all over with the brush of abstraction. While loudly denouncing every kind of abstraction, or general rule, they are carefully drawing deductive inferences concerning the success of this or that measure, from *a priori* maxims that only differ from other *a priori* maxims in the fact that they rest upon comparatively few and comparatively narrow observations; and, at best, only upon the transcient as distinguished from the permanent facts of human nature. Evidently these people think that the more narrow and superficial the base of a generalization is, the sounder and more trustworthy that generalization becomes; while the wider and deeper the base of a generalization is, the more untrue and valueless does such a generalization become. Superficial and temporary facts are of the utmost importance: radical and indestructible laws are not worth considering! Take, for example, the ordinary clap-trap politician. This gentleman, who cannot see an inch further than the votes of his constituents, may be frequently heard scornfully running down generalizations that are based upon the most thorough and accurate analysis of human characters and motives, generalizations which have stood the test of ages, and which sum up the collective wisdom and experience of all mankind —this political gentleman, I say, will denounce these important generalizations as mere abstract moonshine, while, at the same time, he himself is using some equally abstract theory of probabilities to enable him to forecast the party results of the next parliamentary election. Yet abstract theories are valueless as guides of human conduct!

When it suits his purpose Mr. Donisthorpe applies these abstract theories as rigidly as anybody. According to him, absolute violence "ought to be illegal." There, at least, is a rule which he gathers from the application of one of his own abstract principles. Yet, only a few words further on, he tells us that he cannot see how we can deduce any general rules as to "State action from a single principle *a priori*." But if one person can deductively infer that a certain act ought to be illegal, two can, three can; the particular group of persons who at any moment happen to form a government, can. Nay, more. By taking the most violent aggressions as a fundamental basis, they can treat lesser aggressions as illegal in proportion as these lesser aggressions approximate towards the nature of the most violent ones. Once recognise that a man's actions, together with the unaggressively-obtained results of his actions, should not be interfered with without his consent; once keep the need for defending this fundamental position clearly in view, and the sphere of law may be carefully widened out from such a centre to meet lesser aggressions, as well as the practical equivalents of lesser aggressions. If it should happen that the system of law, established on this basis, tended to become so elaborate and expensive as to involve the committal of greater aggressions while seeking to adjust the evils resulting from lesser aggressions—as it very easily might do—then a recurrence back to first principles would remedy the evil: and as the aggressions of man against man became less numerous, the sphere of law could be reduced at a corresponding rate. Thus, with the improvement of human nature, government would slowly sink down to *nil*, and finally disappear altogether.

Under a more complete respect for individual consent, there would always be one great check upon over-legislation. In a *regime* where the legal power to take a man's earnings without his consent did not exist, failure on the part of a government to behave justly to all would mean lack of the requisite funds for carrying on governmental work. With respect for personal consent taken as the guiding principle of all legislation, we should get a system of law, which, while subserving the just claims of the majority, would cease to inflict legal aggressions on the minority; and, while protecting the liberty of those who had not saved, would render it impossible for them to pick the pockets of those who had. Only when respect for consent is the fundamental principle of legislation will that monstrous injustice disappear which enables one man to live by taxing another man. But it seems that, for the present, average humanity can only read a principle in the light of facts. Only through the enormous public debts and excessive taxes of a growing socialism, shall we at last learn the true meaning and importance of self-sovereignty.

By taking this rule of protecting from injuries in proportion as they approximate towards the character of direct aggressions, we may get a rough answer to some of Mr. Donisthorpe's puzzles. Thus, for example, if his neighbour puts a piggery or an ash pit so close to Mr. Donisthorpe's house that the latter is able to show that he already has, or on probable reasoning is likely to be, injured by the nuisance, it would be possible to have an efficient and prompt legal machinery for giving redress where redress was really needed. But the important consideration is, that the initiative in such cases should lie upon the injured person, and not be taken over by the forestalling hand of a cast iron official-coddling system. The great care of law should be to avoid hindering the growth of quick, intelligent, and self-reliant natures: but this it utterly fails to do when it does away with the necessity of personal initiative, and pets both intelligence and dullness into the same equality of mental stagnation by its anticipation of every personal need and regulation of every individual life. (See pages 32 and 33 of this book).

The infliction of penalties should of course be regulated by a sound knowledge of human character, and by the important consideration that the end of law is not merely the redress of particular injuries, but also the inculcation—so far indeed as *force* can inculcate anything—of a general respect among all for the liberty and property of each. Justice would then be tempered, if not by mercy then at least by a scientific knowledge of human nature, which would be the equivalent of mercy; and while the fullest possible redress, compatible with these wider aims, would be given to the injured, due care would also be taken not to over-exasperate the injurer, and thus leave his motives unchanged for the better.

All these considerations, if duly taken into account, would cause the law to be administered with a flexibility and moderation, and yet at the same time with an accuracy and exactness, as nearly approaching ideal justice as it is possible for human frailty to achieve. Of course, larger functions and greater discretionary powers would have to be given to judges and juries, cases would have to be dealt with more on their merits; yet not with less, but with greater regard to those great ethical principles which are independent of legislation, flowing as they do from the very structure of the human understanding.

Many of the hampering restrictions of the present system would have to be abolished. For example (to take one of Mr. Donisthorpe's instances) the future labour of a bankrupt might be taxed—(1) in proportion to the loss the creditors had sustained; (2) in proportion to the amount of fraud the evidence proved the bankrupt to have been guilty of; (3) in proportion to the discouragement and incapacitation that the tax would inflict upon him; and (4) in proportion to the deterring effect that the penalty would have upon the general community. Only in some such way as this could justice to each be made to square with justice to all.

All these considerations, embracing as they do the generalized experience of the past, would have to be applied *a priorily* to each separate case, and inductively verified or corrected by each new experience.

Another of Mr. Donisthorpe's difficulties has been partly answered by himself. "Who [according to the liberty principle] is the owner of a pawned watch?" This is a question of property. Now, on page 92 of his book, Mr. Donisthorpe has defined property as "a species of the genus Use." But use and freedom of use are one and the same fact. Consequently, property is a species of the genus Liberty. Now liberty means the freedom of some particular person or persons, and therefore property also means the same. On page 114 of his book, Mr. Donisthorpe recognises this implication. "The very notion of property involves . . . . a distinct contemplation of two factors—a thing owned and a person owning." In the same way, liberty involves two factors—a set of movements and a person or persons that do or may perform these movements. Thus, the bundle of movements called ownership of a watch, are performed, or may be performed, let us say, by John Smith. We will assume that at 12 o'clock on Monday morning the watch in question belonged to John Smith. He obtained it without either forcibly or fraudulently violating the liberty of his neighbours. For if this can be shown to be not the case, then he, or some other person, must have stolen the watch from its rightful owner, since wrongful ownership necessarily involves its correlative, rightful ownership; and moreover, as we have seen, Mr. Donisthorpe himself admits that ownership must be posited somewhere. But ownership is merely a species of the genus Liberty, a bundle of non-aggressive uses attached to a particular person or persons, and limited by the non-aggressive uses of his or their fellows. We will assume, then, that at 1 o'clock on Monday afternoon John Smith takes his watch to A.B., and agrees with the latter that the watch shall remain in pawn until such time as Smith shall pay down a certain sum of money for its withdrawal; but that if this sum of money be not paid before the elapse of one year from the day on which the watch is pawned, the article in question shall become the property of A.B. Now assuming that the bundle of non-aggressive uses called ownership originally and rightfully rested in Smith, it follows that one of these non-aggressive uses consisted in lending or giving the watch to A.B. It follows also that the placing of limits upon the uses thus freely transferred to A.B. just as much resided in the original bundle of uses as the mere lending did; provided, of course, that A.B. assented to accept such limits. Consequently, when the dispute arises and the question comes before a court—"To whom does this watch belong?"—the answer given in accordance with the liberty maxim, would be "In so far as the bundle of uses called ownership can be shown to have originally resided in Smith, and in so far as A.B. fails to prove that these uses, or any portion of them, have, under any or no conditions, been freely transferred by Smith to him, the watch belongs to Smith; but in so far as A.B. can prove that these uses, or any portion of them, have been transferred to him, he himself having fairly fulfilled all the conditions (if any) of the transfer, then the watch to this extent is the property of A.B. Should there be a conflict of claims after both sides had been fairly heard, should it turn out that one portion of the bundle of uses still remained untransferred by the original owner, then, if neither would forego his claim, the watch should be sold for what it would fetch, and the proceeds divided between the two claimants in proportion to the number of uses that each had fairly established a claim to. If the claims of other creditors still remained to be considered, they would have to be made upon the separate divisions of these proceeds.

It may be objected that this would make justice a matter of great complexity. So is human life.

Another of Mr. Donisthorpe's difficulties is—To what extent should a principle be held responsible for accidents, and for the injuries done by his agents. The reply is—Just so far as it can be shown that he has either explicitly or implicitly agreed to be responsible for them. Implicit agreements—and it cannot be denied that a clear knowledge of custom often amounts to an agreement of this character—would have to be very carefully dealt with, and ought not to be enforced except on the clearest possible evidence. Accidents are part of the discipline by which Nature teaches men how to live, and it is to the advantage of all that each should bear the share that fortune inflicts, and not be assisted to force this share upon his neighbour simply because his neighbour happens to be more wealthy than himself. Let those who know their own strength be free to bear such of other men's burdens as they may think fit, but let not one man be legally helped to force his burden upon another man without that other man's consent.

Another of Mr. Donisthorpe's difficulties, and one that he takes a lot of pains to elaborate, arises out of the evils which he thinks may take place as the soil of a country gets more and more occupied. Here the counter fact is ignored, that, in proportion as the land of a country comes under cultivation, a greater variety and number of objects are produced, which necessitate a corresponding increase of modifying and carrying agencies. Consequently, the demand for such agencies grows greater and greater. This being so, the real difficulty is not so much one between separate land-owners, who, as Mr. Donisthorpe points out, may quarrel about the boundaries of their respective estates, as between farmers or owners of the raw materials, and those whose business it is to work up these materials into the finished products of an infinitely varied civilization. Both these classes are, so far at least as the opportunity of making exchanges is concerned, mutually dependent on one another, and, as civilization grows more complex, as the division of labour extends further and further, that mutual dependence tends constantly to increase. The application of the liberty principle to this difficulty lies in securing justice for both parties ; as far, of course, as limited human powers can secure it. On the one hand, the law should see that the liberty of the man who possesses the abilities needed for modifying the raw material, is not violated by the owner of that raw material ; while on the other hand, it should afford equal protection to the latter as regards his own consent respecting the disposal of his own property. Secure perfect free trade in land, and if the working class don't then join their savings together for the purpose of buying it up as it comes into the market, that will be because they don't want it, or because their thriftless habits have placed them in a position of comparative helplessness: and neither government nor any other human contrivance will effectually save people from the consequences of their own bad habits.

Another point, bearing on this question, is the right of way, of movement from place to place. The right to this is as real as the right to private property. Therefore, under a just social system, the realization of the latter right would have to suffer such a deduction as would guarantee the adequate carrying out of the former right. Under such a system, private property would come to mean all that resulted from the non-aggressive exercise of personal faculties, whether in the way of production or exchange; limited only by the *reasonable* satisfaction of the right of movement from place to place: a right equal in reality and importance to the right of property, necessary to the obtaining of property, as well as to the very existence of liberty; and claimed by property-owner and non-owner of property alike.

For it is perfectly clear that if private property is not sufficiently limited to allow people to communicate with one another, no market, no exchange, and, therefore, no society, can exist. Suppose, for example, that no public road could be constructed until all land-owners had freely consented thereunto; how, under such conditions, would it be possible for people to get from place to place? I do not deny the right of property; but the right of liberty is equally real; and, when the two rights come together, a reasonable compromise must be made. It is as unreasonable to carry the principle of private property to such an extent as to destroy all liberty, as it would be to carry the principle of liberty to such an extent as to destroy all private property. We should endeavour to arrive at a state of things where both individual liberty and private property are at such a maximum as is compatible with the fullest possible existence of each. Neither can be rightfully destroyed. With present human nature, we cannot afford to let our means of communication wait until all owners of private property freely consent to allow us to communicate. The principle of liberty is wider than that of property, for only by the free movement of human bodies can property be acquired.

And besides the right of movement there is the right of un-aggressive private appropriation of the uncultivated surfaces, wild fruits, herbs, and roots that Nature produces. The cranberry growing in the wild swamp belongs to no man. But a man may fairly make it his own by being at the trouble of gathering it. The prairie belongs to no man, but a man may fairly make it his own by clearing and cultivating it. Labour is the *ultimate* basis and justification of all property. In fact, the right of a man to the un-aggressively obtained results of his activities is only the logical extension of the right of a man to himself. The man who ploughs up and cultivates a piece of barren land, makes that piece of land his own, just as much as the berry-gatherer makes the berry *his* own; although neither create a particle of raw material. A fair system of property would be based on these fundamental rights. But when all was done in this respect that could in equity be allowed, it would still be possible for those who had not cultivated the soil, to come trampling all over the gardens of those who had, saying, in Mr. Donisthorpe's words, "You may starve me out of existence, but I may not shoot you out of existence." It is indeed highly probable that even the most thorough carrying out of the liberty principle would leave imperfect human beings with many grievances to grumble about. But we are mortal, and it is for those who would base law on some other principle, to work out an ideal system where imperfect beings would have nothing to quarrel about. Assuredly, if we are not to be bettered by moving towards liberty, it is hardly likely that we shall be improved by going the other way.

In the foregoing paragraphs the attempt has been made to show that Mr. Donisthorpe's objections to the liberty maxim, on the ground of its deductive or *a priori* character, are of very little value. First it was pointed out that the same objections would upset all science and all morality; in fact, all those great and important principles now used for the practical guidance of life. It was then shown that there is an *a priori* element in all human reasoning; and one which even the most thorough-going inductionist is compelled to take for granted. It was further shown that each step in an ordinary inductive process is only possible in virtue of those scientific generalizations or statements of past inductions which are called principles; statements which, when applied to fresh experience, assume all the characteristics of *a priori* rules or principles. It was also pointed out that, not only are these *a priori* maxims of the highest value as guides of human conduct, inasmuch as they embody and gather up the observations and experiments of all present and past generations, but that, without the light they throw upon present problems, all our knowledge would have to be re-learnt, and we should now be blindly groping in the midst of universal darkness. It was then shown that what is called the principle of liberty, is merely one of these important generalizations, not inferior to any of them either in point of moral urgency or efficiency of practical guidance; being based upon the widest and deepest natural fact, not merely of human life, but of all life—"the will to be, to do, to act"; the indestructible self-love, which is firm and fixed as the universe itself. A number of practical difficulties were then taken, and it was shown that they could not even be approached, still less settled, without the application of definite and sweeping *a priori* rules not less abstract and general than the liberty maxim. Then the solutions to which the theory of liberty seemed to point were briefly and imperfectly dealt with, and a rough assimulation of the principle of property with the principle of liberty was finally attempted to be made.

Mr. Donisthorpe may fairly be asked to say on what sort of principle the difficulties that he mentions are to be settled, if, as he urges, they are not solvable on the principle of liberty. It is difficult to believe that he is serious when he says that social problems can "only be worked out by rigid induction." But if he can point out a method of dealing scientifically with any problem whatsoever, that does not, either implicitly or explicitly, involve one or more of these very objectionable *a priori* maxims, there will be something to be said for his "rigid induction." Let it be remembered that there is here no attempt to deny the value of induction. It is a most necessary part of the means by which truth is ascertained; but when used by itself, and apart from deduction, it looks (as before remarked) very much like a man trying to run on one leg.

Mr. Donisthorpe makes great sport of those who, like the Honourable Auberon Herbert, seek to rest the doctrine of liberty on a teleological basis. "God," says the teleologist, "specially intended that men should be free." How do you know what He intended? asks Mr. Donisthorpe. How indeed! To talk of an infinitely perfect existence intending one thing more than another is to utter a contradiction in terms.* To intend to do something, is to *want* something that does not already exist; and to *design*, is simply to employ the requisite means for getting this want satisfied. But an infinitely perfect existence, by the very terms of its definition, cannot lack or want anything. To such an existence all things must be equally present. To such an existence there can be no past and no future; no movements towards future satisfaction, and no movements away from present disatisfaction; no suspensive interval during which it hesitates between different alternatives, and no future moment wherein it subsequently makes up its mind to have this arrangement rather than that. With such an existence subjective thoughts must be equivalent to objective realities; the ideal must be the real: there can be no interval between thought and thing, between conception and realization: to think must be to possess, and the infinite number and variety of the thoughts of such an existence must make up the entire extended and unextended universe.* Using an

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* A logical teleologist, such a one, for example, as the late Mr. Mill, would rather have an imperfect designer, with the possibility

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of personal advantages in another life, than an absolutely perfect existence, such as SPINOZA preached, without this possibility. "Strictly speaking," says the latter, "God does not love or hate anyone, for God is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain."—*Ethics, part V., prop. XVII., Cor.* "He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return."—*Prop. XIX.* A cold shower bath for the theological sentimentalists! They cannot bear it, although merely the outcome of their own theory.

* According to SPINOZA this existence is unknowable to us save through two of its attributes. "God is a Being consisting of infinite attributes, whereof each one is infinite or supremely perfect after its kind."—*Spinoza's Correspondence, Letter IV., Spinoza to Henry Oldenburg.* The two known attributes are thought and extension. In the final analysis these two are one, for extension is but a form of consciousness, a complex of sense impressions which can only be conceived to exist in a mind (see *Berkley's Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, and also his three dialogues between *Hylas and Philonous.*) The scientific doctrine of the unbroken parallelism between what are called mental and physical states, between *neurocis* and *physocis*, although a good working hypothesis, is not a matter of experience, but merely an imaginary association of a particular set of sense impressions, that is, of a particular group of states of consciousness, with consciousness in general. Thus, with each idea and each sensation of my neighbour's, I associate that

inadequate metaphor, this existence may be likened to a tree which blossoms at an infinite number of points, spontaneously, simultaneously, necessarily, eternally. SPINOZA calls it God or Substance indifferently, but it is entirely different from what is generally meant by the first of these terms, being, in fact, as far removed from the littleness of personality, as the vastness of eternity is removed from the narrowness of time. A comparison may serve to make what is here meant a little plainer. The poet WORDSWORTH was in the habit of falling into such deep reveries that for the moment he lost the knowledge of who he was, what he was, and where he was. As happens to a man in a dream, his thoughts flowed spontaneously, *and without will*, from his own nature, and the forms of time and space were for the moment to him as if they did not exist. In just such a manner does that extended and unextended consciousness called the universe flow necessarily from the infinite existence of which it is one of the infinite and eternal expressions. Nature is the eternal dream of substance, the everlasting and most real reverie of an infinite impersonal reality; neither made nor begotten, but proceeding, and unfolding itself without will, or effort, or strain of any kind, in orderly variety for ever and ever. Just as the conclusions of the exact sciences flow necessarily from the premises laid down, so does the whole universe flow necessarily from that eternal existence of which it is one of the myriad expressions.* It

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particular group of my own sense impressions (*i.e.*, of my own possible states of consciousness) which I call his brain; and he does the same with me. So that ultimately the universe is simply the totality of actual and possible states of consciousness, associated together in certain definite ways, and exemplifying certain definite laws of sequence and co-existence.

* Some people have urged that the doctrine of an infinite number of attributes does not necessarily belong to SPINOZA's system. But an infinitely perfect being must be perfect *in an infinite number of ways.* To pin such an existence down to two attributes, would be to limit and take away its infinite perfection.

is therefore absurd to ask *why* the universe exists, or *why* any particular natural object exists that is contained in the universe. On this theory of SPINOZA'S* there can be no will or choice in the matter. The universe cannot help but exist, and all things in it cannot help but be what they are, namely, absolutely and supremely perfect in relation to Nature as a whole. If one single item of the universe disappeared, the whole of it would go; just as the sylogism breaks down if one of its terms be missing. To speak, then, of design in connection with such an existence as this, is to utter arrant nonsense. It is to reduce the eternal to the level of a mere tinker; a patching bodger of unsatisfactory material; a being subject to all the local conditions and limitations of the cunning circumventing personal contriver—the finite modeller and shaper whose designs have no meaning apart from the difficulties that they are intended to overcome. Teleology is a puerile little conceit. As well say that the twigs that simultaneously grow upon the tree, are each of them specially designed by the tree, as talk of the phenomena of this universe being designed by the infinite existence of which they are the modes. As well urge that the thoughts of a dreamer are designed by the dreamer, as predicate design of the thoughts that are contained in the infinite intellect of infinite reality. But there is no difficulty in seeing how this notion of design has arisen. Human beings have got so accustomed and adapted to many of the facts of existence that they imagine these facts are there for their special benefit. A mouse living in the middle of a cheese would think the same about the cheese; that is, if it could think at all. All our notions being modified by nature to square with her facts, many of the things that she gives us are what we should give ourselves if we were consulted before hand. We have got so used to them that we cannot do without them. Thus we come to imagine that nature is limited by intentions similar to our own. Just as our actions are prompted by purpose so are hers. The notion, once having taken root, is transplanted to every corner of the universe. If the adaptations that happen to be useful to us are prompted by purpose, so are all other adaptations ; and if we can only find out what the purpose of each thing is, we shall have solved the riddle of existence. The illusion vanishes when we discover that the *purpose* is merely a restatement of the adaptation that it pretends to explain, changing just as our knowledge of the adaptation changes, and leading us no further than the barren conclusion that each thing is designed to be just whatever it is thought to be, and to do just whatever it is imagined to do. 'Tis a strange conceit, this of putting ourselves at the back of nature. Anyone looking at the nebulæ just when it was forming into a solar system would say that the *final cause* of the process was the production of this same solar system. Anyone looking at this solar system when its planets were falling into its central sun, would say that its *final cause* was the generation of sufficient heat to dissolve the whole mass into another nebulæ. And thus the end, the purpose, the *final cause*, or whatever it may be called, would be continually shifted from place to place to suit the point of view of the speculator. And why ? Because there is no particular finality in nature. She is deeper and vaster and grander than purpose. She is not limited like a cunning child who builds his tottering castles in the sands of time. To her there is no time, no end, no beginning. There is only eternal becoming. One thing grows out of another : one phase passes into another phase, that into another, and so eternally.

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* Not put forth as true, but as an alternative to Teleology.

. . . The clod I trample
Was the skull of Alexander,
And the waters of the ocean
In the veins of haughty princes
Once ran red.
And the dust clouds of the desert
Were the lips of lovely women:
Where are they, and they who kissed them?
Power dies, and beauty passes,
Naught abides.

Where is Jamshyd, and his beaker?
Solomon, and where his mirror?
Which of all the wise professors
Knows where Kaus and Jamshyd flourished—
Who can tell?
They were mighty, yet they vanished,
Names are all they left behind them:
Glory first and then an echo;
Then the very echo hushes—
All is still.

The doctrine of liberty would be in a poor plight if it rested upon a false theory of Nature; a theory which presumptiously attempts to wrest from the infinite its eternal secret, and which may be, and indeed has been, used to excuse every species of spiritual and temporal despotism that this world has ever seen. But the doctrine of liberty needs no assistance from a childish metaphysic. There is no necessity to spoil a good cause by bad arguments. The doctrine of liberty has its foundation in the very structure of human reason. It is a logical consequence of our intellectual being. Mr. Donisthorpe himself seems to recognize this when he says that "the ultimate appeal [is] to our own selves." It is: and we are so constituted that we cannot claim liberty for ourselves without at the same time claiming it by implication for our fellows. The laws of human reason are mightier than the minds which exemplify them, and these laws inevitably involve both the individual and the crowd in the tacit admission of what passion seeks either to hide or deny. Whenever we ignore these laws our actions unsay our words, and we involuntarily stand forth as the living appeals for the liberty that we seek to destroy. This is the unavoidable contradiction which for ever turns the laugh against despotism. Produce the man who does not claim the fullest possible liberty for himself! He does it in acts if not in words; and those who are the readiest to enslave others are usually the loudest in claiming freedom for themselves. There are laws of thoughts as well as of things, and the conclusions that logically flow therefrom are equally important, equally binding upon all rational beings. In the long run the penalties of ignoring them cannot be shirked. He who enslaves another strikes at himself, for he commits an inconsistency against his own understanding which stings and rankles in consciousness, a perpetual accuser and rebuker while life lasts. This law of rational consistency is what is called the moral law, fixed and lasting as human thought, ceasing only with the mental conditions on which it depends. And inasmuch as man lives his life in consciousness; inasmuch as understanding is the very essence and defining feature of his being; he who violates this law injures his own mental habitation, and prepares a hell for himself to live in. On a deeper and firmer basis than the laws of thought can no ethical theory rest. The conclusions logically reared on such a foundation reach wherever reason holds its sway; and these conclusions must remain, with all their binding force, until man finally abdicates his intellectual pre-eminence among the creatures of the earth.

Before us Nature has placed an ideal of individual liberty. Whether she has done this intentionally or unintentionally cannot alter the fact. She has made the recognition of this ideal a necessity of intellectual and moral growth. Upon its gradual realization she has rested all morality, all happiness, and all progress. She has made liberty at once the primary interest of all and of each, of the many and of the few. For while all good things that can be obtained are achievable through its recognition, nothing without it is worth having. And this fact rests, not upon the experience of a few persons only; nor even on that of a particular nation; nor on that of one or two generations: but upon the lives and actions of all men who live or have lived since the human race begun. A generalization based upon such wide data, expressing as it does the collective experience of an entire race, cannot therefore be thrust aside as furnishing no practical guidance to the law-maker. On the contrary, there is good warrant for saying that the deductions logically drawn from it, checked and verified by present induction, and applied with that moderation without which no rule is serviceable, may readily supply practical working guides to both law maker and law respector, to statesman and citizen alike. This is certainly more than can be truthfully said of that impossible and one sided method called "rigid induction."

CHAPTER X.

LET us now examine the plea that with so-called social equality and official regulation, a happier and better humanity would result. Even admitting that there may be a small mite of truth in the argument that criminality and poverty are casually related, and that the removal of the latter would mean the almost total disappearance of the former; yet it is as certain as anything well can be in this world, that no mere rearrangement of imperfect social units could *suddenly* make all, or even many, bad people good. He would be a clever conjurer indeed, who could, by mere shuffling, change an old pack of cards into a new pack. True, a diminution of poverty might lessen the number of a certain class of vices—such for example as petty thefts and infanticide—provided that it could be effected in a legitimate manner, say, by the growth of saving and investing habits amongst the *whole* of the working class: an impossibility as average human nature is now constituted and likely to be constituted for thousands of years to come. But more than this both reason and fact alike forbid us to expect. A man must be either a blind fanatic or a great fool who imagines that securing to everybody—the industrious and the lazy, the wise and the foolish—all the material and mental satisfactions that admit of division and distribution, would effectually get rid of the murderer, the ravisher, and the thief. Human passions are not appeased in so simple a manner by a plentiful supply of warm clothing and full stomachs—rather the contrary.* The great readers of the human heart knew this well. "I never heard," said GOETHE, "of a single crime I might have not committed." And when some one once asked GEORGE ELIOT where she got the idea of one of her most diabolical characters, she replied, "Here, in my own heart." Like all other fanatics, the share and share alike worshippers have not yet emerged out of mental fairy land, and are still expecting a magic godmother, called social equality (or by some other hollow and high-sounding name) to come and change their pumpkins and rats into coaches and horses. Superstition of one kind or another dies hard. Although we live in a world of inexorable and universal law, we are always expecting the miracle that never has and never will come. Vicious people, and even moderately selfish people, are not as a fact suddenly transformed into saints by altering

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* This appears to be born out by Dr. Leffingwell's new work on *Illegitimacy and the Influence of Seasons upon Conduct.* Two Studies in Demography. Maps and Diagrams. By A. Leffingwell, M.D. 'Social Science Series.' (Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 2s. 6d.)

The following facts are taken from a summary of it which appeared in the *Literary World* for April 1st, 1892 :—Not only do we find that the proportion of illegitimate births in England, Scotland, and Ireland varies but slightly, the percentage of illicit progeny being 4·7, 8·2, 2·6 respectively.

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If we take the unmarried female population of England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland for the decade ending 1887. we find that of every thousand widows and spinsters the bastards born were 14, 21·5, and 4·4 respectively, and the fact that Scotland had thus the unenviable majority of nearly 5 to 1 over Ireland is very remarkable when, as Dr. Leffingwell's tables enable us to do, we compare the parts of the two countries that afford, more or less, similar conditions of life.

Can we discover the proximate causes of the varied, but locally constant, averages of bastardy? Poverty, ignorance, and the contamination of great cities have often been put down as contributory. Bad cottages in the country have almost by common consent been pronounced as *the* evil. Let us see.

WHAT DOES IRELAND SAY?

Two counties, Mayo and Down—one on the bleak and barren coast of the Atlantic, the other in prosperous Ulster—each containing by the

the circumstances of their lives. A sick patient is not improved by being taken out of a bed made of wood and put into one made of gold. The profoundists of all moralists saw this clearly, and in his tragedies we see vice facing it out through prosperity and adversity, through good repute and ill repute, until death cuts short the fight. Cataclysms are as rare in the moral as the physical world. Here and there, it is true, some JEAN VALJEAN there may be, with almost every spark of human feeling trampled out under the iron heels of hate and force ; who chances to meet a justice that reaches down to the very depths of his nature, and fans the feeble warmth that still remains into a steady flame that lasts through life. But these cases are exceptional, and it is because of their rarity that we notice them. And even if there are many potential JEAN VALJEANS, there are few actual Bishop MERVEILS ; so that the amount of vice the latter can redeem is only as a drop in the ocean of iniquity.

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census of 1881 about the same number of inhabitants, present a contrast which is worth studying. That census enumerated four classes of dwelling-houses. Houses of the fourth class were defined as 'built of mud or perishable materials, with only one room and one window'; homes, we may say, unfit for human habitation, and equalled only by the dwellings of the most barbaric tribes. The third class included houses of similar character but somewhat better built, of less perishable materials, and containing more than a single room or a single window. Houses somewhat superior to these constituted the remainder. Now in 1881, in County Mayo, more than three-fourths of the population were occupying dwellings of the third and fourth class. In County Down scarcely one-third of the people were equally impoverished. In Mayo but a little over one-eighth of its surface is susceptible even to cultivation, and forty per cent. is either barren or bog. . . . In County Down, on the other hand, only eight per cent. of the land is intractable to the husbandman ; and nearly half its total is actually under tillage. Now how do these two sections of the same country differ in that sentiment of morality which at least tends to prevent illegitimate births? [Our author here gives details which we summarise.] In the decade ending 1888, out of a total of 57,141 births in Mayo, only 322 were bastards ; whilst in Down there were 3,084 out of 60,346, which, reduced to the rate per thousand, shows that in Down there were 51·1, and in Mayo 5·6. If we work this out in regard to the numbers of

"No device," says Mr. LESLIE STEPHEN, "has hitherto succeeded in making bad men good." If we could trace the proportion of vice, of one kind or another, backward along the line of human descent, we should be astonished at the very slow progress of morality; and at the difference there often is between it and the civilization mentally coupled with it. The production of the socially unfit, like that of the naturally unfit, seems always to have gone on at a comparatively rapid rate. To ask why this is so is like asking why motion is in the direction of the least resistance, or why water is wet. It is part of the evolution-process, an indispensable condition of natural selection, and forms one of those ultimate facts which can neither be ignored nor explained. The average human character remains pretty

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unmarried and nubile women (between 15 and 45 years of age), the number of illegitimate births to each 10,000 such women in Mayo was 11; in Down, 90; in all Ireland, 44.

We cannot extend our survey to other countries. Suffice it to say that observation in the poorer parts of Scotland, France, Italy, and Switzerland serves to show that destitution, hunger, and chronic wretchedness are not proved to be necessarily provocative of immorality —though, as our author observes, 'it would, perhaps, be too great a stretch of scientific imagination to regard them as excitiments to virtue.

. . . . . .

Education as a preventive seems to fare no better than improved dwellings and the simplicity of rural life. In Europe, the countries wherein popular education is widely diffused among all classes—Denmark, Scandinavia, Scotland, for example—have a high average of bastardy. Russia and Ireland, at the opposite pole in education, have a low average. The Registrar-General reported of Scotland in 1862 that 'the counties which show the highest proportion of illegitimacy are the counties which are in the highest condition as to education; whilst, on the other hand, the counties which produce the fewest illegitimate births are those where education is at the lowest ebb.' Our author adds that this still holds true, and cites Kirkcudbright as a startling illustration of it. In Ulster education is far more diffused than in Connaught, yet the decade 1879-1888 in the former province was marked by four times the rate of illegitimacy found in the latter. Finisterre is the least educated province in France, yet its illicit births —34 in 1,000 births—are less than the rate for any county in Great Britain.

Why is this? The reply is obvious. Nature teaches Duty: artificial and false "education" unteaches it. In the 19*th Century* for June, much the same under the successive veneerings of culture and refinement it puts on and throws off. It *does* change though : there is a movement upwards and away from the beast, but the process is slow ; perhaps it is all the more sure and safe on that account. At bottom there is not so much difference as is often supposed between the so-called savage and his civilized master ; what there is is often anything but flattering to the latter. The rule, so largely exemplified elsewhere, shows itself here ; the most important thing is the last to appear—the longest in forming. The heart of man changes as slowly as the everlasting hills, and the evolution of a perfect race is the longest of all natural processes.

The superficial character of the social reformer's psychological analysis is never more clearly shown than in this childish theory that equalizing wealth by robbing PETER and giving to PAUL, will promote better feelings between the two parties. It would not even do this if the said PETER had defrauded the said PAUL of the amount transferred —so utterly impotent is mere force to produce any moral change—still less would it do so when the amount confiscated represented—as in the majority of cases it would do—superior industry or intelligence. When all men work alike, think and feel alike, and are equally endowed with the same tastes, then it will be time for them to be all remunerated alike ; but until that happy period arrives, the inequalities of character must be matched by the inequalities

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1892, the chaplain of Wandsworth Jail says that in England and Wales (where compulsory cram has been extending its refining and moralizing influence during a period of 20 years)—"police statistics are a striking confirmation of prison statistics, and the statistics of trials ; and all of them point with singular unanimity to the conclusion that crime during the last 30 years, for which we possess official returns, has not decreased in gravity and has been steadily developing in magnitude." Yet for years political liars have been telling of the great decrease of crime caused by State cram !

of wealth and station; any other arrangement only achieves equality at the expense of justice, and secures equal possessions at the expense of unequal satisfactions.

Justice must be maintained. No man, and no number of men, have any right to take the produce, or the monetary equivalent of the produce, of another man or another set of men without having first obtained the consent of the latter. If, for example, A writes more readable essays than B and C, the former, and not the latter, should alone be free to dispose of the extra value therefrom arising. So evidently think the writers of the Fabian Essays; for although their book has had an uncommonly large sale, they have never yet offered to go shares with people whose inferior essays don't sell at all. They know better. They know too well what real equality is, to think seriously of practically adopting the sham. However cheaply they may sentimentalize about equality, and fraternity, and brotherhood, and all that rot; yet, when it comes to the pinch, they evidently fail to see how, if they who wrote these essays have no right to dispose in their own way of the extra value of such effusions, some other person or persons, who did not write them, can possess an ethical warrant both of disposal and confiscation; for under these circumstances the last two terms are synonymous. They wisely illustrate the profound wisdom of FREDERIC BISTAIT's remarks—"There is always this contradiction when we set out on a false principle. Its results are in practice so absurd and so mischievous, that we are forced to check ourselves. The punishment follows too soon upon the error, and exposes it at once. But in matters of speculative industry, such as these theorists reason upon, a false principle may be followed a long time before they are warned of its falseness by the complicated consequences to which it leads; and when at length these consequences are revealed, they act according to the opposite principle, contradict themselves, and seek to justify their change of front by asserting that in political economy there is no absolute principle."

Fraternal equality is merely for writing about, and canting about, and getting political power and cheap popularity by means of. In this matter actions unsay words, and truth gets expressed though lies are spoken. The only real equality is within, not without, and it consists in an equality of pleasure taken in diverse and unequal possessions. In this, the only true sense, DIOGENES is equally as happy as ALEXANDER, for his tastes are as perfectly gratified by life in a tub, as ALEXANDER'S are by universal empire.

To imagine that we shall all form one happy family when everybody is as well off in the eyes of social experts as everybody else, is to ignore nearly the whole of the elements of which the moral world is made up. At least 90 per cent. of human vice grows out of the clashing of thoughts and feelings, out of envy, jealousy, malice, hatred, and a host of other evil passions. Will A cease to envy his neighbour the private monopoly of a fine voice, when he is as rich—or as poor—in other respects as his neighbour is. Will B fail to hate the man who calls him a fool, and, what is worse, proves it too, because they have both got the same share of clothing, house, or rather workhouse, accommodation, use of libraries, museums, schools, lavatories, dormitories, refectories, &c., &c. Will nobody do anything, or say anything, or think anything except what happens to fit in with the tastes and thoughts and feelings of everybody? Will there be no disappointed lovers, no discarded old maids or bachelors, no unfaithful wives or husbands under the *regime* of social equality? Or will the Socialist, like PLATO, carry out his theory to its logical conclusion, and not only equalize the mere grub and board, but also all the pleasures of life that now arise out of the personal relations of individuals?

We know that he supplements his elevating philosophy of eating and drinking, by a sexual philosophy equally elevating; although, in deference to modern hypocrisy, he takes good care to keep the latter well in the background: and small wonder too, considering that the "Contagious Diseases Act" is decency itself compared with the amount of regulation that would be inflicted on individuals under a *logical* Socialism. When the family life of the isolated home, and all the responsibilities and duties that grow out of it, are withered and destroyed by the blighting hand of State Socialism; the communal Phryne will throw off her mantle, and stand in the open court of the world; corrupt, but not ashamed. When the State has assumed the duties of the parent, the wife and husband will give place to the officially sanitated and licensed Hetairæ and her hundred lovers. And as for the children—well, in that ideal crowd the remark of Prince Krapotkin will become nominally appropriate: "All children," says he, "are our children," and so they will then falsely appear to be: for we shall not know them, and they won't know us. A glorious ideal! Children the property of the community—of everybody in general and nobody in particular—managed, trained, and controlled by communal officials; individual parents rendered practically childless, deprived of the discipline in duty which the training of their children gives, and their minds left to grow the weeds of vanity and lust; the words father, mother, brother, sister, rendered obsolete, or emptied of all intelligible meaning; a community of revellers in what Carlyle called "pigswash," its whole collective life a pitiless struggle between the demons of desire and force. And this world of collective orphans and childless parents is the goal of human progress. This is "the far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves." Could there be a greater libel upon all that is best and highest in human nature? We thought we had left materialistic Communism behind, and that although we had come from the brute we were not destined to go back to it; we thought we were helping to evolve a complete man, and not merely an intelligent animal, more cunning and more corrupt than all the beasts of the field. If Socialism is sound we were mistaken.

The utter impotence of a collective and distributive social equality, held together by collective force, and expressing itself in regulative officialism—the impossibility of this promoting either happiness or morality, becomes apparent when we enquire wherein happiness and morality consist. Happiness is the mental concomitant of free action, that is, of those movements which argument the processes we classify as living, in order to distinguish them from non-living processes. It is the mental correlative of unimpeded organic functional activity. Consequently, in proportion as this kind of activity is interfered with, whether by extraneous personal or non-personal action, in that proportion do its mental correlatives decrease. Contrast the mental state of a child running freely in the fields, with that of a child cooped up for five or six hours a day in a stuffy school-room. And the indirect results of force are precisely the same as the direct results. Frightening people by threats of punishment into doing what they don't want to do, fills their minds with all kinds of painful pictures, and makes their conduct not so much an attempt to achieve happiness as to avoid misery. Every repressive law, however excusable it may be—and legal prevention of violence is not only excusable, but indispensable—lessens, in a greater or less degree, both the happiness of the mind and the health of the body. Hence legislation, with its police, judges, and prisons, is never a positive cause of happiness; at best it is but a clumsy method of preserving intact those conditions of freedom, which leave individuals an opportunity of finding and following their own happiness. The liberties of men may to some extent be secured by law: the happiness of men can only be achieved by themselves. It is often supposed that force holds society together; the exact opposite is the real truth. Just so far as I force my neighbour, or am forced by him, just so far are we at enmity with each other: we are separated by an impassible barrier of mutual hatred and distrust. Hatred is the great *raison d'etre* of force. An aggregate of men held together by force is not a society: it is simply a mechanical grouping of unsocial incompatibles, ready to fall asunder as easily as a policeman and his catch directly the hand of law leaves go. Men are social so far as they are freely joined together by bonds of mutual interest: they are unsocial so far as they are bound by law. All the society there is, is founded on freedom, and in its nature approximates, as ARISTOTLE says, more or less closely to friendship. But Socialistic law is simply the hand of the big bully at the throat of his enemy—nay, often at that of his friend. From this it follows that the growth of society, as such, is necessarily coincident with the recognition of individual liberty: that it implies the latter, and is utterly impossible without it. To point out that, historically, society has always been disfigured by coercion of one kind or another, proves nothing until we are agreed upon what society is. The disintegration of death invariably accompanies the integration of life—there is nowhere a perfect living organism—but the latter is totally distinct from the former, and is only itself so far as it is distinct. Similarly with the free relations of uncoerced individuals, for which "society" is the general term. These relations have always coincided with force; but they are totally distinct therefrom, and are only social in so far as they are so distinct. State regulation is the decaying or dead tissue that impedes the life and growth of the "social organism." Social life only begins where law ends, and every Socialistic addition to the latter is a substraction from the former. It may be said—How about the restraint of criminals, does not that indirectly increase social life? No, it does not; at best it but prevents social life from being *decreased*. It has no positive, but only a negative value. Only could it have a positive value if it socialised the criminal; but the fact that it does not do so is notorious. I may stop this man from picking a pocket: I cannot make him not want to pick one. I may ward off his enmity: but I cannot by so doing make him a friend. Nay, in order to keep him at bay, I am obliged—excusably so, indeed—to expend a certain amount of force—of unsociability—and so part with a portion of my social life in order to preserve the remainder. In any case there is a loss, and the focible suppression of criminality is always a victory that is only a little less terrible than a defeat. Law is simply the pathology of diseased social tissue, and, like all pathological treatment, must disappear with the improvement of health. One day man will stand forth in the fulness of perfect health, mental and physical, free alike from both doctors and quacks, because exempt from the diseases on which they subsist.

But if it is easy to show that coercive legislation cannot promote happiness, it is still easier to show that it cannot further morality. Law is the attachment of penalties to the non-fulfilment of certain prescribed courses of conduct; or, it may be, of rewards to their fulfilment. In either case its tendency is non-moral. The man who behaves himself because he is afraid of a real or fanciful bogie, is no more moral than a dog that is thrashed into obedience; and neither is he moral who keeps straight in order to get some real or imaginary sugar plum. What is morality? According to Socialists—and here we will not introduce any definition of our own—it is useful conduct prompted by a desire to benefit others. But in the cases just given, the happiness of others is never desired at all: the prompting motive is either to avoid some pain to self, or to achieve some pleasure for self, *and it is that alone;* the happiness of others is not considered as an end at all; there is not the least pleasure taken in promoting it, or in seeing it promoted. Moral conduct, on the other hand, say the Socialists, is prompted by the prospective pleasure of seeing others happy. The generous man gives simply for the pleasure he derives in seeing others made more happy through his gift: so far as there is any alloy of other desires, his action is non-moral. And all moral conduct, we are told, is prompted by kindred motives. From this it therefore follows that those who take no pleasure in helping their fellows, but who have to be coerced into doing so, are no more moral than steam engines. Force only appeals to lowest motives: it turns men into cattle and keeps them there. It does not even square with the ethics of Socialism.

The non-moral and depressing tendency of law is clearly seen when we inquire into the class of motives to which it appeals. Its appeal is always either to fear or vanity; it may frighten you into doing or abstaining from certain acts; or it may bribe you into the required action or abstinence. In either case it is stimulating, and therefore developing, that side of our nature which lies below the plain of morality. True, it may keep the sphere of non-moral activity within certain roughly defined bounds, but *as law*, it cannot effectually lessen that sphere; for it is only over motives lying within that sphere that it can have any leverage. Law cannot make the unselfish more unselfish; it cannot make the selfish less selfish; for its very success depends upon stimulating their selfishness to the pitch required for producing action or abstinence from action. Selfishness and unselfishness are like the two buckets of a well; as one rises the other sinks; as one is stimulated and developed the other is dwarfed and stunted. So that the spread of law means the increase of the lower motives at the expense of the higher—the growth of weeds at the expense of flowers. Hence it is desirable to have as little law as possible. Even a Socialist ought to see this.

The deathward tendency of law is equally manifest. As the attacher of pain to non-fulfilment of certain prescribed actions, it fosters the less organic processes at the expense of the more organic. As the attacher of a low kind of pleasure (or rewards) it arrests the evolution of the higher and more organic processes. Happiness, as SPINOZA pointed out, is the mental correlative of augmented living processes. And as thought and thing correspond point for point, augmentation of one involving augmentation of the other, any depression of happiness consequently implies a corresponding depression of vitality. Pain has been defined as the gravitation towards the non-organic; pleasure the ascension towards more complete life. Pain, according to Mr. SPENCER, is the arrest of vitality; pleasure is the increase of vitality. It is perfectly evident, then, that to stimulate fear, or rather pain, is to develope the less vital at the expense of the more vital processes. This accounts for the miserably subdued and spiritless character of all slaves.

Nevertheless Law may offer rewards, and so may increase pleasure to the extent of their enjoyment. But what sort of pleasure does it increase?

Not the peace which comes from the consciousness of having done duty for its own sake, that is, for the sake of self-satisfying and harmonious co-operation with the illimitable cosmos; not the calm recognition of rational fitness with the universal order, obtained through having fearlessly followed the dictates of individual reason: not this unique and unalloyed joy; but something very different, namely, the poor restless vanity of knowing that somebody else either is or *pretends* to be pleased with what you have done. There is all the difference here between heaven and hell, between the thanks of Nature and the inane grin of that paltry, insignificant little travesty of Nature hypocritically called "dear fellow-man." Pleasures differ in duration, volume, and intensity; hence it is legitimate to speak of higher and lower pleasures, just as it is legitimate to speak of more organic and less organic physical processes. For life is not merely one process, but a consensus of processes, some, namely, the governing and directing ones, more important to the maintenance of the consensus than others. Therefore, it follows that the pleasures corresponding to the increase of the more important vital processes, are of more importance than others, and, consequently, anything that developes the growth of the lower pleasures at the expense of the higher, while it furthers pleasure, furthers the wrong kind of pleasure. For the highest and most permanent pleasure, if indeed such a term may here be used, is the peace which comes by rationally employing each part of the human system in such a manner as fits in with the general order of things; thus ever living in quiet oneness with the laws of universal Nature. This by SPINOZA was called "blessedness," by the Jews "holiness," and by the Stoics "tranquility." Clearly a very different fact from that poor fleeting excitement which is generally understood by the term "pleasure." Other people may give you excitement, but only yourself can give you peace. Only by despising a lying social world, and living to eternal principles, is this last to be had at all.

CHAPTER XI.

HOW does the doctrine of liberty apply to animals? It has been shown that the moral obligation to respect our neighbour's freedom rests upon identity of intellectual nature. You, as a rational being, strive to express your own nature as fully and freely as you possibly can, therefore you are logically bound to allow other rational beings to do the same; since things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. "Do not to another (said CONFUCIUS) that which thou would'st not have done to thyself." This, as has already been said, is the great moral law for rational creatures. It is good alike for male and female, white and black, savage and civilized, rich and poor; for all sorts and conditions of people the wide world through. It is at once both the unshakeable foundation and the eternal safeguard of liberty, and never until the human understanding itself goes, can this go; can this fail to show up clear and white through the darkest gloom. You would be free? Then respect the freedom of others. You would have your own consent respected? Then violate not that of others. This is Individualism. How does it apply to the animal world? Let us see.

Now animals are only partly rational. Therefore the principle can only partly apply. It does not apply to a stone or a tree at all. It applies only in proportion as living forms approximate in their nature towards reason. Taking this qualification and applying it roughly, it seems, at least in our opinion, to supply a rule which would lead us to conclude, that although we are not morally bound to defend animals as much as we are bound to defend men ; although we are not bound to defend them from human interference, yet we are bound to do what we can to make that interference as little as possible compatible with our food necessities and the keeping down of animal over-population. If I saw a man drowning a cat I should not interfere. The act might be necessary. But if I saw a man deliberately torturing the animal for the sake of what he pleased to call the advancement of science, I should interfere. Why ? Because I am under a moral obligation to do what I can to prevent intelligent and sensitive creatures like myself from being interfered with. And this obligation is strong in proportion to the closeness of identity between myself and the creatures interfered with. There is no other excuse for government, and the evil is that such an excuse is needed. Now animals, like myself, are intelligent. Like myself, they can feel pain, and that severely ; " not to the same extent " possibly, but to some extent. Therefore inasmuch, as they possess the *same kind* of sensitive and intelligent nature, I am to some extent bound to protect them : but not quite to the same extent I admit. It is necessary that they should be killed. It is not necessary that they should be tortured in addition to being killed. Therefore I may reasonably conclude that when interference is carried further than the needs of human existence ; when, that is, animals are not merely killed but deliberately tortured before being killed, the obligation to protect them becomes imperative ; and I am bound to do what little I can to fulfil that obligation. It is true I cannot do much, but I am bound to do my best. *So is the State, which is but a collection of I's.* Let us again remember that obligation to protect liberty rests upon identity of nature, and that it is strong in proportion as the nature interfered with resembles our own. It is strongest of all in the case of man, who, in so far as he is an intelligent being, in our very self objectified. It is not quite so strong in the case of animals; these last are like our own undeveloped nature looking to us for mercy and fair play. The obligation is undoubtedly weaker. Still, it is amply strong enough to justify us in doing what we can to keep them out of the clutches of heartless devils who do their abominations in the name of science. Yet there is little we can do, for devils work in the dark. Animals have rights; weaker rights than our own, but still rights; for they are sensitive, and they are largely intelligent like ourselves. I repeat that, as human nature is at present constituted, it is necessary to kill them (in fact, nature herself does this if we don't); but it is not necessary to torture them: and the very fact that we are (at least in the case of tame creatures) responsible for their existence, should cause us to be all the more careful to make their short lives as free and happy as possible while they last. The individual, or the community, which would wish to purchase exemption from pain, or length of life, at the expense of torture to helpless animals, sinks below the brutes themselves. Nature has given to each man his own share of the world's pain, and he who would put that share, or any portion of it, upon other living creatures, let him argue and reason as he likes, is a mean and contemptible wretch. Such a one is less worthy to live than the creatures he tortures. In fact he is not a man, and whatever authority or learning he may possess counts for nothing. As for the relief of human pain, which he pretends to secure by torturing animals, it is not a thing we have any right to obtain by such means. Human beings as a class have brought all their aches and pains on themselves by disobeying the laws of Nature, of conscience, and of reason. Why, then, should animals as a class be tortured for what is due to human folly, and what reason and common sense will eventually remedy? Let us spend the time and energy that we now waste on this monstrous and self-degrading cruelty, in trying to obey the simple laws around and within us. This the only right track. Let us confine our science to the non-torturing methods of discovery (there is no limit to the advantages of these methods), and if at present we cannot cure all the ills that flesh is heir to without baking cats, or boiling dogs, or similar practices, then let us wait like rational beings until we can. Far worse and more dangerous to society than any physical disorder is the cruelty which these practices tend to increase. In the Paris Hospitals vivisection has already led to experiments upon human beings. Let it go on, and the medical profession will lose all its ancient trustworthiness. No hospital will be safe. No man will be able to trust himself or his family with a doctor. When shall we learn that attempting to decrease physical evils by increasing moral evils is exchanging gold for silver? Here we stand at the very crown of Nature, armed with knowledge, and supplied with ample opportunities for finding means to alleviate human suffering, and yet we must descend to the level of savages, and make ourselves comfortable by torturing creatures that cannot help themselves! Where is all our boasted philosophy? We have a power of understanding, which, when properly trained, enables us to endure pain. The animals have not. We are more powerful than they. Let us, therefore, treat them with that magnanimity without which all power is vain. To bear pain sooner than inflict it, is better than either health or length of days. A race which cannot rise to this, is unworthy of the high station to which Nature has called it; its moral life is its only true life, and if it attempts to go back from this, it will rot off the face of the earth. Neither science nor anything else can save it.

CHAPTER XII.

REQUISITE as the use of force occasionally is—and that there are circumstances where its use is necessary, few people will deny—yet it is always an evil, never in any case a good. For it is a wrong in itself, just as a lie is a wrong in itself. The passion that prompts it, namely, the desire to do to another what one would dislike if done to one's own person, is disagreeable and peace-disturbing in its very essence. Even the defence of life, liberty, and property, which is the expression of this passion in its mildest and least unwarrantable form, is still destructive of the harmony that prevails where reason has outgrown force, where duty and love are one. That this is so, the practical daily experience of almost all people will bear witness. Take, for example, the ordinary domestic duties. How much satisfaction there is when these are carried on spontaneously and in obedience to the dictates of reason; how much dissatisfaction when force has to be resorted to. The first state is a positive and unalloyed good, a good in and for itself, perfect and complete in each moment of its duration; the second state is a positive evil; an evil in and for itself, whatever its material advantages may be: for it destroys that harmony of reason, which is love; mars that mutual respect for differences of wants and tastes, which is charity; and impairs that joint supply of rationally recognized needs; which is duty. In the place of all these the use of force puts the horrible grind of slavery, the external pretence of an inner harmony which all parties know not to exist; an outside lie;

a whited sepulchre that only covers burning hate and ever seething inner discord; the thin crust of a living volcano which must run over at last.

In their domestic concerns men pride themselves on being able to rule by reason rather than by force. Why? Because in these matters they know by practical experience that reason is a good in itself; force an evil in itself. Wherever reason is, there is harmony and peace; there is joint service of natural law, and joint performance of the duties that arise therefrom and rest thereon. But reason will not be driven. It may be easily led by truth; yet attempt to compel it, and it changes immediately from an angel of light into a fiend of darkness. This law runs right through the universe: even an animal largely exemplifies it. Who, amongst that crowd of fashionable people who know neither how to spend their time nor their money, does not regret having to keep a dog constantly chained up, as a sort of living ornament to the importance of the premises? We all know how much these good people deplore the necessity under which they are so unfortunately placed by the unavoidable circumstances of their lot. We see the fact clearly revealed when, as is frequently the case, the chained creature goes mad in consequence of the considerate treatment it has received, and pays its benefactors with a wholly undeserved and unexpected bite.

How anyone can doubt that force is bad in itself, let its natural results be what they may, is difficult, and, at first sight, almost impossible to conceive. There is, however, every reason for believing that such is here and there the case. Men there are who are tyrants at heart and who love tyranny as their native air. They may never have a public opportunity of exercising their despotic proclivities (it is fortunate for the community when this happens); but when these men have such an opportunity, those who come within reach of their power need expect no justice and any amount of cruelty. These men are the Calugilas and Neros of the earth; monsters whose efforts to do harm are only limited by their powers. And they are absolutely beyond the possibility of reform. Nothing can wash the blackness out of their hearts. A man who believes that, under any circumstances whatever, the use of force is not something to be greatly deplored, is a person to be shunned as a moral leper and a social pestilence. However suave and polished the external manners of such a man may be, within him there dwells the devilish spirit of an inquisitor. His heart belongs to the same species as that of the famous Persian despot, who placed a man's own children before him on the dinner table for him to eat, and asked him from time to time whether he liked the seasoning. That such men even now exist in the world is highly probable. Ever on the look-out for place and power, ever seeking for excuses and justifications for their arbitrary conduct, they need no encouragement from clever sophistry and public reputation, in order to increase their powers for evil and strengthen their motives to perform it.

Such encouragement, however, a well-known modern writer has done his best to give them. In his work on *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, Sir J. FITZJAMES STEPHEN urges that there are cases where the use of force is not an evil in itself. The argument advanced is as clever and specious as the cunningest Jesuit could wish for. If, contends Sir J. F. STEPHEN, the object aimed at by those who use the force is good, and if the compulsion they employ is such as to attain it, and if, moreover, the good obtained over-balances the inconveniences of the compulsion itself, then on strict utilitarian principles, the use of such force cannot fairly be classified as bad.—*Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity*, page 50.

Now on a first glance most people will think that, granting the three conditions just mentioned, it follows inevitably that the conclusion drawn from them is perfectly logical and irrefutable. Yet if all is true that has been said in the beginning of this chapter about the inherent and intrinsic evils of force, such a conclusion as Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S cannot possibly be sound, however plausible it may look on the surface. What is inherently and radically bad in itself, cannot become good because something else is good. Take an example. The preservation of the Roman State was good; or at least it was considered so by those best competent to judge, namely, the Romans themselves. Does it therefore follow that the rape of the Sabine women was also good, because as a matter of fact it was calculated to achieve this preservation, and in fact did achieve it; and because the good thus obtained did, in the opinion of the stronger party, or those who thought themselves best competent to judge, over-balance the "inconveniences" of the compulsion itself? This may be called an extreme case. Very likely. Only by extreme and crucial cases can principles be fairly tested. Judged by Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S criterion, the act in question should have been an unmitigated gain all round, a perfect and unqualified good. All the conditions he mentions were realized, so far as they ever can be realized where force is used. The strongest power judged and the strongest power achieved. That ulterior evil which we can now see, those living then could not see. We can see that such an act largely helped to lower the character of what was in its best days by far the noblest race of people this world has ever seen. For what could be better fitted to make this race what it afterwards became? a rapacious set of pirates; the wolf and terror of all independent communities. There is even a greater good than power and dominion, namely, the recognition of "natural right"; the careful respect for a man's own consent as regards the disposal of his own person. Sir J. F. STEPHEN and those who think with him, laugh at all this as nonsense. "Natural Right" is a figment. One man has a perfect "right," if he can (or better still, if he can pass a law to make matters look respectable) to do just what he likes with another man. And this other man has the same "right" to bully as much as he can. Might is right. This is the great justification of government. How beautifully it works. "Might is right" says the despot. "Exactly: and here it is boxed up in this machine" says the nihilist, "how do you like the looks of it?" "No, no, not that might, but my might" rejoins the despot, "my might is the only genuine one." "To the devil with your might" says the other, "you have taught me that might is right and now you think I should not better the instruction. Don't grumble like a fool at your own darling child. I am the logical outcome of your teaching. You see in me the exemplification of a law that laughs at expediency and crushes all expediency mongers. Enjoy your own handiwork. Either might is right or is it not: if it is, my might is as right as yours: if it is not, your might is as wrong as mine. Humbug that out of the way if you can. You will just as soon get rid of the axioms of EUCLID. If your's is the genuine might, then, of course, it will prevail: if it isn't—well, to put it mildly, it won't prevail; and, in my humble opinion, it does not deserve to prevail. The only way to prove whether it is genuine or not, is to gently test it; and this is precisely what I propose to do by means of this pretty box. It is not beautiful? Hark how it ticks! Your beloved *might* almost in a nutshell! Might is right, you know. We agree: so good bye and a pleasant journey sky-ward, or atom-ward, or hell-ward; for you certainly look sad and heavy enough to sink to your own congenial region. You have played the devil's game, my dear sir, and I'll see to it that you shall not be cheated out of the devil's wages."

To return, however, to the instance of the Sabine women. It is not difficult to see why, notwithstanding all its subsidiary advantages, the act in question was still a radical and unexpungable evil. It was an evil because it broke up that rational harmony which is the only good, because good in and for his own sake, and which can only exist where personal consent is always carefully and logically respected. Liberty is the indispensible condition of this harmony: force is its certain destruction. True it is, as WALT WHITMAN says, that liberty promises nothing. It has no need to do so, for it is an ever present good of itself, an empty vessel filled with the peace of the infinite; and the strength of all things flows into it for evermore.

It may be said that such an instance of the use of force is never likely to occur again. As a matter of fact it already exist in essence in continental cities, and our own police supervisorship of prostitution is but a modified form of it. The truth is, when the principle of liberty is once ignored, all distinctions between right and wrong go by the board. The first law of ethics is a careful respect for the free consent of your fellow man. Begin breaking this law and where are you to stop? State Socialists are fully intending to push Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S personal violation principle to exactly the same length as the Romans did; for we find Mr. B. SHAW, one of the leaders of the Socialist movement, telling us in his new book on Ibsen, that under the Social Democratic State, an "able-bodied" woman may be called upon to bear children to the "State," just as a slavish conscript soldier is expected to fight for the State when ordered. Whether refusal will mean being shot as a rebel or deserter, we are not informed: neither are we told whether the women will be graciously permitted to choose the fathers of their children; or whether, so as to save "society" from being imflicted with the children of unsociable fathers, the State will choose for them ; or, what would be better still, will itself act in that necessary capacity. This is the logical outcome of State regulation. No wonder that Socialists like Mr. RITCHIE should be so highly delighted with Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S book. It furnishes them with a number of plausible sophistries that not all their talents put together could ever manufacture for themselves.

In point of fact this principle (or no principle) can be used to justify anything. Take for instance the case of American slavery. We have only got to assume that the southern slave party were the stronger party, that they believed slavery to be a good institution, that the legal compulsion employed was calculated to uphold it, and that the good obtained over-balanced the evils ; and slavery suddenly appears as a blessing in disguise, a credit to, and a beauty of, civilization. For we must bear in mind that Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S principle involves two distinct facts or groups of facts; namely, a person or persons compelled, and a person or group of persons compelling him or them ; and it leaves the judgment as to whether the compulsion is desirable or not desirable, entirely in the hands of the latter. If the compellors think that slavery is right, it is right: there is no other court of appeal; and the fact that it violates the harmony of reason counts for absolutely nothing Some subtle Italian might have concocted this principle, so utterly worthless is it for good, so terribly potent for harm. There is no surer mark of moral corruption in a State than the spread of such an unprincipled principle as this.

But it may be said "You use force in self-defence : why do you use it if it is wrong?" The reply is easy. *We use it as the lesser of two evils, but never as a positive good.*

When force is used against us, the circumstances thrust upon us are such that we have either got to snuff out or be snuffed out, and we reluctantly prefer the former.

> In peace, there's nothing so becomes a man,
> As modest stillness, and humility :
> But when the blast of war blows in our ears,
> Then imitate the action of the tiger ;
> Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood,
> Disguise fair nature with hard-favour'd rage
> Then lend the eye a terrible aspect ;
> Let it pry through the portage of the head,
> Like the brass cannon ; let the brow o'erwhelm it,
> As fearfully as doth a galled rock
> O'erhang and jutty his confounded base
> Swill'd with the wild and wasteful ocean.
> Now set the teeth, and stretch the nostril wide ;
> Hold hard the breath, and bend up every spirit
> To his full height !

Take a simple illustration. When passing through a lonely place, you are set upon by a man who seeks to kill you. Now if anything is good, surely the preservation of your own life is so. And if any means are calculated to achieve this most desirable end, surely the putting of the man *hors de combat* constitutes such means. And if ever the good obtained over-balances the "inconveniences" of obtaining it, surely the preservation of your own life does this. Self-preservation, you know, is the first law of Nature. Yet, is it not plain, that in spite of all the gain, the force involved in getting it is still an evil. And when you see your enemy lying crushed on the ground, do you not feel very much like what the Duke of Wellington is said to have felt after his last victory—that to win is only one degree less of an evil than to lose? Which is better: peace or war? Is it better to pass through life in the harmony of reason, than in the discord of compulsion? necessary as the latter is in extreme cases. Possibly even Sir J. F. STEPHEN would think it more desirable that we should voluntarily read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest his arguments, than that they should be crammed down our throats in the State Schools; and this notwithstanding the many additional advantages that would come to them by way of compulsory reading.

In Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S argument the truth here contended for is cleverly hidden by a judicious use of words. When strictly accurate words are inserted the argument talks utter nonsense. "If the object aimed at is good, if the compulsion employed is such as to attain it, and if the good obtained over-balances the inconveniences [*evils*] of the compulsion itself, I do not understand how upon utilitarian principles the compulsion can be bad [*evil*]." The only point here raised is—"When are the evils of compulsion out-balanced by the evils that would exist if the compulsion were absent?" Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S principle contains no rule which will in the least degree help us to answer this crucial question. Yet here is precisely the point that the State Socialist ought to deal with: it is just the point, however, which he finds it most convenient to shirk. He much prefers Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S vague and inconclusive position. "I think," says the latter, "that Governments ought to take the responsibility of acting upon such principles, religious, political, and moral, as they may *from time to time* regard as most likely to be true." Yet if the three conditions stated in Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S argument are any good at all, they should point to some definite direction, some direction that is nearer right than some other direction or directions, and towards which it is desirable to move *at any time*; for neither government nor anything else can stand still, and must always be moving either towards or away from liberty. What is wanted is a clear guiding principle, and these conditions supply nothing. The reason of their failure is not far to seek. They are attempts to justify force, and force as such is utterly irrational, and knows no definite direction. They are unprinciples trying to masquerade as principles, and they justify nothing precisely because they justify everything. There is no principle when liberty is rejected, when the free consent of your fellow-man is violated, and the condition of unreason preferred to the condition of reason. You may fight and squabble amongst yourselves respecting whose particular form of compulsion shall prevail; whether it shall be Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S Cæsarism or Cardinal MANNING'S Ultramontanism; whether it shall be Professor HUXLEY'S endowment of a scientific priesthood, or Mr. HENRY IRVING'S establishment of a State theatre; whether people shall be compelled to pay for "Free" Libraries, or "Free" Schools, or both; whether the temperance fanatic shall stop the beer drinking, or his vegetarian brother the meat eating: but anything even so much as approaching the nature of principle, is entirely out of the question; for the first of all human principles is a loyal and ungrudging respect for the free consent of your fellow-man, and when that goes all the rest go with it. In a political struggle of this elevated kind, it matters very little which dog gets the bone; for nothing that has the very remotest connection with principle is in the least degree involved. Wise men look on such a spectacle with patience: they see force bringing its own reward, and the storm following closely upon the heels of those who have sown the whirlwind. It is the political carrying out of such pernicious "principles" as those advocated by Sir J. F. STEPHEN, that prompts desperate and misguided men to burn down cities, assassinate kings, and blow up houses of parliament. For the doctrine that might is right, is one of those infernal lies, which excuse nothing, and seem to justify everything.

How handy this doctrine is for every would-be tyrant may be seen by applying it to one of the schemes just mentioned, namely, the State Endowment of a Scientific Priesthood. Science is a good thing, and the best thing for human welfare; therefore people must be taxed to support its professors, and bullied into swallowing whatever these infallible men may think well to prescribe. Such, when put shortly, is the plea of the scientific despot. "The end justifies the means." "Let us do evil that good may come." So said the old priests for hundreds of years; but then in their case the argument was unsound. What they tried to thrust down the throats of the people was bad in itself: what the scientific professors would enforce is good. The latter say so, and they are the only fit and proper judges of what is scientifically best, both for themselves and for everyone else. They are the only disinterested men who have the welfare of their fellows sincerely at heart. The religious priest is a fraud: the scientific priest is an honest reality. It is said that two of a trade never can agree, and this no doubt helps to explain much of the bitterness that frequently arises out of disputes between ecclesiastically-minded scientists and ecclesiastically-minded religionists. Here are two crafty old grown-up babies eternally squabbling for one teat. The religious humbug has it, and the scientific humbug wants it. "Go away" says the latter to the former, "you have had a quite long enough innings. I am now the only right and proper parasite to suck at this. You are a mere vendor of exploded lies, but I sell eternal truth." At this the wide-awake outsiders (who know that whichever wins, they will be in for a plucking) exchange a knowing wink; but the simple-minded, ever agape for change and novelty, noisily chorus "Hear, hear." It is the same old game. Some disinterested lover of his dear fellow-man wants to live, not upon the pure milk of human kindness, which flows spontaneously wherever liberty is, but upon the deadly narcotic of State endowment;

a drink that contains no energizing power, and speedily drugs all enterprizing originality out of those who are weak enough and foolish enough to take it. This deadening tendency of State coddling is well known, and even those who desire it not infrequently admit the fact. "All great men" says VOLTAIRE "have either been formed before the institution of academies, or at least without any assistance from them. Homer and Phidias, Sophocles and Apelles, Virgil and Virtruvius, Aristo and Michael Angelo, belonged to no academy; Tasso met with no other advantages besides a few ill-grounded criticisms from that of La Crusca; nor was Newton indebted to the Royal Society of London for his discoveries in optics, gravitation, the doctrine of integrals, and chronology. Of what use then are academies? To keep alive the flame which great geniuses have kindled."

And nothing less untrue has ever been said in favour of State endowments. Yet how utterly untrue it is, none knew better than him who wrote it. Did the State endowment of Christianity keep alive the flame of Christ's teaching? VOLTAIRE is never tired of telling us that it did not do so. It buried that teaching under a huge black mass of falsehood and corruption, and put over Europe a devilish despotism which lasted more than a thousand years. And the same effect will again follow from the same cause. Power and privilege will as easily corrupt science as they corrupted religion. Human nature is as weak to-day as it was a thousand years ago. Under a scientific priesthood, instead of the mind alone being the plaything of official tyranny; both body and mind would become as clay in the hands of the scientific inquisitor, who would torture at his pleasure, not only tame and wild animals, but infants, children, and even men and women: in fact, the infirm, the sick, the vicious, and all the friendless, would fall into this devil's clutches, and there would be no one to say a word for liberty, or to stand up in defence of personal rights. A religious despotism is bad enough, but a scientific despotism would be ten thousand times worse. "Hands off" is the right word for these power-seeking knaves.

We have already had a sample of something very much like the endowment of science, namely, the endowment of philosophy. In the time of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus the revenues of the Roman State were used to pamper a crew of canting imitators of the Stoic philosophers. Just as the fat, sleek, slimy, crawling, parsons of to-day pretend to follow Christ, so these Roman pets pretended to follow Zeno and Cleanthes and Seneca and Epictetus. The parallel is complete. These sham Stoics were "the pillars of the State," just as our own sham christians are the props of our State: the former did not save the Roman Empire from going to the dogs, although the well intentioned but deceived Marcus hoped that they would do so; and neither is the latter likely to perform a similar service for our State. RENAN says that the only genuine thing about these endowed philosophers was the cloak they wore. Apply this to our chartered representatives of Christ. These philosophers retailed everything but produced nothing: they commented upon and disputed about what the real Stoics had said; but not a shadow of their own originality did they ever put forth. The wrong of compulsion took all soul out of them. For why forage and prog in the rough and difficult fields of new truth, when you can stay at home and safely depend on a snug income from kind papa everybody's purse? These sham Stoics, like our sham christians, went in for their material interest. They canted without limit, and lived liked respectable citizens on what they managed to get without the consent of those who paid. They were legalized receivers of stolen goods, and the wrong of which they constituted one of the forms, could not and did not live. And it won't live when science stands upon it. What will happen will be this: All orginality will die, and instead of having men of genius like DARWIN and SPENCER, we shall get a contemptible lot of creatures who will do nothing but wrangle and commentate upon what the real founders of science have said. All clearness and truth will be buried beneath a colossal pile of meaningless jargon and silly pedantry. The result will be that State science, like State religion, will quietly settle down into well-fed bodily torpor and imbecile intellectual stagnation.

Of course this does not necessarily imply that these State pampered scientists would do absolutely nothing. But the probability is that they would make no further mental progress. As Professor HUXLEY himself admits, they would be most likely to content themselves with always polishing up the guns and never going into battle. Still, they might do something for the material comfort of those who were gently compelled to do everything for them, something for the general good of society as a whole, or at least for "the happiness of the greatest number." They might manage to bake alive a few thousand cats and dogs every year, and vivisect some hundreds of homeless pauper babies; all for the general good, you know, all the outcome of the purest and noblest motives: and they might also find time to write long and elaborate articles in the *Reviews*, in order to prove these gentler methods to be both practically beneficial and morally right. Without doubt the nation that establishes a scientific priesthood in its midst, will never escape its well merited reward.

What the doctrine of liberty says on this question is short if not sweet. If science cannot swim in the open competitive world, if its own intrinsic advantages are not sufficient to persuade the general public to support it in a fair and voluntary way, if, in a word, it cannot attract the earnings of the free citizen, then let it sink: there is something far better than science; namely, perfect economic freedom for every individual, either to give or refuse to give to what is not necessary to the defence of liberty and property—to what is not a part of the true and normal function of government.

As already pointed out, there is no need to urge that force should never be used. What is wanted is some guiding principle for approximately determining when it is wise to use it. That principle the doctrine of liberty alone supplies. To the question "When are the evils of compulsion outbalanced by the evils that would exist if the compulsion were absent?" it replies "When force, or fraud which is the equivalent of force, is used against those who have not used it: this is the time to interfere; for only at this point is compulsion adapted to do its proper work, namely, the repression of compulsion." Here we get a principle which is entirely independent of numerical majorities and mere political powers; a principle which is as good for one man against the tyranny of two men, as for two men against the tyranny of one man; as good for 30,000 men against 20,000, as for 20,000 against 30,000.

Probably no one has stated this central position of Individualism better than Mr. H. A. TAINE. Speaking of the legitimate functions of the State in his *Socialism as Government*, an essay which appeared in the *Contemporary Review* for October, 1884, that writer says:—

"Let us try to define its limits. After the turmoil of invasions and conquest, at the height of social disintegration, amidst the combats daily occurring between private parties, there arose in every European community a *public force*, which force, lasting for centuries, still persists in our day. How it was organized, through what early stages of violence it has passed, through what accidents and struggles, and into whose hands it is now entrusted, whether temporarily or for ever, whatever the laws of its transmission, whether by inheritance or election, is of secondary importance; the main thing is its functions and their mode of operation. Substantially, it is a mighty sword, drawn from its scabbard and uplifted over the smaller blades around it, with which private individuals once cut each other's throats. Menaced by it, the smaller blades repose in their scabbards; they have become inert, useless and, finally, rusty; with few exceptions, everybody has now lost both the habit and the desire to use them; thenceforth, in this pacified society, the public sword is so formidable that all private resistance vanishes the moment it flashes. This sword is forged out of two interests; its efficacy was first needed against similar blades brandished by other communities on the frontier; and next, against the smaller blades which bad passions are always sharpening in the interior. People demanded protection against enemies without and ruffians and murderers within, and, slowly and painfully, after much groping and many retemperings, the hereditary union of persistent energies has fashioned the sole arm which is capable of protecting lives and property with any degree of success. So long as it does no more I am indebted to the State which holds the hilt; it gives me a security which, without it, I could not enjoy; in exchange for this security I owe it, for my quota, the means for keeping this weapon in good condition; any service rendered is worth its cost. Accordingly there is between the State and myself, if not an express contract, at least a tacit understanding, analogous to that which binds a child to its parent, a believer to his church, and on both sides this mutual understanding is clear and precise. The State engages to look after my security within and without; I engage to furnish the means for its doing so, which means consist of my respect and gratitude, my zeal as a citizen, my services as a conscript, my contributions as a taxpayer; in short, whatever is necessary for the maintenance of an army, a navy, a diplomatic organization, civil and criminal courts, a militia and police, central and local administrations; in brief, a harmonious set of organs, of which my obedience and loyalty constitute the aliment and the blood. This loyalty and obedience, whatever I am, whether rich or poor, Catholic, Protestant, Jew or Freethinker, royalist or republican, individualist or socialist, I owe in honour and in conscience, for I have received their equivalent. I am very glad that I am not vanquished, assassinated, or robbed. I pay back to the State exactly what it expends in machinery and oversight for keeping down brutal cupidity, greedy appetites, deadly fanaticisms, the entire howling pack of passions and desires of which, sooner or later, I might become the prey, were it not constantly to extend over me its vigilant protection. When it asks repayment of its outlay, it is not my property which it takes away, but its own property which it resumes, and in this light it may legitimately force me to pay. On condition, however, that the State does not exact more than my liabilities—and this it does when it oversteps its original engagement; when it undertakes some extra material or moral work that I do not ask for; when it constitutes itself sectarian, moralist, philanthropist, or pedagogue; when it strives to propagate within its borders, or outside of them, any religious or philosophic dogma, or any special political or social system; for then it adds a new article to the primitive pact, for which article there is not the same unanimous and assured assent that existed when the pact was first completed. We are all willing to be secured against violence and fraud; outside of this, and on almost every other point, there are divergent wills. I have my own religion, my own opinions, my habits, my customs, my peculiar views of life and way of regarding the universe.

Now, this is just what constitutes my personality, what honour and conscience forbid me to alienate, that which the State has promised me to hold harmless. Consequently when, through its additional article, it attempts to regulate these in a certain way, if that way is not my way, it fails to fulfil its primordial engagement and, instead of protecting me, it oppresses me. Even if it should have the support of a majority, even if all voters, less one, should agree in entrusting it with this supererogatory function, were there only one dissentient, this one would be wronged, and in two ways. In the first place, and in all cases, the State, to fulfil its new task, exacts from him an extra amount of subsidy and service; for every supplementary work brings along with it supplementary expenses; the *budget* is overburdened when the State takes upon itself the procuring of work for labourers or employment for artists, the maintenance of any particular industrial or commercial enterprise, the giving of alms, and the furnishing of education. To an expenditure of money add an expenditure of lives, should it enter upon a war of generosity or of propagandism. Now, to all these expenditures that it does not approve of, the minority contributes as well as the majority which does approve of them; all the worse for the conscript and the tax-payer if they belong to the dissatisfied group; whether they like it or not the collector puts his hand in the tax-payer's pocket, and the sergeant lays his hand on the conscript's collar. In the second place, and in numerous cases, not only does the State take unjustly over and beyond my liability, but, again, it uses unjustly the money it extorts from me in the application of this to new constraints. Such is the case when it imposes on me its theology or philosophy, when it prescribes for me or interdicts a cult, when it assumes to regulate my ways and habits, to limit my labour or expenditure, to direct the education of my children, to fix the prices of my wares or the rate of my wages. For then, in support of its commands or prohibitions, it enacts against the refractory light or serious penalties, all the way from forfeiture of political or civil rights, to fine, imprisonment, exile and the guillotine. In other words, the crown I do not owe it, and of which it robs me, pays for the persecution which it inflicts upon me. I am reduced to paying out of my own purse the wages of my inquisitors, my jailor and my executioner. A more glaring oppression could not be imagined! Let us take heed of the encroachments of the State, and not allow it to become anything more than a watch-dog. Whilst the teeth and nails of other guests in the household have been losing their sharpness, its fangs have become formidable; it is now colossal, and it alone still keeps up the practice of fighting. Let us supply it with nourishment against wolves; but never let it touch the peaceable folks around the table. Appetite grows by eating; it would soon become a wolf itself, and the most ravenous wolf inside the fold. The important thing is to keep a chain around its neck and confine it within its own pale."

That is the real fact of the matter. Socialism is a case of the shepherd turning wolf. Force is war and the end of war is peace. Liberty—at least as compared with sheer brute force—is peace, and the end of legitimate force is to keep this peace as far as possible intact. But a network of Socialistic laws and taxes is a perpetual war; a war carried on and established in the name of government; a war raging within that very fold wherein men only live in order that they may be free from war. The end of this "principle" is not the preservation, but the destruction of society.

CHAPTER XIII.

ANOTHER of Sir J. F. STEPHEN's points shall now be dealt with. On page 124 of his *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, he discusses the social expediency of having a system of State Paternalism for the special protection of female virtue. This, of course, goes directly in the teeth of Individualism. According to the liberty doctrine, the adult woman should be no more protected than the adult man. Both male and female should be equally insured against aggression, and both left equally free to do whatever does not involve aggression upon others. Moreover, both should stand on an equal footing with regard to frauds, breakings of contracts, and compensations in proportion to losses sustained. In short, there should be perfect equality between the sexes before the law, and precisely the same justice should as far as possible be dealt out to both. This is the all-round application of the equal-liberty maxim. Evidently Sir J. F. STEPHEN does not agree with it. He puts the following case for the purpose of proving that it will not do when woman are concerned—"A number of persons form themselves into an association for the purpose of countenancing each other in the practice of seducing women, and giving the widest possible extension to the theory that adultery is a good thing. They carry out their objects by organizing a system for the publication and circulation of lascivious novels and pamphlets calculated to inflame the passions of the young and inexperienced. The law of England would treat this as a crime. It would call such books obscene libels, and a combination for such a purpose a conspiracy.—(*L. E. F.*, page 124).

Now it is quite clear that the only point here at issue is purely one of persuasion and in no sense one of force. The most virtuous woman must succumb to superior force, but only the naturally vicious woman need succumb to persuasion, or, as Sir J. F. STEPHEN prefers to call it, "seduction." There is no dispute as to whether women should be protected against brute force. In this respect they stand on exactly the same footing as men. The question is: Should they also be shielded against persuasion? Should they be shielded against that which they are free to follow or avoid, just as their own inclination dictates? Should they be treated as pampered hot-house plants? or should they be treated as free, self-reliant, and intelligent human beings? Is it well to let them grow in the open air of freedom? or is it better to dwarf and stunt them in the close atmosphere of State Paternalism? In a word, should we aim so that they may one day become women, obeying their own clear perceptions of truth and right from love of truth and right, and not from fear; or should we endeavour to keep them the vain, helpless, empty-headed creatures that they now so frequently are? The present condition of women is one of the most discouraging sights that this world presents. Prevented by the paternalisms of the past from developing in their own way, from freely following the line of their natural inclinations, they have taken to childish and unnatural vanities; thus cursing man with an amount of folly and expense that nothing can fully compensate for.

Looked at from the point of view of expediency, the forcible prevention of "seduction" is decidedly bad. It makes a corrupt human nature more corrupt still. When men are not allowed to persuade, they will compel. This is precisely what they already do. You drive prostitution off the streets, and as a result virtuous women are outraged in cabs and railway carriages. Magnificent exchange! The innocent suffer because the guilty are "protected." The river of vice is diverted from its natural course, and as a consequence it flows just where it is least expected. My dear sir, you don't understand human nature. Let it alone so long as it keeps its hands off. It will then find its own most congenial channels, and will thus punish itself with its own vices. Instead of forcing itself upon the unseducable, it will find the course easier to content itself with the seducable; undoubtedly an evil, but a lesser evil of the two. Don't attempt to be its conscience, for you won't succeed. Strike down its hands, but don't seek to close its mouth or tie up its pen. If you do, you will sooner or later deeply regret your action. You will find that you cannot both defend liberty and dictate morals. You cannot serve two masters; namely, freedom and paternalism. In the long run one must be sacrificed to the other; and the more you go in for one, the less you will be able to go in for the other. Defend the right at all costs, for this is just; but leave the rest to conscience, and trust and fear not.

This question of freedom is the real question, and the present English law, of which Sir J. F. Stephen evidently approves, simply plays with it; neither firmly dealing with it, nor yet letting it alone. The Orientals lay hold of the matter more boldly, and produce at least an external if not a real conformity. Would Sir J. F. Stephen and those who think with him like to see the virtue of women as well protected in England as it is in Turkey for example? Would they like English virtue to be as genuine as Turkish virtue? This is all that the logical carrying out of protection will give them.

Women should be protected against the seductive persuasions of unprincipled men, or, what amounts to the same thing, against the moral contagion of unprincipled books. Good. To be logical, therefore, or at least to be effectual, every man should be compelled to wear horse bluffs over his eyes, and walk about with a gag between his teeth. For books and pamphlets are mere flea bites, as compared with the play of eyes and the power of words. Indeed in point of fact, the force of the latter grows with the growth of law. In the old Arabian towns, for example, the attempt was made to preserve female virtue by force of law. What was the result? The men and women conspired to defeat the law, and they did defeat it. There was far more vice than there would have been if no law had ever existed. Eyes and words undid everything. Clearly, then, there should be a law for dealing with them, should there not, O most solemn and wise understanders of human nature? Some cynic might suggest that even more drastic measures should be taken for protecting female virtue; beginning, say, with the circuit judges and so proceeding down the social scale. This gentle treatment was partly adopted in the East, but, for greater security still, the Orientals also took another course, and either muffled up or locked up their precious embodiments of female chastity. They were logical, but we are not. This "protection" resulted in their not being able to trust themselves to look on women, and in women not being fit to be trusted to be looked upon. Glorious result of paternalism in matters sexual! A women need only lift her veil before a man, in order to cause the latter to fall head over ears in love with her. Healthy state of things, was it not? A noble zeal to try and bring it about in this country by Act of Parliament!

What a pity we cannot so arrange matters that no poor creature should ever again be subject to the seductive temptations of this wicked wicked world. Why, for example, is there no law to deal with such an evil case as the following:—

"A set of young noblemen of great fortune and hereditary influence, the representatives of ancient names, the natural leaders of the society of large districts, pass their whole time and employ all their means in gross debauchery. Such people are far more injurious to society than common pickpockets, but Mr. MILL says that if any one having the opportunity of making them ashamed of themselves uses it in order to coerce them into decency, he sins against liberty, unless their example does assignable harm to specific people. It might be right to say, 'You the Duke of A. by extravagantly keeping four mistresses, set an example which induced your friend F. to elope with Mrs. G. and you are a great blackguard for your pains, and all the more because you are a duke.' It could never be right to say, 'You, the Duke of A. are scandalously immoral and ought to be made to smart for it, though the law cannot touch you.'"—*Liberty*, *Equality*, *Fraternity*, page 131.

Think of the moral strength of friend F. and Mrs. G. A worthy pair for us all to be taxed for! Well deserving of State officials to look after their morals and keep them straight! How delighted we ought to be to have the honour of paying taxes in order that the very wisely-selecting husband of Mrs. G. may have a morally weak woman perpetually tied round his neck as a sort of nether millstone. Freedom, you see, discovers truth, therefore down with it. What a sad pity that enough liberty should exist to enable the unfortunate Mr. G. to see that he had married a creature who felt she must go wrong because somebody else had gone wrong (query: would she cut off her own finger if somebody else performed such an act?) Those who have wives that don't need protecting ought to be pleased to pay for the protection of those who are not so fortunate. And as for those who have no wives at all—well, they ought to be doubly pleased. So that paternalism, you see, is a clear gain all round; and not least so for the judges, whose honourable duty it is to sit upon all the wicked husbands, wives, mistresses, &c., &c., that a wicked world contains.

But putting ridicule aside, and coming to the facts; it may be shown that even on grounds of mere expediency, all this paternal protection against persuasion, or, as Sir J. F. STEPHEN prefers to call it, "seduction," is worse than useless. Of course, as already pointed out, when the persuasion descends into compulsion, the liberty maxim applies. You have a moral right to defend yourself, and you have a right to pay a government to defend you. The validity of personal self-defence is the only warrant for that collective defence of persons which is the normal function of government. But seduction is quite another matter; altogether up another street, as the "vulgar" prefer to put it. You have a right (if you can) to persuade a woman, just as she has a right to persuade you; but you have no right to compel her. Leave that for the judge or the policeman; they do it nobly and well. Her person is her own. It does not even belong to the infallible State, or even to its very virtuous judges; and, morally speaking, she ought to be perfectly free to lend that person just to whomsoever she pleases, when she pleases, and how she pleases. As a simple matter of fact she always has so disposed and always will so dispose of herself, in spite of all the judges and all the State officials in the world; and nobody but a born fool would ever think of trying to hinder her from doing so. 'Tis a sad waste of valuable time and trouble, and the only people who get anything out of it are the officials of police and the paid administers of "justice." As an example of what is here meant two facts shall be mentioned. In England the law orders the police to abolish all "immoral houses," and so well do these honourable gentlemen perform their delicate work, that whenever a a "swell" cannot find one of the above-mentioned houses, all he has got to do is to "ask a policeman"; and, for a small "tip," the latter will promptly direct him to the best establishment in the neighbourhood, the most respectable place that money can hire! There is one interesting fact for the lovers of legal bullying. Here is another. The police, who are paid by the tax-payers to stop the immoral conduct of immoral women, are also paid by the women themselves to allow that immoral conduct to go on. Frail humanity is set to look after frail humanity, and this is the sublime result. It is not confined to any special class or locality. It runs right through the entire social system. The judge walks out of a Nottingham brothel into the court of justice, and there cants like a parson about the fearful sin of adultery. This is the substitute for *laissez faire* in sexual matters: this the improvement on equal liberty for all! O long-suffering tax-payer, don't you feel proud to pay for it! See how well your private morals are being looked after! A more absurd farce was never played than this disgustingly hypocritical attempt to keep men and women moral by Act of Parliament. Such hothouse pampered virtue would not be worth preserving, even did it exist; but it does not exist and it never will exist, for it is an absolute moral impossibility. The truth is, all these preposterous laws have been built up around women by man; and in order to keep her weak and helpless, a mere plaything in his hands, a slave that he may own and dispose of just as he pleases. If compulsion could produce virtue, women ought to have reached perfection long since. But what has she reached? A mixture of vanity, falsehood, and conventionality, the furthest remove from virtue that it is possible for an intelligent being to make. Noble high-souled outcome of State Paternalism.

Well might the legendary lady of the glass box say to the two eastern princes—"Men had better put no restraint upon women, and it would be the means of preserving them chaste."

The morality of woman, like that of man, no more depends upon legislation than it depends upon the will of a being who dwells up in the dog star. Virtue comes from within, not from without; it is born rather than made, and to it there is no royal road. A woman's virtue rests entirely and exclusively upon her clear appreciation of her own personal self-interest. Whatsoever is less than this, is not virtue, but only untried weakness, and likely to fall just when it ought to stand. Rational self-knowledge, and that alone, is power. Talk of a woman being "seduced" out of her virtue. Why, it is the most absurd nonsense that can be uttered. She cannot be robbed of what she has not got. And if she has no clear knowledge of herself, if she does not understand and live to serve her own self-interest; if, in a word, she does not know how to love herself, she has no virtue; for virtue is self-love and self-love is virtue. Those who preach the opposite doctrine want to get something out of her. Intelligent self-love only hurts the envious, the covetous, the greedy, mean, and contemptible socializers of this world. Outside intelligent self-love there is and there can be no basis for morality. With rational self-love goes obedience to the laws of Nature; comes in slavery to the wants of man; goes self-guidance and self-reliance; goes all that is morally worth having. And in their place what is obtained? The grins and nods and toys of men who whisper to one another what a poor simple fool you are, who tell all your ways and merits to each other, and who will at last, when your beauty has gone, leave you like a second *Nana* to die alone, without even the consolation of the virtuous outcast—that at least you have loved yourself, and that in so doing you have known the infinite love wherewith the eternal loves those who so love themselves that they live only to know and obey its laws. If there is one maxim, which, being acted upon, would do more than all the laws that the wisest men can frame, to raise woman to her right relation to man, and make her really and truly free; it is this: Love yourself, serve the laws of own *maternal* nature, your true nature, and treat man only as a means to that service; for this noble self-love is the unshakeable rock of your strength, and so long as you stand on this, neither smooth-tongued flatterers nor whining sentimentalists can ever prevail against you. Look on man only as a condition of your duty to your own nature, and let your relation to him be a mutual exchange of duties between equally free and equally self-reliant beings. Obey that inner reason, which is grander and nobler than any amount of gushing sentiment, and without which there can be no freedom from your present weakness and worse than childish instability. It is only envy and lust for power that say "Love others; serve society; live for humanity," and all that twaddle. As if this emotional slavery had not already been disastrous enough. Your self-love cannot hurt the self-contained, or those who live in harmony with the universal order. It only rebukes the passion-driven slave who, despising the clear voice of reason, covets what does not exist for him, but exists solely for the carrying out of those laws of Nature, for the performance of those maternal functions which society did not make, and which it can never unmake.

Intelligent self-interest, then, and not legal paternalism, is the only real salvation for women. And what is the true self-interest of a women? It is exactly the same as that of a man, precisely the same as that of every living creature in the universe. She is adapted to live in a certain way, that is to say, to perform certain functions; and in living in this way, and in performing these functions she, just like every other living creature, achieves her own self-interest, and is healthy and happy therein. What are these functions? The mere structure of her outward form proclaims them with stentorian voice. No need to go to Girton College to learn what they are. Plainly and without any gloss; they are the conception, birth and training of children, in conformity to the laws of Nature, and by means of that domestic and only natural organization; the home: the family circle: the highest and purest flower of the infinite. Well might a modern American writer, in speaking of this normal and self-forming organization, say that "the holiest altar beneath the stars is a home that love has built, and the grandest sight in all the wide universe is the fireside; round which gather father, mother, and children." This the Socialist seeks to forcibly sweep away, professing to put in its place a hollow sham called "brotherhood." No knowable fathers and mothers; no real brothers and sisters: only the herd: yet "brotherhood!" What an infernal lie! It would not work. The same duty-shirking spirit which led the units of democracy to shove their personal responsibilities upon the homeless crowd, would lead that same ignoble crowd to shirk the burden of maintaining its orphaned children. The human race would come to an end, and the beasts would deservedly survive over a collection of wretches infinitely lower than themselves. This is the social democrat's ideal, "glowing (so we are informed) with the hues of hope." Shall I tell you what a logical and consistent Socialist is? He is a man who tries to be worse than an animal. He is a Christian who will not bear his cross. He is a soldier who is too cowardly to do his duty. He is a father who throws his children upon the community. He is a husband who disowns his wife and family for a promiscuous crowd. In a word he is a moral retrogressionist, a shuffler out of every personal duty, out of every personal responsibility. His ideal is the painted misery of the streets. His dwelling place is a universal orphanage full of parentless children, and childless parents; and his highest object in life is to drag humanity down to something lower than the dogs.

The true function of woman is the training of her own children, jointly with the father of those children: this is the only system that accords with Nature; for what can be more natural than that the two people who have brought the children into the world should also train them for the world? And what can be more unnatural and confessing than that many fathers and many mothers, and also many who are not such, should join in the performance of a duty which Nature has constituted in such a manner that it is most peacefully and harmoniously carried out by two? As a simple matter of fact the commune is not and cannot be the parent of children. Each child is the result of two and only of two people. In his politics ARISTOTLE tells how, in certain communities, where the practical lie of communism was adopted, this fact could not be hidden: particular children were seen to closely resemble particular people. Nature works through efficiency and need, and in this relationship two only are efficient, two only are needed. So my dear communist, my rather too chummy "comrade!" you who envy every man and every woman that is happier than yourself; you are not wanted because, don't you see? you are not needed; Nature rules you out for ever. Go and burn in your own envious hell! or, if you prefer it, go and dream about Mahomet's paradise: you will never make that a going concern in this world of duty and responsibility; no not even with the help of such a poet as Mr. WILLIAM MORRIS, or such a novelist as Mr. EDWARD BELLAMY. By the side of your piggish philosophy of indiscriminate lust and equal promiscuity, may be placed the wiser thought of Spinoza—"Meretricious love, that is, the lust of generation, arising from bodily beauty; and generally every sort of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul (freedom from emotions in so far as they are passions) as its cause, readily passes into hate; unless, indeed, what is worse, it is a species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than harmony. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train them up wisely; and, moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of the man and of the women, is not caused by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul."

The natural functions of women, then, lie inside the family (not inside the State barracks, my liberty-loving compulsionist!) In proportion as she fails to perform these functions she stulifies herself and passes unperfected through this world of time. For, like all other living creatures, she is a part of universal Nature, and can only become happy by obeying its laws. True self-interest and true obedience to Nature are one. A reality mightier than ourselves sways and moulds our lives; hence as Emerson says, we have only a necessitated freedom: but necessitation by the best is freedom from the worse; and that best is willing obedience to natural law, is the peace of acquiescence in what the mystic calls the will of God: a motive which destroys unrest, arranges all things well, and brings good for ever out of evil. In this way it is that women, through the rational performance of her natural functions, achieves her own highest self-interest, makes herself an efficient link in the chain of things: joining together the hands of those who span the bridge of time; and thus proving her natural virtue in so doing. In this way she satisfies the real needs of her nature, and comes into harmonious co-operation with the universal order. And just so far as she clearly understands all this, just so far as her knowledge of it is undarkened by vanity and fear and passion, just so far is she full of virtue; since virtue is understanding and understanding is virtue. For her to understand her own nature, and freely endeavour to follow out her own self-interest in conformity to the laws of the universe of which she forms a part, is for her to reach the true blessedness of perfect natural virtue. This is no external thing: it lies not in the flattery and admiration of contemptible and unmanly men. Not even her own husband can give it to her; and she does not exist for him; but both exist for that highest of all Nature's productions, viz., the family, the clearly marked and perfectly distinct sanctuary of the home. Strange that the Socialist should render needful the repetition of such simple and fundamental truths in a country like England! But he evidently knows the degeneration of the people on whose growing corruption he builds up his power.

Through this rational performance of her natural functions, or through the endeavour to find the appropriate conditions for performing them; for in both cases the motive is the same, and is a pure and healthy motive; woman lives in the serene and calm atmosphere of truth, at one with universal nature, enthroned in the light of her own understanding, above the sway of passion's storm, a thing enskied and sainted, and as impervious to the persuasions and seductions, either of bad men or bad books, as a rock of granite or a block of ice. This alone is virtue. It is the strength of eternal reality working within the individual soul. It is the fusion of the finite with the infinite; the grand, stately nobility of Nature's uncorrupted purity, the iron granite of her elect; and while no amount of external tinkering can produce it, nothing can destroy it when it once really exists.

It is not the product of to-day or of yesterday. It is no new patent honour, bought with golden unction and grovelling, time-serving servility. In it live and move the honesty and truthfulness of countless generations, of all who lived by the great religion of duty, eschewed luxury, did their work, and now rest for ever in the silent home of death.

But what is needed in order that woman may attain to this? A lot of cramping laws "which seem to keep her up but drag her down?" a lot of babyish protection against persuasion and seduction? a legal thrashing of young sparks to suit all who think with Sir J. F. STEPHEN? Nonsense! nonsense! But guarantee her complete individual freedom, and then she will gradually learn to take care of herself. Surely this is better than Paternalism! Do you want to be surrounded by women who cannot be trusted to look on every truth, however fair or however dark? cannot be trusted to hear all things, and see all things in this many-sided human life, and yet remain pure as light, stainless as a star? If you do, you are not a man; you are not even a child: it is difficult to say what you are. Get rid of all this silly, cowardly namby-pambyism, and have a more robust faith in liberty. The same condition that makes for manhood also makes for womanhood. Where would you be but for liberty? Surely you at least can be trusted with freedom? But are you the only trustworthy person in the world? We think not. Therefore beside your miserable whine over the Duke of A, and his friend F, and Mrs. G, and the four shocking mistresses, may be placed the wiser remedy of TENNYSON'S *Princess*—

> "The woman's cause is man's: they rise or sink
> Together, dwarf'd or godlike, bond or free:
> For she that out of Lethe scales with man
> The shining steps of Nature, shares with man
> His nights, his days, moves with him to one goal,
> Stays all the fair young planet in her hands—

If she be small, slight-natured, miserable,
How shall men grow?

. . . .

Leave her space to burgeon out of all
Within her—let her make herself her own
To give or keep, to live and learn and be
All that not harms distinctive womanhood.
For woman is not undevelopt man,
But diverse: could we make her as the man,
Sweet Love were slain: his dearest bond is this,
Not like to like, but like in difference.
Yet in the long years liker must they grow,
The man be more of woman, she of man;
He gain in sweetness and in moral height,
Nor lose the wrestling thews that throw the world;
She mental breadth, nor fail in childward care,
Nor lose the childlike in the larger mind;
Till at the last she set herself to man,
Like perfect music unto noble words;
And so these twain, upon the skirts of Time,
Sit side by side, full-summ'd in all their powers,
Dispensing harvest, sowing the To-be,
Self-reverent each and reverencing each,
Distinct in individualities,
But like each other ev'n as those who love.
Then comes the statelier Eden back to men:
Then reign the world's great bridals, chaste and calm:
Then springs the crowning race of human-kind.
May these things be!"

Assuming, then, that self-love based upon an intelligent knowledge of the laws and needs of her own nature, and also upon a knowledge of her relation to universal nature, is the only sound foundation of female virtue, we may now proceed to apply this to the cases given by Sir J. F. STEPHEN. For what, according to him, is the purport of all these unprincipled persuasions and abominable books? these most shocking things which, as a respectable member of society, he would very much like to see rigidly suppressed? It may be expressed in a single sentence—They are designed to induce women to sacrifice her much larger and deeper maternal instincts, to her much smaller and weaker sexual instincts. Of course this description only refers to the average woman; not most assuredly to the unnatural and exceptional creature who will never go straight, legislate and protect her as you may. The latter would corrupt even the chief judge himself. These books and seductions, then, are intended to make women in general into lop-sided creatures, unnatural monsters, slaves of tempestuous passions, shirkers of natural duty, and mere fleshy excitements for the gratification of man's lust. Such is Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S proposition when fully expressed and generally applied. And it is perfectly correct. The fact cannot be disputed. To use a vulgar expression, "it is as plain as a pike-staff." This is, or was, the evident aim of such books as Mrs. ANNIE BESANT'S *Law of Population.* I say "was" because I have recently heard that this last book is now withdrawn from circulation, the lady having lately changed her views on the subject. She may have changed back again since then, though; so earnestly does she search for truth. This, however, is immaterial to the argument. The same evil intention is equally manifest in Dr. KNOWLTON'S *Fruits of Philosophy*: and in another work of a similar description, viz., *The Elements of Social Science*, a still more evil design is manifested. In this elaborate work parents are strongly urged, on grounds of utility, to train up their sons and daughters in an artificial and unnatural system of self-stulification; a growth of lust at the expense of maternity; of passion at the expense of reason; of sensuality at the expense of understanding: in short a devilish and infamous something called "Malthusianism," a very hell-broth of filth and lust. These books are just about as bad as they can possibly be; for, unlike the mere sensationalism of romance, which seeks to amuse without convincing; they seek to convince without amusing: thus aiming to undermine the very intellect itself, by dressing their falsehoods up in scientific phraseology, and cunningly posing as the faithful exponents of irrefrangable truth. ZOLA disgusts: these books persuade.

Yet, bad as they are, what harm can they possibly do to the naturally virtuous? Who are they likely to injure? Why, just those thoughtless vanities who don't know how to love themselves; who live to "make others happy," as the canting Socialists put it; who prefer the securing of external approval, to the simple joy of following internally prescribed duty; and who never as much as try to understand their own nature, and the real position they occupy in the natural order of things. These staggering moths will always manage to find some burning flame to singe themselves in, scheme, and coddle, and contrive, and protect, and look after them as you may. But no women who properly understands her own interest; the natural correlation of her sexual and maternal instincts; the tremendous power of the latter as compared with the former, and the terrible way in which they revenge themselves when tampered with; will fail to foresee the evil she is likely to bring to herself in seeking to gratify the first while trying to frustrate the gratification of the last. The virtuous woman understands the organic harmony of all the parts of her nature, and the sin she commits against herself in abnormally developing some of these parts while abnormally stulifying others. She understands that every organ of the human body is adapted to perform a definite and intelligible function, in the performance of which it fits in with the rest of the universe, and thus works harmoniously with the whole system of Nature. She understands that the only natural and intelligible function of the sex-relations, is the continuance of the human race; in short, is natural duty; and that in proportion as these relations are used for pleasure as an end apart from duty, the laws of Nature are disregarded, the plain dictates of reason disobeyed, and all manner of evils and discords begin to creep in. Of course this description does not apply to the modern fine lady, whose one great aim in life is to cut the flower of pleasure off the root of duty, and so enjoy the former while escaping the latter. This unnatural monster, the unhealthy fruit of a society sick unto death, may be seen flouncing about in silks and satins, admiring and being admired ; while somebody else, some coarse grained hired servant, is employed to suckle, nurse, and train up her children ; and solely in order that this worthless piece of modern "respectability" may have all this world's pleasures and none of its duties. This ignoble excrescence of a rotting civilization in no new phenomena. Just the same kind of artificial monster wallowed in the inordinate luxury and rank social corruption of decaying Rome. From such as she largely comes the ruin of States and the fall of Empires. The brand of eternal shame lies on all such, and they are not worth having patent protective laws passed, in order to keep them in possession of a purity that they never possessed. Let them work out their own destruction. Their's is a breed that can very well be spared. No judge can improve them, and it is utterly useless for him to try. It would not even be wise to prohibit their newly acquired habit of thronging the law courts, in order to gorge themselves with all the garbage of modern divorce. With each generation they will get worse, and no human power can stop their downward course.

There is not a bit of use in passing stringent laws for preventing these, and such as these, from listening to evil persuasions and reading bad books. They will listen, and if nobody speaks they will do the work themselves : they will read bad books ; or if they don't read them, they will write them : which comes to pretty much the same thing. You could not protect them if you would : and if you are wise you would not if you could. They only tend to fill the State with bad and unnatural types like themselves, and the sooner their growing viciousness rots them out of existence the better for the "commonweal."

Note the conclusion here arrived at. The natural woman does not need looking after: the unnatural woman is not worth looking after. Take which horn of the dilemma you please: either is fatal to Paternalism: both make for freedom. Those women who have natural virtue will never be taken in either by bad men or by bad books; while those women who have not natural virtue are certain to fall: if not in their own generation, then in the weaker generations that they help to propogate. For the more they are protected, the more morally weak will they tend to get: consequently, the longer their fall is delayed, the greater will it be when it does come. If Nature does not get rid of them individually she will get rid of them collectively. Nothing that is artificial shall stand. What dare not be left perfectly free to face every truth: yes, and every lie also, is doomed sooner or later to certain destruction. The morally weak, because artificially protected community, is as sure to come down with a crash in the day of trial, as cowardice is to flee when danger threatens. You cannot ultimately save the worthless, and under freedom the worthy can always save themselves.

Of course you may partly keep temptation back for a time; but when you do so, that which you protect either rots away of itself, through sheer want of moral exercise; or else it goes to pieces on the very rock that you want it to avoid. The untried strength at last ceases to be strength at all. The soldier who is never permitted to risk himself eventually loses the power of meeting danger when it really comes. What profit is there in being paternally protected into moral cowardice? What a false and ignoble view of life! Temptation is the wrestling ground of the soul; the arena wherein it fights itself into strength and courage: not, indeed, without many a bruise and many a fall: but the struggle is noble: it is the very plot of life's play; and without it the world would be but one dull monotony of torpid conventionality and vapid sentimentalism. Both morally, physically, and intellectually, life is a struggle for existence; and those who fear to take up this struggle, or dread allowing others to take it up, are so unutterably mean, so cowardly, base, and contemptible, that all the languages of men lack words sufficiently strong to describe and denounce them as they deserve.

If law could prevent female vice, it would have done so in Imperial Rome. Nowhere was it more needed, assuming, that it was ever required anywhere. Yet, as a matter of dry historical fact, it could do nothing, and did do nothing. Corruption went on until the entire social fabric came to the ground. Indeed the legal attempt to suppress vice only resulted in the creation of more vice still. The judges themselves committed the very vices they tried people for. And, curiously enough, they committed these vices with the guilty parties that they ought legally to have punished. Immoral women bought themselves off by lending their persons to these worthy judges. In touching pitch the latter became defiled. "More sin" says SENECA "was committed in absolving than in acting the crime. He that was guilty of adultery, divided adulteries; and he was not secure of his life until he had made his judges like unto himself" *(Epistle xcvii.)* And NIEBUHR tells how, although the most stringent regulations were passed to restrain female vice, yet that vice grew to such a pitch, that the best men eschewed marriage, took their slaves for mistresses, and avoided the Roman ladies as a pestilence. Such was the remarkable improvement on letting things alone, such the practical outcome of the application of Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S draconian theories. If there is little to be said in favour of freedom, there is still less to be said in favour of tyranny.

What must inevitably result from this artificial, and at best only temporary, propping up of weakness, this special exempting of women—or men either, for the argument applies all round—from temptation, may in some degree be shown by analogy. In a certain forest, let us say; some few trees here and there are too weak to stand the rough winds that are constantly blowing. Therefore branches are taken from the strong trees in order to prop up the weak ones. The result is that the latter grow for a time and propagate. As time goes on, however, an ever greater and greater proportion of weak trees appear. The consequence is that more and more branches are taken from the strong trees to be used for propping purposes. At last all the strong trees have disappeared : the whole forest is propped up ; and the propping business cannot be carried on any longer. But now the props begin to rot, and there is nothing strong wherewith to replace them. Then the storm comes, and beats upon that forest, and great is the fall thereof. It would have been cruel to have let the weak trees go to the wall, through their own weakness. It was kinder to so regulate matters that all eventually perished.

The best way to cure a sore in the body politic is to drive it in. Get it out of sight, like bad drainage, as soon as you possibly can. What matter so long as nobody sees it, and things look snug and respectable on the outside? The lie, you know, is the only safe thing ; it works well, washes well, and, above all things, is eminently politic and expedient. Not one of your silly and unpractical rules about freedom and self-ownership will go down like this does. No, no, drive the social evil in, and keep on driving it in ; until at last the entire social system is one mass of corruption. Surely, my *a priori* friend, with your eternal talk about truth and freedom; you would never be so cruel as to destroy the livelihood of that honest, disinterested, and painstaking gentleman, the political quack, the great social spouter; the man who knows far better than the gods themselves how all the business of this world should be regulated.

The truth is that no matter how much you paternally protect and regulate them, those women who don't understand themselves, their natural duties, and the place they occupy in the order of things; those poor vain flabby creatures who have no intelligent self-love, no moral back bone, and who live to obey passion before reason; they always have and they always will suffer: no quack will ever succeed in effectually shoreing them up, nor is it desirable that he should succeed. They are "fair game" for the Roman Judge, the Catholic Priest, the Ritualist Parson, and the State Official.* Those who cannot look after themselves always get looked after in one way or another by this or that kind and disinterested protector. You see, the great object of our lives should always be to aim at a state of things in which no body looks after himself, and trusts to himself; but in which everybody look after everybody else, and trusts everything to "other people." Altruism, you know, is the thing: egoism is false and unnatural. God is not within you, but outside in the crowd of other "yous." It is wicked for you to love best that of which you are alone sure; namely, your own existence: it is only right for you to love best that of which you are not quite so sure, that which is purely a matter of inference from your own existence; namely, the existence of "other people": for you may be certain they love you: when they say so they cannot lie. Thus, you see, the foundation of egoism is less certain than the foundation of altruism. The former is doomed to disappear before the latter. The sentimentalist says so, and therefore there can be no mistake about the fact. In the altruistic future, I shall live for you, and you will live for me. We shall both "live for others." O how sweet these dear words sound! We shall do nothing for the sake of ourselves; that would be too sinful. I shall wash you and you will wash me. I shall feed you and you will feed me. I shall digest for you and you will do the same for me. We shall serve as mutual looking glasses to each other, and we shall admire one another, and grin at one another—sociable-like, you know—and sit on the sands of time, lovingly combing each other down with crabs and cockle shells. What a pity both of us will be dead long before the sin of selfishness at last dies out of the human heart. Well, we must be content to enjoy in anticipation what we are helping to bring about "for others." "For others!" how nice it sounds! It is nobler to serve "others" than to serve the truth and reason that the Eternal has planted in our souls.

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* The latter gentleman does not even need to be at the trouble of seducing his victims. Only the other day an undiscoverable Russian official outraged a girl in prison, and then hung her; in order to make people believe that she had killed herself. Now and again even the outside public get a glimpse into the Socialist's glorious paradise of State Officialism.

To return, however, from this slight digression to the question of propped-up morality.

Take Sir J. F. STEPHEN's last quoted case. Probably it would have been better for the noble lord and his four mistresses, so very properly and righteously condemned by Sir J. F. STEPHEN, to have been clapped up in Holloway Jail. They would at least have had a chance of becoming moral then. For morality is not purity of heart, but mere external conformity. Other advantages might also have followed. The four mistresses might have found a new master in the person of their virtuous jailor—for, manifestly, all people who take up the business of regulating and looking after other people, are virtuous: there can surely be no question about this well known fact. And the wealth of the noble lord might have enabled him to purchase a new mistress in the person of his jailor's wife or daughter: for there are few things that money will not buy in this highly moral and respectable world. The outside public would thus have been effectually "protected" against a very very shocking example. O most sad and shocking! Moreover, what is better still, both the inquisitors of vice and all other perfect people, would have been saved from the trouble of having to set these wicked miscreants a good example. For, manifestly, the force of written law is stronger than the force of unwritten example, copy-book headings to the contrary notwithstanding. These vicious persons would therefore have become virtuous; since virtue is not that moral strength which triumphs over temptation, but is rather that moral weakness which needs protecting against temptation. At any rate there would have been more work for those worthy gentlemen who live upon the paternal regulation of grown up children: and that would have been a great gain to the wealth, and, above all, to the "respectability" of the general community. This is far nobler and more desirable than liberty. Will liberty fill a belly? Will it secure position and power and pelf for social busybodies? Will it provide work for State paternalists? No. Away with it then. It does not agree with *us*.

CHAPTER XIV.

WHAT a puerile superstition this State paternalism is. No amount of State protection can save folly and vanity from getting their true wages in the long run. The universe is absolutely and immutably just; its wheels grind slow but nothing ever escapes them. Nature has managed for millions of ages to get along without all these virtue-keepers and petifogging little god-almighties, and she will manage to preserve human virtue after she has effectively weeded every one of them out. The naturally virtuous woman, like the naturally virtuous man,* needs none of Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S hot-house pampering. Defend her from physical force and she will laugh at ZOLA and Mrs. BESANT. The former will inflame her passions just about as much as a dirty little boy who plays with the mud in the gutter. The latter she will merely pity as one of the many sad pervitions of a decaying civilization. But, of course, the naturally weak woman, who does not know how to love herself, whose virtue is only a childish vanity that delights in pleasing other people; the woman who cants about the self-sacrifice of living for others, and takes the wishes of outsiders as her sole standard of duty; such a woman is bound to come to grief. She is like a ship without ballast, and wreck she will in some storm or other, patch and bodge her as you may. How are you to protect such a creature as this from temptation? Is it possible to lock every man up, and then to employ all the women as jailors? Most effectual arrangement. And what would it all be for? To have seduceable women artificially preserved? Are they worth artificially preserving? If they cannot swim in a free sea, let them sink. Let them go on being subject to temptation. There is no other way in which they can learn wisdom. But there is no need to treat them as Sir J. F. STEPHEN, and those who think with him, would have them treated. There is no need to behave towards them as the Socialist's great and perfect god "society" so frequently does. There is no need to follow the example of a "Christian" world's uncharitableness, and push these women further and further into that mire with which they are already partly soiled. A wise man will carefully avoid these mean and unworthy methods, these false and hollow extremes. He will leave Nature and the natural consequences of sin to teach these women what is right; and, in the words of one who had sounded all the heights and depths of human nature, who knew "how very weak the very wise are, how very small the very great are," who was able to look with calm intellectual charity on all the sinful passions of this weary, self-torturing world; he will say to these unmanly and contemptible hypocrites, these wolves in sheep's clothing; these self-righteous people who flatter and fawn and lie continually, and whose inner life is one mass of filthy corruption; he will say to these and to all such as these—"Let him that is without sin cast the first stone at her."

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* In a popular review somebody urges that it is a pity that young men should be subjected to temptation of street solicitation. Cannot law protect them from it? *Protect who?* Not the morally strong. *Not the right type.* No, but the morally weak; that is to say, *the wrong type.* As if temptation were not Nature's only means of selecting the sheep from the goats.

Most of these inquisitive lookers-after their neighbour's morals call themselves Christians, and pretend to be "reforming" the world in the name of Christ. Now, without going so far as to say who are followers of Christ;

it is easy to see who are not such followers. These people are not. Is it likely that the prophet of Nazareth would have employed police to kick and knock and hustle women about in the public streets? would he have employed judges to send them to jail simply for doing what they liked with their own personal property? Was that the way he reformed the Magdalen? The truth is, Christ reformed by the magnetism of virtue: his self-called followers first curse with the deadly magnetism of their passions; and then bully and kick their victims, in order, if possible, to hide their own shame. Christ made his light to shine before men; and men followed the light freely; but in these so-called Christians there is no light: nothing but darkness visible, where peace and rest can never dwell. His name is on their lips, but their hearts are far from him. Inwardly they hate and fear him. These shams dare no more face the teacher they profess to follow, than lovers of lies dare face lovers of truth. If they knowingly met him in the flesh they would slink away like night owls before sunrise: so longingly do they look forward to the "coming of their dear Lord." Like the Scribes and Pharisees of old, they would be too fearful of hearing themselves described as the smiling, conventional, sociable whited sepulchres, that, in their secret hearts, they well know themselves to be.

It was a true saying of SPINOZA's, that evil is not overcome by force, but by love and high-mindedness. Those who love virtue spread virtue, and it never did and never can spread in any other way. The kingdom of hell, no more than the kingdom of heaven, is to be taken by violence Love of virtue and personal example are the only effectual police of this world. Virtue is contagious. It "catches on" as the vulgar say. Those who possess it are free, free in the only true sense; for they are no longer passion's slaves. And being free themselves: having been made free by truth;

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that is, by the clear knowledge of the laws of their own nature and of universal nature, they envy not the freedom of others; so that no vile lust for power over others dwells within them: for they know that the supreme power of this world; the very king of kings and god of gods; is truth, is the calm passionless recognition of the facts and laws of things. They know that before this power the might of evil cannot stand. Hence are they without fear; for faith in the moralizing power of truth casteth out all fear. Therefore they are not shaken by the fullest and freest expression of vice. They desire such freedom. They want to know where vice is. They had rather it existed outside than inside a prison. They know that it is only improved by the knowledge of truth, and that only a free creature can bear to hear and receive truth. In a word, they recognize freedom as the indispensible condition of virtue and truth; despotism the certain parent of falsehood and vice; and they work for liberty only for the sake of the truth and virtue that they see to rest upon it.

But the fussy respectable "Christians" of our day and generation entirely ignore this simple fact. The founder of their creed, however, did not ignore it. In him the love of virtue was real: in them it is a mere pretence. Hence do they seek to hide their own deficiencies by raising a hue and cry over the deficiencies of others. They are so busy screaming about the motes in their neighbour's eyes, that they have no time to pluck the beams out of their own. Instead of striving to free their own souls from all the envy, hatred, malice, and uncharitableness that fill these souls even to overflowing, they prefer to make themselves *look* virtuous by wantonly kicking and bullying a lot of ignorant women: or, if they don't do the work themselves, they employ somebody else to do it, which, if anything, is the more contemptible method of the two.

These sham Christian coercionists, with their eternal cant about respectability, and their perpetual whine over the vices of others; assuredly these people are no followers of Christ. He was as opposite to them as light is to darkness. Between him and his canting followers there is not one single point in common. He never countenanced their lie of legal force for curing moral evils; used by them in preference to the force of personal virtue and personal example. He preferred the straight and difficult path to the crooked and easy one. He never believed in their irrational and futile attempt to bully the vicious and the morally weak into a hollow pretence of conventional virtue. He was no canting conventionalist. Living ever from within, he knew the inwardness, the essential spontainity of all true virtue. Individualistic with that eternal strength, of which every form of Individualism is the living and fearless expression, he clearly saw the supreme value of personal liberty, and, as long as he could do so, enjoyed it for himself. He never bowed to the crowd, but, following Nature's clear inner light, walked a free individual being through this vile enslaving world. The poet SHELLEY gives a true and individualist description of him in the following words—

A power from the unknown God,
A Promethean Conqueror came
Like a triumphal path he trod
The thorns of death and shame;
A mortal Shape to him
Was like the vapour dim
Which the orient Planet animates with light.

He recognized that only the free act is the moral act. He never invoked the aid of the State. No accursed lust for external pomp and power ever stained his soul. He lived neither to found spiritual nor temporal despotisms: these wretched contrivances were the work of knaves who came afterwards. The arms he fought with were not of flesh and blood ; all his victories were won in the unseen, in the inner kingdom of the soul, in its timeless realm of peaceful silence; where abstract reason sits enthroned as light of lights and lord of lords. Little cause was there for him to seek the aid of physical force : he at least needed no help from the strong arm of the law : for, having within himself the love of virtue, he conquered evil with that love : he always argued and persuaded ; never bullied nor compelled : those he won yielded gladly, obeying the truth that they could not help seeing ; and thus gaining for themselves an inner peace, that the world can neither give nor take away. He loyally respected the consent of his fellow-man, even as he wished his own consent to be respected. He never authorized that despotic, inquisitorial, and grasping organization of mental and moral stagnation called a Church. He was no officiou busybody. Yet the modern compulsionists have the audacity to claim him as one of themselves, as an aider and abettor of their worthless and unprincipled work. They go about hawking the canting, meaningless phrase—"Christian Socialism." A more monstrous falsehood was never sought to be foisted upon the memory of any man. Christ was no shallow-brained politician, no believer in mere social lading and teeming; no admirer of the coercionists cunning external shuffling of dead mechanical puppets. He knew that man does not live by bread alone, and he thought the free life of the soul, however short, far better than the enslaved life of the body, however long. In this he was a thorough Stoic. He appealed to the reason and not to the belly. He put principle before comfort, and recognized virtue as something far higher and nobler than any amount of material pleasure. He was no narrow, soulless utilitarian, measuring morality by its effect upon "the general happiness." He knew of a worthier life than that of living "for others," namely, living for truths which are greater than "others." Therefore he never once flattered the democracy of his day and generation. Whatever else he might be, he was certainly no social democrat. A social democrat could not consistently have said what he did about the family—"And they *twain* shall be one flesh." There is a doctrine that will disagree with the canting incarnation of envy, let him explain and modify as much as he please. No, no, the whole life of Christ was one continual assertion of individuality, one long and patient struggle for freedom to speak, to teach, to act; not in slavish obedience to "other people," but in response to individual reason and individual conscience. A more practical instance of Individualism the world has never seen. If ever there was a man who heartily repudiated all forms of conventionalism and social dictation, that man was Christ. He was the boldest inovator that ever lived. Looking on the civilization of his own day and generation, he saw it to be a lifeless and mechanical external show, a hollow conventional lie; rotten, weak, and as certain to break down as the pretentious artificiality in which we of this nineteenth century now vegetate. He saw the depth of degradation to which the mechanical following of the mosaic official rule of thumb had brought moral life; and, in the face of the entire State, he dared to maintain the sound doctrine that morality is not obedience to external law, but to internal obligation, to the inner light of reason and of conscience; and that, above all things else, it is the calm inner peace which such obedience brings. With the Stoic he recognized that "the kingdom of heaven is within" and that, though a man may fulfil every letter of the conventional law, he may yet nevertheless be as far removed from true blessedness as the lowest and blackest of criminals: further, indeed, from paradise than the condemned thief hanging on the shameful cross. The individualism of this teaching cannot be mistaken. In the place of social, Christ planted natural virtue. In the place of utilitarian public expediency he put eternal and unchangeable principles. He penetrated below the degrading slavery of conventional mechanics and into the free realm of that divine reason; some ray of which exists in the soul of each: that god-like nobility which eternally protests against all that is mean and cowardly and base and unworthy of itself, and out of which shall yet arise the perfect manhood of a free and fearless race. Speaking in the name of this nobility, whose highest expression he was, Christ in effect said—"Thou shalt not merely act well: thou shalt be well: thou shalt be noble with the nobility and purity of truth. Therefore above all things be free and stainless within. Thou shalt not hate any man; for this can never *under any circumstances be right.* That it is wrong is an eternal truth of reason. And the same applies to every human passion. All are base, ignoble, and unworthy of the light that dwells within. Thou shall not envy, thou shalt not lie, thou shalt not lust: they are eternally wrong in themselves, and no social advantages can ever make them right. That they are wrong is as certain as that the inner angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; for in their very nature and essence they war against the peace of a rational being, and they are only wrong because they do this." Deeper than such profound analysis philosophy cannot penetrate. Sounder basis of morals will never be discovered. Against this rock all utilitarian and social-expediency falsehoods shall ever break in vain. For allegiance to external rulers, for the slavery of living to please other people, Christ substituted the effort to achieve personal purity of heart. Seek ye first the kingdom of inner peace and its righteousness. Moses said *do* this: Christ said *be* this. For what profit is there in succeeding in pleasing others by staining your own soul? Holiness; the purity of self; the only real self-interest; the natural, innate, and organic selfishness of being true to individual reason and individual conscience; the fearless resolve to please God rather than man: this was the essence of what Christ taught. And this is that true and eternal Individualism, which is the indispensible condition of all real happiness, and without which nothing great was ever achieved. If you have the fixed inner peace of this, said in effect Christ, you possess true blessedness. And he was absolutely and eternally right. This truth nothing can ever shake. It is independent of theological dogma. Down to the very end of time will it go; giving patience to the oppressed, and strength to those who walk through the valley of the shadow of death.

And what resulted from teaching so purely unconventional?

Everybody, or nearly everybody, was offended. For the world hates nothing so bitterly as truth. Knowing itself to be a lie, it curses the light; yet, like a devil, it believes in the light and trembles. In the mirror that Christ held up to it, it saw itself found out and condemned. In looking at the natural man, the healthy expression of uncorrupted nature, it became conscious of its own artificiality and falseness, its own inner rottenness and corruption. The "Society" of Christ's day and generation could not bear to hear the plain facts he told them about themselves. He knew them, and they knew that he knew them. Never before or since has the wickedness of the human heart been so searchingly exposed. Envy and hatred rose up against rebuke. Falsehood and hypocrisy revenged themselves. Scribes and Pharisees, chief priests and rulers, high and low, wealth and democracy: all united against this objectionable person: neither orders nor classes could stand such a radical reformer; one that dared to tell them to reform their own vile hearts: even Barabbas the robber was less dangerous to the "commonweal"; for at least he had the consideration to spare a race of canting liars the terrible sight of truth.

Therefore the individual perished; but the spirit of individual freedom remained. Stronger and stronger is this spirit destined to grow, and through it shall worthier generations of the earth be blessed.

In spite, however, of these well known facts, the Christian compulsionists still put forward the preposterous statement that the founder of their creed was a Socialist like unto themselves. It is a palpable falsehood. Whatever else Christ might be, he was first and foremost an uncompromising Individualist, a believer in personal right, a respector of personal consent, and a worker for individual liberty. This was the very essence of him. All the rest is what a superstitious world has elaborately built up around his memory. That world first sacrificed him on the smoking altar of its never sleeping hate, and then, with characteristic egotism, invented the transparent fiction that he had lived and died solely for its benefit, and to save it from the sweep of inexorable justice. This lie is only one more added to the mighty pile. Christ no more died for the world than Socrates had done before him. The world was never worth either living or dying for. And as for saving it from going to hell; why, it is there already, and burning continually in the seething caldron of its own passions; its envy, hatred, avarice, covetousness, and uncharitableness. No, no, Christ, like Socrates, died for something far higher and nobler than this low herd of "other poeple," namely, for truth's sake, for conscience sake, and for right's sake; for the eternal Law within him. He lived and died for the dictates of abstract reason. He dared to say and do what he thought to be right. He served divinity before humanity. Therefore, above all things he was an Individualist: and the noblest, truest, and purest Individualist that ever passed through time. He lived and died for principle, and when men are liker unto him, there shall be no slavery known.

CHAPTER XV.

IT is to the sham followers of Christ, that a great deal of the cant about female vice, and nearly all the legal coercion of women, is due. Sir J. F. STEPHEN'S plea for suppressing obscene literature, and for punishing those who seduce women, is only one of the many expressions of this respectable but utterly false and conventional Christianity. According to this superficial creed, the best cure for moral evils is immoral force. Purity of heart, freedom from envy, hatred, and lust, is to be fostered by knocking people about or locking them up. One lot of people are to be made better by having another lot of people set to spy upon them, follow them about, and see that they behave themselves like "respectable" citizens. This is the view taken by a group of inquisitive busybodies who call themselves a Vigilance Society. These people are so perfect in themselves that there is no need for them to look after their own morals; hence they have lots of time and leisure in which to look after the morals of other people. Fitting, is it not? They must be careful not to fall into the error of the pious priests of old, who so well looked after their neighbours' morals that at last they lost their own.

This spying and "protecting" system may be respectable: it is certainly not scientific. These sham Puritans never stop to ask themselves how Nature is to get rid of her immoral types, if these types are so "protected" that the conditions of illimination are artificially and arbitrarily destroyed. For is it not as plain as sunlight that the suggestions of bad books, and the persuasions of unprincipled men, are the only effectual means by which morally weak women are either weeded out, or corrected into better, or at least less bad behaviour? For, if they adopt Mrs. BESANT'S unnatural method for making easy the unlimited gratification of lust, they tend to leave no posterity behind to continue their vices. And the more they do adopt either this or any other similarly intentioned practice, the more will they tend to adopt it; since, the check of risk being taken away, the more will their sexual instincts grow by exercise at the expense of their maternal instincts; until at last, like an unnatural modern Frenchwoman, they will live for little else than to gratify lust and escape maternity. Under these circumstances, and just in precisely the same way as the frivolous creatures across the channel, they will surely and effectually efface themselves. Nature will not keep such corrupt types in her realm, and their illimination is as certain as that twice two are four. For the universe is constituted in such a manner that only natural duty can thrive in it. Whatever diverges from the narrow path of natural duty must and will go down the broad road to destruction. Nothing can dodge the methods of eternal reality, not even the tricks of a scientific Malthusian, not even the safeguards of a modern "Free" Lover. Well may EMERSON say that all things are moral. The processes of Nature are more effectual than the laws of men. The wages of sin is death—what can beat that! Leave vice alone, and it burns itself out in the long run: artificially tinker and fiddle with it, and you spread its subtle poison everywhere: you give it far too much importance; and you yourself will get corrupted with it at last; for are you not a mortal being, liable as the weakest to fall headlong into the filth that you are so furiously stirring up? What a short-sighted and needless course you adopt. The very things that Nature would gradually get rid of, you, by your patent fences and embankments, artificially preserve and prolong; and yet, in the long run, you still have to leave to Nature, the slow illimination of that subtle and inner evil, —which is too vast, and too deep, and too cunning, and too potent for any human authority to suppress. My very religious and moral despot, you are not yet God Almighty, and, what is more, you never will be. Look to your own morals, or as sure as you are a living man, you will be bound to lose them some fine day or other: that is, of course, if you have any to lose—a point by no means so certain as you would have us believe.

To continue the argument about unprincipled books and unprincipled persuasions. We have seen that Nature is well able to clear out the vicious type of woman. Indeed, if she had not always been clearing off this type, the human race must long since have come to an end; as, in fact, it will do in proportion as the Malthusian's "lust made easy" comes into fashion.* To proceed, however, with the other alternative. Now if these books, or these persuasions, lead women to gratify their passions without adopting the Malthusian's patent checks, the natural result of such gratification will teach them the meaning of duty in a far healthier, truer, and more effectual manner than any amount of artificial State protection could ever do. In either case Nature is well capable of looking after the matter, and there is no need, either for the infallible judge, or for the still more infallible policeman.

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* Take France as an instance. French statesmen are coming to think that even "the horrors of war" caused in consequence of the pressure of population, are less dreadful than national extinction. And there is no standing still. A nation must grow or diminish. Ultimately it is the fertility of its people that makes it grow. pushes it forward, wins its battles, spreads its empire, and plants its flag in every clime. The Malthusian says "We will remedy this: we will cause men to love one another like brothers: we will abolish war by checking the pressure of population." Poor sentimental fool: he is abolishing his own nation, and making room for some other that will know better than to follow his self-effacing doctrine. This gentleman appeals to the most ignoble sentiments. He talks like a whining Quaker about the "horrors of war." He points for example at the pile of dead heaped up on the field of Waterloo. What a pity all those fine fellows were cut off in the prime of life! What a pity echoes sentimentalism! They might have lived longer but for war, might have died in their beds; of drunkenness, of gluttony, and of a score of other vices. But they died doing their duty; they could not die in a better way, and they might have died in a worse. Was it not a pity?

Thus, Nature, or, if you prefer it, the course of things, either effaces or corrects the immoral. We may be pretty sure, that if this were not the case, the human race would long ago have "bust up," as the Yankee bluntly puts it. Humanity would never follow duty at all if it were not forced to do so. There is no dodge that it has not resorted to for evading the law of its being. But underneath all its glittering lies and cunning shifts works a mightier power than itself. Its hand is forced in spite of all its apparently successful cheating, and it will be forced, until at last the great lesson is learnt, that duty is the only good, that virtue is its own reward, and that, in their highest reach, the intellectual love which prompts to duty, and the abstract reason on which duty rests, are identical. Looking in the far future we may see a race made up of men and women with whom duty is everything; who have become rational parts of Nature in every thought and word and deed; who move calm and passionless to the fulfilment of each natural duty: pure in heart; tranquil in mind; perfect in form; fairer to look on than the lilies of the field; clothed with no artificial aids,

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Had they lived ten thousand years they could not have done more than their duty, and they ought not to have done less. What poor stuff sentiment is. If a man does his part in her universal order, what matter how soon Nature relieves him? All this cant about the horrors of war rests upon a false and mean view of human life.

but glowing with the beauty of continual health; living and dying as gods, because constantly filled with the peace of a rational acquiescence in things; one with the universal harmony through life and death: obeying the inner dictates of supreme reason and dwelling always in its shadowless light. Such, at least, was the ideal of the old Stoics, and even if it never be realized by the race, the individual movement towards it is a present unqualified personal gain. The gospel of natural duty is peace now and for all the future; but the gospel of artificial pleasure is misery and death to the end of time.

If the women whom Sir J. F. STEPHEN is so very eager to protect, only knew what State protection, as logically carried out by the State Socialist, really means for them, possibly a few of them would be not so ready to accept it; corrupt and unnatural as they are in their civilized state. For it means the destruction of what little individual freedom they have with such great difficulty been able to get; the taking away of and pauper training of their children by indifferent State officials; the official inspection of their persons, in order to see if they are in a fit and proper condition to be ordered or forbidden to breed paupers for the "State" to bring up; the destruction of their home life; and the reduction of them to the level of mere cattle for the strongest—and of course the male—political party of the moment to drive about and supper up. We fully believe that some of them would welcome this arrangement, or, in fact, any other patent contrivance that would relieve them from the burden of their natural duties, and give more scope to the play of their mischief-making propensities and inordinate follies and vanities. But we very much doubt whether they would be gainers in the long run. If individual liberty is to the interest of man, it is still more to the interest of woman. The great political superstition that might is right has always kept her down, and as long as it exists it always will do so. There is no principle in it, no manliness, no fair play, no honour, no respect for personal right or for individual differences of taste, feeling, and choice. It is the brute force of numbers; it is the insensate mob trampling on all the flowers of life, and turning the whole world into a howling wilderness of homeless brigands and unprincipled political pirates. In a word, it is social democracy; the very worst form of government that the mind of man can conceive, because the government which places the directing power in the hands of those least fitted to direct well. Under this system woman would become a mere political bribe, bought with the votes of electors, and sold by scheming politicians to whichever party happened for the moment to carry the most votes. As "wife" and "mother" she would be voted hither and thither by her unrecognizable children, and the unnatural prostitute would possess the same political power as herself. Under such conditions all her personal property and power of individual choice must go. The majority of unnatural-living people would dispose of the minority of natural-living people. The many who loved personal irresponsibility, who followed pleasure, and preferred throwing the results of their actions upon the "State," that is upon "everybody," would dispose of the few who tried to follow natural duty, and lived to keep themselves pure and unspotted from this low and corrupt world. There can be no doubt that the Socialists are quite correct in saying that the home must be abolished. It could not exist under their system. The State would select and arrange everything. Men and women could not be allowed individual choice, for, if so favoured, they would, as now, consider only themselves, and "selfishly" leave the dear brotherly majority out in the cold. This selfishness no honest and logical Democracy could put up with. Personal choice could not be allowed; it is altogether too natural and individualistic. Woman, that is, individual woman, would thus be forced to become a mere means for gratifying the lust of the whole "State." The "State" would look after her; deprive (or kindly relieve) her of her children; would bring those children up, not to please her, but to please the dear brotherly majority; and the result, as ARISTOTLE so clearly points out in his Politics, would be that no father and no mother would be able to say, except through a certain undisguisable resemblance, which were their own children; no child which was its own mother or father: all would be one filthy mass of State-regulated promiscuity; natural virtue would have disappeared, and the world would have become full of childless parents and orphaned children. Everybody, having been relieved of parental responsibilities, would think only of individual pleasures, and would leave his or her personal duty to everybody else. The result at last would be that what was not done by one would be done by none, and the whole social system would eventually break into pieces.

How well the politicians are likely to treat women, may be judged from the fact that already these politicians are doing all they possibly can, by factory acts and other drastic means, to shut women out of the labour market; and, what is still more mean and contemptible, these politicians are trying to prevent women from exercising any political power in their own defence; although, as rate and tax payers, the latter are as much entitled to have votes as the men are. Of course, as just pointed out, there is no divine or moralizing power in votes. At best they simply mean the many goats disposing of the few sheep. "Social salvation by political majorities" is the silliest cry that human folly ever raised.

But justice knows no distinction of sex and you cannot in common fairness withhold from one tax-payer what you have already given to another. This question of individual liberty will not be settled by votes or by majorities; make no mistake about that. There is a mightier force in the world than number; namely, the power of those who love principle and are prepared to stand by it let come what may come. Freedom was not voted into existence and eventually it won't be voted out of existence. The day will come when those who believe in principle, will have their eyes opened to what Democracy really means: when they will see that it means the forcible destruction of that very fact which all legitimate force-organizations exist to defend, namely, the home, the only natural plant that grows within the artificial desert of civilization. When this discovery is made, when this issue is raised, a more substantial argument will be used than the politician's childish count of envious block heads. Men and devils will stand face to face, and those who would take the kingdom of free individual choice by violence, will be hurled into everlasting silence.

But this will not be yet. The family will not, at least on a large scale, be openly attacked in our time, and what comes after will be for others to deal with. Our business is to say what we think, defend what we believe to be best, and never care a straw whether we win or lose. The latter rests not with us. Our preference for the monogamic family is the same as our preference for Nature. The family is best because it is the most natural, and Nature never takes up more elements or factors than are needed for carrying on a given function. What goes beyond need only hinders, confuses, and encumbers. Two many cooks spoil the broth. If you have a complete upper and lower jaw, you don't want "other people" to masticate your food for you. You can afford to bid them clear out, or go to the devil. If insatiable and covetous envy wants indiscriminate communism, let it pay for it: under freedom there will always be characters to suit all tastes; not even excluding those modern imitators of the virtuous Athenian Democracy—our loving and accommodating "comrades."* But nature abhors all this needless luxury, and for the continuance of the race, requires only a communism of two. What oversteps this is not Nature, but that greedy socialistic luxury which is a blind irrational abuse of Nature. The true Adam and Eve are sufficient unto themselves under all circumstances. Where they are nothing is lacking to the carrying out of that calm, passionless life of simple duties, which is perfect peace; which beggars all the restless artificial excitements and empty pleasures of a deceitful outside crowd: and if both are wise they will ignore canting sentimentalists, and gently blow out the brains of all communistic intruders. True natural love can only exist between two people, and when more than two are present its harmony is utterly broken up and destroyed. All charm goes when the "community" are thrust into the business. The very essence of love is something greater and deeper than a vague desire for the general, conventional, and artificial herd: it is a desire for nature in the simplest, most true, and least confusing form. It is a desire for oneness with *one*, and happy reliable separateness from all the disgusting deceit of the many, whom it is as impossible to know as it is unreasonable to trust. Love is the yearning of the human soul for the simple life of Nature, for its long lost peaceful Eden, which it strives and strives so often in vain to build up in the midst of the great social waste called civilization. The Socialist considers this to be selfish: his own mother was selfish because she did not lend herself out to the whole community, or to some members of it appointed by State authority; because she was mean enough to let envious and covetous people stew in their own juice. Well, if this is selfishness, the more there is of it the better. Of such is the kingdom of Heaven. Nature may be selfish, but at any rate her clear distinctions are better than envy and all the miserable confusion that it means. She may not live to suit "other people," but at least she lives to the plain truths, simple needs, and clear personal duties of human life. The family is all that is needed for continuing the race. It is a perfectly natural, distinct, and definite organization, thoroughly adapted to perform its needful function; whereas communism is a hopeless confusion of irrational pigs, a crowding and crushing together of all the worst passions in human nature. It does not even rise to the level of the morality of the higher animals. It is a system under which the human race would very soon come to an end. For when everybody repudiated his or her personal responsibility, when all natural duties were thrust upon that silly abstraction called the "community," these duties would never get properly fulfilled at all; for if it is not right for the parents to fulfil these duties, how can it be right for those who are not the parents? The result of this system would be a wild scramble for pleasure, ending in a hellish pandemonium of passion and death. That this should come of itself would be bad enough, but that it should be forced on by majority tyranny, would be infinitely worse. The true attitude of Power is—"Hands off." Let free personal consent carry social development in the natural direction; in the direction of that yet more complete respect for personal consent which is at once reason, harmony, and peace. The doctrine of liberty teaches that, if let alone, the family is a flower which grows and flourishes of itself. All it requires is a sufficiently strong defensive organization to strike down those who would pluck it up by force, or trample it out under the iron heel of officialism. In short it needs just the same security from aggression as is needed by the individuals of which it is composed: no more and no less. And, in point of fact, the whole apparatus of defence, both external and internal, exists entirely for guaranteeing this most requisite security. Army, Navy, Police just serve the purpose of keeping at bay those who would destroy both that private property which is requisite for the home's existence, and that freedom of association which gives sufficient scope for the individuals who care to undertake the responsibility of carrying on such an institution. The bristling spikes of these organized forces are the prickles that defend the wild rose of Nature, and before the State Socialist has succeeded in trampling that flower in the mud of Democracy, he will be deservedly impaled upon those sharp and glittering points. We may be pretty certain that Nature will prove herself the stronger in the long run. Instinct may seem to be circumvented for a time, but it reasserts itself at last. The Socialist thinks that with the assistance of all the scum of the country—and this scum is not confined to any particular class—he will be able to gradually vote away the only natural fact in human life. First he will educate the children, then he will feed them, then clothe them, then look after them altogether, from the first to the last day of this mortal life. In this way he expects to effectually undermine the home, by destroying the need for its existence. In this manner he hopes to abolish Individualism and plunge the country in a slavish state-regulated communism. And if votes were the only forces in the world, he might succeed; but they are not, and sooner or later, something harder than paper, will be passed through both him and his ballot box.

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* The "beauties" of Athens were not young women but young men. Even in this healthy business the comrades were not equal. Some were in more general request than others.

Doubtless the moral protectionist will ask "What has all this got to do with me? I am no Socialist. I want to protect the home, not to abolish it." Then let it alone. Afford it no more protection than you give to the individuals that compose it, namely, the ordinary protection against physical force and fraudulent aggression. Either it can grow under freedom or it cannot. If it can, there is no need to coddle it up. If it cannot, the sooner it goes the better; for them it is not adapted to the highest state of healthy human life. We feel as certain that, if let alone, it will grow of itself as we do that promiscuity, under the same conditions, will die out of itself. The home exists to thoroughly perform a natural and needful function. Promiscuity exists to half perform, and therefore to stulify, a natural function: as carried on in obedience to Malthusian rules, it is in sexual matters what the beastly epicureanism of the degenerate Romans was in matters of eating and drinking; for the end of food is digestion; but these last-mentioned people did not eat to digest: they stuffed to repletion, and then by thrusting a feather down the throat, brought all back again, and once more commenced the stuffing process. Fair types were they of the modern Malthusian pig. The home, so long as it carries on its normal function, is the expression of a truth; but promiscuity is the expression of a lie. The first frankly accepts and honestly seeks to carry out a fundamental law of Nature: the second merely trys to dodge this natural law; thus living to pleasure and shirking duty. There can be little doubt as to which will stand. The women who, following the advice of the sublime PLATO, and of his imitator, the modern social democrat, let themselves out to the lust of the general community, tend to cut both themselves and their posterity off the face of the earth. Yet we cannot prevent them if we would; we ought not if we could. They are the right people to disappear; and if they had not always ended by effacing themselves there would be no human race to-day. The moral protectionist says "No, no, let them be artificially preserved, put walls round their lives in order that they may be shielded from temptation." My dear sir, temptation is the best thing that can possibly happen to them; for it finds them out, and it clears them out. Do you want the State to be crammed with them? so crowded that they will burst all your artificial walls like strips of tissue paper, and swamp in their onward rush what little virtue still remains in the world? Yours is Indeed a short sighted policy, fitter for the nursery than the Senate. Give them plenty of rope, and they will soon enough hang themselves. But by your paternal regulation and inquisitive supervision, you introduce the thin end of a wedge which the Socialist will drive in until he has reduced all sex relations to one uniform and degrading State slavery.

This reasoning will be more clearly understood when applied to right down professional prostitution. Some short-sighted people would, if they could, abolish the latter by Act of Parliament. Fortunately there is no need to proceed to such extremity, even were it possible to do so, which, indeed, it is not, as all who know anything of the subject are well aware. When let alone these prostitutes are always tending to abolish themselves, and if, like the Shakers, they were not constantly recruited from outside; if, that is to say, they did not form, as it were, a sort of human Niagara over which lapses from the true type are constantly being hurled into racial destruction, their class would speedily disappear from the face of the earth. They exemplify that continual falling away of the bad from the good which is indispensible to the health and continuance of the latter. Women, in so far as they adopt prostitution, do not leave any posterity. Nature, the just but pitiless, has got her iron grip at the throats of all these poor unnatural people, and she curses them with unfruitful impotence in proportion as they become vicious. So that in attempting to legally wall in the would-be vicious, and in trying to make them artifically virtuous, you are striving to keep going the bad type that Nature is doing all she can to illiminate. You won't succeed. It would be the worst thing that could happen to the human race if you did. Observe how much better Nature acts! Prostitutes as a type constantly tend to clear themselves out. Therefore, those who use them also tend to clear themselves out, as a type, in proportion, of course, as they do use them. Consequently, in so far as you succeed in keeping prostitutes, and those who use them, from coming together, you artificially preserve the wrong type in the field: instead of tending to die out, both tend to marry and leave behind a morally weak posterity. So that in the next generation you have a larger crop of viciously-inclined people, and, the same process going on generation after generation, a point must eventually be reached when the viciously-inclined people have become too numerous for the virtuously-inclined people to be able to look after: then; as happened in the 2nd Charles's days, and after the fussy puritans had played out their little god-almighty game; with a crash down comes all your elaborate coercion system, and the last state of your morally nursed society turns out to be worse than the first. Don't you see that your draconian method takes account only of one generation? It is too narrow. It thinks only of making things look respectable just for the present moment; whereas it ought to think of the whole human race, which has got to wag on for ages yet to come, and cannot so wag unless its bad variations are always permitted to efface themselves by freely indulging in their own vices. My friend, you cannot forcibly stop viciously-inclined people from going to the deuce if you would, and if you were wise you would not if you could.

CHAPTER XVI.

BUT you may probably say "What are we to do in a case like this? Here are two people who have contracted to fulfil certain natural and important responsibilities. This woman has six young children. This man is the father of them. The marriage is virtually broken, and neither of the parties to it will carry out the tacit contract that they made with the children by bringing them into the world."

The reply to this is obvious. Let the man be charged with the support of the children he has caused to come into the world; that is, of course, in cases where he can afford to pay. The woman has fulfilled her part of the agreement in bearing the children: let him fulfil his part in keeping them. But go no further than this. Do not spread the evil by thrusting it upon people who are not responsible for it. By so doing you only encourage it. The more you make it easy for people to put their offspring upon the community, the more cases of this kind will you get (as witness the result of the old Poor Law): until at last you will bankrupt your State with fatherless and motherless children. In short, you will kill with over kindness to the immoral and gross injustice to the moral. For it is monstrous that any man should be compelled to keep children that are not his own. Such an arrangement in the long run means national death.

"But how about Divorce." The whole theory of divorce is false. What free consent hath joined together, let not law put asunder. If it breaks of itself you are not responsible, and you cannot make it hold together against the consent of its units. Treat it simply as a matter of contract; not as a matter of proprietary right, justifying the compulsory tying of people two together in a hard and fast knot of mutual torture.

Divorce is based upon the theory that people can have property in each other. This undoubtedly is a remnant of slavery and leads to more harm than good. The only wise course is to treat marriage in the same manner as other contracts. Leave people perfectly free to make and break their sexual agreements; but when anyone can satisfy a jury of his (or her) peers that, through the breaking of a sexual agreement, he (or she) has been unjustly treated, let compensation be given in proportion to the injury received, and in proportion to the injurer's ability to pay it. Each case could then be tried on its own merits; just as breach of promise is dealt with now. People could not be compelled to dwell together. The spirit as well as the letter of agreements could be fully taken into account. Loss could be estimated, not from an idealist's point of view, but from a similar point of view to that of the loser himself (or herself)—a most important consideration and one we nearly always forget. In this way it would be possible to make some approximation to justice correspond to each case. Orders could be made respecting the maintenance of children. Compensation could rise from *nil* to an indefinite sum, and the maximum of justice could in some degree be secured with a minimum loss of individual liberty. Add to this, that as the general sentiments regarding marriage became less material, the compensations would diminish in amount, and as personal independence became more real, the need for them would disappear. Thus, as theoretical and practical Individualism spread amongst the people, the negative regulation of marriage would gradually disappear along with all other negative regulations; and a social condition would at last be reached when there was neither positive nor negative regulation, either of marriages or of other human relations.

The capital objection to the Divorce Court is, that it is merely a legal convenience for sentimental and therefore utterly unprincipled people. It encourages a bad moral type. Take, for example, the following disgusting farce copied with modifications from a popular weekly newspaper. It appears (to cut short a long preamble) that a certain John Smith of Cape Town, had a wife who, while on a visit to England, met with a certain Henry Jones. "She at once wrote back to her husband, and told of meeting the latter in London, frankly acknowledging an affection she had formed for him. Smith evidently thought this a merely platonic affection, and, I guess, had good reason to think so, for he wrote her that if she loved Jones to come back to Cape Town and obtain a divorce. She did this, and as soon as the divorce was granted the invitations for her marriage to Jones were sent out. The bridegroom was in town during the divorce proceedings. Smith was invited to the wedding, and he accepted. He appeared on that evening dressed faultlessly, and having on his arm a lady of rare beauty. The wedding over, the new Mrs. Jones introduced her new husband to her former one, and Smith in turn represented the lady on his arm as Mrs. John Smith! He had been married quietly to her as soon as the divorce was granted. Smith would make no outward sign, but the episode broke his heart. He went to Australia, and Jones to India. I have never heard from Smith since. The places and men that knew him know him no more, and I do not know whether he is living or dead."

Here is only one out of many similar cases, and the point raised is this: Why should sentimental people of this description be provided with a special contrivance for legalizing and making "respectable" each one of their very strange and utterly unprincipled sexual magnetisms? It is just as absurd to provide means for encouraging them as it would be to provide means for preventing them. Let them alone; only holding them responsible for such real and practical losses as the breakings of their engagements, or the neglect of their children (when they have any) can be clearly proved to have caused.

The real truth is that the evils which arise, not indeed out of marriage itself (for this last, when undertaken for the rational performance of its only natural and legitimate function, namely, the continuance of the human race, is free from passion) but out of the envious passions so frequently dwelling in the hearts of those who marry, cannot be got rid of by law, let the people who set up as "brother's keepers" legislate and regulate as they please. Law can do a little for justice: it can do nothing for morality. Somebody objects that the principle here advocated applies as well to prostitution as to marriage. Well, what if it does? The contention here set up is, that compensation for breach of contract should be determined by two considerations: first, the extent of the injury: second, the ability of the injurer to compensate. If the injury can be shown to be great, it matters not whether the agreement is for one night, for ten years, or for life. This meets the case advanced by the objector. A prostitute is a human being, with a perfect right to arrange her own sex relations, and as much entitled to justice as the purest women in the land. Let us face this question as a judge, not an advocate. Take an example. A (a rich man) agrees with B (a known prostitute) to pay her £100 at the end of one year's services. He gets the services, and refuses to pay. In the meantime, the prostitute has spent £50 on her own maintenance, and has (according to all reasonable computation) lost £80 or

£90 from chance customers. The swindler *can* pay, but won't. Well, I think a just court would do its best to *make* him. Now let us take another case. A (a rich man) marries B (a girl of 18), lives with her for 6 years; *causes her to forego the learning of some craft or business by which she might maintain herself;* promises everything; agrees to everything; can find no ground of complaint; and yet, simply because he happens to see his "affinity" (or fancies he sees it), runs off and leaves her without any means of livehood, and with four helpless children to maintain. I cannot help thinking that a just court would give her as much compensation as possible; more than that is beyond finite power. Human justice is limited. It cannot square every twopenny-halfpenny squabble. But glaring cases of fraud could be dealt with, and should be dealt with.

To this the sentimentalists object that the price of "love" is not hard cash but love. Very likely. And the price of service is what has been agreed upon for the service. What has justice got to do with love? What has fair play got to do with a lot of maudlin foolery? Let us keep close to the concrete facts. Marriage, whatever else it may be, is an agreement on the part of a woman to perform those services for a man which enable him to carry out the perfectly normal function of continuing the human race: and it is an agreement on the part of a man to supply certain maintenance in exchange for those services. When viewed thus the relation of law is clear. Let justice compensate for breach of these contracts, whether the breach be on the part of the man or on the part of the woman. Let it compensate in proportion to the loss of the injured, and *in proportion to the ability of the injurer to compensate.* Now marriage and prostitution are not so different as sentimentalists would have us believe. True, there is a distinction, but not one that justice as such can take any account of. Vice is often virtue in the wrong place: it is the abusive extension of natural functions and natural duties beyond what uncorrupted human nature needs. The present case is a good illustration of this truth. Marriage is prostitution reduced to its fewest possible terms; prostitution is marriage expanded indefinitely beyond what is required for uncorrupted bodily needs. "Immoral contracts" exclaims the sentimental objector to prostitution. My dear sir, all passion is immoral; a perfect life would not have a trace of it. Marriage, in its present imperfectly managed state, is only a lesser evil than prostitution, because it gives less encouragement to the lower side of human nature, and allows more scope for the development of the higher. All passion is evil; it is the only evil in life, just as understanding is the only good, the only joy, the only strength, the only fact that neither the few nor the many can take away.

I may add that I am in favour of diminishing legal adjustment for breaches of contract all along the line. What we ought to do, is gradually to lead people to depend upon themselves, and not even upon judges and juries. But this cannot be done by making clean sweeps here and there just according to the caprice of sentiment. All revolutionary methods are unscientific, and always productive of more harm than good. Why in the name of reason should we sweep away all compensations for breaches of contract for bodily services, and leave other forms of compensation flourishing as much as ever? I say, gradually lessen all along the line. Let us put sentiment aside once and for ever and look steadily at facts. What we want is more intellect and less emotion; less sentiment and more justice. Justice must not be made the plaything of our tastes and fancies. When we enter its holy temple even love must be left behind; there understanding should alone worship in the pure light of reason. Justice can make no distinction between the loss of one person and that of another. In its sight the prostitute and the wife, the murderer and the saint, are equal. It pronounces not who is, and who is not immoral; what is and what is not an immoral bargain; it does not praise and blame: it gives measure for measure of the imperfections of human nature, and treats a devil as fairly as a god. Let us apply it to marriage, to prostitution, to everything, but let us apply it in slowly diminishing amounts. Let us treat human nature fairly, not turn up our noses at its "immorality" and drive the despised and abused away with a phrase about "immoral bargains." No bargains made in the light of truth are immoral; the passions they express often are, but not the mere bargains themselves. The best way to improve men and women, is not to preach at them, not to coerce them, not to despise them and call them immoral, but to give them simple justice and leave the rest to Nature and their own consciences.

But, replies one of the sentimental objectors to monogamy:—"If I understand him (the advocate of monogamy) correctly, he means that an ill-assorted couple, who may have married young, should pretend to love, or try to love, or force themselves to appear to love one another, or at all events should go through life as though they did really love one another,—out of difference to the ideal. My advice to them would be to dissolve partnership and seek their several affinities elsewhere, and *then* live up to the ideal. A slave to an ideal is I think as pitiable as any other slave.

This shall now be dealt with.

As to whether people should pretend to love, I don't think they should *pretend* anything. They should treat each other justly, fairly, considerately, mercifully, with a firm determination always to speak and act the truth to one another, and to fulfil the engagements they have made with one another. Not, indeed, for one another's sake, but for the sake of something far higher and holier; for truth's sake, and for right's sake. Let them do this, and they won't even think whether they love one another: their paltry personalities will be transcended and merged in a higher, wider, and more intellectual love: a love of that infinite impersonality which works through them and through the ages, towards the more rational life of a nobler and freer race. Like two stars that obey one central sun, they will then move together in perpetual harmony, and will unite the sweetness of childhood with the strength and reason of manhood and womanhood. The idea of running about the world seeking after "affinities" will never present itself to their minds. I thought ARTEMUS WARD had laughed that nonsense out of all sane people's respect. If anyone wants to see the misery and confusion to which "affinity" leads, let him read Mr. HEPWORTH DIXON's book on *Spiritual Wives.* Talk about the evils of married life! they are trifles to this hot-bed of lust and pain, of envy, jealousy, excitement, and despair. My advice is, stick to your engagements: be a slave to honour, rather than fancy: bear with one another: remember that no injuries can in the least degree hurt your only true and intellectual self; they only hurt you in so far as you let yourself down to the level of passion. What truth can indifference or cruelty deprive you of? what law can it prevent you from seeing? Can it prevent you returning justice for injustice; openness for false dealing; reason for passion, and order for confusion? The true goods of life are imperishable, and neither the indifference nor hate of others can touch them. It takes years to know and get used to people, therefore put patience before comparison. Habit will produce the most lasting affinity. You might spend a lifetime in hunting that will o'-the-wisp "affinity," and then never find it. Indeed, in an exclusively sensual sense there is no such thing. For sensual demands in their very nature are irregular, uncertain, unstable. There is no simultaneousness in their occurrence in any two people. When they are present in one, they are absent in another; at the moment when they are strong in one, they are weak in another. To make their agreement the end of married life, is simply to go down into a hell of confusion and contention. The only true, healthy, peaceful, and lasting affinity of human beings is reason. There is nothing more profitable to one human being who is governed by reason, than another human being who is also governed by reason. Just as the upper and lower jaw fit in with and are mutually serviceable to each other, so, a man that is governed by reason, and a women that is also governed by reason agree with and are mutually useful to one another. For reason and reason alone is the foundation of virtue; and love, when properly understood, is but the natural and spontaneous harmony of virtue with virtue, of truth with truth, of honesty with honesty; and of the constancy, courage, and highmindedness which these imply, with the same great and holy facts in another. True love is the divine calm of reason agreeing with that which is akin to itself. There is no passion in it. It is light without fire: it is god-like, grand, and pure. But passion is an unprofitable dross that, among low base natures, has somehow got mixed up with the gold. Its only wages are mutual distrust, fear, and confusion. From this burning slavery of passion spring falsehood, deceit, fraud, hate, envy, adultery, murder and death. But those who serve reason are free from all this wretched bondage, are capable of loving without coveting, and of either marrying or abstaining from marriage; for they know that human life is a sphere of high and noble duties and not a low hell of base sensual pleasures: thus are they really free because the clear knowledge of truth has made them free. Hence they freely perform the simple, natural duties of life, in the pure atmosphere of intellect and true liberty; and with the quiet restful strength of those whose souls are too great and brave to bow down to the slavery of any passion, however seductive. They are few in number but they form the very salt of this earth, and with their disappearance the last remnant of nobility goes out of human race.

The calm and peaceful "affinity" of reason is independent of sex and lust, and no one need break their agreements or plunge into a sex slavery in order to find it. The fact is there is not a rag of argument that can be advanced, either in favour of promiscuity, or of "affinity," or of continually changing partners in order to find comfortable "mates." All the arguments point just the opposite way. How many changes would it take to get use to anyone? No, stick to principle, and let sentiment go. So far as my own observation of bad marriages goes, I am inclined to believe that their supposed evils spring solely from passions and vanities that would bring misery anywhere, and with anyone, because, indeed, these passions *are* misery in themselves: their so-called results are but the outward smoke of inward fire. VOLTAIRE, whose writings are far too keen and rational to be appreciated by this maudlin and pampered generation, made a true remark when he said that "nothing violent is lasting." People begin by worshipping each other as gods, and end by cursing each other as devils. What is wanted is, not a lot of silly love dreams, or longings for affinity, but calm, sensible, good-tempered, charitable reason all the way through. With this, marriage will be happy; without this, nothing will be happy.

The fact is, that if people follow reason and truth as far as they see them, if they try to do justice and love mercy, they will get loved in return; not indeed for their own transient sakes, but for the sake of what is lasting and satisfying and complete. All the love worth having will come to them, and will be as fixed and lasting as the things out of which it arises and on which it rests. In this sense love grows out of duty: it is a kind of intellectual sympathy which all honest souls feel for those who follow reason rather than passion. It is the joint recognition of the eternal. Real love has nothing whatever in common with the Free Lover's blind lust after sexual "affinity," and the more it is confounded with this the more hopeless will both marriage and everything else become.

The secret of success in marriage, as, indeed, the secret of success in all things human, is natural, healthy common sense, without a tincture of vanity or passion; a quality which is much less common than its name would lead one to suppose. More than the whole world is this worth, and wherever it is there is the kingdom of heaven established upon earth.

The sentimentalist tries to make a strong point about slavery to an ideal. The reply to this is very easy. A man who follows his reason is not a slave, for his reason is himself. But a man who loves promiscuity, or who spends his time in a discontented and miserable search after an impossible sexual "affinity," certainly does not follow his reason; he follows his lusts: he does not even reach the level of ordinary every-day sense. He gets into the habit of regarding all the women he has known, as certain non-affinities; and all the women he has not known, as possible affinities. Thus he lives in a state of perpetual unrest and unsatisfied desire, with eyes of envy and lust continually resting upon his neighbours, and thoughts ever tending downwards towards disorder and confusion. Poor creature! perhaps his true "affinity" is in the South Sea Islands, or in the planet Mars. How can he ever know he has got the right one? And every new "affinity" that he gets will necessarily feel greater doubt and distrust for so fickle and unmanly an epicurean. And he will feel the same towards the affinities that have broken their marriages in order to live with him. For there is no secure anchorage for the human soul except in principle; no peace, no lasting happiness: nothing but doubt, despair, and fear eating at the very core of the heart continually. He needs an eternity to search and test in, and then another eternity in which to live up to his ideal. He is like a man hunting after a perfect house to live in. My advice to such a one is not "seek affinities elsewhere," but "reflect and come to your senses," and if you cannot do that, tie a stone round your neck and jump into the sea. If you cannot live rationally and with patience in this world, with such people as you have elected to live amongst, clear out of it as soon as possible. Don't take your unreason and lust from place to place, from life to life; offending all, quarrelling with all, and making a blight wherever you go. My dear sir, the keynote of life is something far grander than the "pleasure" of an effeminate Epicureanism: it is the duty of a free, fearless manhood.

Does the sentimentalist mean that the losses frequently arising out of broken marriage contracts should receive no sort of legal adjustment whatever? Of course it is perfectly true that when the law attempts to compel two people to live together it steps beyond its power. In the case of breach of promise it acts with more common sense. To me it seems evident that when breakings of contract practically amount to interferences with freedom, there is good warrant for the law stepping in to adjust the losses consequent upon such interferences; although here, as elsewhere, all the difficulties of protection should be duly weighed against its advantages.

Look at this practical case: A man, we will suppose, marries a girl, and, growing tired of her in three months, turns her adrift on the world. What has happened? On the one side a life-long loss has been sustained, and on the other side an agreement has been made to balance that loss by a life-long service. There is nothing at all unreasonable in such a contract. When we remember that marriage is so much more important an affair to a woman than it is to a man, and that the breaking of the marriage contract causes a great loss to her, while it scarcely affects a man at all, we cannot wonder that law has stepped in. It must be remembered that no amount of female liberty can possibly shift the burden of marriage off the woman's shoulders. So long as individuality, probability of male parenthood, and parental responsibity, are valued higher than promiscuous communism, just so long will the breaking of the marriage contract be a most serious loss both to the woman and to the race. THIERS has worked this out well in his book on *The Rights of Property*. He points out that the general regard for the sacredness of the marriage contract is coincident with the growth of civilization, and that, in proportion as the contract is generally and widely broken, nations lose their vigour and inevitably decay. During the declining years of Rome it was common for the wife to pass out of one home into another. (See also Seneca "De Beneficus" book iii, chap. xvi.) And one of the clearest proofs of Athenian degeneration was afforded in the spectacle of female companions of light morals, called Hetairia, who loosened the bonds of social life and injured the honest home customs of the old times. It is hardly too much to say that the luxury and materialism which inevitably settle down into sexual communism, is the rock on which every ship of civilization has hitherto been wrecked. We see this well exemplified to-day in the decline of French literature and in the general decay of the French nation. And there are very conspicuous signs that the disintegrating process is well at work here. All the different forms of educational Socialism—which mean at bottom a repudiation of all personal parental duties—are so many instances of the fact. The continual increase in the number of divorce suits points to the same truth.

I think that what I have stated about the loss resulting to women where the marriage contract is broken will generally be admitted. Such being the case, we have got to ask whether, taking all things into account, it is always advisable to allow this loss to be on the female, and not on the male. The adjustment of the losses resulting from a broken marriage must always be a difficult matter. But are we to say that no such adjustment shall be attempted? If, for example, it is right to make a Railway Company bear the loss resulting from non-fulfilment of contract, is it not equally right to make the man who throws a life-long loss upon a woman, bear at least a portion of that loss? If it is legitimate to legally adjust injuries resulting from contract breaking anywhere, is it not important to do so here? Suppose the evils to the woman—in the very nature of the case especially so to her—are increased by the presence of children. Is there not then another justification for the law acting? Here a tacit agreement has been made on the part of two responsible people to maintain certain helpless human beings. Either the children must starve, be kept by voluntary effort, or some person or persons must be compelled to keep them. Now if compulsion is to be applied at all, who, in the name of justice, should be the first on whom it should fall? Surely, the persons who alone are responsible for the existence of the children. If contract is fairly enforcible anywhere, it is so here. But on what grounds should it be so enforced, if not on the fact that a contract has been entered into by two people, to render themselves liable to bring children into the world? And, in order to make this fact perfectly clear, it is necessary that such a contract should be legally drawn up and signed before witnesses. At least some means are needed to prevent fraud.

In Scotland it is sufficient for two people to verbally agree before witnesses, that they freely take on themselves the duties and responsibilities of marriage. In the absence of this the law would have very little data by which to justify its protection of the rights of women and children, both of whom are in a manner rendered more or less helpless by marriage.

Without something in the nature of a contract the door would be opened to a great deal of confusion and difficulty in the settling of disputes and the apportioning of burdens.

Moreover, when it is remembered that the loss a woman sustains through the breaking of the marriage contract, is life long, the conclusion is inevitable that the agreement on the part of the man to insure her against that loss should be considered binding as long as the woman is burdened by the results of the man's relationship towards her.

The most practical and efficient way in which this agreement can be enforced, is for the law to compel the man to maintain the woman in proportion as she can prove that the marriage has prevented her from maintaining herself, to maintain the children until they can maintain themselves, and to refuse to recognise any new agreement so long as both of the parties to the first agreement live. The sentiments of the community, together with the ordinance of Nature herself, have made 90 per cent. of the burden of marriage to fall upon woman; consequently, when the marriage contract is broken, the legal adjustment should be so framed that the male side of the agreement shall bear at least an equal portion of the burden. Even married women who are without children, are generally injured by the breaking of the contract, and still more is this almost certain to be the case when children are born. Of course a great deal of discretion would have to be exercised, just as is already the case with breach of promise. But if contract laws are needed anywhere they are needed here; if only on grounds of justice to women and children.

As for the Divorce Court, there is no excuse for its existence. When two people marry they enter into an agreement which has distinct and life-long relations and consequences; not only are they themselves directly affected, but, in case children are born, others are also directly affected. No subsequent conduct on either side can alter this. Consequently it is as absurd for the law to recognise new obligations before the old ones are fulfilled, as for people to enter upon such new obligations. Broadly speaking, the marriage agreement extends to something more than the whims and fancies of the two people who enter upon it. Both have generally made themselves responsible for the parental control of children. This being so, when the law recognises a second marriage, with new interests and duties distinct from the first one, it fails in its protection of the children resulting from the first one. All things considered, there is a strong balance of advantages to the public, and much better protection afforded to women and children, when the law only goes so far as to recognise the first marriage (as long as the two parties to it live), to adjust the losses sustained through the breaking of it as equitably as possible, and to afford no sort of encouragement to promiscuity by divorce courts. When people marry they take each other for better or worse; and there is no reason why the law should encourage them to regret their bargains.

But the sentimental people never so much as attempt to deal with the practical side of this question. When it is pointed out to them that it is a common case for a man to run off and leave his wife with the full burden of the group of children that he has agreed to support, all they reply is that the law cannot make a true marriage. Who said it could? If I fail to fulfil an important business contract, the law cannot make a true contract, but there is one thing it can do: it can make me responsible—or at least partly responsible—for the losses I have caused. Where possible it ought to do just the same with marriage. Let us remember that we are dealing with actual humanity, and not with Utopia. It may well be, as one sentimentalist says, that "in any same condition of society no girl would undertake the responsibility of bearing children without making some provision for them." But as applied to present conditions this is pure romance. In the case of 99 out of every 100 marriages, young women have not a heap of capital to lay out on prospective children. Their only capital is themselves. As Mr. W. DONISTHORPE, well puts it on page 384 of his *Individualism*, "I do not see what the State has got to do with either sanctioning or preventing marriage or divorce, except in so far as it is the duty of the State to enforce the fulfilment of a contract, or the payment of reasonable damages for the breach thereof. When a prepossessing woman marries young on the terms of a life-partnership, and is put away at the age of fifty, and the partnership dissolved against her will, her capital (so to speak) having in the meantime been exhausted for the good of the firm, it seems but just that, as her youth and beauty cannot be returned to her, some compensation should be made for breach of contract." Here is an Individualist who seems to have grasped the practical bearings of the question: very different in his argument from the Utopian romancing of sentimentalists. Arguing that the pleasures of marriage are equal for the two sexes, one of the sentimentalists, slips in this very amusing sentence "I say without hesitation that *putting on one side the pains and responsibilities of child-bearing*, the debit and credit side balance," which is very much like this remark "I say without hesitation that barring that trifling matter of £10,000 I am as well off as you." The sentimentalist's psychology is as defective as his reasoning. After making such an admission as the above he argues that the pleasures are as great to one sex as to another. As if, with present defective human nature, the thought of such tremendous consequences, could make no mental difference to those who risk such consequences. By all means let us avoid sentiment and favouritism, but let us have the truth. Nature herself has made the pleasures, to all but the few who live only for duty, very unequal indeed, and no dreaming about what may be can alter facts.

Let it be remembered that I am not arguing that law can make true marriage. What contract can it make true, I should like to know? All that law can do, is to make those who break the contract, bear the losses resulting from such breaking; and bear those losses in proportion as they have caused them, and in proportion to their ability to bear them. This is not making marriage compulsory; neither is it compelling people to live together: it is merely making one person bear the loss of such frauds as he (or she) can be shown to have committed against another person. As an anonymous writer well says: "There is no system so moralizing as that which leaves men free, but holds them strictly and sternly to the full consequences of their conduct."

And now I come to deal with some of the sentimentalist's arguments in favour of polyandry and polygamy. He argues that a general laxity in sexual relations is "a most desirable" thing, because it will tend to get rid of the population difficulty. Fortunately the Individualist quoted previously has partly replied to this. Criticising the sexual come-and-go-as-you-please Utopia of Mr. MORRIS's *News from Nowhere*, Mr. DONISTHORPE says "*First of all the population question is not solved, but glozed over.* We are told that the population is about the same in two hundred years as it is now. Since, at the present rate of increase, it may be safely assumed that in one century it will have at least doubled itself, it is clear that in the following century it will have to *halve* itself. But let that pass. Perhaps the Revolution of 1952 will dispose of thirty millions; and this again may account for the number of crows, ravens, and other corvidæ which frequent Kensington Forest. The real question is: *How, in an age of universal plenty, and indeed luxury, and with freedom in the sexual relation accepted as natural and becoming, is an enormous increase of population to be prevented?* It would certainly be a pity to spoil a pretty river landscape by a vision of some Neo-Malthus stalking about with the *Amantis Pharmacopœia* in his knapsack. If the writer is serious, it is his duty to expound this point."—*Personal Rights Journal*, Aug. 1891, page 80.

The sentimentalist may of course reply that Mr. MORRIS's looseness does not go low enough. We know as a matter of fact that when polyandry gets very gross the population does diminish. But why? Because citizens have reached such a degree of physical and mental decay that they are absolutely unable to keep up their numbers. France is fast getting to that state: but the growing rottenness does not appear to have increased "the general happiness"—rather the contrary. The fact is that "lust made easy" never has and never will lead to anything but national decay and final extinction. Gild and gloss the fact over as you please, but there is no getting away from it. And the reason is obvious.

Human nature is made up of two elements—a lower and a higher—and what the sentimentalist calls "variety" only develops the lower at the expense of the higher. That commanding and distinguishing feature of man, the reason, has only been got by the minimization of the sensual elements, occurring *pari passu* with the maximization of the rational elements. But in proportion as the animal appetites are whetted and developed by "variety" they grow at the expense of the intellect, and the light of this world sinks lower and lower into the steams and mists of a gross animalism, infinitely worse and more corrupt than that of the animals themselves. You cannot have it both ways. Either the intellect must grow at the expense of the beast, or the beast must grow at the expense of the intellect. Herein lies the supreme advantage of monogamy: it is the minimization of sensuality and the reduction of the latter to the fewest possible terms compatible with the continuance of the race. At the same time it is also the clearest and least confusing condition of natural duty. Not only so, but the long term of the monogamic relation builds up a joint interest and a joint sense of duty, together with an intimate knowledge of the deeper and more mental side of human life—of the undertone of this world—of "the still sad music of humanity"—all of which powerfully help to transfigure lust into love; to tranquilise human character, and to lift men and women into a higher and purer atmosphere, where love merges in duty; where both man and woman may dwell together in one light; bound by no other tie than a mutual sense of allegiance, not to another—that is poor and paltry—but to something greater than themselves; to that ideal of purity and duty which alone makes life worth living, and men and women worthy to live it.

Can the same be said of those butterfly relationships known as polyandry and polygamy? Look around in the world and in history. Are not polyandrical and polygamic peoples noted for the shallow and sensual views they take of everything? Their hop-skip-and-jump connections do not allow them time to see anything more than the mere husks and shows of things. Look again at France. Look at its life as reflected in its literature! Polyandry and polygamy have only time to know the senses: the intellect and the heart are almost sealed books to them. We see the effects of a laxity in sexual relations well exemplified in lives of Eastern kings. "Hardly an Eastern ruler addicted to the enervating practice passes middle life without these signs branding his very countenance,—ensues lassitude, disgust, weariness with everything; ensues neglect of State affairs; then corruption, revolt, ruin or assassination."

The curse of promiscuity is that no sense of duty and responsibility go with it. It is a mere arrangement for gratifying people whose concupiscence is stronger than their sense of duty, and it inevitably leads to a confusion of relationships and every form of sexual degradation. Its effect upon the female portion of the community is to destroy parental feelings and love of children, and to replace them by a shameless erotomania. For it is an absolutely certain and well known fact of life, that the most sensual women are those least possessed of any natural love for children. Here again the growth of the lower means the death of the higher, and the effect upon the race is most disastrous. As pleasure comes in, duty goes out; and the innocent are made to suffer for the accursed lusts of a corrupt duty-shirking race. *Loving* brotherhood and sisterhood destroy *dutiful* fatherhood and motherhood. No wonder that the sentimentalists should enlarge on the advantages of sending children *away from home*, and should point out that in proportion as this is done the parents can indulge in the dutyless "pleasures" of polyandry, &c.,

the school master acting *in loco parentibus*. How unselfishly natural and pure! The ideal of these free lovers is simply a mixture of mutual admiration society, and Mahometan paradise, where pleasure will be everything and duty nothing. If they think the world is going to settle down in that trough they are greatly mistaken. The whole tendency of Nature, as exemplified in the law of evolution, is towards the minimization of sensuality, and the maximization of intellectuality; and this general tendency won't stop because modern civilizations are rotting to pieces with their own vices. The wages of those who shirk duty shall be individual and national death for ever. Nations have deserted monogamy before to-day, and they have paid the penalty for so doing. Compare the Roman people in the period of their promiscuous corruption—their polygamy, polyandry, incest, and sodomy; for among decaying civilizations this noble family of virtues always hangs together—with the earlier days when the marriage bond was held sacred. From the sacredness of this bond "was derived the pure and lofty character of the ancient Roman Matron. At Rome it was not by clever and fascinating courtesans, such as Aspasia and Thais, but by wives and mothers, such as Lucretia and Volumnia of the legends, such as Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, in actual history, that noble wishes and heroic thoughts were inspired into the hearts of men. The chastity and frugality of the women found an answer in the temperance and self-devotion of the men." Was it not always so, and will it not always remain so? All the old civilizations tell the same tale. What was the effect of promiscuity in Athens, in the Assyrian and Babylonian empires, in Judea and in Egypt? —decay: this result never fails. When humanity has once risen to a certain elevation of moral life, it cannot go back to its lower customs and yet retain its former strength and integrity. Temperance is strength, and no custom so much promotes temperance as monogamy.

According to the sentimentalists lust and love are the same. I don't believe it. I don't believe that it is lust which a mother and father feel for their children. The highest fact in life is not lust, and has nothing in common with lust. What a black infernal lie is this doctrine about love being lust! It shows what those who propound it are really made of: miserable souls, they are their own scourges and tormentors. They will always be known and their lives despised by all truly rational beings.

Of course it may well be that if, as the sentimentalists contend, love is simply eros, it may pass away very quickly. Evidently it does so in their case. All that these low base natures care about, is getting comfortably rid of the duties that they have freely contracted to fulfil. "Free" Love indeed! rather the self-accursing passions of set of smirking admirationists and lying hypocrites. Well may they confuse lust with love. They desire nothing higher than their own shame. But there is another sort of love—a love of fulfilling duty in proportion to the closeness of the relationship out of which that duty springs. And, seeing that marriage is the most intimate of all relationships, there is nothing at all anomalous in its duties being more important or longer lived than others, or even in their lasting through life. That a rational being should *always* feel bound to do all he or she can for the intellectual and moral advancement of a person so close as wife or husband necessarily must be, is not in the least degree surprising: rather is it surprising when rational beings act otherwise. It was a wise remark of St. Paul's, that "he who loves his wife, loves himself;" for an honest wife grows to be the very flesh of her husband's flesh, bone of his bone, and blood of his blood. Permanent marriage has grown with the reason of the race, with the development of the sense of duty, and it will only grow more secure as humanity becomes more rational. Promiscuity is the past, not the future, of humanity. Those who wish to justify polyandry and polygamy will have to re-write history. They will have to re-interpret the teaching of evolution; for, if there is one thing that evolution more clearly teaches than another, it is that the tendency of the ages is towards the maximization of the intellect and the minimization of the beast in man. They will have to do something more than destroy what one of the sentimentalists calls "religious dead dogmas." They will have to show that the Character with which those dogmas are associated, is not the ideal life to which the irresistible process of things is bringing the human race—an ideal of duty, of courage, of strength and endurance, of purity, and of love, with which nothing modern has anything to compare. And when they have done all these things it will then be time enough to dream of polyandrical and polygamic heavens.

In duty, and not in promiscuity, lies the true solution of the population question. Promiscuity means the development of those very instincts to which over-population is due, and although, when gross enough, it may depopulate a race out of existence (as it seems to be doing in France), yet it effects no movement towards temperance and self-control, and, consequently leaves humanity as much at the mercy of the Malthusian law as ever. When, in consequence of their piggish promiscuity, the decaying communities have disappeared, the surviving communities take up the problem of self-control at as great a disadvantage as ever. The sensual side of human life has still got to be mastered, and this mastery has only been rendered more difficult by the backslidings of the past. Why have the promiscuities of the past not solved the population question? Because they have gone the wrong way about it. Instead of developing self-control, they have developed self-gratification: have consequently rotted to pieces, and left the problem to be solved by stronger races. The real solution for a race, which wishes to retain its intellectual and moral strength, lies in the gradual growth of the temperance promoted by a strict monogamy. In proportion as monogamy and temperance grow side by side, the population question tends to solve itself; and in proportion as surviving communities are thrashed by the lessons of the past into greater and greater intellectuality and less and less corruption, a balance will be reached between "the amount of food and the number of mouths to be fed." Not only so, but the right types will be spread at the expense of the wrong types. We cannot circumvent Nature, but we can follow the lessons that our reason gleans from her facts. One of her greatest lessons is temperance and self control. "Lust made easy" simply means national death.*

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* Since writing the foregoing we have seen Mr. Grant Allen's essay in the "*Universal Review*" on "THE GIRL OF THE FUTURE." We can only make a few remarks on it. "The Girl of the Future" is precisely the same corrupt, dishonest, and unnatural creature as the Roman lady to whom allusion has been already made. She lives both as a "woman;" that is to say as a prostitute; and as a mother: for in Mr. Grant Allen's philosophy the sex relations are used both for pleasure and duty; *i.e.*:—*abused* in lust and *used* in continuing the race of lusters! This noble creature constantly uses herself as a "woman" but, by reason of her deep love of the human race, she only allows herself to have children by athletes, poets, scientists, philosophers, or at least by the very best men that she can find. In other words she exercises more judgment and discrimination in selecting the fathers of her children, than she does in the promiscuous bestowal of her ordinary sexual favours. While constantly living as a "woman" (not as a possible mother, but as a perverted prostitute) she only acts in the capacity of a race-continuer with certain specially picked men. For example, one "woman" may have one child by a Newton, another by a Gothic, another by a Shelley, and so on to the end of the chapter. In this manner the race will be both purified and improved! Sublime! is it not? There is, however, just one slight hitch. How half-a-dozen separate fathers are to all do their fatherly duties by the children of one woman we are not informed. Would they all live in one house? Or would they take it in turns to make periodical visits? If so, would

CHAPTER XVII.

PERHAPS someone will say—"But this is not perfect liberty." Of course it is not. Perfect liberty cannot be jumped into all at once. It must be approached slowly and surely. Sudden revolutions are the quack remedies of fools. Wise men prefer growth, and they don't much mind how slow it is, so long as it only proceeds in the right direction: that is, towards and not away from liberty. Liberty is a plant that our generation shall never see the perfect flowering of. Its rearing is the work of ages: its sap is the blood of martyrs: by death it grows: but some day it shall give life to all the nations of the earth.

Between the State socialists who would deprive woman—and man too for that matter—of all individual choice; who would simply leave her at the mercy of the political majority and its army of official inspectors: between the aims of these worthy people and the methods of grandmotherly protectors like SIR J. F. STEPHEN, there is only the alternative of equal

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they not be likely to come into conflict with the crowd of ordinary, everyday, and *unparental* lovers?—those necessary to the constant use of the woman as a "woman?" But now look at the arrangement under another aspect. A Newton, being one of the best of breeding men is everywhere in great request, and has fifty different children by fifty of the "best" women. Now how is he to do his duty towards this vast crowd of offsprings? Mr. Grant Allen says that this condition of things will mean "a fine time" for the best men. We fancy it would be a terribly bad time for the children of such men. The mothers would be prostitutes and the fathers patronizers of prostitutes. All would be living for the purpose of indulging in the widest possible sensuality and shirking their parental duties to the greatest possible extent. Here, according to a recent divorce case, is a sample of the effect of sensuality upon parental duty—"She (a girl 8 years old) then gave some painful evidence against her mother as to what occurred in a railway carriage when the co-respondent was with them. A handkerchief had been liberty, of political and social individualism, of impartial all-round defence of personal liberty and private property. All that is needed is a fair field and no favour, equal freedom for each separate unit of the social aggregate to develope in his or her own way, to earn whatever can be earned without aggressing upon others, and to dispose of the property so obtained in any manner that does not interfere with the equal freedom of all. Those who accept this principle are logically bound to admit, that neither socially nor politically can there be the slightest distinction between women and men.

If we accept this position we are able to see the absurdity of attempting to suppress bad books and unprincipled persuasions in the supposed interests of female virtue. It is like depriving your judges of the evidence on which they are to adjudicate. For if women—and men too, for, as already pointed out, the argument applies equally to both—are not to be allowed to read and hear these evil things, how shall they be able to say whether or not such things are deserving

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placed over her eyes and she was told not to remove it. Her brother Harry, 7 years of age, said that his sister made a communication to him and he told his father. Mr. Grant Allen informs us that this low, unmotherly and unfatherly sensuality has already begun amongst us. Possibly it has. But this only proves the rank and rotten condition of modern civilization. There is, however, something else also growing up amongst us—a social convulsion that will probably make short work of some of these womanly, motherly, pure, and honest women; these deep lovers of the human race; these respectable prostitutes and their hundreds of high souled, fatherly patrons. Mr. Grant Allen notes George Eliot as a forerunner of "The Girl of the Future." A most unfortunate example. Her letters, so full of groanings over self-made troubles, clearly prove this woman to have been one of the most unhappy people that ever lived. Misery is stamped upon her face. And necessarily so, for the only foundation of happiness is moral courage; and this is just what George Eliot lacked. She could not even bear to see what hostile critics said about her own books. Truth was too strong for her tender nerves. Undoubtedly a clever woman, but not great with the highest greatness—the nobility of allegiance to principles, and conformity to those great laws of Nature which no human being can ignore and yet be happy.

of suppression? And if they are to be so allowed, then will they have the power of suppression already in their own hands. They can shut the books and ignore the persuasions. A more effectual means of suppression is not possible, and any other method is neither just nor expedient.

What type of woman are the moral protectionists trying to produce? Are they ambitious to be surrounded with poor flabby creatures that cannot be trusted to read a volume of Zola, see a nude figure, look at a forbidden picture, or hear and reject the persuasions of unprincipled men? Do they want to have the world always filled with the same leaning willows as it is filled with at present; or would they not prefer to see a race of Imogens and Isabellas, a race of women in whom virtue is natural, organic, indestructable, infinitely nobler than any gilded social slavery can ever become, however pretentious and dazzling it may appear to superficial minds? Such a race liberty alone can give. For it insures woman against her only enemy, namely, force; allows her to grow to her full height, and thus acheive—by her own effort—her own complete self-development. In artificially shielding her against bad books and evil persuasions, you shut her out from that knowledge of the human heart which is her only real and effectual protector. Thus you give her a one sided view of life and cause her to be misled with dangerous half-truths. You weaken her understanding by depriving it of a large portion of its needful subject matter. You put beyond her reach those materials out of which she could construct a lamp wherewith to safely guide herself in the midst of shadows, and in those desolate places where there is no one to put her in the right way, or defend her against the thousand and one dangers of a lying, corrupt, and violent world. You find her weak and you prefer to keep her weak. Strange and unnatural taste! For there is no virtue in weakness, and strength is born nowhere outside the risk and competition of freedom. By your silly paternal protection you deprive her of a large and most requisite portion of truth; for there is no truth the knowledge of which is not also a strength. If, by your external tinkering, you could alter the human heart, there might be some excuse for your conduct. But this you know you cannot do; and yet you do not scruple to try to deprive weakness of that heart-knowledge which is its only real protection: you take away its eyes, and then thrust it adrift in the midst of a rock-girt stormy sea. Don't you see that woman, like man, needs to know as much of human nature as she possibly can; if only to enable her to protect herself against her self-constituted and hypocritical protectors; infallible and perfect as these last always pretend to be. Your method is as short-sighted as it can well be. By your drastic measures you frighten, let us say, the unprincipled man so much, that he neither opens his mouth to seduce, nor plies his pen in the production of bad books. Why, it is the very worst thing you could do. If you had only let him alone he would have discovered himself. Everybody would have been able to know who and what he was, and what he had living inside him. He would have hung out his own danger signal, and all who loved peace would have carefully shunned him as a very pestilence of sin and wickedness. Thus he would have found his own level and have been known by all the world for what he really was. But, by your short-sighted legal bullying, you force him to play the hypocrite, you encourage him to hide his innate sinfulness until such time as he is able to get power behind it; and thus, by infinite cunning, he is able to pass with his unchanged heart into the very citadel of your power. By means of the same crafty tricks which, at most, would only have enabled him to seduce a few morally weak women, write a few bad novels, or paint a few objectionable pictures, he is able to cheat the whole body of electors, and thus become possessed of a power that he is absolutely certain to abuse. In this way he becomes a "protector," a wolf set to look after the sheep, an Angelo or a Judge Williams, condemning and lusting after that which he condemns. A really splendid result of force, is it not? Yet every despotism does and must exemplify it. For it is a law of human life that wrong increases wrong, and that only by right can wrong ever be overcome. All aggressive force of this kind is a species of lying. It says: "This evil is in human nature, but human nature shall not know anything about it. We will carefully hide it away. Only our own perfect and uncorruptable souls shall see it." My dear sir, truth will not be hidden away in this pharisaical and cowardly manner, and the attempt to cover it up by means of a practical lie only poisons and degrades your own soul. It is there, within you, and out it will come when you least expect and desire it. Meet it boldly in the open: it cannot prevail over anything that is worthy and noble. Liberty at least reveals the truth, though that truth may oftimes be hard and bitter to bear. But protective force tries to hide away this truth, this only hint and warner of the bogs and quicksands of life, this stern god that moral cowards dare not look upon and live. Yet force cannot destroy or change this truth. The result is that, while ostensibly protected, the weak are really left helpless; utterly devoid of the inner light of eternal reality, and therefore passion-led and ready at any moment to fall headlong into the very trap that the lie of force is professedly intended to save them from. Thus are they cheated and misled; and in the place where they are told to look for protection, they come only to find evil flourishing with greater power and authority than ever.

"They are not careful considerers of human things," wrote one that was no encourager of vice, "who imagine to remove sin by removing the matter of sin. Though ye take from a covetous man his treasure, he has yet one jewel left, ye cannot bereave him of his covetousness. Banish all objects of lust, shut up all youth into the severest discipline that can be exercised in any hermitage, ye cannot make them chaste that came not thither so. Suppose we could expel sin by this means; look how much we thus expel of sin, so much we expel of virtue. And were I the chooser, a dram of well-doing should be preferred before many times as much the forcible hindrance of evil-doing. For God sure esteems the growth and completing of one virtuous person more than the restraint of ten vicious."

As a case of unwarrantable interference with the freedom of the press, take the foolish attempt to suppress "*The children of Adam*" in WALT. WHITMAN'S *Leaves of Grass.* This portion of the book was deemed by "competent judges" to be unfit for the general public to read. Why? Because the reading of it would be likely to inflame human passions. Of course "competent judges" have no passions; they cannot be contaminated; but ordinary mortals like you and I can. We are poor, weak, fallible creatures: competent judges are not: they are the pure in heart; and it must be confessed that they look like what they are. "*The children of Adam*" would send *you* down the broad road to destruction: it would not hurt a government official! Social equality in modern Democracy! "The mother and her equal brood!" Admire the equality, my dear comrade! it is a fair sample of what your official nurses would allow under the social democratic State. They might treat the bellies all alike—though that's doubtful—but they would think twice before applying the same rule to the minds. Expediency would come in here. If people got too wise the whole official system might collapse, and if such an event were to happen all the laws of Nature would cease to exist; the universe would come to an end forthwith.

Yet, looking at the question seriously, where is the real gain in suppressing this morbid bit of poetry? this sensual *Gloat* of an unnatural mind; this trailing of art through the dense mists of the stews; this poetic phallic worship of pleasure as an end apart from duty: this double distilled essence of all the sensual gluttony, the coarse gorgeings and stuffings and lickings, of whole generations of that low herd of two-legged pigs called *demos* or democracy? A temptation is removed out of the way, the truth about a particular man's nature is hidden; the morally weak are kept for a little longer on their legs: but the exercise ground of virtue, scope for the play of moral judgments, of right and natural preferences, is proportionately curtailed: there is more external conformity but less internal strength. Nay, even this needs qualifying. The temptation is not really removed. It is only transfered from the general public to the official bureau: that is, to the most corrupt and easily tempted crew in the whole community. Do you think they won't amuse themselves with it, thinking it all the more pleasant because forbidden? Do you think they won't talk about it to their friends, or even smuggle away a copy for their favourite mistresses to read? Don't you see that your "suppression" means the pouring of a ton of filth into what ought to be a fountain of social purity? The disease is driven from the skin to the heart, from where it can be seen and avoided to where it cannot be seen, and therefore cannot be avoided. Magnificent remedy! If left exposed to the free air of criticism it works itself out: truth overthrows it: but your "suppression" keeps it in, and puts it where truth cannot get at it. Is this the way to preserve the "social organism" in a healthy state? Why! you are only making bad worse. You are soiling the hands of your own nurse. The infallible directors of conventional morals read another excitor of their unbitted passions; that is to say, their lust for flesh is added to their lust for power. A great gain, is it not? The morally weak outsiders are possibly for a time shielded from the last straw which would have broken their rotten backs, and so have enabled their friends to find out a little sooner what they were really made of. A foul-minded poet is expurgated and made to appear what he is not. He professed to be a lover of Nature. But "*the children of Adam*" prove him to have been a lover of pervertion; an admirer of the unnatural abuse of Nature's means of racial continuance, in the passionate worship of pleasure as an end in itself, that is to say, as something more than a mere motive or hint towards the rational performance of natural functions and the intelligent service of natural law. He wrote about the excess-created excitements of these irrationally-used means of racial continuance, just as a glutton might rave over the pleasures of his poor abused stomach, or as a wine bibber would dilate on the tastes of his artificially-stimulated palate. He dealt with part of a natural process as if it were distinct from the whole.* He isolated the beginning from the end, the seed from the fruit, the love from the duty that naturally grows out of it. He knew so little about Nature that he imagined an organ to exist rather for special excitement, than for the general, calm, and constant health which comes with the rational use of each separate part of the human system for its true and natural function. In sexual matters he preached the false philosophy of living to eat, instead of the true philosophy of eating to live. If he had rapturized over people who used their eyes for some other function than seeing and their ears for some other function than hearing, the world would have seen through all the unnatural falseness of him; for then he would have appealed to the supreme and only worthy human attribute, viz., reason: but he preferred to appeal to what is the infirmity of reason, namely, passion; and he prostituted the poetic art in an unprincipled attempt to undermine what little natural virtue stills struggles to live among men. Of course there here comes in the lust-worshipper's paltry excuse that poetry should deal in everything. No it should not. It should not deal in lies. Truth is the highest, and before it every form of art must bow. The beautiful is the true, and the true alone the beautiful; therefore all sound art is moral, is the expression of immutable laws and eternal principles, is a vehicle of the light that shall never go out, and which to know is peace. When the poet dresses out pleasure as if it were higher than duty, he lies against the nature of things, he stulifies and degrades his own art, he mocks at the reality that gave him life. Every organ in the human body has a definite function; and when any organ is used for either more or less than its true function, it is grossly abused, all the pleasure-seekers in the world to the contrary notwithstanding. The end of life is not sensual pleasure, but peace, tranquility, blessedness; harmonious oneness with the universal order: is dwelling in the white cloudless calm which comes from following duty. The *summum bonum* is not fire, but light: not passion, but reason. And those who understand and obey Nature rightly become free from all this poetically gilded lust; for they then see that love is reason, is the joy of knowing the abstract, is the bound of the soul at the recognition of Nature's perfect uniformity: in this manner they rise far above all unhealthy excitements of the flesh and dwell continually in the stormless constancy of her never changing laws. Such intellectual love WHITMAN failed to represent: it was foreign to his low corrupt nature. His book is the sensual language of democracy set to music. It is the song which a devil sings to the many who go down the broad road to national destruction. In one shape or another the filth of sensuality is on nearly all that WHITMAN wrote. He cannot even walk through the spring woods without lusciously tasting the steam and wet of the leaves. He is in the universe at large just what low bred people are in a cook-shop. One after another he lifts the various natural objects to his tongue, and then loudly gushes over the separate flavour of each. His descriptions of natural scenery, when compared with those of a refined nature like SHELLEY, sound little better than the slobberings of a pig beside the song of a nightingale. He is vulgarity gushing forth in rythm. He is the life of the body raised above the life of the intellect. He is reason sacrificed to sensation. He does not mentally enjoy the universe as a calm, rational, and intellectual being should, standing always erect on his feet, and with the sunlight of truth playing around him: he runs about on all fours, licking, tasting, and sloaming over everything. He gushes about his unmanly feelings much in the same spirit as some greedy creature of the slums, who dips into the treacle jar, and then exclaims with rapture "Oh my! ain't it delicious!" With other poets sensuality is part of the necessary expression of a many-sided truth:

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* This is absolutely certain in the case of his poem to a prostitute, where he indulges in a ghastly gloat over the pleasure he imagines himself about to get at the expense of the health and strength of this poor unnatural creature. He may have been a poet: he was certainly not a man. Said one who had more knowledge of human nature in his little finger than this wretched spawn of Democracy had in his whole body:—

"Call it not love, for Love to heaven is fled,
  Since sweating Lust on earth usurp'd his name:
Under whose simple semblance he hath fed
  Upon fresh beauty, blotting it with blame;
Which the hot tyrant stains, and soon bereaves,
As caterpillars do the tender leaves.

"Love comforteth, like sunshine after rain,
  But lust's effect is tempest after sun:
Love's gentle spring doth always fresh remain,
  Lust's winter comes ere summer half be done.
Love surfeits not; lust like a glutton dies:
Love is all truth; lust full of forged lies.

with WHITMAN it is the plot of the play, the very body and substance of nearly all that he wrote. Well might one of his blind and sentimental admirers say that when she read him his words roused such strong feelings in her that for the moment her heart almost seemed to cease beating. Glorious tribute to the intellectual strength of both poet and admirer! A mere sensationalist at best he was: a teacher and type of that unnatural sham—"the modern man." He may fitly stand for the poet of Democracy, tarred with its filthy brush, and all the music and rythm in the world cannot hide his coarse and innate morbidness. In short, "*The children of Adam*" prove all his parade about Nature to have been but one hollow sham, and show him up as a mere whitewasher of corruption, a devil's advocate, a gloater over flesh for its own sake, a low grovelling unclean soul, a poet who knew less of Nature and of the moral purity which is one with Nature, than does many a poor and uneducated Irish girl, who, though living in the barest possible surroundings, and knowing nothing of the fine arts of a false civilization, yet keeps the peace of purity in her soul and the joy of health in her body.

The *Children of Adam* is probably the most unprincipled attempt to gild and decorate an infernal lie, in such a manner as to make it look like an eternal truth, that the wickedness of the human heart has yet sunk down to. The theory upheld and expressed in this low class of literature, is as false and bad as it can possibly be; as contrary to the dictates of right reason, as passion is contrary to peace. Yet you cannot afford to forbid or persecute it; such a course is not merely unjust, but also highly inexpedient: for the more you treat it thus, the more sympathisers and adherents will you be gaining for sin. The public will naturally think you are afraid of what you feel to be true. Adopt a wiser expedient. Follow a bolder course. You need not fear that such a monstrous theory will ever ultimately prevail against reason. The worthiest people will always despise it. All the wisest and noblest sons of men have ever seen through and exposed this foul and diabolical lie, and all the truth and wisdom yet to be will but confirm that which has gone before. Let the morbid sin of sensuality be painted in any colours that the vicious please, and the soul of man will still recognize the falseness of it; the shameful individual degradation and the certain racial extinction to which it inevitably leads. The law of man's being is not sensual pleasure, but right reason. This he is slowly but surely coming to see, and nothing that these foul-minded poets and novelists can produce will in the least degree be able to alter the general course of human progress. Upon the irrational life of the flesh the eternal has pronounced continual extinction. Man does not live by agreeable feelings but by supreme reason; by the peace of its holy purity. For him there is no good distinct from duty. To revel in all manner of sensual pleasures; to run about the universe as Whitman pictures, always thirsting after everything; with lolling tongue licking up all the sweet dust and ashes that lie in one's path: smacking lips and crying with this wretched poet Oh! Oh! Oh! continually; to lusciously enjoy, dwell upon, and constantly gloat over the seductive sins of the flesh: in a word, to soak the soul in the stickey reason-drowning sugar of an æsthetic materialism—this ideal of life is no more likely to finally prevail than the solar system is likely to break up into ten thousand separate pieces. It cannot prevail; and for the simple reason that the entire teaching and tendency of things is against it. The key note of Nature is not this luscious enjoyment: it is quiet obedience to the laws of things; it is the right and rational use of each and every part of the human system in the service of the whole universe: that is to say, in such a manner as to work in rational harmony with that vast cosmic order of which this short human life is but one of the infinitissimal fragment.

When looked at in the light of scientific truth Nature does not say "follow your lusts and sensually enjoy yourself." She speaks the stern, cold language of stoicism, and protests alike against all the needless sociability, the gross sensuality, and the unprincipled utilitarianism of all the different varieties of a degraded modern epicureanism. She says—"Follow your reason and mortify your passions. You cannot serve two masters. You must either walk up to the light or down to the darkness. You no more than other creatures can stand still. Always reason and never sensuality is the condition of your forward progress. It may well be, as these debased sensualists are never tired of repeating, that mind and body are in the most intimate correspondence [The grand plea of Whitman's admirers]; but this fact is no excuse for sin, rather is it the best of all possible reasons for avoiding sin. With a rational being, the life that is lived *in* the flesh, ought never to be lived *for* the flesh: since this sin against the light means the contracting of habits which make flesh master and reason slave, drag heaven down to hell, and so bring to ignominy the only god-like attribute of man. The closer the connection between body and mind, the greater the need for so disciplining the former that it may be a quiet and obedient servant to the latter and so absolutely under the control of the divinity that dwells within it. The true and lasting interest of man, as man, as a rational animal, is not an effeminate and degrading slavery to pleasure, but life-long service to the dictates of right reason. Let him love the light and hate the fire. The two are never indistinguishable. There is an unchangeable right and an unchangeable wrong in the world which no accidents of time and place can ever alter. Never is it right to love sensual pleasure; neither to love anything except duty, or the part that reason points out for the soul to perform in my universal order. Under no circumstances, for example, is it right to lie, because never is it to the true interest of an intellectual being to wilfully misrepresent what dwells within itself: there is always the choice of silence; and the momentary peace of faithfulness to inner reality is greater than endless years stained with so much as a single falsehood; greater than life either for self or others. Be as catholic as you like in what reason approves, but never for a moment countenance what it condemns. For you, as a chooser between what makes for, and what makes against, the purity and strength of your own reason, there is and must always be a lower and a higher, a moral and an immoral course cf conduct. All acts are not profitable to a rational soul. Nothing is profitable except reason and the peace that obedience to reason gives. The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing, nor the heart with loving, nor the mind with understanding. But only is their satisfaction in the reason which passes understanding; only is there peace in the divine flash of intuition, which not merely sees that things are, but sees also the invariable laws that things exemplify; and in so doing partakes of the perfect, everlasting harmony of my eternal being. This rational harmony is greater than pleasure, and that it may grow from strength to strength, from height to height, and from glory to glory, is the only worthy object in human life. This is the intellectual crown of manhood; and to minister unto this exist all sensations and all mere objects of sense: for the whole sensible world is but as an altar whereon the white light of reason may gleam; pure, calm, and free from every shadow of lust and passion. Therefore, if you would possess much of this calm, live ever in the present recognition of my laws. Never worship the low herd's gross lust of sensual pleasure. Sensuality is not natural to you. It is an infirmity that has been thrust upon you by generations of base, corrupt and irrational human beings. But for the wilful sins a self-accursed race, you might always have lived in my changeless calm; but for a miserable and hypocritical society's devilish disobedience of natural laws, you might be one with me in all things. But for generations of gluttons, drunkards, liars, and adulterers, your nature might be as perfect and free from passion as mine is. But for disobedience to the dictates of right-reason, there would be no sin, and no misery the child of sin. There would be something better than the fleeting pleasures of this low, corrupt, vanity-seeking herd; for there would be perfect inner strength and peace, unbreakable and eternal harmony like unto mine. Therefore [and here let it be remembered that we are only expressing what, whether rightly or wrongly, seems to us to be the plain teaching of Nature to each one of her children] I say to you, ignore the crafty devices, and lies, and hypocracy of others: let no mocking mask of flesh come between you and my peace: follow my laws: slave not to please a bad, rotting social world; but live to know and obey my truth: and this long lost peace you shall again find. "*Be pure and free within, and entangle not thy heart with any creature.*" For in your relation to me lies the only real and never-deceiving comradeship. In me there is no mockery, or flattery, or falsehood. I never change and my strength is always sufficient for duty. Who lives to me as to his all, is warmed within with the fire of my eternal youth: his soul does not grow old, and the pure unalloyed happiness of childhood never departs from him. See what I have done for you! By an endless process of evolution, reaching down infinitely deeper than this base human herd, I have given you the possibility of freedom and self reliance, in so forming your true nature that it can never, without your own consent, become the mental slave of other minds, that is to say, led by mere external opinion, and so made to swallow all the foolery that cunning knaves are only too ready to thrust down the gaping throats of the general herd. I have given you a separate mind and a separate body, thus well walling in your soul against the hate and meanness of everybody; against the worst that others can either say or do. For no power in all the wide universe can make you stain your soul with a lie, or compel you to believe anything that appears to be contrary to the reason that I have given you. Therefore obey my laws; be brave with my strength; present a front of iron to the canting crowd: this is your duty: this is the part you are naturally adapted to play as a soldier in the battle of time; soon for you to be closed in the sleep of eternity: and thus you shall give to yourself a joy that nothing external can either impart or destroy. I am your general, speaking to you through the voices of reason and of conscience the capitalized wealth of reason. To obey my orders is no difficult matter, it requires only the patient use of your own faculties in the service of your own true interest as a rational animal; for your own personal interest and the obedience of my laws are inseparably and eternally one. Therefore eschew all luxuries and with them every form of sensual pleasure. Never eat for the sake of eating, or drink for the sake of drinking: clothe only for health: never follow bodily appetite for its own sake: but have a conscience—satisfying reason for all that you do, and bend all things in the service of reason; that is to say, in obedience to the clear recognition of my laws. It is amply enough if you just keep body and soul together until I require to take them back into myself. This is both natural duty and natural piety combined, and all beyond this is sin, not only against the harmony of my universal order but also against your own interest as a rational portion of that order. Every sensual pleasure is wrong; for it injures the true and essential nature of a rational being, and defiles the inner purity of reason's habitation. Live to make your body content with simple and easily obtained objects, and your mind reconciled to the truth of my unchanging laws. Have I not given you the sunlight and the air, the woods and fields and streams, the rocks and seas, the contrasts of night and day, of summer and winter? have I not covered the floor of your dwelling place with flowers, hung its roof with gleaming fires, varied its uniformity with the glories of sunrise and sunset and mingled with its music the peaceful stillness of dawn and twilight? These riches are free; without money and without price. What is all that men have ever done for you, compared with what I have done? These sociable sycophants, abject slaves to one another's fantastical tastes and shallow opinions, who follow their passions, hate truth, and care not for me or my laws: these base creatures are but as atoms in my immensity, but as momentary sand builders in my infinity. What is there amongst even their best products that is worth so much as a glance in comparison with my beauty? Their highest and purest ideals are but imperfect pictures of what would be now if only my laws had always been obeyed. Their grandest works of art grow old and fade like a garment; all the gorgeous colouring lies at the mercy of time: their temples, together with the creeds that are taught in them, moulder into dust and are swallowed up in darkness: all they can boast of is borrowed without acknowledgment from me; and even while they hold it, it melts like snow in their hands: they are always false and corrupt, but I am trustworthy and real: my loveliness is everlasting: my youth cannot fail: the joy of my impersonal presence never cloys. Therefore look ever towards me and my peace: live without passions in order that your mind may always be clear and brisk to recognize my laws; for the strength that comes from me is only to be possessed by those who in all things are guided by reason. Subdue lust: renounce sensual pleasure: and my peace shall come and dwell within you. You shall be gathered into my universal harmony, you shall live and move as one with me in all things; and the white passionless calm of my everlasting light shall be with you and remain with you always. What is there that a false, heartless, and corrupt social world can give you in the place of this? Not as man's restless vanities and trumpery shows give, do I give unto thee: these paltry and unreal things come and go with fortune, and all who love them live and die the miserable bond-slaves of time: but the peace that is obtained by obedience to my laws, is absolutely secure: like my own perfect existence, it transcends time, and no power either in heaven or on earth shall ever destroy or mar its beauty."

Such is and has ever been the plain teaching of Nature, both through reason and conscience, that "seed of reason planted in every race of men."

> "Age to age with hoary wisdom
> Speaketh thus to men."

Against this universal truth neither literary obscenity nor other forms of modern corruption will finally prevail. "This is natural reason itself, encompassed about with great darkness yet still retaining power to discern the difference between good and evil, true and false, although it be unable to fulfil all that it approveth, and enjoyeth no longer the full light of the truth, nor soundness of its own affections."

If ever there was a case for suppression, *The Children of Adam* was certainly one. But suppression even in this extreme instance would have been both wrong and impolitic. It would have shut out the knowledge of a truth; for though WHITMAN, a professed lover of natural truth, undoubtedly sang up a foul and unnatural lie, yet it is true that he did so; and to know how he did this is a truth that must in the long run make for righteousness, since truth cannot be the enemy of truth. Let us face every truth, and fear not. Successful suppression would only have resulted in preventing the world at large from knowing what WHITMAN really was and what devil he had burning inside him. Each human mind (if such a metaphor may be allowed) is of a certain average temperature, ranging from the starlit calm, the perfect stillness of eternity, down to the raging fires of passion's hell, where the worm of insatiable lust writhes in ceaseless agony. We now know in what circle of the inferno to class the great prophet of modern Democracy. Let all who admire him wallow in his mud, and thirst continually after his "jellies" and "roots" and all those other fleshy idols which he had not the pluck even to call by their right names; so utterly degraded and unnatural did he instinctively feel his foul poetical gloat to be.* There is no need to suppress him: he suppresses himself. Although a liar against nature, he is still a truth so far as he represents the type of some of her worst and most corrupted specimens. It is well to see and know these specimens. There is no wisdom in compelling the devil to hide his cloven foot. Nothing is more dangerous than an expurgated, respectablized, and whitewashed devil. Let us not be so foolish as to drive the goats into the necessity of appearing as sheep. By just so much as you suppress the exhibition of literary obscenity, so much do you prevent the outward manifestation of Nature's infinitely varied truth. If such evil dwelt within the mind of WHITMAN, the same may dwell inside the minds of others. A wise man, who trusts in the invincible power of truth, will be only too glad for his friends to see this evil. It cannot hurt what is good, and what is not good deserves no artificial protection. The power of men and women to live well is solely dependent upon their clear perceptions of the facts and laws of the inner and outer universe. Now human wickedness is a part of the universe. Therefore people will be liable to be weak in proportion as they are shut out from a knowledge of this wickedness. Innocence is not strength. Exemption from temptation is not virtue. Mental cowardice is not the blessedness of the pure in heart. Therefore we say to the coercionists—Have a more robust faith in freedom. Genuine virtue has no fear, and no evil that ever was or ever will be can destroy it. There is not a single aspect of human depravity that it may not freely look at, and grow yet stronger with looking. In fact, temptation is the indispensible condition of its development; and will ever remain so, until it arrives at that height of perfection when duty is all in all, when the right path is never departed from, and when, therefore, by the pure only those things are desired which are pure. True knowledge is no enemy to true virtue, and nothing that lies without, or in the mind of another, can of itself corrupt a healthy mind. So that there need be no fear, however the wicked may scheme and burn and rage. These last fight in the darkness of passion, but virtue strikes in the light of reason. She dwells aloft, always impregnable on the eternal rock of truth. This high citadel of moral purity no human power will ever take; for there is no external force in all the wide universe that can compel the mind to voluntarily sin against itself. Violence and frauds, flattering lies and gilded lusts cannot enter there. Within this sphere nothing that defiles will ever be able to come. Here dwells the perfect peace which saints call heaven. Here is the inner eye, the spotless lens, through which truth's clear vision is seen. Hence, to the glance of the healthy mind, the morbid sensationalisms of corrupt writers show up in all their true proportions, foul and distorted in nature but utterly powerless to mislead. Good is stronger than evil, and it only needs a fair field and no favour for ultimately achieving a perfect triumph over sin. There is no wisdom in walling it in, or trying to shore it up with useless laws. It can stand by itself. Let it be open to all the breezes of heaven; aye, and of hell too. It cannot be shaken. From the serene height of its own perfect calm, the passion-freed soul may look on every one of this world's truths and never suffer loss. This divine peace is virtue, is the star-like crown of a well used liberty. And seen from this eminence, all things, even those most foul and bad; all the heats and discords of time's unrestful dream; become as notes in a great hymn whose fulness fills eternity, and blend like music with the perfect harmony of infinite reality. In the white radiance that surrounds this throne there is no shadow: here everything is viewed in its due proportions, all misgivings vanish, and the world is seen to be the theatre of an absolutely unerring justice: evil is found to exist only for the minds that think it; as one of the myriad forms of infinite existence; necessary to Nature's complete perfection; and unconsciously working well for ever.

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* "Why not use milder expressions?" Bad teaching can only be exposed in strong words. Where there is freedom to teach evil, there must be equal freedom to denounce evil. What would the founder of Christianity have said if he could have read the *Children of Adam*. It was to destroy the evil over which this bad poet gloats, that he lived and suffered and died. In this sense he bore, as all noble natures have born, the burden of that wickedness which such people as Whitman seek to make heavier for others yet to come. The powers of language fail to brand these people as they deserve. Hell is too good for them.

CHAPTER XVIII.

NOW let us apply what has been said about WHITMAN to one or two less objectionable books. Take *Nana*, a book judged by the authorities to be unfit for public circulation, and on that account recently suppressed. Now it seems to us that every thoughtful person who read this book will be bound to admit that, in spite of all its wearisome nauseousness, it yet puts before the reader a class of people whom it is an advantage to know something of. For there can be little doubt that such people do really exist in the world, and, therefore, to know the marks which distinguish them, is to possess the means of avoiding them. So far as it accurately described these debased people ZOLA's book was useful. There is an advantage in being able to see what sort of kites hover around one. This ZOLA tells you without any sort of gloss or whitewash. He deals in bad material, but at least he tells the truth about it. He does not gush and gloat over it as WHITMAN does. He has not become altogether rotten with the poison of Democracy. Unlike the poet just dealt with (who evidently needs pickling in thick ribbed ice for a few million years) he never loses his head in an insane rant over low fleshy excitements. He put's before the reader a lot of miserable people, who, like the Socialists, Communists, and "Free" Lovers, are for ever worrying about what does not belong to them, and what, in the very nature of the case, can never peaceably be shared out or enjoyed in common. These people are the sorriest specimens of mutual covetousness that ever supplied matter for novel writing. Yet however bad they may be, they cannot do real harm; for, the truth being told about them, they serve as moral helots to all thinking readers. Our own conviction is that a person may gain much tranquility of mind through reading about such enslaved wretches. He (or she) may be strengthened in the conviction that all flesh is grass, and that for its own sake it is not worth the snap of a finger. The getting rid of this illusion, this mutual-admiration between the sexes, this miserable slavery to particulars, to animated dust and potential ashes, is true liberty, is freedom from passion, is peace. By telling important though disagreeable truths, ZOLA helps to put his readers into a position for obtaining such a peace: and in this world nothing is got for nothing. We cannot understand how any sensible person can do otherwise than profit from the reading of his books. He assists people to get that moral strength which comes from grasping the nettle of evil firmly, and there is no strength like this. Those who have the moral power that comes from a clear knowledge of sin, may laugh in face of all humanity; for then they can never be swayed by either the beauty or the wit of any man or of any woman. In clearly seeing both the evil and the good of human life, they learn to know and love that grand dispeller of every illusion, that breaker of every fleshy idol, that damper of all sentimental cant and mutual admiration: the truth, namely, that everything beyond duty is an infernal lie, a snare that promises everything and gives nothing; a primrose path to intellectual death in passion's hell. And through this knowledge they become so at one with the eternal granite of absolute reality, that nothing short of omnipotence can either break or bend their souls. Thus do they achieve that firm condition of wise, self-satisfied calm, so well described by BUDDHA in these words—"*Whosoever, either now or after I am dead, shall be a* *lamp unto himself and a refuge unto himself, betaking himself to no external refuge, looking not to anyone besides himself as a refuge, even he among my disciples shall reach the very topmost height.*" It is at any rate conceivable that a thoughtful reader, so far from being injured with reading *Nana* and similar books, might be led to make the following profitable but unsociable reflections. "This sort of thing will never agree with me. I love myself and the calm of social freedom too well to mix up in a boiling mess like this. I am no saint, but I believe in number one, and number one says so long as you know how to keep yourself pure and unspotted from the world, you are *free:* you have the liberty and happiness of a natural and untamed creature; "The Kingdom of God is within you": you live in the inner calm of your own silent, eternal home: that from which you came, and to which you are soon to return again, quietly "bearing back the divine within you to the divine in the universe." Is it worth while to destroy this peace for the sake of a few toys of worthless dust, a few grins, a few smiles, and a pack of lies? Which is the best: that which you give to yourself, or that which others give to you? So long as you rise above the lusts of the flesh—the poisons distilled and gratuitously presented to you by "dear fellow man," *i.e.* by all the loving "brotherhood" that lived before you—so long as you do this, you have a joy that no woman and no man, and no crowd of such can ever impart; no, not if you loved and served them for eternity. You possess the harmony of reason, the peace that passes understanding, the silence that no chattering society of hypocrites can ever break, and which outweighs the glory of kingdoms and of empires, and of worlds. For if you know how to love yourself, your very self, and not the empty soap bubbles that others run so madly after, you shall never be alone, you shall always stand in one with infinite reality, united in the star-lit calm, the passionless, white and pure light which others, by reason of their smoking passions, are seldom permitted to see: the perfect impersonal peace which the world calls God, and to which only after long ages of restless hopes and fears shall it at last come into possession."

In suppressing such books as *Nana* the law hides away some of truth's most useful moral lessons. Of this there is no doubt. The good is here suppressed with the evil. For never can a book be written so as to make the worse appear the better reason. Passion is an evil in itself, a burning and consuming flame. Dress it up in as many gorgeous colours as you please, build around it the most magnificent palaces that human imagination can conceive; yet is it still the same worm that dieth not, the same fire that is not quenched. Not even Mr. William Morris can make it look beautiful. You may put on it the mantle of pleasure, but can you make it wear the robe of peace? No more than you can make the inner angles of a triangle equal to three right angles. The nature of things won't let you. The success of what is evil in itself (that is, in a human mind) has never been portrayed because it is impossible to portray it. The attempt goes against the grain of reason, and every intelligent reader sees through such a transparent lie the moment it is uttered. As well try to create a fire without combustion, as seek to palm off passion as an angel of light. The thing never has washed and it never will. And writers like Zola knows the laws of human nature too well to try on such a dodge. In *Nana*, for example, the heroine is obliged to teach against herself. She reveals the devils grin that fate always keeps in pickle for those who "live for others" rather than for the great ethical principles which flow from supreme reason. She teaches the result of being too sociable. There, in the final chapter, she lies on her death bed, broken down with kindness to others, dying for the "service of man." She is alone. Where are all those "others." What! not one to hand her a drink of cold water? Bah! they have got what they wanted. Sociability is played out and of no further use; and now its elements are hunting, and canting, and simpering, and grinning, and lying, in fields and pastures new. She had no rational love for herself, and they have none for her. She lost her self-respect, became a practical communist, and she got the reward which, in one form or another, every one who lives for others, sooner or later does get: the laugh of the clay idol that has been worshiped; the devil's grin: the stinging mockery of a lying worthless world. Those who have loved the world, feel this; but on those who have not, it falls like drops of rain on granite rocks. Virtue is its own reward; rational self-love always pays itself. A man had better be hated and despised of the whole world, than become the poor broken down sentimentalist who lives for others, forgets the laws of abstract reason, and does not even know how to love himself. When self-love goes, when, that is, the service of your own abstract reason goes, you are clean bankrupt, the inside of you is ripped out, and at best you are become but a poor puling milksop for every passing knave to grin and nod at..

Take *Sappho*, a fruit also forbidden, and on that account all the more hunted after and relished by those who collect such stuff. For, regulate him as you will, the two legged pig will always manage to find some kind of congenial garbage to root his nasty snuffing nose in. In *Sappho* there is another moral lesson. The poor deluded fool, the hero of the play, who has had the misfortune to become enslaved by a very seductive but rather too sociable piece of dust, stands (in the last chapter) on the sea shore, watching his pretty painted butterfly sail lovingly off with a former lover. There is the devil's grin for him. It is inevitable. Passion must suffer.

Things have an indestructable polarity: they will only work together in one way; and for man nothing lower than reason is in any sort of harmony or conformity with them. Only reason moves smoothly and peacefully through this world. Only in so far as a man follows the dictates of his own reason, of the god within him, does he here and now reach perfect blessedness; absolute oneness with that of which reason is the highest known expression. All things work together for good with those that follow their own reason, put duty first, ignore passion, and cast all sentimental cant about others to the four winds of heaven.

Now does any rational man believe that the great moral truths of this world, the constantly verified conclusions of all time, the inevitable and intuitive distinctions between the divine peace of virtue and the miserable unrest of passion: does anyone really fear that these unshakeable truths can be so much as pin-pricked, let alone overthrown, by either the unmanly gushings of depraved poets or the coarse obscenity of sensational romance writers? Whoever dreads to look on any or all of the evil of this world, is corrupt already; for the only strength of virtue is not ignorance, but contempt for known vice. Let there be the same freedom for immorality that there is for morality. Let the sword of justice be held evenly between the two, in order that both may do as they please, so long as neither prevents the pleasing of the other. Let force be used to suppress force, and moral example be employed to counterwork immoral example. Those who advocate any other course distrust the light and fear the darkness. They prefer the sham of conventionality to the reality of nature. But those who really love truth cannot fear liberty; for they know that the latter is the indispensible condition of the former. Let virtue and vice stand face to face: the former need never dread a fair encounter. There is no need to turn passion into a skulk, and thus add the vice of deceit to the vice of lust. Fire burns safest in the open air. Let us all see and know where it is. When once clearly viewed in the open, it condemns itself. Restriction only gives it a false and enticing glamour. "That which has so much fuss made about it must be certainly very important, and is surely very pleasant,"—such is the conclusion that force helps to encourage. Suppression is a self-destructive policy, and it must break down terribly in the end. It is the surest possible proof of weakness in high places and helps to give some colour of probability to that statement in *The maiden tribute of modern Babylon*, that "Princes, Nobles, Judges, Legislators, Magistrates, and Police are implicated in atrocious licentiousness." (These saints make up the agency of legal moral reform.) Only the weak minded try to hide unpleasant truths about human nature. For they feel within themselves a something that responds to the evil without them. They are filled with combustable material and inflamable gas; hence they dread the presence of matches. They are magnetic with tumultuous possibilities of vice; therefore they dare not look on the magnets that would be likely to attract them: consequently they judge others to be as weak as themselves, and the result is a repressive system of foolish and short-sighted laws. They are morally bankrupt; therefore, everybody else is in the same predicament. *They* need walling in: consequently, so do all other people. For is it not a great good to have the world filled with morally weak because artificially protected saints? Surely MILTON was in error when he wrote—"As the state of man now is; what wisdom can there be to choose, what continuance to forbear without the knowledge of evil. He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true wayfaring

Christian. I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather; that which purifies us is trial and trial is by what is contrary. That virtue therefore which is but a youngling in the contemplation of evil, and knows not the utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank virtue, not a pure; her whiteness is but an excremental whiteness; which was the reason why our sage and serious poet SPENSER, whom I dare be known to think a better teacher than SCOTUS or AQUINAS, describing true temperance under the person of GUION, brings him in with his palmer through the cave of MAMMON, and the bower of earthly bliss, that he might see and know, and yet abstain. Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with less danger scout into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading all manner of tractates and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read.* Truly, these restless protectionists very loudly proclaim what kind of infirmities they suffer from. As a class they will assuredly have their reward. For all human types that dare not look on every side of truth, are doomed to slow but inevitable extinction. Truth is to the mind what exercise is to the body: those who are too weak to bear its full blaze will rot off the face of the earth; and the sooner they go the better. For if the knowledge of vice, or the sight of evil example, is calculated to break the moral back-bones of these respectable shams; then, the more they are left to the tender mercies of liberty, the quicker will the world be rid of its useless encumbrances. The fiercer the fight in the moral world, the greater the temptations offered to all, the mightier and purer will be the moral and intellectual strength that survives. Virtue, to be virtue, must be robust like the valour of a true soldier; not weak with the weakness of dangers officially removed, but invincible with the strength of unshielded competition, and temptation fairly faced and overcome in the open field. To fall in this battle is a clear proof of unfitness to wear the crown of manhood, or to have any part or lot in the freer and purer and stronger race that is to be.

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* MILTON'S Areopagitica. In the words just following upon this passage, Milton argues that if we mean to do away with the literary occasion for vice, we must suppress the Bible, the writings of the Ancient Fathers, the Classics, and a mass of other literature. The argument is strong, but so obvious that there is no need to deal with it here.

It is not virtue that these cowardly people feel to be in danger, but the moral weakness that fears the sight and knowledge of vice. It is not the true teaching that is likely to suffer by freedom, but the showery hypocrites who have not followed the true teaching. These people know that temptation will find them out; and they don't want to be found out; they want to remain eminently "respectable." Artificial virtue, ever in search of an equally artificial reputation, is always preaching down vice; natural virtue is ever content with itself: it knows that vice can never injure what is genuine, and what is not genuine it does not deem to be worth a special legal protection. Vice cannot undermine true virtue: it only persuades those who want to be persuaded. Unnaturalness can never outbalance naturalness. Where truth is, all lies break down, however cunningly they may be decked out with toys and ornaments and silly affectations. When men see the lie against nature placed side by side with the truth of conformity to nature, they know the difference between right and wrong; between the wicked and the virtuous of this world: they know that there is a lower and a higher, however much these sensual minded devils may grin and gloat and sneer. What, for example, does all the beauty and all the knowledge, and all the eloquence of an ASPASIA amount to when placed beside the simple natural virtue of a VOLUMINA? Gilt and tinsel, paint and powder, looking-glasses and presents; and smiles of flattering liars: and dust and dirt and ashes, and outside sociability seeking to hide innate indestructible loneliness. When nature appears the foul abusers of nature are undone. Example breaks their spell far more effectually than any amount of sympathy-creating punishment could ever do, even though it should last until Doomsday. Who, let us ask such shallow brained whitewashers of prostitution as Mr. GRANT ALLEN: who, if he could choose, would not rather be the son of an honest VOLUMINA than the son of a filthy lying ASPASIA? Which type of character, by following natural duty and avoiding unnatural sensuality, makes most for the future greatness of the human race? Which adds most of strength and real happiness to its own day and generation? Could all the unnatural beauties, all the cultured mistresses and clever prostitutes, that live, ever have lived, or ever will live, consistently say anything so true and powerful in their influence for good, as those words about her son CORIOLANUS put by SHAKESPERE into the mouth of VOLUMINA, the highest type of motherhood and the grandest woman in literature,—"When yet he was but tender-bodied, and the only son of my womb; when, youth with comeliness plucked all gaze his way; when, for a day of king's entreaties, a mother should not sell him an hour from her beholding; I,—considering how honour would become such a person; that it was no better than picture-like to hang by the wall, if renown made it not stir,—was pleased to let him seek danger where he was like to find fame. To a cruel war I sent him; from whence he returned, his brows bound with oak. I tell thee, daughter,—I sprang not more in joy at first hearing he was a man-child, than now in first seeing he had proved himself a man." When vice and virtue can both be looked upon, when one is no more favoured than the other, when both enjoy equal freedom, the former has not a word to say for itself; it sees and knows itself to be the lie it is. All the advantage it has is due to the oppression that is put upon it by short sighted people, an oppression which enables it to pose as injured virtue, and thus appear to the shallow minded in the guize of an angel of light. Legal bullying creates for it an amount of sympathy that gives to it a strength far greater than the force brought to bear against it. Let it alone, and it will injure only itself, or at best what is only akin to itself. Truth and virtue are secure against every possible attack of vice, for the power of the latter is always weaker than that of the former. What, for example, can all the evil suggestions, all the passion-rousing romance, all the morbid poetry, that ever has been or ever will be written, make against the eternal truth of these thoughts on passion from " The song Celestial " the " Mahabharata " of India.

Mighty of appetite,
Sinful and strong is this !—man's enemy !
As smoke blots the white fire, as clinging rust
Mars the bright mirror, as the womb surrounds
The babe unborn, so, is this world of things,
Foiled, soiled, enclosed in this desire of flesh,
The wise fall, caught in it ; the unresting foe
It is of wisdom, wearing countless forms,
Fair, but deceitful, subtle as a flame.

Translated from the Sanscrit by EDWIN ARNOLD.

The attempt to suppress only makes bad worse. It adds the vice of hypocritical secrecy to the vice of pruriency You dictate to people what books they shall read and how they shall personally conduct themselves, and they pay you out by doing on the sly what is far less dangerous when done openly. Don't you see that freedom from dictation enables outward conduct to demonstrate what dwells inside the heart, and thus forms the surest possible safeguard of all real morality? Under liberty the wicked are known and rejected by their fruits; but, in preventing them from showing these fruits, in frightening their sins into holes and corners, you destroy the only conditions of selection, and so make vice and virtue appear equally respectable. As you cannot force wickedness out of the heart, the next best thing is to allow such freedom of conduct as will allow the heart to reveal its own wickedness, which it will be sure to do if only let alone. This state of things gives the maximum of safety in giving the maximum of reality. But the "respectable" result of a patent coercion system is at best only what the vulgar call "top show," and all the same old vices are being carried on with greater relish than ever underneath the deceitful surface of outside conventionalism. The kind of stuff that you prohibit is still read, and read with greater gusto and eagerness than before. Forbidden fruit is the sweetest always. You stop, let us suppose, the open sale of a particular book. But can you stop people talking about the subject matter of which that book is made up? Don't you see that you are liable to drive what would pass off in the form of a morbid literary feast, into a real and practical evil. You stop the outward flow of ideas towards distant and imaginative objects, and, as a consequence, these ideas take an inner direction towards near and unimaginative objects: thus causing greater evil still. In other words, by preventing the ideal gratification of morbidness, you indirectly encourage its real gratification. Evidently you don't understand human nature. If you did, you would see that these books are the least evil channels through which its youthful infirmities can be worked off. Let it read as many as it likes, and in this manner it will get a knowledge of the evil that is in the world, without at the same time necessarily becoming enslaved to bad practical habits. Thus it will be able to retain both moral purity and clearness of understanding; knowledge of evil and indifference to evil; strength of mind and health of body.

Again, can you hinder young people from wondering why they should be forbidden from reading such books? Can you pass a law that will put down the morbid curiosity which you have thus artificially raised? Don't you see you are putting a fictitious value on worthless rubbish. You are manufacturing a secret, and in so doing are inevitably directing everybody's attention to it. You make a marvel and a wonder of sin, and naturally everybody runs to see what it is like. Better have treated it with silent contempt. If you had shut your mouth it would have found its own level in the world of things, and that level would not have been a very high one. But you, in your wisdom, prefer to place it upon the highest pinnacle and advertisement of notoriety. You come down on the "*Fruits of Philosophy*" and thus put the knowledge of the existence of such a book before every man and woman, and every boy and girl, in the land. For half a century before you made such a fool of yourself, that book had scarcely sold at all; but directly you ventured to put your finger upon it, directly you tried to stop it from selling, it sold in thousands, nay, in tens of thousands. Wise despot! How well you understand human nature! You could not think of leaving your wife and daughters at the mercy of truth, that is, of a knowledge of the evil that exists in the world. This would be unfair to them. They might know too much about the facts and laws of the social system in which they are obliged to live; and the less they know of these facts and these laws, the stronger, wiser, and more self reliant will they become. Ignorance is power. Innocence is power. Knowledge and understanding are weakness: sure and certain plungers in every vice and in every crime. This is what you think. Therefore as a respectable member of society you call upon the government of the day to extend its protecting arm round your family, in order that your household may be kept artificially and conventionally pure. Why indeed should not your moral property be specially protected from temptation? Surely its genuineness deserves every care. No doubt the next move that you will make, will be to have a law passed for "suppressing" all the young students who visit your mistress's villa during your own loving performance of family duties. For ought not *all* your property to be kept equally free from tarnish? Conventionality, you know, is the thing. Brass is not gold, but it does very well to "keep up appearances." Unfortunately, however, it won't always retain its colour. And neither will your legally protected family. For want of moral exercise, through lack of opportunity to distinguish between good and evil, its moral muscles will relax and run to waste; its unsharpened intellectual guard will rust and sleep; its power of moral discrimination will die slowly away: and just when you think you have made everything safe, your wife will run off with your dearest friend while your daughter elopes with the coachman.

My dear Sir, the truth is that what you want is a law which shall be able to change the human heart, and no government can put such a contrivance together. You know well enough that this is the root of all evil, and that, in spite of the silly and shallow sentimentalisms about the natural goodness of humanity, it is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. Yet it improves in proportion as you allow it more freedom. It is frequently conquered by justice and loyal respect for freedom, but never by force. My dear Sir, get rid of this superstitious worship of force. You will find that you have sufficient to do to morally direct your own life. Is it not enough if you yourself are pure? Why should you worry about the purity of your wife and family, or of your noble mistress? That is their business, not yours. Their conduct cannot hurt you: and your conduct cannot hurt them. Only what is in the soul injures the soul. Up-grown persons are not responsible to you: you are not God Almighty. Why do you fear? Is not your example, combined with the unanswerable arguments and solemn wisdom that constantly fall from your lips, enough to outweigh the influence of any number of bad books, or seductive but wicked men? Have you no moral force in yourself? or can you only carry on "home rule" by means of the indirect helps of the common informer? Evidently this is the very sad state of the case, or why this helpless, puling cry for law? Your plea is your own confession. You are not respected. You have no persuasive power. You cannot rule by the noble force of intellectual and moral greatness. There is no god dwelling within your soul; therefore you reign only by permission of the devil of external coercion. Your empire won't last. Your family instinctively know you for the humbug you are. You live in a nest of conventional lies. You are cheated and deceived continually. The members of your household are always glad when they see the back of you. They like their prison best when its jailor is away. Their love is hypocrisy. Their caresses are simply the hard mechanical grinding of dust against dust. Their endearing words are wind and smoke merely. They would be glad to see you dead and buried, if only they were sure you would leave them plenty to live upon. For instinctively they know you to be a miserable coward that dare not face the risks of truth and freedom; and although they may not be able to put what they feel into intelligible words, yet somehow it gets expressed indirectly; it weighs you and condemns you as you deserve. You love power better than freedom, force better than trust; and like all tyrants you are cursed with the doubts and fears that tyranny always brings. You cannot square your interest with truth, therefore you think that truth ought to be squared with your interest. You cannot bear the full blaze of heaven's light, therefore you cry to the law to shade you from it. Thus you expect more than human power can achieve. Learn to take a more modest view of things. Be content with your own virtue. Remember that evil is only to those who think evil. Why should the sight of this picture, for example, trouble you more than it troubles a child who does not understand its meaning? Because your virtue is conventional. You are worse than you were when a child. You are rotten within, and as far as possible removed from the soul's kingdom of purity and peace. Well may you fear truth. You cannot see that it is not what entereth in, but what cometh out, that defileth; and that no fact however vile can corrupt a man unless he chooses to let it. My dear Sir, be bolder and more trusting. Be a man. Leave the whole world and the facts of the whole world ever open to the free observation and reflection of all. Recognize that truth is the only teacher, the only moralizing power in the universe, the only real and effectual purifier; and trust that in the clear atmosphere of freedom, others may at last learn to be as perfect as yourself.

The fact is that the family-protection scheme is just as shallow as all the other compulsory schemes for propping up morally weak types. There is only one really efficient moralizer of the family, namely, the free example of the parents: this outweighs all preaching and all compulsion, however cunningly administered by soulless formalists or vicious State bullies. But if the parents are too immoral to moralize their own offsprings by means of personal example, then, it is very clear that their blood is bad and vicious. they are a corrupt and unsurvivable breed; and the same vicious blood that is in them must also be in their offsprings: therefore, their viciousness, and the viciousness which their example encourages in their basely-blooded offsprings, is Nature's own most effectual and beneficient method of clearing out a corrupt and undeservable stock. The children will inevitably be filled with the same blood as the parents. Consequently, it is most desirable in the interests of the human race to come, that when this blood is vicious—and all vice is ultimately a question of blood—its own viciousness should be left perfectly free to clear it out as quickly as possible. Temptation is the environment which selects the bad blood from the good. The latter does not succumb to it: the former of course does. The bad only attracts the bad. Whoever heard of a thorough-bred bull-dog being tempted away from its duty? This does not lie in the nature of the beast No, it is not the thorough-breds that fall into vice, and through vice into racial extinction: it is the curs that do this, and the more effectually they extinguish themselves with their own vices, the better for the posterity which they thus save from being burdened with their vicious and corrupt natures. The purest breed will survive: the corruptest breed will perish. In no other way can nature keep the race going on from generation to generation: in no other way can she prevent humanity from dying off the face of the earth. The other day a woman who takes a natural pride in her children, pointed out to us a woman who shamefully neglects hers. At first we were staggered by the fact. But presently we remembered that the neglectful woman was only after all neglecting her own bad, vicious blood; that is to say, she was neglecting just the particular type that ought least to be protected, and so unconsciously helping to clear a bad type out of existence. The partial evil was a universal good. The individual lost but the race gained.

> "Yea, but Thou knowest even to find
> a place for superfluous things,
> and to order that which is disorderly,
> and things not dear to men are dear to Thee
>
> Thus dost Thou harmonise into One all good
> and evil things, that there should be one
> everlasting reason of them all."

Properly understood everything is a question of breed, of blood, of race. Purity is a strength not given by law but by nature. Surround it with as many temptations as you please, and it will not fall into them; and for the simple reason that they will not appear pleasant to it: they will not square with its tastes: to use a vulgar expression, it will simply turn its nose up at them, just as a well-bred dog will only growl at people who seek to bribe it away from its defensive duties by cunningly offered pieces of meat Nature cannot be overcome. Purity cannot be defeated. See how this truth is exemplified in the matter of drink. Here is one man surrounded on every side with exciting alcoholic drinks. But they make no impression upon him. So far as drink is concerned he possesses the strength of natural purity: that is to say, there is no corruption inside him for the drink to appeal to and work upon. But here is another man who will walk miles out of his road simply in order to get a glass of beer. Why this difference in people? It is a difference of breed, of blood, of race: the most radical and the most indestructible of all differences. No law can touch it, for it does not belong to time but to eternity. It is a nobility not given by man, but by nature. It is equally real whether clothed in rags or ermine, whether dwelling in a palace or a hovel, and to its seed the future of this world inevitably belongs. This is a nobility which beats your monkey-faced, penny paper collar, lardy dar swellish noble lord, who fawns upon and flatters the democracy for the sake of political power and public applause, and it will live and flourish when all such miserable toadies and shameful sycophants have reaped their well deserved rewards.

And now to sum up the arguments contained in the last few chapters. It has been shown that just as compulsion only produces hypocrisy in the sphere of religion, so it only produces conventionality in the sphere of morals. Both are equally unnatural and equally fatal to the present health and future continuance of the race in which they occur. The only strength of men and women is naturalness; the only weakness unnaturalness. Naturalness is purity of mind and purity of body, is the spontaneous and truthful correspondence of individual human nature with universal cosmic nature. O thou eternal and impersonal one, thou awe-inspiring infinite of infinites, let me live to thee, and to thee alone, and so be at peace with thee in all things and at all times. This is naturalness, this is strength, is the piety and health of the crowning race of human kind. This is the last grand creed of men to be. Those who are capable of embracing it require no protective compulsion to keep them from falling: they can stand without being propped up: those who are not capable of embracing it are assuredly bad types; unworthy of being propped up; unworthy of being artificially kept in the field; and well deserving to be left to viciously efface both themselves and the debased generations that flow from them. For where is the sense of protecting the posterity of the bad? If the bad are not worth propping up neither are those bad descendants who take after them. What would be thought of a dog breeder who propped up all his worst bred dogs on the false supposition that in so doing he was protecting the badly bred posterity of those bad bred dogs? Why, the fool would simply be helping to fill the world with curs. He would be more like a cur than his own dogs. Yet this method of procedure is seriously defended by thinking people, more especially in its application to drunkenness. The latter vice, so they say, is not purely self-regarding: it injures posterity. Yes, but whose posterity does it injure? Not the posterity of the strong, healthy, and natural types; not the posterity of those who are likely to leave desirable and survivable offsprings. No, but the posterity of those who are not likely to leave survivable types; and whose vices, if only let alone, will eventually end in their own most desirable effacement. The wages of virtue is certain survival. Here is a law of nature that cannot be altered. Those who see it can well afford to trust in liberty and have no fear.

Moreover, what warrant has posterity given to anybody, or to any number of bodies, to stop the drinking of the base individual booser? Of course if the poor fellow, in one of his drinking fits, attempts to nobble me on the head, I have a right to defend myself, namely, the right of my own existence and of the self-defence which that natural right of existence carries with it. I have a right to act on behalf of what exists, or to pay others to act for me; but I have no right to act on behalf of what does not exist, and what, in fact, may never exist at all: for, so far as I can prove to the contrary, before the drunkard can injure *his* unsurvivable posterity, if he should happen to have any, the whole system of the heavens and the earth may break up and be reformed in the twinkling of an eye. Suppose, however, that this last event does not happen.

Will stopping the poor man from getting drink make him not want to get it? make him not a weak flabby temptable creature, ready and itching to fall into another sin in place of the removed drink? Is he likely to be made any better by being rendered savage? The very fact of his falling away from temperance into habits of drinking proves him to be a weak and unsurvivable type, which nature is doing her level best to get rid of by means of this very vice of drinking; and which she will manage to get rid of by means of some other vice if the tap is stopped: perhaps a vice that will be more violent and more dangerous to virtuous and peaceable citizens. The vice of drink is bad, but there are worse vices, and, if the tap is stopped, viciously inclined people will manage to find those worse vices out. Ah! my blind, silly, busy, fools; if you could see the inside as well as you can the outside of life, you would at once penetrate below all this hollow conventionalism, and see that internal heedance to the vicious inclination is what alone kills; and that the man who merely strives to gratify that inclination is as much on the high road to extinction, both individually and racially, as he who is in the present act of gratifying it by beastly and unmanly over-drinking. He who looks on a glass of beer to lust after it, and to use it for anything more than the temperate sustentation of his own body, has injured himself already: for it is not the beer which injures, but the wicked lust for the beer: that burning and consuming fire which injures and destroys the fine living tissues of the human system. This doctrine is not in the science primers, but it is more true than a lot of what is.

The foregoing of course assumes that the vice of over-drinking must go on from generation to generation. But it is not absolutely bound to do so. Even a bad breed may turn from its unnatural courses and survive. Indeed, whole families have been known to become temperate, simply through *seeing* the evil effects of drink displayed in the individual vice of one or two members. Openly seen truth alone has power to really moralize. Vice tends to counterwork itself if it is only left sufficiently free and open for those to see it who are likely to profit by seeing it. But hide it out of sight, in (say) such asylums as were mentioned on page 61 of this book, and all its moralizing influence will be entirely lost to just those who really need such influence.

It may be asked "Have not the sober to bear the results of drunkenness?" They have under the socialistic system, but not under the individualistic system. Under the latter they are as far as possible safeguarded against the direct aggressions of the drunkard, and not taxed to safeguard either him or his debased posterity against the natural and inevitable consequences of vice. Of course it is true that the drunkard's own debased descendants cannot be provided with a new set of ancestors; but individualism affords a chance even to them: for under liberty they are always free to profit by experience, and turn from inherited viciousness and survive: and if they fail to do so their bad type will gradually die out in the struggle for existence. How far legal propping up of drunken types is likely to protect posterity was discussed on page 61 of this book.

Under liberty the way of salvation is always open. Let an unnatural type turn from its unnaturalness and it shall survive. The majority of types, however, never do turn. The universe seems like a system of natural election. Many are called but few chosen. This is the fact of the matter, whether we like it or not, and to sneer at it is simply to mock the eternal. Better recognize and act upon it like rational beings, that is, freely and for the sake of the peace which such action brings. No survivability can be conferred by Act of Parliament. The survivable type is the naturally rational type; the type that neither smirking "lovers," nor obscene books, nor exciting liquors can persuade into the paths of unnaturalness. Such a type is well able to look after its own morals. It can always face the infinitely varied temptations of a truth-exposing freedom with an equal mind, making a right use of appearances, and employing each part of human nature in the rational performance of those natural functions to which each part is naturally and unalterably adapted: the body in healthy sustention of itself and in individual, honest, truthful, unconfused, monogamic self-continuance of its race; the mind in the discovery of truth: and both in harmonious co-operation with the universal order of nature as a whole. And the life of such a type is not a life of self-denial. To mortify the flesh and live to the soul is to indulge in true self-expression: is the real and natural luxury. It is to exchange fire for light. It is to lose the lowest but find the highest. A life ever replete with joy unspeakable; free from passion and full of peace, free from lust and full of love. "What love?" do you ask? Not the love of fair faces and deceiving, laughing eyes. Not the grinning mockery of lying masks. Not the love which is blind, but the love which sees with the clearness of a light that never goes out; the love which is one with reason and obedient to the voice of conscience. The love which looks through the eyes of God. Not the love of humanity, but the love of that vast reality which infinitely transcends this babbling ant-hill of vanity and confusion. The love that lives in heaven. The love which is self-centred because resting in a reality with which self is eternally one. The calm, contained, passionless love, standing fixed and unchanged as eternity, pure as light and stainless as alpine snow. The peaceful patient love, which, quietly and untiringly working in the service of abstract principles that rest upon an immortal base, is content to regard mortals, not for their own transient sakes, but only as as parts and expressions of something far more worthy than they. The love that is enslaved to nothing that belongs to time, but, dwelling always in the secure blessedness of its eternal home,

> "sees the children sport upon the shore
> and hears the mighty waters rolling evermore."

In a word, that unshakeable natural piety called by SPINOZA "the intellectual love of God" "a love towards a thing immutable and eternal, whereof we may really enter into possession"; which cannot "be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love; but may grow from strength to strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and deeply penetrate it."

This is the only real safeguard against vice; this the conqueror of sin and resister of temptation. By means of this love, humanity refinds the purity of its early years; when it ran free and unstained in the sun-lit fields of youth; when the world was fair, and from every flower and every tree a friendly joy looked forth; when passion was not and lust was not; when the soul, fresh and clear as the summer sky, rejoiced continually in its own self-satisfying intellectual health, and thought not of all the sins and vicious, unnatural pleasures of a bad, base, hypocritical, human race. By means of this love, so cold and pure, so closely akin to the deep white stillness of death, mortality is born again "of water and of the spirit,"; the child's heart comes back to its own; and, the wisdom of age uniting with the restored purity of youth, there results a strength to resist temptation that is at once peaceful, restful, and yet active and invincible. No state conventional slavery can give this strength. It is the outcome of individual liberty, and in an atmosphere of social despotism it must die out of the world for ever.

CHAPTER XIX.

A FEW words now on the relation of personal freedom to labour, trade, and commerce. From all that has now been written, it will easily be seen that the application of the principle of individual liberty to industrial exchange, logically and inevitably leads to thorough going, all-round, and complete free trade; that is to say, to such an unregimentalized state of things as equally allows each individual unit, not only to co-operate or to abstain from co-operating with other units whenever and wherever he thinks it to his interest so to do, but also (that is, of course, if he cares to enter on such a hazardous campaign), either to beat his fellow unit or be beaten by him in the risky business of industrially or commercially supplying human wants and tastes, so far as they are expressed through the unfettered exchange of a perfectly open market, where all buyers are equally free to buy or not to buy, and all sellers equally free to sell or not to sell, just accordingly as the private reason of each, operating upon the particular circumstances of each separate transaction, may lead them to agree or not to agree to traffic away either the labour or the property that, as privately owning and personally choosing units, they are justly warranted in disposing of on such terms as are mutually agreed upon between them.

As might be readily anticipated, the Socialists and semi-Socialists have the strongest possible dislike to this very much for them too radical kind of freedom. They are trade-protectionists of the most irreconcilable type; pledged to support every one of the exploded economic fallacies of the past; working for and representing the interests of the industrially inefficient; and ever seeking to "protect" the latter against the naturally unwelcomed rivalry of superior labour or better talent: since it is plain as a pike staff that none but the inefficient need any special protection against the rigour of industrial competition: if, for example, I feel confident that I can write a more saleable novel than my neighbours I certainly don't want any "protecting"; but if I do not feel confident of this: why then, I may begin to think that industrial competition is a very mean and selfish arrangement, inasmuch as it fails to make the dull writer as comfortably off as the brilliant one, and that protection is the all-powerful justice of man which successfully outwits and counterworks the blind justice of God. Protection is a magnificent institution for the fool; for enabling him to get the same wages as the man of talent: only God or Nature has once and for ever decided that the wages of folly shall not in the long run equal the wages of talent, and if man can repeal that decision he will deserve all that he gets by doing so, whether what he gets turns out to be worth having or not. If, for instance, I could obtain a monopoly in novel writing, what a price I should have to charge for novels! if only to keep back the press of custom!

Where does the cry of protection come from? From inefficiency, from cowardice, from the base dishonesty which objects to reap the fruits of its own inferiority, and covets to forcibly collar the fruits of somebody else's superiority. Sift the arguments of protectionists to the bottom, find out who the people are that want protecting, and it will be seen that only by inferiority is this cowardly and unmanly plea put forth. Efficiency wants no propping up. Industrial struggle is at once both the condition and the opportunity of the really efficient man, and the more there is of it the more will efficiency flourish and inefficiency come to grief; as, indeed, what can be more fit and just than that the latter should "get the worst of it?" since, in this great battle of life, somebody must loose; somebody must go to the wall in this universal and irrevocable struggle for existence.

Let us meet fact face to face. Either the Darwinian law is a truth, or it is not; if it is, then we may rest assured that it will not be dodged: no, not by all the combined powers of human wisdom, let alone by those of human folly and industrial inefficiency.

While the individualist on his part has much to urge against protection, the state socialist on his side is equally emphatic in denouncing what he regards; and whether rightly or wrongly shall presently be considered; as the necessary and unavoidable evils of free trade. In fact, curiously enough, the upholder of protection urges against his opponent, that free trade, if not checked by state regimentation, inevitably results in the bringing about of the very condition of things which it is supposed to render impossible, and which, indeed, it is specially designed to guard against; namely, monopoly, or the concentration of wealth and of the means of production in the hands of a few privileged persons. This objection is worth considering. The protectionists say that among other evil consequences of free-trade, are dividend—collaring syndicates, limited companies, rings, trusts, and similar devices for helping the idle few to live upon the sweat of the industrious many, Such is their main contention; and if it were really valid, not merely against the partial free-trade as at present existing, but also against the complete free-trade that ought to exist, it would indeed be formidable, and individualists might justly be warranted in laying down their arms and quietly surrendering their case. But, inasmuch as it leaves out of consideration the well-known fact, namely, that these objectionable monopolies arise, not in proportion as exchange is really free, not in proportion, that is to say, as individuals are simply defended from the aggressions of their neighbours without at the same time being aggressed against by the unjust regimentalism of a bureaucratic tyranny; but, on the contrary, just in proportion as individuals are regimentalized, restricted, and "protected" by special legal enactments which specially favour one unit at the expense of another unit, or one group at the expense of another group: inasmuch, I say, as it fails to notice this most important fact, such a contention will have little weight with those who know anything at all of the real facts and laws of industrial and commercial life.

Let us, however, now see what may, with more detail and greater particularity, be said in reply to this socialistic contention that free trade is a creator of special monopolies; that is to say, of monopolies over and above what each man, fully enjoying equal liberty of action and equal security of property, can get through the unaggressive, or, what is the equivalent of the unaggressive, namely, the unfraudulent, exercise of his own private faculties: for certainly the private monopoly of one's own faculties is a monopoly which must be assumed as a starting point from which to deduce every other kind of property whatsoever, and is, in fact, unavoidably implied and practically asserted by even the socialist himself. This last is a mighty truth, and it is destined to break the back of Socialism. These hands; these eyes; these brains (if there be any): all these bodily and mental parts, are yours: the crowd of fools and knaves around you did not make them; they could not make them, though they experimented for ever and a day: of course it is true that two particular individuals sowed the seeds of them: but even those two particular individuals did not and could not cause those seeds to germinate: nothing that dwells in time can achieve such an end as this; only the infinite existence in which we live and move and have our being can do it: and this dwells not in time, but in eternity; which it fills as one great, silent, everlasting now. Humanity indeed sows the seeds of life, but that vast cosmic process which includes and works in and through all lives and all worlds, alone gives the increase. Therefore, my reader, whoever you may be, always remember that you own your own cosmically-given self, together with all your varied faculties, be they great or be they small, by a right not human but divine; since humanity did not and could not of itself determine whether you should ever have existed at all. Humanity may call spirits from the vasty deep, but they are not bound to come when it calls for them. That response comes from a mightier magician than humanity. There is in you an elemental base that never began and will never end, and your life is the outcome of all that has been going on since long before a single mortal existed in the world. Ah! my poor sentimental conventionalist; so much led of the nose by the humbug of other people; if you did but realize it, you are no child of the darkness of this low race of ruined blood, but one of the sons of heaven's stainless purity; bound in social slavery to no filthy herd of sociable Yahoos, but joined only in free, loving allegiance to the light of reason and of conscience which shines within you, and justified in serving that light by fearlessly defending your own interest to the very last, and setting at defiance all the frothy humbug of a lying, canting world. *Dieu defend le droit.* Aye, and in the long run against all odds. The Eternal Reality, from which comes all strength to endure and all courage to fight and all victory in the fight, gave you a separate interest in giving you a separate body and a separate mind. Stand with it or fall with it like a man; not meanly, but nobly and as becomes the most right and just of all causes: the cause of truth as it is in nature and in human nature: the cause of private property and of individual liberty. Laugh to scorn all these envy-prompted snearers at self-interest: when boldly met they always collapse like the poor flabby creatures they are. Strike down their lies while strength is given you; live to the truth of nature, which is eternal; despise every form of unmanly sentimentality from the very bottom of your soul, and do all things solely for the sake of what is worthier and higher than humanity: move upward to the light, serenely and calmly, like a rational being who minds no man, and leaves curs to rage and gnash their teeth in vain; and you shall no longer walk in the miserable bondage of social darkness, but shall enjoy that glorious liberty which is one with individual duty, and which is only known and possessed in all its perfect, self-satisfying fullness by the reason-enfranchished sons of light.

Undoubtedly there is about the socialist's objection to free trade, made on the score of its supposed monopolistic tendency, a certain degree of surface-plausability which gives to it at least the appearance of truth. The socialist points out that under the present *regime*; which, by the way, is neither a socialistic *regime* nor an individualistic *regime*, but a mixture of the two; capital is largely concentrated in the hands of comparatively few individuals, many of whom do nothing but luxuriate, while considerable numbers of the real workers drag out a miserable existence on starvation, or next to starvation, wages. The fact is undeniable; but it is a very poor argument against free trade and in favour of legislative expropriation. For, apart from the important consideration that the wealth of the few, notwithstanding the imposing appearance it makes in the hands of the limited number who now hold it, would amount to very little when distributed over a million-headed proletariat; there stands the other great truth, which the Socialist always finds it convenient to ignore, viz., that this very concentration complained of is largely due to legislative enactments. Centuries of legislative premiums upon unthrift, accompanied by centuries of protective and monopolist laws specially framed for the express purpose of bolstering up and enriching particular classes and for helping the individuals that compose such classes to pile up capital into large heaps, have at last produced, not certainly inequality itself—that is Nature's own ordination—but the *artificial*, unnatural, and cruel inequality which stands out so palpably before us to-day as one of the crowning disgraces of modern civilization. The Individualist, therefore, as such, is not concerned to defend the modern capitalistic *regime*, resting to so large an extent, as it does, upon ages of class legislation, political favouritism, and special protection of this or that interest at the expense of other interests—evils, bear in mind, which form the very essence of Socialism, and which do and must increase in proportion as the salary and pension absorbing bureaucracy of the social democratic state grows at the expense of liberty and free trade.

All that the individualist, as such, is bound by his position to justify, is real, all-round, impartial, and thorough-going *laissez faire* or Free Trade; that is to say, the most just, impartial, and effectual means by which capital can be distributed and profits equalized that we are able to conceive. Of course, as just pointed out, even under the most perfect Free Trade, there would still be inequality; but it would be more real, and less artificial; more the outcome of inner difference, and less the result of external compulsion; more caused by the free expression of Nature's indestructible process of variation (which works for ever in successive individual lives) and less due to the arbitrary tyranny of political majorities or political minorities. For if there is one feature of the present order more conspicuous than another, it is that the gulfs—mind we say the gulfs—between wealth and poverty are almost entirely caused, not by the industrial competition which the Socialist, unconsciously and unavoidably exemplifying that sublime irony with which the Eternal Reality treats all those who kick against its laws, is now *politically competing* to remove; but by the destruction of that competition through arbitrary, unscientific, undiscriminating legislation and shallow-brained, heartless, official rule of thumb: a destruction which does not and, indeed, cannot destroy competition; but which merely substitutes one kind of competition; and that one of a very much more demoralized and unscrupulous character, in the place of another kind; to wit, a miserable competitive struggle for power and pelf on the part of a set of blatant political liars and greedy, luxury-loving officials, in the place of a competition among capitalists and labourers for higher or securer rates of interest, or more satisfactory conditions of employment. But for the Socialist's and semi-Socialist's constant interferences with and restrictions upon trade, the various degress of private wealth would gradually shade into each other, just as the various degrees of private talent and industry now already do, and, indeed, always have done, and always will do. But for political aggressive regimentalism there would be none of these sudden and abrupt social contrasts. In fact, we find that in proportion as industrial competition is unrestricted by the State, these unbridged contrasts tend to dissappear, and the freer trade is allowed by the State to be, the more does personal wealth tend to correspond with personal talent or personal industry, and this last kind of correspondence is the nearest possible approximation to justice as between man and man that finite human power can achieve. For infinite reality alone, whose knowledge is wider than the heavens and more searching than the lightning; such super-human reality alone can see with sufficient clearness to apportion to each according to the conscince of each. Man is not a god to his fellow-man, and thanks to that which, be it what it may (and only a god could know it in all its perfect fullness) is certainly infinitely more mighty than humanity, he never will be: for even if he were the infinite, he would still fall infinitely short of the Infinite of Infinites, which is God. Therefore he must be content if he can establish and maintain such a state of freedom from fraud and aggression for each and all, that material reward goes according to material success, and not necessarily according to moral merit: in short, a state of things in which he who wins the race gets the prize, and is free to dispose of it as generously or as ungenerously as he pleases; although in point of fact the slowest runner may [*or may not*] have put forth the greatest effort to win: for this last, namely, moral merit, can only be seen by a Reality to which the secrets of all hearts are open, and which silently rewards those who live to love and serve it, not with the noisy praise and trumpery baubles that men prize, but with the cool inner peace whose home is the everlasting light that never yet shone on sea or land, yet which is, and was, and is to come, as the last impersonal glory of those who, disdaining all human sympathy, have faced and fought life's competitive battle right bravely and well, not for base humanity's sake, but for right's sake and for truth's sake, and because clearly recognizing that whatever is according to Nature is right and true, and that whatever is right and true is worth doing for his own sake alone. There is indeed a glorious peace where those soldiers who faithfully serve under the standard of eternal right and eternal truth shall at last rest from a soldier's duty; where, freed from all sorrow and all pain, they shall be calm and still, lost in the Eternal's infinite light for ever more.

The marked manner in which protective restrictive legislation builds up special monopolies for big capitalists, by hindering the healthy, experiment-promoting, and therefore progressive and economy-furthering tendency of the rivalry of smaller capitalists, has been well and clearly illustrated in a recent number of that able advocate of individual liberty, *The Personal Rights Journal.* As the illustration there given serves to show up the foregoing contention in the light of facts, it shall be quoted. Referring to our present most unjust and expensive banking monopoly the writer says:—

"The cheque stamp . . . . acts as a differential duty against such institutions as the Cheque Bank and in favour of the Money Order Office, and prevents the extension of the cheque system to small amounts. . . . . The large bankers do not want cheques for small amounts to come into use, as this would lead to the breaking down of the quasi-monopoly of banking which at present exists, and to a large growth of banking industry on a more modest scale than that of Lombard Street. Just as the paper duty kept the manufacture of paper in the hands of a few large firms, and its repeal led to a wide diffusion of the trade among small capitalists and the cheapening of paper, so does the cheque stamp act as a dam against the flood of small capitalists in the direction of the issue of cheques; and its repeal would bring about an enormous increase in the use of cheques, probably developments of the cheque system which are undreamt of now, and a considerable economy in the use of money. . . . . Of course, ... 'the City' and the Post Office would fight strenuously for their artificial privileges."

But this is only one out of thousands of similar and equally striking instances that might be given. The fact is, arbitrary official curtailments of industrial freedom and of personal initiative and enterprize; with consequent blocking out of cheapening improvements and inventions; as well as legal monopolies of every order and description, have been poisoning the springs and distorting the channels of trade for many centuries. They ramify throughout the whole length and breadth of the entire industrial world, and directly or indirectly injure all industries; for even those that are not directly interfered with, suffer in their purchases by reason of the artificially increased prices or officially deteriorated products of those that are interfered with: since the different trades and industries so closely hang together, and have their separate interests so intimately related, that an injury to one means an injury to all.

On every hand there are expensive, production-limiting, and enterprize-restricting enactments, which to a large extent drive trade out of the hands of those who cannot comply with them, and therefore to a proportionate extent make it a legally protected monopoly for those who can. This is well exemplified by the present bloated condition of many of our brewing firms (to say nothing of the poor rubbishy stuff that a long dammed up monopoly enables them to palm off upon the vitiated tastes of a swilling public.) The land of Free Trade is literally crammed with close corporations expressly manufactured by Act of Parliament. There are monopoly-creating (because industrial-competition restricting, and, therefore, industrial experiment and improvement hindering) regulations of Mines, of Ships, of Railways and Canals, of Education, of Manufactures and Trades, of

Professions, of Sanitation, of Recreation, of commerce in Alcohol, of Working Class Dwellings, and of Land and Houses.* Without reckoning Professions, there were, between the years 1870—1888, no less than 60 Acts of Parliament, passed for the express purpose of regulating either one or other of the various interests that have just been mentioned.† All these enactments are based upon the old exploded fallacy that non-aggressive and non-fraudulent transactions can, on the whole, be better regulated by arbitrary State Officialism, than by flexible private contract and voluntary arrangement; always alterable and modifyable from time to time, as the latter is, according to the changing dictates of the mutual self-interests of those who are directly concerned in the real work of production or distribution. This expensive cast-iron tyranny rests upon the preposterous assumption that State Paternalism is best, not merely for this or that particular individual, or for this or that greedy class, but equally so for the entire community; not only for one or two coddled up generations, but also for all the generations that yet may be. The principle underlying this five minutes expediency legislation has been tried over and over again in the past, both in this and other countries, but always in the long run with the same disastrous results. Now however that the masses have unwisely been given so large an extent of sham political power—every scrap of which shall presently be taken away from them—this bad principle comes to the front once more, loudly paraded by shallow mob-flatteries and place-seeking demagogues as an infallible pill for curing all the ills that mortal flesh is heir to. Even men who ought to know better, and in fact do know better, allow themselves to be dragged along its fatal path towards the yawning gulf that waits to swallow up both mobs and mob worshippers, in order to make room for the real power that shall be established when the Statesman has tried his last lie, and the farce of representative folly is played out for ever. That power is not power of votes, nor of the knaves who buy them; it is the power of something

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* For the argument against the special regulation of house builders see pages 32-33. It applies to all kindred legislation.

† The Liberty and Property Defence League, an association for resisting Over-legislation, for maintaining Freedom of Contract, and for advocating Individualism as opposed to Socialism, irrespective of Party Politics—(Central Offices:—Westminster Chambers, 7, Victoria Street, London, S.W.)– opposes legislation of this kind on the following grounds:—Against paternal enactments for Mines, this League urges that they are "Contributions to a State Code for the regulation of the mining industry, with the effect of lessening the sense of personal responsibility among mine owners and of promoting an unwarranted confidence in Government inspection." It objects to paternal laws for Railways and Canals on the grounds that they are "encroachments by the Board of Trade upon the self-government of private enterprise in railways, and successive steps in the direction of State railways." To similar measures for Manufactures and Trades it objects that they "are invasions by the State of the self-government of various industries and curtailments of freedom of contract between employers and employed." State Paternalism in Education it describes as being "based on the assumption that it is the duty of the State to act *in loco perentis*: this is a contribution to a growing code State education which by being suppliedat less than the market value, is bringing about the extinction of voluntary systems and "free trade" in education, and their replacement by a universal State monopoly after the manner of the French Lycées: [as also are all] measures for enabling the application by local authorities, out of the rates, of the system of State regulation to the higher branches of technical instruction." Paternalism in Sanitation, etc., is described as "Resting on the presumption [surely a false one] that the State is the best guardian of the individual's health. Pater-

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nalism in the matter of Working Class Dwellings is "objected to on the ground that it will result in costly and abortive schemes promoted by municipalities for the supply of rate-aided dwellings, to the detriment of the efforts now being successfully directed to that end by private enterprise." Paternal laws for dealing with Land and Houses are "all measures tending in a greater or less degree to the confiscation of proprietary rights, the suppression of freedom of contract, and the substitution of State regulation in the management and transfer of land—steps in the direction of absolute "land nationalisation," in the place of qualified individual ownership." [See appendix to *Socialism in England* (1888 and 1889) by the Earl of Wemyss, Price 1d., Published by the Liberty and Property Defence League, 7, Victoria Street, London, S.W.]

that cannot fawn or lie; it is the arbitration of an instrument behind which moves the pitiless strength of the eternal; it is the last and just resource of superiority and talent against greedy clamorous mediocrity: it is the power of the sword; wielded by genius in the formation of the absolute yet free empire of the future. Do you think that liars, and cowards, and demagogues, and smiling plausable knaves, and men of showy promises, and the blind sodden crowds that believe in them, are the real masters of this world? No: and never will be while the laws of nature hold.

The loss to wholesale and retail consumers is only a portion of the evil that the official restriction of industrial competition causes. The working class as a class suffer through being deprived of employment which they would otherwise have got. For employment depends upon production, and nothing is more fatal to production than the official curtailment of industrial competition, which, by fettering the scope for private initiative, and by compelling industry to run in officially-prescribed cast-iron grooves, needlessly increases the cost of production all along the line.* The greatest possible amount of competition compitable with freedom from aggression or from fraud which is the equivalent of aggression, is necessary to the maximum bringing out of every useful order and degree of human faculties, as well as of all those varied improvements which result from the exercise of such faculties; and without new and constantly improved improvements, made continually on the top of old improvements, it is utterly impossible for production to keep pace with the ever augmenting demand, both for employment and for articles of consumption, of an ever increasing population. One illustration shall be given in order to make this point perfectly clear. If some of the old methods of production were to be reverted to now; let us say, to take a concrete case, the old fashioned hand-mill for grinding corn; the cost of production would at once become so great that few consumers would be able to purchase more than a very small quantity of corn, and many, probably the majority, would not even be able to do that. The consequence of this rise in the cost of production would be that corn manufacturers would only be able to produce a very small quantity of corn, and this they would have to sell at an enormous price to cover the cost of time taken in production, which last, in its turn, would be obliged to be conducted upon a much smaller scale: so that the result would be that thousands of workmen would be thrown out of employment, and millions of people brought to starvation.

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* Take Factory Acts; which, as Mr. BRADLAUGH shows on pp. 45-54 *Labor and Law* (Forder, 28, Stonecutter Street, E.C.), and Mr. PLATT's on pp. 71-75 *Poverty* (Simpkin & Co.) have driven an enormous amount of trade to foreigners. They increase cost of production, raise prices, lower wages, create monopoly, increase taxes, and drive trade abroad.

And precisely the same reasoning applies all along the line. For without improvements ever succeeding upon improvements, there would be no possible means of keeping up with the growing demands of a growing population; and without industrial competition, keenly and incessantly carried on within the just limits of exemption from aggression, and from fraud the equivalent of aggression, there would be no improvements, because there would be no adequate motives for producing them: since a producer never knows what he can do, or how much more cheaply or efficiently he can produce, until he is put to it by the spurring experiment-prompting competition of determined and clever rivals; that is to say, until he is left to sink with his own weakness, or swim with his own strength in the open markets of the industrial world. In proportion as he is "protected" against hostile industrial competition, or harassed in his industrial movements to an extent over and above what exemption from fraud and aggression requires, in that same proportion is he either encouraged to remain in a state of stagnant non-improvement, or discouraged from going to the increased trouble and expense of adopting new and improved methods of production. For just so far forth as he is protected from the rivalry of his neighbours, just so far forth is he relieved from the necessity of having to be continually on the look out for those new improvements and inventions which are calculated to enable him to beat his rivals in the business of successfully attracting the custom of outside consumers (to such extent, that is, at such custom is expressed through an open market): and just so far forth as he is harassed and restricted in his movements by arbitrary official rule of thumb, so far forth is all heart taken out of him, because the possibility of acting upon the conscientious promptings of his own individual judgment is to a large extent destroyed: and a man won't put forth extra special effort, even for his own interest, let alone for that of others, when he is prevented by official slavery from freely acting on the dictates of his own private recognition of whatever seems to him to be most just and fit under the particular circumstances that he may happen to find himself placed in.

All this, indeed, is so plain that those who run may read. The truth is, the competitive carrying on of industrial production, or of industrial distribution, for the custom-attracting supply of the world's market, is in itself such a difficult and delicate operation, that it is absolutely impossible for those who are engaged in it to enjoy more freedom than is good, both for furthering their own interests in particular and increasing commercial wealth in general: since, as a simple matter of fact, the latter is but the wealth of the fittest commercial survivals in the industrial struggle for existence as carried on among adults whose fitness to survive is proved by the degree of commercial success that they are able to achieve under such competitive conditions as are so far as possible limited by exemption from aggression and from fraud the equivalent of aggression.

If governmental agencies were more enterprizing than private agencies, there might then be something to be said in favour of protection. But we know from experience that the very reverse of this is the real state of the case. Governmental activity is the worst kind of activity that we have any knowledge of, barring, of course, right down criminality. The case for private enterprize as against state enterprize is well put by M. TAINE in the essay referred to on page 199 of this book. He says:—

" If we now take into consideration no longer the direct but the indirect interest of all; if, instead of looking to men, we concern ourselves with their works; if we regard human society as a material and spiritual workshop, the perfection of which consists in its being the most productive and economical, and as well furnished and well managed as possible; from this point of view again, with this secondary and subordinate aim, the domain of the State is scarcely less limited; very few new functions are to be attributed to it; nearly all the rest had better remain in the hands of independent persons, or of natural or voluntary associations.—Contemplate the man attending to his own affairs, an agriculturist, a manufacturer, a merchant, and observe his earnestness and devotion to them. His interest and pride are both involved. His own welfare, and that of those around him, is at stake, his capital, his reputation. his social position and advancement; while, on the other side, he has to face want, ruin, social degradation, dependence, bankruptcy, and the hospital. In the presence of this alternative he keeps close watch on his affairs and becomes industrious. His business keeps his mind on the stretch, even when a-bed or at his meals; he studies it, not afar off, speculatively, in a general way, but on the spot, practically, in detail, in all its bearings and relationships, constantly calculating difficulties and resources, with such sharp insight and special information, that for any other person to try to solve the daily problem which he solves, would be impossible, because nobody could possess or estimate as he can the precise elements which constitute it.. Compare with this unique devotion and with these peculiar qualifications the ordinary capacity and languid uniformity of an administrative head-clerk, even when an expert and honest. He is sure of his salary, provided he does his duty tolerably well, and this he does when he is occupied during official hours; let his papers be correct as the rules and traditions of his bureau demand, and nothing more is asked of him. If he conceives any economical measure, or any improvement of his branch of the service, not he, but the public, an anonymous and vague impersonality, reaps all the benefit of it. Moreover, why should he care about it, since his project or reform ends in a report that finds its resting-place in a pigeon-hole? The machine is too big, too complicated, too unwieldly, too clumsy, with its rusty wheels, its "ancient rights and acquired situations," to be reconstructed, just as one pleases, like a farm, a warehouse, or a foundry. Accordingly, he gives himself no further trouble in the matter, and, on leaving his bureau he thinks no more of it, but lets things go on automatically, just as it happens, in a costly way and with indifferent results. Even in a country of so much probity as France [!!!] it is calculated that every enterprize managed by the State costs one quarter more and brings in one quarter less than when entrusted to private hands. Consequently, if work were withheld from individuals in order that the State might undertake it, the community would suffer a loss of one-half when the accounts came to be balanced.

Now this is true of all spiritual or material labour, not only of agricultural, industrial, and commercial products, but also of works of science and of art, of literature and philosophy, of charity, of education and of propagandism; not only when the motive power is egoistic, like personal interest and vulgar vanity, but likewise when a disinterested sentiment is involved, like that which prompts to the discovery of truth or the creation of beauty, to the spread of a faith or the diffusion of convictions, religious enthusiasm or natural generosity, affection on a broad or on a narrow basis, in one who embraces all humanity or one who devotes himself wholly to his friends and kindred. The effect is the same in both cases, because the cause is the same. Wherever individual energies are free, the motive force is always enormous, almost infinite, because the source of it is a living spring which flows at all hours and which is inexhaustible. The mother thinks constantly of her child, the *savant* of his science, the artist of his art, the inventor of his inventions, the philanthropist of his endowments, Faraday of electricity, Stephenson of his locomotive, Pasteur of his *microbes*, De Lesseps of his isthmus, Sisters of Charity of their poor. Through this peculiar concentration of thought man derives every possible advantage from human faculties and surroundings; he himself gets to be a more and more perfect instrument, and moreover he fashions others; he daily reduces the friction of the powerful machine which he controls and of which he is the main wheel; he increases its yield; he economizes, maintains, repairs and improves it with a capability and success that nobody questions—in short, he fabricates in a superior way. But this living spring, to which the superiority of the product is due, cannot be separated from the producer, for it consists of his own affections and profoundest sentiments. It is useless without him; out of his hands, in the hands of strangers, the fountain ceases to flow and production stops. If, consequently, a good and large yield is wanted, he alone must have charge of the mill; he is the resident owner, the one who sets it in motion, the born engineer, installed and specially designed for that position. In vain may attempts be made to turn the stream elsewhere; it results simply in a stoppage of the natural issue, in a dam interfering with useful channels, a haphazard change of current, not only without gain but with loss, the stream subsiding in swamps, or running to waste and undermining the steep banks of a ravine. At the utmost, the millions of buckets of water forcibly taken from private reservoirs, half fill with a good deal of trouble the great central artificial basin in which the water, low and stagnant, is never sufficient in quantity or force to move the huge public wheel that replaces the small private wheels doing the nation's work.

Thus, even regarding men merely as manufacturers, in treating them simply as producers of what is valuable and serviceable, with no other object in view than to furnish society with supplies, and to benefit consumers, the private domain comprehends all enterprizes undertaken by private individuals, either singly or associated together, through personal interest or personal taste. This suffices to ensure their being better managed than by the State; it is by virtue of this that they have devolved into their hands."

There can indeed be little doubt in the mind of anyone who understands human nature, even though it be to ever so slight an extent, that no man can know how to manage a business half as well, and, in the end, half as advantageously for the general public, as he whose own personal interest is specially at stake in the business. Only he who wears the shoe knows where it pinches. In this most important and difficult operation of competitively meeting the demands of consumers; in so far, that is, as those demands are expressed through an open market; there are a thousand and one nice considerations, that are constantly arising out of the continually varying conditions of commerce and of industry, which none but those competitively engaged in the real business of production or distribution can be in any sort of position to properly estimate or act upon. Therefore any attempt on the part of a stupid external legislature, or on that of an equally stupid, because legislatively appointed, bureaucracy, to interfere with those who have all these intricate and risky considerations to take into account, is a procedure that must on the whole and in the long run be productive of greater loss than gain. This conclusion is not only sound *a priorily*, but all known facts point to its truth. Indeed, hundreds of years of widely extended and infinitely diversified experience have demonstrated to us that there is no force anywhere to be found in governmental bureaucratic monopoly, which is at all capable of doing the work of private interest operating under conditions of free industrial competition, and therefore continually stimulated to renewed exertion, as well as kept constantly on its mettle, by the ever present possibility of individual loss through commercial failure. Individual want, or, if you prefer it, private self-interest, is the spring of all human effort, and industrial effort is only put forth in proportion as individual want is felt, and in proportion as the results of the individual efforts which spring from such personally felt want are permanently secured to those individuals who put them forth: that is, of course, in so far as the said efforts are of a purely unaggressive character, and are carried on without interfering with the carrying on of other equally unaggressive efforts. Security is as necessary as competition. Out of the last proceeds the individual want in the absence of which there would be no adequate stimulus to effort, and out of the first grows up that most indispensible confidence which makes each individual feel it to be worth his while to make an effort. We are speaking, of course, of industrial effort, and not of any other kind. We know very well that in one form or another, effort can no more be suppressed than competition can be suppressed. Both have their roots irremoveably fixed in an eternal rock against which the moaning waves of sentimentality shall for ever break themselves in vain. In proportion as the results of the unaggressively-carried-on industrial efforts, whether efficient or inefficient, of each separate individual, are governmentally, and therefore arbitrarily, appropriated and distributed in such a manner that each individual receives in return for them, not what they would fetch through exchanges contracted for under conditions of equal exemption from aggression for each and all, but simply what some political majority or its politically appointed agents for the time being may fancy or pretend to fancy them to be worth, in that same proportion will each individual cease to put forth industrial efforts, and will commence to put forth non-industrial ones; these last (to be sure) being of all kinds and degrees, from the pleasing lies of a political campaign to the bitter truths of a military one: from demagogic revolutionary agitation to dynamite and assassination. Has not the encouraging transformation already begun, and is it not progressing most beautifully? When the fruits of his own industry, so far as carried on without aggression upon his fellows, are not perfectly secure to the labourer, it pays him better to compete by fighting than by working. That each adult should as far as possible always receive just what the unaggressive expression of his own nature brings him under a *regime* of voluntary contract as distinguished from a *regime* of compulsary status, be the amount so obtained much or be it little: that each, we repeat, should get no more and no less han this, is of the very essence of justice as between man and man; forming, as it does, the primary and indispensible condition of all industrial production, as well as of all commercial exchange. Of course it is perfectly true that this simple and unsentimental principle of justice is difficult to defend, especially for the cowardly and base; but failure to defend it will not go unrewarded: when man is too base to do his duty, Nature is well able to deal with him: and the more pronounced his unfaithfulness to the right, the greater will his reward be when it does come. As surely as there are stern unalterable laws of things, there is and shall be justice in this world for the cowardly and the base. The power of truth is stronger than that of falsehood. The simple courage of a real manhood which lives and works for truth, is mightier than the shallow lie of a shameful and unnatural brotherhood, and the day is coming when the former shall drive out the latter like chaff before the storm. In the long run it will be found that abstract principles cannot be sneered and laughed at with impunity; that loving trust of the Eternal, in the infinite intellect of which all sound principles are based, is greater than trust of humanity; that faithful allegiance to truth for its own sake, and for the sake of nothing lower, is more potent than crowds or majorities, or than all that such can ever manage to achieve. The strongest power in this universe is not the power of numbers, but is the power of One that cannot be numbered, and against which the envious baseness of humanity shall always measure its finite strength in vain: this power is the power of the Infinite of Infinites; it is the power that men call God: the reality wherein "we live and move and have our being," and where love finds its only worthy resting place in the silent depths of everlasting peace.

The very life and soul of trade is freedom; for trade, as such, is free exchange, and therefore whatever lessens freedom to an equal extent lessens both scope for the contracting of mutually-judged advantageous exchanges, as well as encouragement to contract such exchanges. The ideal of protection is a single individual producing everything for himself and exchanging nothing for what others produce; so carefully fenced in and protected by special restrictions that nobody can compete against him, while at the same time he can compete against nobody. Certainly under this unselfish arrangement there could be no heartless elimination of the less efficient producers by the more efficient ones. For where there is no industrial competition, where, that is to say, each separate competitor is not left; so far at least as any kind of compulsory provision or regulation is concerned; to stand or fall solely on the merits of his own industrial talents, no mutual measuring of separate industrial strengths is possible: inasmuch as the only effectual test of truth in matters industrial, namely competition, is destroyed: just as the only effectual test of truth in matters militant, namely militant competition, would be destroyed if the struggle of real war could be abolished.

The truth about every form of strength, human or non-human, is proved by struggle, just as the truth about gold is proved by fire. Indeed the highest can be brought forth into the light by no other way. Nothing for nothing. God helps those who help themselves. 'Tis an old but everlasting gospel, crushing sentimentality to the end of time. What is best must be paid for with the heaviest price. This is the eternal law of an inexorable justice which no finite power can ever alter, and he is only a fool who either desires or attempts to alter it; for it is according, not merely to human nature but also to universal nature, and whatever is really this cannot be radically changed. You may change the form of life's struggle for existence, but you cannot destroy the fact: there it is in spite of you, going on against you whether you will or no, coldly treating all your unmanly crocodile tears with the pitiless contempt they so richly deserve; and in attempting to abolish it you only drag humanity away from the higher forms of competition and once more plunge your fellows into those lower because more slavish forms, out of which, with so much pain and difficulty, they have been slowly but surely up-growing. The penalty for opposing the laws of nature is retrogression, the reward for obedience is progress. If you won't take the risk and responsibility of going forward, you shall have the loss and degradation of going backward. Stand still in a comfortable brotherly stagnation you shall not. There is justice but no more than justice for sentimentalists. If you are too cowardly to compete on the plain of freedom you shall compete on that of slavery. In any case you shall either compete or be competed against; either beat or be beaten to the end of the chapter. Your impious cowardice deserves nothing better, and it is well treated in getting nothing worse.

You are put into a world of competition and you object to compete. Nature gives you near and real duties and you despise them as being too hard and "selfish," continually calling upon "society" to supply you with sham ones in their place; as if society were stronger than nature, and the shallow lies of social convention capable of smothering out of sight the real distinctions of natural truth. Lover of darkness and confusion! hater of purity and light! Character most mean and base! When the mask of canting "brotherhood" is torn off, what are you after all but a devil's advocate of the envious hell in which you live? and into which if possible you would plunge the whole human race. A contemptible shirker of the real issue, you see plainly enough that in a world like this, where the normal function of the benevolent instincts is the parental supply of the real needs that are constantly arising out of the naturally and not viciously caused [as is so frequently the case with adults] helplessness of individually begotten and individually brought up offspring, men must necessarily compete, if only in order that each, in proportion to his strength, may get the requisit private means for adequately fulfilling those natural parental duties, which, without any doubt whatever, are privately and not socially contracted, and which, whether individually recognized as such or not, are never the collective entailment of any existing society, but always the consciously brought on consequences of the conduct of particular individuals; and should in a natural and just order of things be personally fulfilled by the particular persons who bring them on. You see this plainly enough, and yet you still go on canting about brotherhood and whining like a fool over competition; although you know very well that competition can never be abolished until natural individual duty is abolished also, and that universal brotherhood in your bad impure sense can only be established on the ruins of individual parenthood, and a lying conventional socialism bought at the expense of real manhood and real womanhood. It is not human selfishness that you are crying out so loudly against, but truth as it is in nature. You cannot stomach real natural distinctions: they are too undemocratic to go down. Well do you know that so long as they are recognised in society there is no standing ground for you and your unnatural system. Therefore you are not so much at war with selfishness as with innocence. Your great heart is so very, very sociable that you envy the helpless child its own mother's love. You think, and rightly too, that the more love the mother bestows on her own—her own in a sense in which it cannot possibly belong to the crowd—the less she will have left for the "brothers;" the pure, virtuous unen vying brothers. It is the poor bird's nest that you hate, O serpent with the oily tongue. Nay, you are too generous; much too generous. You "love" men and women so much that you would rob children of their natural rights; thus perverting and misdirecting the benevolent instincts by taking them out of their true natural sphere, to cast them like pearls before an incestuous herd of grown-up Yahoos, who, of course, will be far too brotherly and unselfish to individually know and personally appropriate their own children out of the common orphanage, so as to be able in their own way to do their own duties. This is the end of all your dear brotherly cant—a universal practical lie robbing every individual child of its natural right to the individual love and duty of its individual parents. Well may you denounce individualism. It is too plain and true to agree with your corrupt tastes. Your poor blood is bankrupt; you belong to a played-out stock; the strength of nature is taken away from you: and you must and shall be cleared off by a better and stronger and purer type that is to be. Rest assured that the future of this world is not for a filthy lying crew of cowardly duty-shirking Yahoos, let them sentimentalize and equalize and brotherize as much as they please. No, it is for men and women, and for real mothers and fathers, who are honest enough to know and acknowledge their own; who have sufficient nobility in them to honestly respect individually-contracted natural distinctions: to live to truth as it is in nature; compete without passion for the private means to properly fulfil the personal duties which grow out of, and rest, not upon changing artificial conventions, but upon unalterable natural facts; always looking for their reward, not to the worthless flattery of a crowd of incestuous "brothers" and "sisters," but to the perfect peace of that infinite Reality which is wider than personality, and to love and live for which is to possess a strength that is more than life and stronger than death.

The only effectual test of truth as regards industrial strength or fitness is free competition, carried on under such conditions as make industry profitable to those whose superior qualities, whether physical or mental, enable them to compete well; and unprofitable to those whose inferior qualities only permit them to compete ill. As already pointed out, these conditions are two, namely, exemption from aggression and from fraud the equivalent of aggression. The fittest in an industrial sense are those who manage to succeed most when competing under these two conditions; so far, that is, as such conditions can be realized in a society made up of imperfect human beings: and the unfittest are those who succeed least or not at all under such conditions. The realization of these two conditions, so far, of course, as they can be realized, is that human justice which constitutes the indispensible primary requisite to the continuation of the human race, and which, in proportion to its non-realization, necessarily leads to that race's deterioration and finally to its extinction. For man lives and continues his kind by means of what his industrial skill is able to wring from the forces of nature, and therefore, inasmuch as he cannot stand still in a comfortable brotherhood of everlasting stagnation, and must always be either going backwards or forwards, it is necessary to his progressive continuance as a species that those individuals who are best adapted to succeed under the conditions of industrial life; that is to say, those who are most skilful or most efficiently laborious under a *regime* of exemption from aggression and from fraud the equivalent of aggression, should be continually advantaged by their superior fitness, while, at the same time, those who are not adapted to succeed under these conditions should be correspondingly disadvantaged by their unfitness: in order that the fittest may constantly thrive and constantly propogate their fitness to succeeding generations, and the unfittest just as constantly dwindle and their type die out in nature's irrevocable struggle for existence.

Hard, cold, and unsentimental as this conclusion may seem to be, there is no escape from it. It is as certain as that the inner angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. In fact it simply expresses a fundamental law of nature; inexorable and irrepealable as gravitation. Throughout the world of living forms each highly developed species is preserved from generation to generation of its racial life by the constant elimination of such of its mature units as are least adapted to cope with the difficulties of their environment, and thus preserve themselves under the particular competitive conditions in conformity to which the species whereunto they belong is necessitated by its position in the evolutionary process to live, so long, that is as it remains the same species: and if it evolves into some other species, then, unless it sinks to a very low degree of vitality indeed, it merely passes from one set of competitive conditions to another, very much akin to the first in point of severity. So that from moment to moment of a highly evolved specie's adult existence, it is simply a varying summation of such of its adults as have managed to preserve themselves in the great struggle for existence. In short, it is merely a collection of selfish self-survivals, surviving and holding its own as a species precisely because a sufficient number of its units are individually surviving and holding their own as individuals. Self-interest supplemented by tha parental self-continuance which is but an extended form of the same egoistic tact; being, indeed, absolutely necessary to complete self-expression and self-development; is the fundamental basis of its collective life, and its only strength is the strength of the successful survivals that go to make it up.

For example, and to take a concrete case, the race of flying fish is constantly kept on the go as a race of flying fish by the continual elimination of such of its adult units as are least swift to escape the jaws of the pursuing dolphin. These "slow coaches," together with those members of their posterity that "take after them,"—and bad blood naturally takes after bad blood—constantly tend to die out by reason of the severity of their eliminating environment; and but for this most necessary process of elimination, all the members of the flying-fish tribe would sooner or later lose their present swiftness. The perpetual elimination of their weak adults is the indispensible condition of the survival of their strong adults, and the strength of their tribe is simply the strength of its strongest adult survivals. About this conclusion there can be no doubt whatever. For if the weak adults were not constantly killed off by the dolphin, they and their weak offspring would eat up the food required by the strong adults, as well as by the offspring of the strong adults; and would thus thrive and increase at the expense of the latter. On no other terms could they by any possibility be preserved; since the food supply of any given species is always at any given time limited either in amount or in get-at-ableness: nature being, in fact, but a vast whole of parts which are so intimately related that what is given here is taken from there, and what this species gains that species loses. [The brown rat occupies England, but only by eating up the food supply of an earlier occupier, namely the black rat; thus "eliminating" the latter out of "house and home."

The Anglo Saxon does the same with the North American Indian. So much gained so much lost: the law is absolute and nothing shall ever successfully dodge it.] If (to continue the previous argument) it were possible, generation after generation, to artificially preserve the slowest flying-fish by benevolently safeguarding them against the cruel jaws of the unsentimental dolphin, and by giving them and their offspring a constantly increasing portion of the limited natural supplies that would otherwise have been used in sustaining the swiftest ones; thus making the slowest ones and the offspring of the slowest ones as well or better off than the swiftest ones and the offspring of the swiftest ones; the race of flying-fish would at last become so slow and sluggish that it is questionable whether it would eventually possess sufficient energy to swallow enough food to "keep body and soul together:" whether, indeed, this "protected" race would not ultimately get very much into the lively condition of the famous pampered dog, which grew so shockingly lazy with perpetual coddling that at last he had the conscience to "lay him down to bark." It might, however, escape falling to this depth of weakness by stopping short at the parasites: fallen "comrades" that were once higher up in the battling ranks of life, but which, like the self-sacrificing officials of a loving state paternalism, have to a large extent escaped the severity of the general struggle for existence, by fastening their mouths to, and sucking like greedy bags upon, the devoted skins of those more highly developed creatures, which, not only for the sake of their own bags, but also for the sake of the bags that suck at them, have still as much as ever to face life's great competitive struggle in all its dire severity.

This, of course, is taking for granted that such a piece of benevolent foolery could be practically carried out. In point of fact, however, it would be absolutely impossible to carry it out. The food supply of any given species being limited, and the natural fecundity of any given species being in excess of its food supply, it follows that in the absence of a rigorous eliminating process, which puts an effectual check upon over-population by constantly nipping off the weakest and least fit types; that is to say, those unfortunate ones which, in accordance with an irrepealable process of variation, happen to vary in the direction of non-adaptiveness to efficiently cope with the difficulties of their environment; an increasingly deplorable state of general poverty would soon be reached, wherein more and ever more mouths constantly appeared than food wherewith to fill them. In proportion as this point was approached all the members of the species would either be obliged to die of starvation, or else the strongest variations—and whatever brotherly contrivance be adopted, no two things in nature can ever be made exactly equal, either in strength or in any other quality—would have to declare war and forthwith commence competing on their own account against the weakest, in order to get hold of this limited food supply, and by means of it selfishly continue *their* race (and not the race of the weakest) from successful parent to successful offspring; from surviving generation to surviving generation. Is it not mean, O my canting sentimentalist, on the part of the gods, to have so constituted this universe that life's race is to the swift and the strong, and shall be so for ever and for ever? Is it not cruel to have so framed the great laws of things that hard cold truth about nature is mightier than floods of sentimental cant? and that with this truth for their watchword and their strength, the strong and brave in days to come, shall strike down you and your shallow falsehoods with all the stern justice of a power that makes for right and for liberty, and whose strong ones cannot fail?

To be sure, it is true that the weakest, or at least some o them might vary in such a way as to be able to live upon a different kind of diet: but they could not possibly succeed in doing this in the absence of competition; for every successful variation is only enabled to be successful in virtue of the fact that its unsuccessful opponents have been driven out of the new competitive field on which it enters. Unless a varying creature becomes a mere parasite, it must sustain itself by living upon the food that other creatures previously lived upon: consequently those unfortunate "other creatures" must have been gently obliged to clear out of "house and home" in order to leave enough elbow room for their fitter successor. And even by becoming a parasite, a creature does not in reality evade the competitive law, or get beyond the reach of the struggle for existence. It only seems to do so. For in any case it must suffer with the higher competing creature, on whose skin it fastens itself and whose blood it sucks; just in the same way as American State Officials suffer with the particular government whose good or evil fortune they have elected to share. Moreover, the eliminating process plays upon parasites in another way. Those particular parasites that cause least loss to their host, will, in the natural course of things, inevitably survive over those that cause most loss. On no other terms could a balance of life be maintained. There is no living thing in this world that is not directly or indirectly influenced for good or ill by the process of natural selection, or, as it may otherwise be termed—"the constant survival of the fittest to live in life's universal struggle for existence."

In short, inefficient types must be eliminated by the struggle for existence, which, by constantly clearing off the unfit, leaves just sufficient food for the selfish sustentation and mean, unsociable self-continuance of the fit.

There is but one way of avoiding competition, and that is by falling down, down, down, in the scale of life, until at last you are lost in the darkness of eternal death. Yet even in this ignoble descent, you will not; at any rate not until you have reached a state of absolute extinction; escape the great law of competition: for all the way down you will be obliged to compete with the creatures that were once below you. The king may become a beggar, but only by competing against beggars for the gifts bestowed on such; and every little bit of private property that he puts into his mouth without the brotherhood's permission, will inevitably call forth the never sleeping envy of his fellow beggars. Better have remained a king, fearlessly fighting for the just and the true, striking down all liars and hypocrites without stint, and so moving firmly up life's rugged steep towards the peace that dwells in light.

"In the world's great battle field,
  In the bivouac of life,
Be not like dumb, cattle driven;
  Be a hero in the strife."

The lower you go down, the nearer you get to the highest ideal of Democracy; for the glorious goal of this movement is a boundless mass of structureless mud, every portion of which is equally level with and exactly like every other portion. Sink to this and you shall know no more troublesome competition. For only when all are equally lost in the mire, will the inferior give over envying the superior, and devils cease to conspire against the unshakable throne on high. Crawl on your belly; put your head level with your feet: that is the only real meaning of Democracy.

Now apply the foregoing considerations to the human species; a species that is as much a part of nature, and as much bound to exemplify her laws as any other species. Bear in mind that no two individuals of this species are exactly alike, either in point of mental or of physical efficiency; that, in fact, there is greater industrial inequality and diversity, *i.e.*, greater individual differences of power to increase or improve production, displayed in this species than in any other: inequality and diversity progressively becoming more pronounced as we ascend in the scale of life, and less pronounced as we descend. Indeed, incidental degenerations apart, the general process of evolution is, and always has been, towards ever greater and greater inequality; ever more and more marked diversity of personal traits and industrial potencies. This diversity is individuality: it makes each one somebody instead of nobody; a distinct person instead of a mere number in a flock of sociable, brotherly sheep; a man instead of a fool; an individualist instead of a communist: and towards it works the process of the suns.

Beavers are industrious; so are ants; so are bees: but then, as compared with men, these curious clockwork machines are all of them so extremely alike: instinct and not reason guides them; and the industrial efficiency of one, if not equal is at any rate very similar to another: therefore they can afford to be chummy, and go in for a good lot of the "share and share alike" business without much risk of swamping their ship with worthless cargo, or breaking their backs with lazy brotherly baggage. For this enviable security, however, they pay a heavy price in the total deprivation of everything in the nature of strongly marked individuality or variety, which, by the way, having never possessed, they never miss. Who would think of distinguishing one bee by the name of Mr. Smith, and another by that of Mr. Jones? No: they are either all Smith or all Jones, and "as like [or unlike] as two peas." They make magnificent communists, but there are no Shakespeares or Miltons among them: nay, not even a few professional traders upon envy to stir up the dull monotony of their mechanical existence.

With human beings, however, the case is entirely different. Man, so far as he is an efficient unit of his species, and, above all, a fitting citizen of that "eternal city" made up of men and beasts and birds and flowers and suns and worlds—a universal brotherhood far grander and worthier than any number of loving brothers—is not worked by the blind mechanic of instinct, but by the supreme light of reason. He is strong, and naturally fitted to survive in the struggle for existence, in proportion to the degree of his rationality: he is weak, and unfitted to survive in that struggle, in proportion to the degree of his irrationality; that is to say, in proportion to the extent of his slavery to sensuality, and to passion the child of sensuality. For the strength of man is not darkness but light, not flesh but soul, not humanity but divinity. In him there is only one fact that is pre-eminently divine, inasmuch as this fact alone brings him into peaceful harmony with the divine in the universe. This fact is reason. Through reason he becomes one with the infinite intellect of infinite reality: no longer the slave of time or of time's base entanglements, but free with the unconditioned freedom of an existence, which, because acting eternally according to the inherent necessity of its own nature, is eternally unbound by any foreign cause. Reason is the crowning glory of his manhood, its peace is the peace that passes all his ordinary understanding, and the white stillness of its purity is the divine end of his being. Through reason he re-born into that true liberty which no State can either give or take away; that liberty which is the foundation of all other liberties, and without which all other liberties are vain—the perfect freedom from lust and passion, the loving service of the light for the sake of the light and for no other sake: the liberty of the Kingdom of God which is within the soul of man.

The end, then, of man's existence, and indeed, the only real strength of his life, being reason, and not instinct, or passion, or sensuality, or anything of that inferior character; it follows that those political conditions which give the widest possible scope for the exercise and growth of reason, and consequently for the survival of the most rational human types and variations over the least rational ones, are the indispensible conditions both of man's existence as a rational being and of his progress towards the light and away from the darkness. As already implied, these conditions necessarily involve the greatest possible security for the unaggressively obtained property and the unaggressively carried out self-continuance of the former types and variations, because otherwise the irrational types and variations would soon swamp out the rational ones, and so the human species would come to an end.

These conditions are themselves prescribed by reason, and, as already pointed out, they are two, namely, exemption from aggression and from fraud the equivalent of aggression: so far, of course, as such primary requisites can be realized in a world made up of imperfect human beings. There is the same divine law for the species as for the individual; and just as the only strength of the unit is a loving obedience to the dictates of supreme reason, so the only strength of the race is a faithful, unyielding maintainance of those impartial conditions of justice that supreme reason prescribes. More than all and above all is justice; higher than affection or friendship, than pity or generosity: for even at best these things are only human; whereas justice is divine: these things rest upon the mutable personal feelings of finite beings; but justice is based upon a wider, deeper, and more secure foundation: not upon the bounded, inconstant sentiment of man, but upon the infinite, impersonal, and immutable intellect of God.

Justice, then, being first, we, so far as we see and understand this truth, are under the first of obligations to defend it for all rational beings whatsoever, just as readily as we would defend it for ourselves; since all beings are constantly one and naturally act together so far as they are governed by the dictates of supreme reason, though in perpetual disunion so far as governed by anything else: one in the everlasting light of infinite reality, but for ever divided in the never ending darkness of mere finite humanity. These most high dictates were by the Stoics called the "will of God" working in the soul of man, and on joint obedience to them such philosophers rested what they regarded as the only true and lasting brotherhood: true and lasting because based, not upon the love of perishable humanity, but upon the love of eternal reality; not upon the love of men for men, but upon the love of men for God.* A similar idea is in the New Testament—"For whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother."

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* In obedience to the dictates of right reason the Stoics identified self-interest and the interest of others. The only good is reason, and men may share and obey it in common without coming into conflict; but this is true of no material things. Says EPICTETUS: "For universally be not deceived, nothing is so dear to any creature as its own profit. Whatsoever may seem to hinder this, be it father or child or friend or lover, this he will hate and abuse and curse. For nature hath never so made anything as to love aught but its own profit: this is father and brother and kin and country and God . . . .
Therefore, if a man place in the same thing both profit and holiness, and the beautiful and fatherland, and parents and friends, all these things shall be saved; but if he place profit in one thing, and friends and fatherland and kinsfolk, yea, and righteousnees itself some other where, all these things shall perish, for profit shall outweigh them. For where the I and the Mine are, thither, of necessity, inclineth every living thing: ["Where your treasure is there will your heart be also"] if in the flesh, then the supremacy is there; if in the Will, it is there; if in outward things, it is there. If, then, mine I is where my Will is

This, it need hardly be said, is an entirely different brotherhood from that towards which modern Socialists either consciously or unconsciously move. This is a brotherhood in truth and duty; a brotherhood of those who strive to live according to Nature, and keep clear her natural distinctions of real relationship; a brotherhood in purity and the love of purity: not a low promiscuous hell where there is to be no manhood and no womanhood, and no scope for such; where life is to be one continual falsehood; where every single child born into the world will be practically orphaned in being severed from its true individual parents, to be lost, a poor, nameless, homeless, abused misery in the

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[where reason is], thus only shall I be the friend I should be, or the son or the father. For my profit then will be to cherish faith and piety and forbearance and continence and helpfulness; and to guard the bonds of relation. But if I set Myself in one place and Virtue some otherwhere, then the word of EPICURUS waxeth strong, which declareth that there is no Virtue, or, at least, that Virtue is but conceit. Through this ignorance did the Athenians and Lacedaemonians quarrel with each other, and the Thebans with both of them, and even now the Romans with Getae; and through this yet earlier wars of Ilion arose. Paris was the guest of Menelaus; and if anyone had seen how friendly-minded towards each other they were, he would have disbelieved anyone who said they were not friends. But a morsel was flung between them—a fair woman, and about her there was war. And now when you see friends or brothers that seem of one mind, argue nothing from this concerning their friendship; nay, not if they swear it, not if they declare that they cannot be parted from each other. For in the ruling faculty of a worthless man there is no faith; it is unstable, unaccountable, victim of one appearance after another. But try them, not, as others do, if they were born of the same parents and nurtured together, and under the same tutor; but by this alone, wherein they place their profit, whether in outward things or in the will. If in outward things, call them no more friends than faithful or steadfast or bold or free; yea, nor even men, if you have sense . . . . But if you hear, in sooth, that these men hold the good to be there only where the Will is, where the right [and rational] use of appearances is, then be not busy to enquire if they are father and son, or brothers, or have long companied with each other as comrades; but, knowing this one thing alone, argue confidently that they are friends, even as they are faithful and upright. For where else is friendship than where faith is, where piety is, where there is an interchange of virtue and none of other things than that?"

vile social crowd, there to have palmed off on it that devil's lie of the divine PLATO, namely, that it is the child of the whole incestuous community, when, in fact, every sociable devil will know full well that it is utterly impossible under any circumstances whatever for any human offspring to be the result of more than two individual parents. And all this sin against truth, all this outrage upon innocence, for what? Why, merely in order that a race of slimy twining serpents may be helped to shirk their natural duties, have their bellies constantly gorged with pigswash, and their lusts continually satiated with universal incestuous "brotherhood." Which is the true brotherhood?—that of lies or that of truth?—that of natural duty or that of sociable confusion?—that of men or that of devils? To which belongs the future?

Just in proportion as our fellow beings are rational and self-governing, we ourselves as equally rational, self-governing beings, unavoidably claiming in the very fact of our own self-governance as much individual freedom as we can unaggressively and therefore rationally obtain, are logically and morally bound, under certain penalty of sin against the light of reason that shines within us; as well as inevitable loss in the long run of the liberty we enjoy; to see to it that our fellow beings shall be perfectly free to do anything and everything that does not either aggress upon or defraud others; this non-aggressive and non-fraudulent behaviour on their part being, indeed, itself the only possible proof that, at any rate in their relations with the rest of the world, such beings are rational: and, whatever our own private suspicions may be, we are not warranted in treating people as different from what they seem until we have clearly proved them to be so; or justice is not governed by doubts and fears, but by facts. Among men who are freely governed by reason, non-aggressive and non-fraudulent people ought always to be perfectly free to go peaceably from place to place; thus quietly following what the reason of each inwardly assigns as the duties of each, and in this manner spontaneously obeying the god that Nature has planted within them rather than the Demos which she has placed without. It is not in any sense just that such people should be compelled to live as so many mere puppets, to be continually ordered hither and thither like slaves who exist solely for the sake of carrying out every new fad or crotchet that a set of narrow-minded fools and their equally narrow-minded mobs of noisy, half drunken voters may think likely to promote "the common good"; that is to say, the good of their own greedy, envious desires, and low, sensual, duty-shirking inclinations. This may be sound Democracy; certainly it is all that can ever be expected from what the Iron Duke truly described as the "aristocracy of blackguards:" but it is not fair play: it is condemned by reason, and the time will come when a stronger and cooler force than Democracy shall summarily put down all who practice and grow fat upon it. Non-aggressive and non-fraudulent people should be perfectly free to buy and sell, to give and receive, to contract and arrange, without let or hindrance either on the part of State officials or on that of the power and place-seeking quacks who appoint them. Liberty-and-property-respecting citizens should be free to get and keep whatever they can get so long as they abstain from aggressing against or defrauding others. They should also be free to manage and manipulate, and lend to others either with or without interest—or pay agents to do it for them—all objects which they have either unaggressively or unfraudulently obtained; proof positive to the contrary being required *for each individual case* before they are deprived of anything that they may own. Of course the same also applies to the monitery equivalents of all unaggressively obtained objects.

In fact people should always be free to deal with their own in any manner that does not demonstrably aggress upon other real personages then living: since, looked at in the light of justice, aggression implies an actual act, done to a real person who is known to be actually injured thereby, and not a possible act supposed to be done to a line of posterity which may never exist at all: moreover, human justice has quite enough to do to deal with real injuries, without attempting the endless task of redressing imaginary ones, whose influence may easily be supposed to extend "to the last syllable of recorded time." No man should be dispossessed of any property that he may hold until he can be clearly proved to have got such property either by force or by fraud, and until the particular person or persons from whom it has been so obtained can be severally and distinctly pointed out. If this simple and obvious principle were constantly recognized as it ought to be recognized, not even the very beginnings of socialism would ever be able to begin; and the vague, impersonal accusations of the enemies of private property would continually be treated with all the contempt they deserve. For the sentimental objector to private property, when looked squarely in the face, affords the strongest possible argument against himself, and is then clearly seen to be the thorough paced humbug he undoubtedly is. Nature herself takes a silent ironical pleasure in making a fool of him. Here is a person with private hands buried in private pockets, with a private skull full of private emptiness, loudly denouncing by means of a private voice the awful selfishness of private property. Folly is too inexpressive a term for this creed—but to continue with the main point. Liberty and property respecting individuals should be free to exchange their own unaggressive activities, or the unaggressively obtained results of their activities (on just such terms as they can unaggressively arrange) for the unaggressive activities, or the unaggressively obtained results of the activities, of other individuals: and they should also be perfectly free; if, that is, they are so minded; to do all this mutual exchanging business solely for the sake of their own private profit; in order that they may spend or invest such profit in any manner that the reason given them by nature tells them is best calculated to specially further their own private interests, and thus enable them to unaggressively preserve or unaggressively continue their own individual lives in their own individual ways. Such real freedom will not in the slightest degree whatever hinder them from being just as generous as they may severally feel inclined: and it is absolutely impossible for any human creature to be more than this; since generosity is not in the amount given, but in the will to give, and in that alone; the good will being the only good, and the evil will the only evil, that exists or ever can exist for human life. Under liberty there would be ample scope for every Socialist to be as sociable as he pleased, *but always at his own expense and never at that of his neighbour.* Real freedom will never prevent people from co-operating amongst themselves for just such ends and with just such persons as the separate inner judgment of each co-operator seems to individually warrant each in specially furthering; while, at the same time, it will not compel any man to assist in any form of association that his own private judgment condemns, or help, either with labour or labour's equivalents, any person or persons whose aims do not meet with his full, complete, and conscientious approval. Real freedom will always provide that no human being, however obscure and insignificant, shall be compelled to extend either help or property to anybody against the natural grain either of his heart or of his judgment, and consequently against the only efficient strength that nature has given him. The desire for unwilling help is the thoughtless want of a shallow-pated fool; for, in point of fact, such assistance would not be truly worth having; could not, indeed, be a real gift at all; inasmuch as, through being forced against the grain of individual character, it could not proceed from a spontaneous and therefore a generous motive. How clearly SHAKESPERE saw that a practical recognition of this most obviously unalterable law, affords the only solid foundation of human strength, is shown by the words he imagines Henry V. to have said to his soldiers on the eve of Agincourt:—

> "He, which hath no stomach to this fight,
> Let him depart, his passport shall be made,
> And crowns for convoy put into his purse:
> We would not die in that man's company."

This most just freedom, in proportion to the settled permanence of its security, alone affords sufficient scope to each man for making a rational self-choice between good and evil, as the latter appear, not in the distorted atmosphere of his artificially stimulated hopes and fears, but in the clear light of his natural, unintimidated judgment, which is his own by nature to respect and follow, and never to surrender into any person's keeping, or into the keeping of any crowd of persons, however large or however threatening. In providing such ample scope for rational choice, this freedom secures intact the indispensable condition of true manhood: a far higher and holier fact than any quantity of sentimental brotherhood, being, indeed, a real, strength-giving relation to the infinite reality from which all strength comes; and not a false, soul-destroying bondage to mere finite, time-serving humanity, which, being in its finite life only so much dust and ashes, has of itself no abiding strength, but only failure and death continually. Freedom is the very breath of manhood's life; for this life is the free, loving service of reason for its own sake, for the sake of the divine, ever present peace that is one with it, and which a man may possess without being enslaved by any external force whatsoever; either the sham force of votes or the real force of bayonets: either the quackery of to-day or the medicine of to-morrow.

Finally, under real freedom there would be as much security for private property as scope for the private carrying out of rational motives. In fact, equal freedom would be worthless without equal security; and, properly understood, the second is the logical correlative of the first. No true freedom can exist where all who have unaggressively or unfraudulently obtained property are not always perfectly free to privately possess and dispose of such property without being interfered with or dictated to by their neighbours. Equal freedom involves equal exemption for each and all from any arbitrary interference with whatever they may hold that cannot be clearly *disproved* to have been obtained without aggression or without fraud the equivalent of aggression. This does not destroy the right of a man to get about from place to place so long as he does not perceptibly interfere with, damage, destroy, or appropriate the property of his neighbours. Of course, as repeatedly insisted on, such perfect freedom as this is an ideal, and can only exist where all are mutually respecting both one another's unaggressive conduct and the unaggressively obtained results of such conduct [see bottom of page 40]. Immediately one man or one group of men compulsively or fraudulently obtain what another man or another group of men have obtained without compulsion and without fraud, the state of equal freedom; that is, the state of equal exemption from human interference with whatever has been unaggressively and unfraudulently obtained, is manifestly broken; the complete egg has suffered a most damaging fall, and no human power can fully restore to it its original perfection.

There then only remains to make the best of a bad job. Those who follow *unreason* have got to be dealt with as irrational beings, and with as little sacrifice of their freedom as is compatible with the securing of the maximum of freedom for those who follow reason. In fact, just government only exists to defend the rational against the irrational. That is the true meaning of it; that the true end of it; that its only legitimate function, and, just in proportion as it fails therein, it is on the sure and certain high road to destruction. True government is an unaggressively and unfraudulently exercised liberty, and an unaggressively and unfraudulently obtained property, defence league; resting, not upon compulsory taxes, but upon voluntary contributions, and some day such a league will defend justice all over the world. As an example of unjust destruction of equal freedom, take the following—A unagressively and unfraudulently picks up some pebbles on the sea shore, unagressively strings them together so as to form a necklace; and then unaggressively places that necklace round the neck of the freely-consenting B: but C, observing the toy, and envying B the possession of it, takes it away by force from the person who had fairly, because unaggressively, obtained it. Clearly a destruction of equal freedom in the matter of private property. It applies to every kind of unsociable socialistic confiscation, and under a *regime* of equal justice such miserable acts of dishonesty would be treated with the swift punishment they so richly deserve. Under such a *regime* all *rational* beings would enjoy a real equality, for each would be equally secure (so far as human power could achieve it for him) in the private possession of all unaggressively and unfraudulently obtained property; whether such property amounted to ten pence or ten million pounds; and equally free to dispose of it in any manner that did not plainly aggress upon others. This is true equality, for it is equality before just law; and in proportion as it is sternly and resolutely carried out, all justly, because unaggressively and unfraudulently, obtained private property will be as secure from the political confiscations of unprincipled Socialists as from the busy fingers of common thieves This is the justice that is one with freedom and the freedom that is one with justice. This is the polity dictated by that supreme reason, the light of which, though dwelling in man, is yet infinitely higher and wider than he ; which constitutes his only real and lasting strength; and which, in years to come, shall lead him out of the poor, blind, sentimental slavery wherein he now seems almost lost, and bring him into the free, fearless manhood of nature's crowning race. You say "Ah! but this polity is at present losing ground." What of that? It has lost ground before, but always in the long run gained more than it has lost. It loses for the years but wins for the ages. Are not the civilizations of to-day freer than the older ones? They have advanced further into the light, and now they go back into the darkness. What of that? Let them go. They deserve their fate. Who trusts in the strength of the Eternal need have no regrets and no fears. Let him only do his duty and his soul shall be at peace in the perfect fulness of God. Truth will conquer at the last. The human race is wider than any civilization, than any number of civilizations, however pretentious and corrupt; and through this race there works a mightier power than legislation: a power that is one with every star and every world throughout the universe. With this power rests the destiny of humanity; and this power makes, not for the sentimental injustice of socialism, but for the rational justice of individualism: not for the slavery of man to his neighbours, but for the freedom of man from his neighbours: not for the life which is lived for the sake of what is human, but for the life which is lived for the sake of what is divine. The false brotherhood of socialism is behind: the true manhood of individualism is before; and, though particular individuals and communities may go back to be lost in that dark, hellish confusion of all clear, natural distinctions, yet the bravest and noblest of the human race do not go back; but the movement of Nature herself bears them ever forward and upward towards the purity, truth, and duty of freer days to come. Cowardice does not finally win in this world: falsehood does not win: shirking of natural duty does not win: cant does not win: bribery does not, trading upon the envy, greed, covetousness, and lust of the base multitude does not. In the long run this polity of justice, this creed of individualism, will survive over all that is mean and base and unmanly; over all the shallow, frothy speeches and time-serving policies of that blatant sham called modern democracy. It may fail with this nation or that empire, because they are too weak to carry it out, and because their weakness is dragging them down, first into slavery, then into extinction; but with the best and strongest of the human race it will not fail: and it will not fail because it cannot fail: and it cannot fail because the ever more and more complete carrying of it out is the necessary and irremovable condition of racial survival: and because that race which most perfectly carries it out will triumph over every other race in the great struggle for existence. And that race will do this solely through getting rid of those base irrational types which are not adapted to conform to the indispensible conditions of human survival; that is, to the conditions of liberty and of justice which is one with liberty. All socialistic races will be sunk with the weight of their own unjustly and artificially preserved rubbish; their irrational types, who hate reason and obedience to reason, and who, therefore, are devoid of the strength of reason. For what constitutes fitness in humanity, except obedience to the dictates of reason? that is, to the moral laws of the Eternal? And what determines in the last resort whose race shall survive and whose shall not? Not a finite humanity but an infinite reality. Those who rest on humanity shall break down. Those who rest on sentiment shall break down. But those who rest on the truth of that Eternal Power which wields the heavens and the earth, and works through all lives and all beings, shall not break down. To them belongs the future of this world. From them shall spring the crowning race of human kind.

CONCLUSION.

The end, then, of life is reason, or rather, the divine peace that a loving service of reason gives. And the fullest possible scope for the play of reason is equal liberty for every kind of unaggressive or unfraudulent activity: this involves, as already shown, an equal security for the results of such activity. Man has a natural right to this real and secure freedom because he has a right to do right; not from fear, but from love: because his true nature is rational, the Eternal Reality having given him an inner divinity, the image of that Reality's own infinite intellect, to love and serve all the days of his life; a pure and holy light enabling him to distinguish right from wrong, and follow the former while avoiding the latter, freedom being the condition of his freely doing so; that is to say, of his doing so from a motive of love which is free from the fear of human punishment. This love unites him in oneness with the Eternal, and so makes him truly free in that perfect exemption from the constraint of foreign causes which the Eternal alone possesses. The same love also takes away the slavery of his passions, makes him pure, and gives unto him the calm, passionless activity of the one, the only existence: the great impersonal, awe-inspiring infinite of infinites: the reality which men call God, but which in all its perfect fulness can never be known to mortal beings.

These conditions of freedom and of security the correlative of freedom, so far as they can be realized, guarantee that all shall have an equal scope for making a rational use of their separate and diverse faculties; that is, for rationally competing with one another in mental, moral and physical strength, and by so doing bringing out to the fullest possible extent the separate individualities of each: not, indeed, for the sake of the material things or the fickle human sympathies that perish, but for the sake of the peace of duty that does not perish. For the sake of this peace all human actions, from the greatest to the smallest, may always and at all times be equally done; and those who live in this peace enjoy a companionship that is more than social, that is cosmic: that is more than human, that is divine. High as the heavens are above the earth is this peace above the restless social life of man.

This, it may be said, makes life one continual competition. Well, what if it does? Those who have peace within do not mind the storm without. Those who love what is eternal do not pine for the love of what belongs to time. Does competition prevent a man from doing his duty? from making the most of each circumstance that presents itself? and from doing this in accordance with the dictates of his own reason? of the light that shines within him? This miserable whine over competition sinks modern life below the level of ancient paganism. A man must compete, and he cannot serve both his own reason and the sentiments of others. "If I counsel honourably" said CHRYSIPPUS "I shall offend the citizens, and if basely, the Gods." It is the part of a coward to run down necessary war. However fiercely rages the battle, a man can always do his best, and for his own sake strike the hosts of darkness with such strength as he has got. The strongest can do no more, the weakest should do no less. He who only uses one talent well is equal in the sight of the infinite intellect of infinite reality to him who uses ten talents no better, and far fuller of peace than he who uses twenty talents badly. "But in this struggle some must fail if others succeed." None need fail in securing the peace which comes by doing the duty which reason prescribes; and those who secure this peace are above the losses of time; its stings and disappointments cannot prick them more: to them it matters not whether they succeed or fail; for in any case they have their reward, and at last but go out of the present peace that is into the eternal peace that shall be. Having fought, though possibly only as a common soldier, in the great fight of truth, they pass into its everlasting light and become one with it for ever.

But it is not absolutely necessary that life should be all competition. On the contrary, it is indispensibly requisite that one side of it should always as far as possible be uncompetitive; and this simply in order that a sufficient number of strong, healthy competitors for stocking and replenishing life's great arena may be constantly supplied. Here we come to the very foundation stone of Individualism: here we strike the keynote of its polity: and here we shall be able to sum up what that polity is, on what it rests, and what it means: only premising beforehand that all we are about to say merely describes nature, and truth as it is in Nature; and refers not in the remotest possible degree to that shameless, impious lie called modern civilization: a lie which is fast going down the broad road to long deserved destruction, there to suffer the vengeance of a power whose laws can never be mocked and scorned with impunity.

There is one human relation into which competition does not naturally enter; namely, true, natural, pure and honest individual parenthood: a relation by means of which, so far as life is lived to truth as it is in nature, each individual that comes into the world is carefully trained for fearlessly competing in the great struggle of adult competition. Out of this relation, and just in proportion as it is at once both absolutely voluntary and absolutely pure, spring all those sterner virtues which alone make life worth living and men and women worthy to live it. From hence comes nothing that is cowardly or base, nothing that is frivolous or paltry; no puling sentimentalism or stifling, poisonous cant: no miserable prostitution of manhood before the flesh and dust of outside humanity. Here is, or rather was, the sacred birthplace of honour and of chivalry, of courage, purity, and highmindedness; of all that ever made or ever can make real nobility. All gone out of these Yahoos; out of high and low, of aristocracy and democracy alike; but not gone out of Nature: and some time in the future they shall rise again, to shine starlike and clear as they never shone before.

It is mainly for the sake of securing a free scope for this relation, and for the virtues bound up with it, that the polity of individualism is formulated; is advocated, and will be advocated; is weakly and imperfectly carried out now, but, as surely as truth is truth, will be more firmly and thoroughly carried out by the braver hearts and stronger hands of days that are to come. Why will it be carried out? Because man, so far as he is a rational being, is bound to serve truth: because those who serve truth, however few they may be in number, are stronger than those who serve falsehood; because the fittest must survive; and because the constitution of things is such that whatsoever either directly or indirectly seeks to establish the universal lie and the universal defilement of communism, is bound sooner or later to be met face to face, and crushed out as mercilessly as vipers are treated by those whose business it is to destroy them. In a word, because there is a right which is above all expediency, and a power that makes for truth and purity, against which no lie can in the end prevail.

The real nature of man being reason, there is a natural order of relations corresponding to that reason; in short there is a true order of things corresponding to the reason in man which is capable of knowing truth: an order which, though it may not be completely known in the intellect of any particular man, is always completely known in the infinite intellect of God; of which man's intellect is but a part, bearing, indeed, about the same relation to God's intellect that any point in an infinite line bears to the line itself. In this sense God is truth as well as love, and only those who live to the truth can know the love. To live to truth is purity, and love is the child of purity.

There is, then, a true order or cosmos corresponding to the reason of man as part of the intellect of God, and the only normal function which a rational being, as such, performs in this order, consists in living in rational harmony with it: but this he can only do by keeping clear, so far as lies in his power, the distinct relations in which the various facts contained in this order naturally and necessarily stand towards one another. So far as he clearly distinguishes these relations and knows them as they are known in the infinite intellect of God, so far as he bears himself calmly and rationally towards them, constantly endeavouring to deal with them without being swayed by any passion, but always with a desire to preserve his own true, rational nature as pure as it is at its best; so far does he do what may be termed right, because so far does his own intellect grow into line with that of God. Thus does he become one with God, and with his own true nature as part of God; thus, to use a Shakesperian phrase, does he grow into eternal lines with time; thus, as SPINOZA says, does he come to view everything under the form of eternity; and thus does he live harmoniously with the truth of that natural order of facts which is one of the infinite expressions of an infinitely infinite reality. In the same way, through rational oneness with what is divine, he also obtains the freedom of an existence which, being everything, cannot be constrained by foreign causes; and so dwells in the peace of those who prove their love of God by living to truth as it is in Nature.

From this it follows that, inasmuch as living to truth is the measure of reason, and living to falsehood the measure of passion, and of the impure darkness of passion's life; man must necessarily endeavour in virtue of his very rationality, and just in so far as he is rational, to live under conditions where the highest possible degree of truth respecting the natural relations in which the facts that make up Nature necessarily stand towards one another, is clearly and permanently manifest. For in proportion as a rational being encourages any conditions involving falsehood; involving confusion and misexpression respecting natural relations; involving the obscuring of the clear distinction of things as they are in Nature; such a being mars the purity of its own rationality, sins against its own light, against what is divine within it, and sinks in life's scale towards darkness and destruction. All this is self-evident. For reason being the only strength of man, being, indeed, the strength of God in man, it is only strong and itself in proportion as it endeavours to see and live by those relations as they really are in Nature, and not as they may be hidden by passion, or falsely made to appear by unnatural, though it may be very brotherly and sociable, arrangements. The life of reason is the life lived according to the clear distinctions of things as they are in Nature, that is, according to truth; and this is purity: and purity is the clear-sighted strength of man. This fact is writ large on every page of history; in every sphere of human life. How well it was exemplified in the history of the Jewish race! So long as that race remained pure, it conquered; striking down hosts of foul, impure breeds like corn before the sickle; clearing them out root and branch, as they deserved; for they were adopting communism: and there is an eternal justice which will not allow that monstrous sin to survive in the struggle for existence.

In no figurative, but in a most literal sense, purity of breed was to those early Jews a god of battles and a lord of hosts; as it was to the early Romans: as it was not to the later Romans; as it was not to the later Jews: as it shall be to Nature's crowning race, whose empire of freedom and of justice shall reach from pole to pole.

The reasonableness of life according to Nature, or rather to truth as it is in Nature, and, therefore, as it is in the infinite intellect of God, constitutes the ethical foundation of Individualism: and on this basis is reared the individualistic polity, so far, of course, as Individualism has a polity; and, as pointed out on page 16, if human nature were perfect, no polity would be needed, for then truth and purity would be all in all, and man's lost Eden found again. But human wickedness renders a polity necessary, and will render one necessary for ages yet to come. There are well-intentioned and bad-intentioned in the world, and, as someone well says, "the good are few." There are people who love truth and to live to it, and there are people who hate it with an exceeding bitter hatred, who look on natural duty as a bondage, and seek by every possible means, both social and political, to shuffle out of it, and shove it on to the backs of others. Men and women there are who love darkness rather than light, because their aims, however much sugared over with cant, are evil and sensual and devilish. In a word, there are those who delight in the service of unreason, of worldly pleasure, and sociable vanity, and lust, and passion ; caring nought and thinking nought of all the shameful falsehood and confusion that such service inevitably causes. But notwithstanding this the true nature of man is and always must be rational. As a species he cannot and will not go back into the darkness: he must move upward towards the light; and whatever foul and evil thing ventures to obstruct his forward march will sooner or later be mercilessly trampled beneath his feet.

Now Nature, in evolving this as yet imperfectly developed human species, has evolved three naturally distinct and separate spheres for the play of the activities of man in so far as he is a rational being, and three special kinds of activity corresponding to them. First, she has evolved a non-competitive sphere, wherein, if there is life lived according to the truth as it is in Nature, and as it is known in the infinite intellect of God, individual man may naturally and truthfully continue himself as a being naturally separate from other men, and endowed by Nature with separate powers of self-continuance. This is called the family; and although, as our pure-minded preachers of the gospel of brotherly love are so extremely delighted to see,* it is now in this and other countries fast going to ruin on the vanities and luxuries of a false, hollow sociability; yet in a future race it will survive to see the death of that old serpent, material communism, and rise to its true purity and perfection when the morally, mentally, and physically bankrupt nations of a shabby genteel civilization have consumed both themselves and their posterity in the seething caldron of their shameful and most unnatural corruptions.

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* *Fabian Essays*, pages 134 and 146

One sphere for the activity of man, then, in proportion as he is rational and a lover of truth as it is in Nature, is the family: a purely paternal and non-competitive institution when in a healthy condition, which it invariably is in a rising empire, and invariably is not in a falling one. For example, the power of the Roman Empire was built upon the purity of the family life, and with the spread of communism that power declined, and finally went to pieces. While barbarians were attending to their individual natural duties, the men and women of Rome were neglecting theirs to wallow in the gilded filth of truth-obscuring lust, and at last the sword of Nature's inexorable justice fell upon the shameful lie of communism.

Outside the non-competitive family Nature has evolved another sphere for the play of man's faculties so far as they are governed by reason, namely. a competitive sphere of an exchanging or non-aggressive character, where, as was shown on page 104, a man may rationally compete with other men on a footing of personal independency, for the purpose of unaggressively securing the requisite means for efficiently carrying on his natural function of self-continuance; that is to say, for the end of maintaining his family, which he naturally, and just so far as he is rational, prefers should be his own, and not in any sense whatever that of his very dear, chummy, but sometimes envious and covetous "brother." This miserable selfishness on his part is exactly what makes competition with his sweet "brothers" so just and necessary. For God, or Nature, will not for long permit him to tell his children the infamous lie that they are not the children of a particular father, but of the whole herd of Yahoos: God or Nature sooner or later stamps this lie out; and, therefore, so long as he is bound to live to the truth, he cannot expect his "brothers" to co-operate for the purpose of providing him with the means for having a private family, which they shall help to support in order that he may have the sole and exclusive monopoly of getting. This is not just and it does not wash. Says Mr. W. HEPWORTH DIXON in the second volume of his amusing and instructive work on *Spiritual* [!] *Wives*—"The very first conception of a Socialistic State is such a relation of the sexes as shall prevent men and women from falling into selfish family groups. Family life is eternally at war with Socialistic life. When you have a private household you must have personal property to feed it, hence a community of goods, the first idea of a Socialistic State, has been found in every case to imply a community of children [already people in the East End of London are agitating for the feeding and clothing of their, or the State's [!] children out of the rates and taxes] and to promote a community of wives. That you cannot have Socialism without introducing Communism is the teaching of all experience, whether the trials have been made upon a large scale or on a small scale, in the old world or in the new. All the Pentecostal and Universal Churches have begun their career with a strong disposition towards that fraternal state in which private property is unknown. Some have travelled along that line, adopting all the conclusions to which the journey led them, while others have turned back in alarm on seeing that the fraternal theory was at war with all the sacred traditions of home. The Shakers found their societies on the ruins of family life. The Mormons, in order to save their family life, have been forced to give up their inclination towards a common property in the Lord. The Princutes of Spaxton have to renounce their old ways of thinking when they place their feet in the Abode of Love. The Bible Communists (or Free Lovers) found their logical term in the doctrine, which they adopted, of a common right in goods and wives. [A "complex marriage" they call it. According to the supplement to *Chambers' Encyclopœdia*, the founder started "Bible Communism" with his mother and family.] All the social reformers who have striven to reconcile the family group with the general fund have failed, though some of these reformers, like the pioneers at Brook Farm, were men of consummate abilities and unselfish aims."

Outside the non-competitive family, and outside the non-aggressively competitive sphere of exchange, Nature has evolved another competitive sphere for the activities of man as a rational being, living, as in the present imperfect state of human development he must live, in the midst of beings who are often anything but rational. This is not of a non-aggressive character, and therefore the activity corresponding to it is only legitimate when undertaken, not for purposes of confiscation or enslavement, but solely in order to defend *or carry outward* those eternal principles of justice (and of freedom as being one with justice) which are dictated by the supreme reason of the infinite intellect of God, and behind which the strength of God moves in the arm of man: for that strength in relation to man is the purity of reason, and fearless, unflinching following out of reason's dictates. By means of the activity corresponding to this 3rd sphere, man may defend, keep clear, and widen ever further and further outward, both the 1st sphere for truthful, monogamic, self-continuance, and the 2nd sphere for unaggressively competing amongst his dear brothers for the private means of carrying on a most selfish, though perfectly natural and truthful self-continuance!

Paternalism, Industrialism, Militaryism: Self-continuance, Self-support, Self-defence. These are the three correlated spheres evolved by Nature in evolving the rational activity of man as individual continuer, individual exchanger, and individual defender. The perfectly separate and distinct maintainance of them enables him to selfishly live according to the truth as it is in Nature; not for the sake of his dear brother, but for the sake of the truth and purity which are worthier than any number of brothers, however dear: for the sake of obedience to supreme reason, and for the sake of the perfect peace that such obedience gives. The polity of Individualism consists in keeping these three spheres perfectly distinct, and solely by securing free play for the natural activities corresponding to each. If allowed to be distinct from one another they will simultaneously stand and strengthen each other with the strength of truth: but if compelled to become confused they will simultaneously fall with the weakness of falsehood; of unfaithfulness to truth as it is in Nature and in God. All history proves this. What ruined Rome and Athens and Sparta? What ruined Babylon and Judea? What ruined every dead and buried lie? Confusion. Confusion of clear distinctions as they are in Nature. What is destroying the loud, showy lies of to-day? The same deadly poison. A lie cannot stand and it won't stand. Does it deserve to stand in the presence of eternal justice, and in the light of the infinite intellect of God? which sees all things and knows all things that go on in this infinite universe. As an instance of the effect of confusing these clear distinctions of Nature, take the case of Sparta. In Nature the paternal sphere is for children, and the competitive sphere for adults. The latter sphere clears off the bad adults, and the former gives the children a chance of coming to manhood, and proving whether they can or cannot successfully compete. Such is the general law, and if it were not so no highly evolved species could survive; for the bad types, the variations in the direction of unfitness, would swamp everything. Well, the Spartans tried to reverse this natural order. They introduced paternalism among the adults. That is, they tampered with the natural process which clears off the bad adults, and of course then found themselves under the necessity of trying to get rid of their bad variations in an artificial manner. They killed off all their *apparently* weak children, and practiced brotherhood by lending their wives about amongst one another; for naturally, as they loved their children less they loved their brothers more: what was given to the impurity of humanity was taken from the purity of God: the *seemingly* weak young were gently hurled into a mountain cave, and the brothers and sisters honeyed and made love, as Hamlet well puts it, "all over the nasty sty." They all went to the devil. They undertook the work of God, and failed.

Such is the polity of Individualism. It is not founded in brotherhood, or in humanity, or in sentimentalism, or in sociable hypocrisy, or in anything of that description; but it is founded in Nature, in the truth of Nature, and therefore in the truth of God; whose visible expression Nature is. Even amongst some of the higher living forms the rudiments of this polity are clearly manifest. For example, according to Mr. H. Spencer, "An eye-witness affirms that among rooks, a pair which steals the sticks from neighbouring nests has its own nest pulled to pieces by the rest." Suppose, however, that instead of this harsh policy being applied to the socialistic rooks, an opposite policy was adopted. Suppose that all those rooks which made the worst nests were pitied for being so deucedly hard up, and kindly assisted by a majority of the rookery to take as many sticks from the best nests as they thought necessary for making good the deficiencies caused by their own mental, moral, or physical inequalities: suppose that all the slovenly, scamping, dirty, shirky rooks; all the good-natured, spendthrift rooks; all the unthrifty rooks; all the idle ones; all the fraudulent ones; all such as neglected, ill-used, or starved their badly-blooded progeny to indulge in drink and debauchery and other unnatural pleasures: suppose that all these, and the offsprings of all these, were provided with sticks compulsively taken from the best nests—*and remember that the best is rare, and must in the very nature of the case be in a minority*—what would be the natural outcome of such a polity if it were only persisted in for a few generations? Why, as was implied in the argument given on page 224, the rook species would soon all go to the devil. Yes, every man jack of them, every mother's son among them. It could not miss but be so. But suppose a wiser policy was adopted. Suppose that separate nests for separate pairs of rooks were abolished as being selfish, uneconomical, and unsociable; suppose that all the sticks of the different nests were taken, some to form a young rook's public nursery, where the promiscuously empoisoned young of every separate rook would be lost in the throng of the young of other separate rooks; suppose that some sticks were taken to form a public vivisection establishment, where all the young ones that were apparently weak in body, though possibly strong in intellect, could be lovingly and tenderly experimented upon (yea, even as a father pitieth his children) for the spread of science and the good of rooks in general; suppose that other sticks were set apart for the purpose of public libraries, and picture galleries, and museums, and theatres, and schools—all free as stolen rates and taxes can make them—and dormitories and refectories where all the chummy adult rooks could love the impurity of one another better than the purity of their collectively orphaned young ones: what would be likely to be the outcome of this profound polity? The fact is, my dear, loving brother, rooks are wiser than you are. They are nearer to God. They are not a brood of vipers, canting and lying in the sight of heaven, and trying to shove their young ones on to one another. See how selfishly they monopolize their own! Each pair knows its own and takes a natural pleasure in doing its natural duty by its own.

Who ever saw them go to balls or parties? Who ever knew them hire nurses to do what they should do themselves? Who ever heard of them sending their young away almost broken-hearted to a soul-corrupting boarding school. There in the light of heaven, and of that still higher heaven, which is natural duty, they personally, parentally train their young, until training is no longer needed. And shall not man do the same? But the training of his young takes the greater part of his life-time; and when he has finished this duty, he has achieved the peace which duty gives, and may calmly look towards the day when that which gave shall take back; so that what has been serviceable in the part may be equally so in the whole. And his love and his duty will live on through all the ages in his children, and in his children's children to the very end of the world.

Paternalism, Industrialism, Militaryism. Each in its place in the trinity of Individualism. The first of these three spheres indicate man's duties in the other two; his duties, not to his fellow man, for he has no duties to anything lower than God, but to truth as it is in Nature, and as it is in the infinite intellect of infinite reality. For, as already shown, man *must*, so far as he is a rational being, live in accord with truth; since rational life is itself but conformity to truth. Therefore, so far as he is rational, he must live by performing the duties which are necessary to rational life. As a separate selfish self-continuer he must endeavour, by marrying an honest woman: if, indeed, such a rarity can be found among sociable Yahoos; to possess and train up his own children, and he must not try to palm either them or the education of them upon those who, so far as he knows, have had nothing to do with the getting of them. Even rooks have sense to see this. As it is in the natural order of things for intelligent individuals to look after themselves, so it is in the same natural order for them to look after the continuances of themselves. Therefore individual man is naturally bound to get what he can to support his own family, so long as he does not go against his own true nature, which is reason; that is, so long as he does not confiscate or defraud unto himself what is due to the unaggressive activities of other men. Reason compels no man to live irrationally, and there is no reason why a man should live at all unless he can live rationally, and with due respect for *meum* and *tuum*

Out of the duties of provision grow the duties of defence. So far as a man is rational he must defend both himself and his family which is part of himself. If anybody interferes with his wife and children, he must die like a lion or a tiger in their defence: he must make no bones about it: for to act otherwise would be to die to reason, and therefore to God, and to the light of God within him.

And however brief may be a true man's fight, he necessarily lives longer than the coward: for at least he lives until he dies (and who can do more?) whereas the coward dies before he does die; and lives in the living death of darkness to God, and to the light of God, which is reason. The true man always remains himself and retains his true rational nature to the last, but the false man loses all, and yet lives on in the torture of that loss. Therefore as a soldier man must defend both the sphere for continuing himself and the sphere for unaggressively providing the means for so doing. This last may be only a small county, or it may be an empire; but so long as it is the place where he and his own are not interfered with, the same reasoning equally applies. He must defend his home and his liberty, or else freely pay others to do it for him. But he should do it always freely and because it is according to reason, and good and true and right for its own sake. His sword should be drawn by a free man, and it should be made of good steel because paid for out of free contributions, not made of bad steel because paid for out of compulsory contributions. It should be neither wielded by begrudging conscript hands, *nor bought with money stolen out of begrudging conscript pockets.* It should be as free as the old sword of chivalry; and some day such a sword will be drawn, and those who draw it will establish liberty and justice in every corner of the globe.

Just as it is according to reason that a man should look after, and defend without flinching, his own interest, so it is equally according to reason for him to defend the unaggressively acquired property and family which are necessary to his own complete and rational self-expression. Here are implied his three spheres of duty. The more he does his duty in the paternal or non-competitive sphere, the more he and his will survive over those who don't: the more he does his duty in the non-aggressively competitive sphere, the more he and his will survive over those who don't: the more he does the same in the aggressively competitive sphere the more will he achieve the same result. The fittest fathers, the fittest exchangers, and the fittest soldiers will survive; and the unfittest will go to the wall. And why should they not?

What in the long run will this survival mean? A free world without walled cities or closed ports; or restrictive tariffs; or interferences with unaggressive activities; or insecurity for the results of such activities: a world where men may go from town to town, from city to city, from port to port, and from land to land: where, if things are not doing well in one place, a man will be free to try better luck in any part of the globe. In short, it will mean a real individual liberty together with a real security for private property. And under the polity of which it will be the embodiment, the natural resources of all climates and all soils will be freely developed to an inconceivable extent. Under this polity man will be able to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's. For what is Cæsar's? Respect for individual liberty and private property, which Cæsar exists to defend. And what is God's? The free and unaggressive use of the faculties which God gives.

Such is individualism. It is the natural unity of the triple life of man, as free continuer, free exchanger, and free defender. It is the harmonious combination of his three spheres of natural duty. These three spheres, like the three sides of a triangle, necessarily involve one another, and the health of the 2nd and 3rd depends entirely on the health of the first. The home makes or mars everything. When good and pure it wins in the competition of industry, and it wins in that of war. The Roman Empire, for example, grew so long as its home life was good, stopped growing when that life became bad, and went to smash when it became too bad. Nature is too just to posterity to continue to give either offspring or power to the bad. When you laugh at her she laughs back at you, and her laugh is the crushing irony of God. Unnatural Frenchmen felt that irony at Gravelotte, and at Metz, and at Sedan. "Betrayed" Yes, and by their own impurity: and now going to the devil of extinction through the same fatal cause. Their dream of universal, industrial and military empire is ended. The realization of that dream is reserved for a purer breed. For just in proportion to the purity of the individualistic monogamic family there grows up the need for and incentive to useful production; and also at the same time the need for and incentive to that legitimate defence and extension of freedom for exchange which is necessary to efficient production, and without which the true maximum of production cannot be reached, or the wealth of all proportionately increased. It is no mere jingo saying that "trade follows the flag." The flag opens out new ground, abolishes protection, and firmly establishes freedom for unaggressive industrial exchange. If it does not it ought to do, and that flag which most perfectly does so, will survive over all others in the struggle for existence. But that flag will have to truthfully represent purity of breed. In proportion to the purity of the family life, free exchange and free production will grow from more to more; and just in so far as this natural growth takes place, the circle of steel in which alone such free activity may with present human nature be securely carried on, will widen outward and outward, until at last, in the far future, the flag of one free empire waves on every land and on every sea. This is no Utopia; but the inevitable result of a natural process of things: a consequence, in fact, of the on-going of that universal order to which the whole human race naturally and organically belongs. All events make for it. It is coming with the hours and the years and the centuries; coming though ages may roll away before it is fully realized, and all existing states deservedly perish in their short-sighted tyrannies, ignoble vanities, luxuries, follies, and corruptions wide as deep. The most real of ideals; there it exists, high in the light of what to time seems future: a true *Imperium et Libertas;* a true embodiment of "a polity in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech; the idea of a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed." There, white and clear, radiant with the beauty of a divine human nature's perfect peace, it waits silently and securely, till justice shall unite with power, and the purity of Christ and the genius of Cæsar rule from the single throne of the single empire of that free earth which is to be the end.

NOTE TO PAGE 6.

Reason is limited only in this sense: namely, that it can no more avoid drawing certain conclusions from certain real or imaginary premises as, for instance, that in so far as A is equal to B and B to C, just so far is C equal to A ; than water can avoid exemplifying the laws of fluids, or unsupported bodies avoid falling to the ground. Although to us reason appears to be an ultimate, an unconditioned, and, given the requisite subject matter, a spontaneously self-legislative process, yet it has a necessity of its own, which cannot be explained by reason, because it is bottomed in what a finite can never know, namely, the infinitely infinite fulness of God : *i.e.*, because its base is not in time but in eternity. This necessity is the same in all men, and all argumentation is but this symbolized necessity calling unto itself; that is to say, is but light within seeking for light without, and seldom finding anything more than love of darkness and fear and hatred of what is higher; seldom finding the light which alone makes true kinship: of course, always finding any amount of "pathological liking," as KANT well describes that low sentimentalism which is everywhere as cheap and nasty as the dirt it is on a level with; but seldom finding glad recognition of the moral law that reason alone sees: and consequently not often finding "a practical love, resulting from maxims of conduct, and not from ebullitions and overflowings of the heart." What is this moral law; this Categorical Imperative; this "Word" which "was with God"; this "life" which "was the light of men" and "shineth in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not?" Simply the universal law of justice, than "duly to praise" which "there is no greater glory for men or gods." A rational as such, and consequently a man in so far as he is rational, *must* treat each thing with which it has to deal, according to each thing's clearly perceived nature; for example, men as men, brutes as brutes, inanimate things as inanimate things; varying the treatment with the variations of the natures dealt with: for this kind of conduct is the only possible witness of reason, which in us is at once both spontaneously practical and inexorably imperative. To a rational, considered wholly as such, *must* gives *ought*; and therefore in so far as a man is rational, he can because he ought; since what must happen most assuredly can happen. In fact, the appeal to reason is but the proving of the rational must, and is consequently but the bringing to light of the ethical ought; and therefore is the imposition of a real, because a binding, *obligation* upon the true and rational nature of man. In other words, a true ethic is solely and simply an appeal from the variable *personal* feelings of base humanity to the immutable and imperative logic of the infinite, and therefore the *impersonal*, intellect of God. This is why, to a rational as such, it is impossible to prove that duty, or obedience to supreme reason, *ought* to be done, without at the same time proving that it *must* be done. For in a rational there are no impediments to this obedience; because in such a nature love moves with reason, and fear is not: all the oars, so to speak, pull some way and every stroke brings nearer to the light. To a rational there is but one love, namely, the love of God, a unique regard consisting largely of joy at being so constituted as to be absolutely free, because independent of all slavery to mere human feeling, and therefore capable of acting upon the dictates of a pure and supreme reason for the sake of the simultaneous peace which such conduct never fails to give. This love moves as firmly to duty as the magnet to the pole. Without it the bare dictates of reason are utterly powerless to regulate conduct; since men have not this love because they obey the dictates of reason, but they obey those dictates because they have this love. Love and duty are one in God alone, and this oneness is the essence of all real freedom. For so far as a man acts from love of what is free and unconditioned he has the freedom of that with which his love makes him one. Thus it is that only through the love of God are men freed from the miserable bondage of sentimentalism. Whosoever has this love needs no comrades; he is never alone; for he has the companionship of the Eternal, and the peace of eternity dwells in him and he in it. From the foregoing it follows that in so far as we are rational we *must* treat other rationals as we ourselves would like to be treated; for in so far as men are rational they are our very selves objectified. The golden rule is but a necessary deduction from the universal moral law of reason, the Categorical Imperative valid for all rationals under all circumstances · Treat each thing according to its clearly perceived nature. But precisely the same Imperative which gives the golden rule for the treatment of rationals, forbids it for the treatment of irrationals. For example, "Treat each thing according to its nature" does not mean treat a wild irrational mob to a good champagne supper, it rather means "Disperse such a mob in the most effectual way possible, so as to make an efficient example for the millions of irrational beings who are only kept in some sort of respect for justice through fear, their second nature."

NOTE TO PAGE 53.

The only intelligible meaning of freedom is exemption from interference, and this was all that was given to slaves. In this sense, an ignorant man who is not interfered with, is as much exempt from interference ar a wise man who is also not interfered with. To be sure, the ignorant man may not be able to make the same "use of appearances," but he is equally free to make what to him seems the best use, and therefore to do his duty. The wisest cannot be freer than this, nor, in fact, have a higher joy than this. And the same argument applies to food. An empty-bellied man who is not interfered with, is as free in the only intelligible meaning of freedom, and is as exempt from interference as a full-bellied man who is also not interfered with; and he is equally able to do his best with the difficulties of his lot, though, of course, when judged externally, this best may only seem a poor best. As for what "reason assigns as desirable;" all it assigns is that a man shall do his best under *any* circumstances, to the end of furthering his own interest as a rational being, and, above all, as a part of that infinite reality to which he belongs. Considered as such a part there are times when reason tells a man to make the best use of life: there are other times when she tells him to make the best use of inevitable death. Under freedom both can be done well and for the sake of the true interest of a rational being. If a man is exempt from the interference of others he is free, and all the food in the world cannot make him more so.

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to population, notwithstanding enormous growth of reformatory and industrial schools, for "whatever the prisons have lost these establishments have more than gained." "Grave offences against women and children have almost doubled within the last 30 years." Even if the growing practice of substituting fines and bail in place of imprisonment, be left out of account, "the fact still remains that crime, as judged by the growth of the prison and the reformatory and industrial school population, has become more prevalent in the last two decades. *The Increase of Crime.* By the Chaplain of H.M. Prison, Wandsworth. Nineteenth Century, June, 1892. Statistics given.

NOTE TO PAGE 193.

In other words, if one set of evils, to wit, those of compulsion, hold in check another set of evils, namely, those which would exist if compulsion were absent, then it follows that the first set cease to be evil and become good. As if a lesser of two evils could suddenly change its nature, immediately something greater than itself is removed. As if a little monkey ceases to be a monkey when he has knocked a bigger monkey on the head. The policeman may be a lesser evil than the burglar, but what man in his senses will say it is not an evil to have to be beholden to the former?

NOTE TO PAGE 351.

"Bad blood naturally takes after bad blood." Heredity is of course qualified by variation, but it is impossible to tell beforehand which direction the latter will take: whether towards morality or depravity. You force, let us say, what you consider a neglected child away from its debased parents, clothe it in fine linen, and feed it well every day. Even if it turns out respectable, you are only encouraging the parental neglect of natural duty; a general evil which far outbalances any special gain, seeing that it strikes at the root from which all duty grows. The real parents may be bad, but then they are the real parents, and, compared with them, you are only a sham. Encouraging them to neglect their duties will not in the long run improve either them, their posterity, or the world in general. Of course it may find employment for an army of spies, who illegally break into the houses of the poor, and take away children to be officialy farmed and trained up in herds and droves of dozens together. But this is infinitely worse than bad parenthood. Many of the rich people who support this expensive system, grossly neglect their own natural duties, and then set spies to watch whether the poor fulfil theirs. O the hypocrisy of it! One grain of real personal virtue outweighs it all.

NOTE TO PAGE 386.

To be properly carried out this polity requires the whole world for its theatre, and behind it a force sufficient to put down all aggressions against individual liberty and private property, to maintain equal lasting security, prevent the imposition of hostile tariffs, and keep clear an open scope for the easiest possible exchange of all exchangeable things in every corner of the globe. This involves a military, naval, and police power, maintained entirely out of voluntary contributions, and resting, not on the shallow lie of political votes, but upon the practical, competition tested, truth of proved strength of arms; and determined to have fair play all round, and no nonsense and no political humbug anywhere. This is the just Cæsarism of the years to come, when our blatant Democracy shall get its wages.

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